Migration Between the Horn of Africa and Yemen: A Study of Puntland, Djibouti and Yemen by Sturridge, Caitlin et al.
		
	
Migration	Between	the		
Horn	of	Africa	and	Yemen	
A	Study	of	Puntland,	Djibouti	and	Yemen	
	
Submitted	by	staff	of	the	Research	and	Evidence	Facility	
For	the	EU	Trust	Fund	for	Africa	(Horn	of	Africa	Window)	
25	July	2017	
	
	
	
		
The	Research	and	Evidence	Facility	(REF)	Consortium	is	comprised	of:		
	
	
Thornhaugh	St,	Russell	Square	
London	WC1H	0XG,	United	Kingdom	
www.soas.ac.uk	
Team	Leader:	Laura	Hammond	
Communications	Key	Expert:	Idil	Osman	
Eutf-hoa-ref@soas.ac.uk		
	
	
Queen	Elizabeth	House,	Oxford	University		
3	Mansfield	Road	
Oxford	OX1	3TB,	United	Kingdom	
https://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/		
Migration	&	Development			
Key	Expert:	Oliver	Bakewell	
	
	
Nairobi,	Kenya	
www.sahan.global		
Conflict	&	Governance	Key	Expert:		
Vincent	Chordi	
Research	Coordinator:	Caitlin	Sturridge	
	
With	Funding	Provided	by:		
	
	 	
The	EU	Emergency	Trust	 Fund	 for	 the	Horn	of	
Africa	
Development	Cooperation	DG	
Brussels	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Suggested	Citation:		
Research	and	Evidence	Facility	(REF).	July	2017.	‘Migration	between	the	Horn	of	Africa	and	
Yemen:	 A	 Study	 of	 Puntland,	 Djibouti	 and	 Yemen,’	 London	 and	 Nairobi:	 EU	 Trust	
Fund	 for	 Africa	 (Horn	 of	 Africa	 Window)	 Research	 and	 Evidence	 Facility.	
www.soas.ac.uk/hornresearch-ref			
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
		
	
	
	
	
Acknowledgements	
This	report	was	prepared	and	written	by	Caitlin	Sturridge	(lead	author),	Oliver	Bakewell	and	
Laura	Hammond.	The	fieldwork	was	carried	out	by	local	researchers,	Farrah	Hussein,	Hanad	
Mohamed	 (who	 also	 took	 all	 of	 the	 Puntland	 photographs,	 except	 where	 noted),	 Idyle	
Abdourahman	(who	also	took	all	of	the	Djibouti	photographs)	and	Wameedh	Shakir.	Special	
thanks	also	to	Vincent	Chordi	and	Lavender	Mboya	for	their	help,	and	to	the	key	informants	
and	 interviewees	 who	 contributed	 their	 insights	 from	 Puntland,	 Djibouti,	 Yemen,	 Kenya,	
Ethiopia	and	elsewhere.	Finally,	we	would	also	like	to	thank	Virginie	de	Ruyt	and	Fulgencio	
Garrido-Ruiz	from	the	European	Union	Trust	Fund	Development	Cooperation	DG,	together	
with	 the	 EU	 Delegations	 who	 supported	 this	 project.	 Maps	 were	 prepared	 by	 Fit	 Image	
Studios	in	Nairobi,	Kenya.		
	
The	 views	 expressed	 in	 this	 report	 are	 those	 of	 the	 researchers	 and	 do	 not	 indicate	 a	
position	 or	 opinion	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 or	 the	 EU	 Trust	 Fund	 for	 Africa.
 	 1	
	
	
	
Table	of	Contents	
	
Acknowledgements	....................................................................................................................	3	
List	of	Tables,	Figures	and	Images	......................................................................................	3	
Executive	Summary	...........................................................................................................	5	
Key	findings	from	the	Research	..................................................................................................	7	
Trends	in	Migrant	Routes	and	Profiles	..........................................................................................	7	
Factors	that	Drive	and	Shape	Migration	........................................................................................	8	
Smuggling	Activities	.....................................................................................................................	12	
Experiences	and	Outcomes	of	Migration	....................................................................................	13	
1.	Introduction	................................................................................................................	17	
1.1.	Overall	objectives	and	research	questions	.........................................................................	19	
1.2.	Methodology	.....................................................................................................................	20	
1.2.1.	Field	Work	..........................................................................................................................	20	
1.2.2.	Desk	Review	.......................................................................................................................	22	
1.2.3.	Report	Structure	................................................................................................................	23	
1.3.	Challenges	.........................................................................................................................	23	
2.	What	is	Driving	the	Growth	in	Migration	from	the	HoA	to	Yemen	Despite	the	Dangers	of	
the	Journey	and	the	Deteriorating	Security	Situation	in	Yemen?	.....................................	25	
2.1.	Migration	Numbers	and	Trends	.........................................................................................	25	
2.1.1.	Migration	from	the	HoA	to	Yemen	....................................................................................	26	
2.1.2.	Migration	from	Yemen	to	the	HoA	....................................................................................	29	
2.2.	Who	is	migrating?	..............................................................................................................	32	
2.2.1.	Nationality	.........................................................................................................................	32	
2.2.2.	Age	and	Gender	.................................................................................................................	33	
2.2.3.	Socioeconomic	background	...............................................................................................	35	
2.3.	What	routes	are	migrants	taking	and	why?	........................................................................	36	
2.3.1.	Mapping	the	routes	...........................................................................................................	37	
2.3.2.	Who	decides	on	the	route?	...............................................................................................	38	
2.3.3.	What	factors	influence	decisions	about	migration	routes?	...............................................	40	
2.4.	What	is	driving	migration	in	the	region?	............................................................................	47	
2.4.1.	The	chronic	poor	economic,	social,	political	and	security	conditions	...............................	48	
2.4.2.	Underlying	socio-political	structures	.................................................................................	51	
2.4.3.	Deterioration	of	conditions	in	the	region	..........................................................................	55	
3.	To	what	extent	are	smuggling	and	trafficking	networks	involved	in	facilitating	people’s	
movements?	...................................................................................................................	62	
3.1.	How	does	the	trade	in	humans	operate?	...........................................................................	64	
3.2.	Where	do	they	operate?	....................................................................................................	66	
3.2.1	Djibouti	...............................................................................................................................	67	
3.2.2.	Somaliland	and	Puntland	...................................................................................................	68	
3.2.3.	Yemen	................................................................................................................................	70	
3.3.	Who	is	involved?	...............................................................................................................	71	
3.4.	Links	to	other	criminal	activities	........................................................................................	73	
4.	What	is	the	impact	of	these	movements	on	the	lives	of	migrants?	...............................	75	
 	 2	
4.1.	Protection	risks	and	abuse	.................................................................................................	76	
4.2.	Hardship	............................................................................................................................	79	
4.3.	Unfinished	journeys	...........................................................................................................	85	
4.4.	Who	is	most	at	risk?	..........................................................................................................	87	
5.	What	is	the	impact	of	these	movements	on	local	communities	and	wider	society?	......	89	
5.1.	Local	economy	and	labour	market	.....................................................................................	93	
5.2.	Health	...............................................................................................................................	95	
5.3.	Security	.............................................................................................................................	96	
5.4.	Local	values	.......................................................................................................................	97	
6.	What	are	the	existing	policy	and	programme	responses	to	this	migration?	..................	98	
6.1.	State	Response	..................................................................................................................	98	
6.2.	UN	and	NGO	Response	....................................................................................................	103	
6.3.	Migrant	Response	Centres	...............................................................................................	104	
6.4.	Community-level	responses	.............................................................................................	106	
6.5.	Mechanisms	for	coordination	..........................................................................................	107	
7.	What	are	the	Gaps	and	Opportunities	for	Future	Policy	and	Programming?	...............	110	
7.1.	Provide	greater	protection	and	assistance	to	migrants	....................................................	110	
7.2.	Adopt	a	more	holistic	approach	to	smuggling	and	trafficking	...........................................	113	
7.3.	Expand	opportunities	for	regular	migration	.....................................................................	116	
7.4.	Support	local	communities	affected	by	migration	............................................................	117	
7.5.	Improve	data	collection	and	monitoring	..........................................................................	119	
8.	Conclusions	...............................................................................................................	120	
Annex	1:	Overview	of	the	different	respondents	and	groups	engaged	as	part	of	this	research	
through	interviews	or	focus	group	discussions.	......................................................................	124	
Annex	2:	Bibliography	............................................................................................................	126	
Annex	3:	Overview	of	UN	agencies,	international	and	national/local	NGOs	working	with	
migrants	in	the	study	areas.	...................................................................................................	134	
Annex	4:	Overview	of	the	governmental	ministries	and	departments	involved	in	migration	in	
Puntland,	Djibouti	and	Yemen	................................................................................................	144	
Annex	5:	Overview	of	National	and	International	Legislation	Relating	to	Migration	...............	147	
Annex	6:	Glossary	of	Key	Terms	..............................................................................................	149	
Annex	7:	List	of	Acronyms	......................................................................................................	151	
	
	
	 	
 	 3	
List	of	Tables,	Figures	and	Images	
 
Image	1:	Research	locations	in	Puntland,	Djibouti	and	Yemen	..............................................	21	
Table	1:	Breakdown	of	the	numbers	and	categories	of	people	involved	in	interviews	and	
FGDs	as	part	of	this	research.	.................................................................................................	22	
Figure	1:	Percentage	of	migrants	arriving	in	Yemen	via	the	Red	Sea	and	Arabian	Sea	
crossings	between	2008	and	2017	(Data	source:	UNHCR	and	partners)	...............................	26	
Figure	2:	New	arrivals	in	Yemen	from	2006	to	2016	(Data	Source:	UNHCR	and	partners)	....	27	
Figure	3:	Numbers	of	Ethiopian	and	Somali	migrants	arriving	in	Yemen	via	the	Arabian	
Sea/Puntland	in	2016	and	2017	(Data	source:	UNHCR	and	partners).	..................................	29	
Figure	4:	Numbers	of	Ethiopian	and	Somali	migrants	arriving	in	Yemen	via	the	Red	
Sea/Djibouti	in	2016	and	2017	(Data	source:	UNHCR	and	partners).	....................................	29	
Figure	5:	Number	of	migrant	arrivals	from	Yemen	to	Djibouti	and	Somaliland,	Puntland	and	
South	Central	(Data	Source:	UNHCR)	.....................................................................................	31	
Figure	6:	Arrivals	of	Yemeni	migrants	to	Europe	(Source:	Frontex)	........................................	31	
Table	2:	Movements	of	Yemenis,	Somalis,	other	nationalities	and	national	returnees	from	
Yemen	to	Djibouti,	Somalia,	Ethiopia	and	Sudan	(UNHCR,	2016)	..........................................	33	
Figure	7:	Preferred	destinations	for	Yemeni	and	Somali	migrants	within	the	HoA	(UNHCR,	
2016)	......................................................................................................................................	33	
Table	3:	Proportion	of	migrants	registered	at	the	Bossaso	MRC	(January	2015	to	July	2016).
................................................................................................................................................	34	
Image	2:	Regional	map	of	migratory	routes	..........................................................................	37	
Image	3:	Djibouti	map	of	migratory	routes	............................................................................	37	
Image	4:	Puntland	map	of	migratory	routes	..........................................................................	38	
Table	4:	Average	journey	costs	...............................................................................................	41	
Table	5:	Monthly	comparisons	of	Ethiopian	arrivals	in	Yemen	(Data	source:	UNHCR	and	
partners)	.................................................................................................................................	56	
Figure	8:	Arrivals	of	Ethiopian	and	Somali	migrants	to	Europe	(Source:	Frontex)	..................	57	
Figure	9:	Somali	and	Ethiopian	arrivals	in	Yemen	across	the	Arabian	Sea	and	Red	Sea	routes	
(Data	source:	UNHCR	and	partners)	.......................................................................................	61	
Figure	10:	Monthly	trends	in	migrant	deaths	in	the	Gulf	of	Aden	and	Red	Sea	compared	
across	2014,	2015	and	2016.	..................................................................................................	86	
 	 4	
Table	6:	Detail	on	some	of	the	main	organisations	working	with	migrants	across	the	
region.	..................................................................................................................................	134	
Table	7:	Detail	on	some	of	the	organisations	working	with	migrants	in	Puntland	...........	137	
Table	8:	Detail	on	some	of	the	organisations	working	with	migrants	in	Djibouti	.............	140	
Table	9:	Detail	on	some	of	the	organisations	working	with	migrants	in	Yemen	...............	142	
Table	10:	Governmental	ministries	and	departments	involved	in	migration	in	Puntland	 144	
Table	11:	Governmental	ministries	and	departments	involved	in	migration	in	Djibouti	..	146	
Table	12:	Overview	of	national	and	international	legislation	relating	to	migration	........	147	
	
	
	 	
 	 5	
Executive	Summary	
	
This	 report	 on	 migration1	 between	 the	 Horn	 of	 Africa	 and	 Yemen	 was	 produced	 by	 the	
Research	and	Evidence	Facility	(REF)	at	the	request	of	the	European	Union	Emergency	Trust	
Fund	 for	 Africa	 (EUTF).	 The	 project	 involved	 primary	 and	 secondary	 data	 collection	 in	
Puntland,	 Djibouti	 and	 Yemen	 between	 January	 and	 June	 2017.	 The	 objective	 of	 the	
research	 is	to	better	understand	what	 is	driving	the	growth	 in	migration	from	the	Horn	of	
Africa	to	Yemen,	and	the	extent	to	which	smuggling	and	trafficking	networks	are	involved	in	
facilitating	these	movements.	It	also	explores	the	impact	of	these	movements	on	the	lives	of	
migrants,	 the	 local	 communities	 and	wider	 society.	 Finally,	 it	 examines	 the	existing	policy	
and	 programme	 responses	 to	 this	 migration	 in	 order	 to	 identify	 potential	 gaps	 and	
opportunities	for	future	policy	and	programming.		
The	year	on	year	increase	in	migration	between	the	Horn	of	Africa	and	Yemen	has	slowed	
in	 the	 past	 twelve	months.	Migration	 between	 the	 Horn	 of	 Africa	 and	 Yemen	 has	 been	
taking	place	for	many	years	and	involves	a	range	of	migrants,	including	so-called	economic	
migrants,	 refugees,	 asylum	 seekers,	 victims	 of	 trafficking	 and	 unaccompanied	 migrant	
children	from	Ethiopia,	Somalia	and	Yemen	and,	to	a	lesser	extent,	from	other	countries	in	
the	region.	In	this	sense,	this	migration	can	be	described	as	mixed,	both	in	terms	of	who	is	
migrating,	but	also	in	terms	of	their	motivations	and	drivers.	Journeys	between	the	Horn	of	
Africa	 and	 Yemen	 have	 traditionally	 been	 made	 across	 two	 sea	 routes	 whose	 relative	
popularity	has	ebbed	and	flowed	over	time:	the	Red	Sea	via	Djibouti	and	the	Arabian	Sea	via	
Puntland.	UNHCR	and	partners	estimate	that	over	800,000	people	have	made	the	crossing	
to	Yemen	between	January	2006	and	December	2016,	and	data	collected	over	the	last	ten	
years	 shows	 an	 upward	 trajectory	 in	 migration	 along	 this	 route,	 with	 record	 numbers	
arriving	in	2016.	More	recently,	however,	there	is	a	common	perception	that	the	number	of	
Ethiopians	 migrating	 to	 Yemen	 in	 the	 last	 year	 has	 reduced;	 a	 claim	 which	 is	 broadly	
substantiated	by	available	data.	Travelling	in	the	opposite	direction,	UNHCR	estimates	that	
just	under	96,000	people	have	left	Yemen	for	the	HoA	since	the	start	of	the	conflict	in	2015,	
with	most	of	these	movements	occurring	during	the	first	five	months	of	fighting	in	Yemen.		
The	demographics	and	routes	taken	show	significant	changes.	Young	men	primarily	 from	
Ethiopia,	but	also	Somalia,	represent	the	majority	of	those	making	the	crossing	to	Yemen.	
However,	 a	 sizeable	 and	 growing	 number	 of	 female	 migrants	 are	 also	 on	 the	 move,	
estimated	to	be	between	20-30%,	and	attracted	by	the	considerable	demand	for	domestic	
workers	in	the	Gulf	states.	While	some	migrants	stay	in	Yemen,	the	majority	are	hoping	to	
make	 it	 to	 Saudi	 Arabia.	 A	 growing	 minority	 of	 mainly	 Somali	 migrants	 are	 choosing	 to	
migrate	to	Europe	via	Yemen.	This	research	tracked	the	emergence	of	a	new	route	from	the	
Horn	of	Africa	to	Yemen,	back	through	Sudan	and	onward	to	Egypt	and	Libya.	For	those	who	
successfully	reach	Europe,	this	amounts	to	three	dangerous	sea	crossings	in	their	attempts	
to	 reach	 their	 destination.	 Movements	 in	 the	 opposite	 direction,	 towards	 the	 HoA,	 are	
mainly	comprised	of	Yemeni	and	Somali	migrants,	 for	 the	most	part	 towards	Djibouti	and	
Somalia.	Among	 this	 group,	 the	male-female	 and	adult-child	balance	 is	more	evenly	 split,	
and	arrivals	from	Yemen	were	52%	male	and	48%	female,	with	46%	under	18	years	(UNHCR,	
                                                
1	Throughout	this	report,	‘migration’	is	used	to	refer	to	all	kinds	of	movement,	including	voluntary	migration,	
displacement,	 and	mixed	migration.	 The	 report	 does	 not	 aim	 to	 take	 a	 position	 on	whether	 people	 on	 the	
move	are	economic	migrants,	refugees,	or	another	category	of	persons.		
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2016).	Data	on	child	migrants	 is	 limited,	though	key	informants	describe	growing	numbers	
of	children	travelling	along	these	routes,	and	indicate	that	unaccompanied	migrant	children	
could	make	up	as	much	as	20-30%	of	migrant	flows	towards	Yemen.	
As	in	many	contexts,	the	drivers	of	migration	and	displacement	are	multiple,	overlapping	
and	 change	 over	 time.	 Socioeconomic,	 political	 and	 security	 factors	 were	 key	 reasons	
behind	decisions	to	migrate,	although	state	policy,	cultures	of	migration,	 family	and	social	
networks,	and	the	growth	in	the	smuggling	industry	also	play	a	role.	Many	of	these	drivers	
are	 linked	 to	 a	 general	 deterioration	 of	 conditions,	 associated	 with	 conflict	 in	 Yemen,	
political	 unrest	 in	 Ethiopia,	 and	 drought	 in	 the	 region.	 Although,	 it	 is	 worth	 noting	 that,	
while	 these	 developments	 significantly	 impact	 movement	 choices	 and	 patterns,	 those	
affected	by	conflict,	 insecurity	and	drought	may	be	more	likely	to	migrate	 internally,	or	to	
neighbouring	countries	than	to	attempt	sea	crossings	to	and	from	Yemen,	and	beyond.	This	
is	likely	related	to	the	fact	that	these	groups	lack	the	ability	to	finance	sea	crossings	or	long-
distance	movements.		
Despite	 the	 difficulties	 of	 the	 journey,	 most	 people	 do	 not	 regret	 leaving.	 Movements	
between	 the	 Horn	 of	 Africa	 and	 Yemen	 are	 dangerous,	 with	 many	 living	 in	 deplorable	
conditions	 and	 experiencing	 extreme	 suffering	 and	 abuse.	 However,	 in	 spite	 of	 this,	
migrants	 demonstrate	 significant	 resilience	 and	determination	 to	move,	 and	most	 do	 not	
regret	 their	 decision	 to	migrate;	 calling	 into	question	 the	effectiveness	of	 campaigns	 that	
seek	 to	 deter	 movements	 by	 raising	 awareness	 of	 the	 risks,	 dangers	 and	 difficulties.	
Furthermore,	migrants	and	local	communities	suffer	many	of	the	same	hardships.		
Communities	 in	 transit	 and	 destination	 areas	 carry	 much	 of	 the	 cost	 of	 supporting	
migrants	 and	 refugees.	 This	 report	 is	 also	 concerned	 with	 migration’s	 impact	 on	 local	
communities	 and	wider	 society.	 Poverty,	 unemployment,	 vulnerability	 and	 drought	 affect	
both	 groups,	 and	 the	 influx	 of	 large	 numbers	 of	 migrants	 can	 put	 further	 pressure	 on	
already	 overstretched	 social	 services,	 natural	 resources	 and	 livelihoods.	 In	 general,	
however,	 community	 respondents	 voice	mixed	 feelings	 towards	migrants	 and	 recognised	
both	the	challenges	and	opportunities	associated	with	migration.	
A	 range	 of	 programme	 and	 policy	 gaps	 and	 opportunities	 are	 identified.	 A	 range	 of	
governmental,	non-governmental	and	civil	 society	organisations	are	 involved	 in	 responses	
to	migration.	However,	given	the	sheer	scope	and	scale	of	migration,	efforts	have	generally	
been	 undermined	 by	 poor	 coordination,	 limited	 funding	 and	 capacity,	 inconsistencies	 in	
policy	and	practice,	and	difficulties	of	accessing	remote	and	sometimes	dangerous	migration	
locations.	 In	 this	 context,	 five	 main	 gaps	 and	 opportunities	 for	 programme	 and	 policy	
emerged	 from	 stakeholder	 consultations:	 (i)	 greater	 protection	 and	 assistance	 to	 all	
migrants,	 regardless	of	their	status;	 (ii)	adoption	of	a	more	holistic	approach	to	smuggling	
and	 trafficking;	 (iii)	 expansion	 of	 regular	 opportunities	 for	 regular	 migration;	 (iv)	 better	
support	to	local	communities	affected	by	migration;	and	(v)	improvements	in	data	collection	
and	monitoring.		
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Key	findings	from	the	Research	
	
Trends	in	Migrant	Routes	and	Profiles	
	
1. There	 is	 a	 perception	 on	 the	 part	 of	 key	 informants	 and	 local	 communities	 that	
there	has	been	a	reduction	in	migration	to	Yemen	in	the	 last	year.	 In	spite	of	the	
reported	 year-on-year	 increase	 in	 migration	 from	 the	 Horn	 of	 Africa	 to	 Yemen,	
respondents	in	Puntland,	Djibouti	and	Yemen	indicated	that	they	believed	there	had	
been	a	drop	 in	 the	numbers	of	Ethiopian	migrants	passing	along	both	 the	Arabian	
Sea	and	Red	Sea	routes	in	the	past	12	months.	A	number	of	factors	may	be	behind	
such	a	reduction.	These	include:	restrictions	on	movements	of	Ethiopians	under	the	
ongoing	 State	 of	 Emergency	 in	 Ethiopia;	 drought	 and	 its	 erosion	 of	 resilience,	
livelihoods	and	opportunities	for	migration;	an	increase	in	the	costs	of	the	journey	as	
smugglers	 extend	 their	 geographic	 reach	 and	 borders	 become	 harder	 to	 cross;	
worsening	conditions	of	conflict,	insecurity,	hardship	and	abuse	in	Yemen	(although,	
contrastingly,	 this	 can	also	 serve	as	a	pull	 factor	 for	migrants	who	believe	 this	will	
enable	 them	 to	 transit	 Yemen	 undetected);	 and	 tighter	 border	 controls	 by	 transit	
and	destination	countries.	The	perception	that	migrant	numbers	have	fallen	across	
the	 Arabian	 Sea	 (Puntland)	 route	 is	 supported	 by	 data	 collected	 by	 UNHCR	 and	
partners,	which	shows	a	noticeable	decline	 in	arrivals	to	Yemen	across	the	Arabian	
Sea	since	 June	2016.	 In	contrast,	data	shows	 that	arrivals	across	 the	Red	Sea	have	
remained	 fairly	 consistent	 and	 even	 show	 signs	 of	 a	 moderate	 increase	 between	
November	 2016	 and	 March	 2017.	 Although,	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 constrained	
access,	brought	about	by	conflict	and	insecurity	 in	Yemen,	 is	affecting	the	accuracy	
of	 data	 collected	 on	 migrant	 numbers.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 popularity	 of	 these	 two	
routes	 has	 ebbed	 and	 flowed	 over	 time	 and,	 while	 the	 Arabian	 Sea	 remains	
significantly	more	popular	 (attracting	 around	74%	of	migrants	 so	 far	 in	 2017),	 this	
albeit	modest	shift	could	signal	a	resurgence	in	popularity	for	the	Red	Sea	route,	and	
this	trend	should	be	monitored	over	the	coming	months	for	greater	clarity.		
	
2. New	routes	to	Europe	are	being	used.	While	most	migrants	hoping	to	reach	Europe	
continue	to	use	the	so-called	‘western	route’	(through	Ethiopia,	Sudan,	Libya	and/or	
Egypt)	 a	 growing	 minority	 of	 mainly	 Somali	 migrants	 are	 choosing	 to	 migrate	 to	
Europe	via	Yemen.	This	 takes	 them	across	multiple	 sea	crossings	 from	Puntland	 to	
Yemen	then	back	across	the	Red	Sea	to	Sudan	and	overland	to	Libya	or	Egypt,	and	on	
to	 Europe.	 This	 route	 is	 relatively	 new	 (first	 cited	 in	 2015),	 and	 appears	 to	 be	
growing	 in	popularity	with	young	Somali	men	from	relatively	affluent	backgrounds.	
There	are	reports	that	small	numbers	of	Ethiopians	are	also	embarking	on	this	route.	
It	 is	not	yet	clear	why	people	are	migrating	to	Europe	along	this	route,	rather	than	
the	 cheaper	 and	 more	 popular	 alternative	 through	 Ethiopia	 and	 Sudan.	 The	
smuggling	 networks,	 support	 structures,	 and	 information	 and	 knowledge	 that	
facilitate	movements	along	this	route	have	strengthened,	making	 it	easier	to	move	
along	this	route	than	before.	Tempting	‘leave	now-pay	later’	schemes	are	also	being	
offered	to	would-be	migrants	by	smugglers	operating	in	Puntland	to	encourage	them	
to	 migrate	 to	 Europe	 through	 Yemen.	 Furthermore,	 the	 strengthening	 of	 border	
controls	 in	Sudan	and	Ethiopia	(particularly	 in	the	wake	of	the	State	of	Emergency)	
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has	 made	 it	 more	 difficult	 and	 dangerous	 for	 migrants	 to	 transit	 through	 these	
countries.		
	
3. Migration	to	Yemen	is	gendered	but	the	numbers	of	women	using	sea	routes	are	
increasing.	Men,	 typically	 characterised	 by	 respondents	 as	 young,	 single	 and	with	
limited	 education,	 make	 up	 the	 majority	 of	 people	 moving	 towards	 Yemen.	
However,	a	sizeable	and	growing	number	of	female	migrants	are	also	on	the	move,	
estimated	 by	 key	 informants	 to	 be	 between	 20-30%,	 and	 attracted	 by	 the	
considerable	demand	for	domestic	workers	 in	the	Gulf	states.	Crackdowns	by	both	
the	 Ethiopian	 and	 Saudi	 authorities	 have	 limited	 legal	 opportunities	 for	 labour	
migration,	pushing	many	women	to	engage	in	irregular	and	less	visible	movements,	
suggesting	that	the	actual	numbers	of	female	migrants	may	be	larger	than	assumed,	
as	many	move	‘under	the	radar’.	While	male	migrants	continue	to	outnumber	their	
female	 counterparts,	 the	 gap	 is	 therefore	 likely	 to	 be	 narrowing.	 Travelling	 in	 the	
opposite	direction,	from	Yemen	to	the	HoA,	the	male-female	and	adult-child	balance	
appears	 to	be	 fairly	evenly	 split.	Arrivals	 from	Yemen	were	52%	male,	48%	 female	
and	 46%	 are	 under	 18	 years	 (UNHCR,	 2016).	 When	 taken	 together,	 women	 and	
children	make	up	71%	of	arrivals.		
	
4. The	socioeconomic	status	of	different	groups	of	migrants	varies.	Evidence	suggests	
that	Somali	migrants	travelling	through	Yemen	may	be	more	diverse	in	terms	of	their	
socioeconomic	 and	 educational	 background	 than	 their	 Ethiopian	 counterparts.	
Ethiopian	 migrants	 travelling	 to	 Yemen	 are	 typically	 described	 as	 having	 limited	
education	and	 low	economic	 status,	especially	 those	of	Oromo	origin	who	 tend	 to	
come	 from	poorer	 families.	 Low	economic	status	and	extremely	 limited	disposable	
income	explains	why	nearly	all	Ethiopian	migrants	complained	of	the	high	living	costs	
in	Djibouti	and	Bossaso,	and	a	large	number	said	they	had	had	to	borrow	money	in	
order	 to	 pay	 for	 medications,	 food	 and	 rent.	 In	 other	 cases,	 they	 went	 without	
medical	attention,	food	and	other	provisions,	slept	in	open	areas	and	often	resorted	
to	 begging	 due	 to	 a	 lack	 of	 money.	 The	 research	 found	 that	 while	 some	 Somali	
migrants	 come	 from	poor	 families,	 others	 are	 better	 off.	 This	 is	 supported	 by	 the	
growing	number	of	Somalis	choosing	to	migrate	to	Europe;	a	 journey	that	can	cost	
up	to	US$	10,000,	and	which	is	considerably	more	than	the	cost	of	travelling	to	the	
Gulf	States.	The	assumption	that	Somalis	may	be	better	off	than	Ethiopian	migrants	
is	 also	 supported	 by	 differences	 in	 their	 means	 of	 travel	 through	 Djibouti.	 Most	
Ethiopians	make	much	of	 the	 journey	on	 foot,	whereas	 Somali	migrants	 are	more	
likely	 to	 travel	 by	 vehicle,	 perhaps	 due	 to	 greater	 financial	 assets	 and/or	 better	
access	 to	 smuggling	 networks.	 Furthermore,	 traffickers	 have	 been	 known	 to	
particularly	 target	 Somali	 migrants,	 whose	 families	 they	 perceive	 to	 be	 more	
affluent,	and	therefore	more	likely	to	pay	ransoms	for	release.		
	
	
Factors	that	Drive	and	Shape	Migration	
	
5. The	drivers	of	migration	are	varied;	most	people	are	motivated	to	move	by	a	mix	
of	 factors.	 Economic	 issues,	 characterised	by	 a	 lack	 of	 employment	 and	 livelihood	
opportunities,	were	the	main	reasons	cited	by	both	Ethiopian	and	Somali	migrants	
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for	 their	 decision	 to	move	 towards	 Yemen,	 and	on	 to	 Saudi	 Arabia	 and	 Europe.	 A	
shortage	of	 employment	or	 livelihood	opportunities,	 low	 salaries	 and	 land	 scarcity	
(amongst	 Ethiopians	 especially)	 were	 the	 main	 contributing	 factors	 to	 economic	
uncertainty.	Amongst	Ethiopian	respondents,	there	was	also	the	perception	that	the	
best	 jobs	 are	 reserved	 for	 particular	 groups	 of	 people	 or	 elites,	 and	 that	 these	
opportunities	 are	 not	 available	 to	 young	 people	 from	 rural	 backgrounds	 or	
marginalized	groups	such	as	the	Oromo.	 In	addition	to	economic	factors,	Ethiopian	
Oromos	expressed	fear	of	political	persecution	by	the	Government	of	Ethiopia	as	a	
factor	 behind	 their	 decision	 to	 move.	 Many	 migrants	 also	 voiced	 aspirational	 or	
abstract	objectives,	such	as	the	search	for	a	 ‘better	 life’,	which	may,	ultimately,	be	
difficult	to	quantify	and	fulfil.	For	migrants	moving	from	Yemen	to	the	Horn	of	Africa,	
insecurity	brought	 about	by	 conflict	 and	 fighting	was	 the	main	 reason	 for	moving,	
and	all	interviewees	identified	war,	conflict	and	insecurity	as	the	principle	driver	for	
moving.	However,	the	relationship	between	insecurity	and	migration	is	complicated	
by	 insecurity	 in	 multiple	 places	 of	 origin,	 transit	 and	 destination,	 meaning	 that	
migrants	 cannot	 necessarily	 exchange	 a	 place	 of	 insecurity	 for	 one	 of	 security	
through	movement	alone.	What’s	more,	while	 insecurity	may	be	a	push	 factor	 for	
migrants	 looking	 to	 flee	 insecure	 contexts,	 it	 can	also	be	a	pull	 factor	 for	 irregular	
migrants	 looking	 to	 pass	 through	 the	 country	 undetected	 (see	 next	 paragraph	 for	
more	details).		
	
6. Conflict	 in	 Yemen	 has	 had	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 the	 movement	 choices	 and	
patterns	 of	 different	 groups	 of	 people.	 Two	 million	 are	 internally	 displaced	 in	
Yemen	and	over	180,000	have	fled	the	country.	Logically,	places	of	conflict	are	often	
characterised	 by	 increased	 out-migration	 and	 reduced	 in-migration	 as	 people	 look	
for	 greater	 safety	 and	 security	 elsewhere.	 However,	 for	 a	 number	 of	 reasons	
(including	 lack	of	 financial	 resources	and	a	 tolerance	of	hardship	and	 risk)	 this	has	
not	 occurred	 to	 the	 levels	 expected,	 leading	 to	 large	 flows	 of	 people	 travelling	 in	
both	directions,	depending	on	their	circumstances,	hopes	and	expectations.	What	is	
more,	 many	 Ethiopian	 and	 Somali	 migrants	 have	 been	 encouraged	 by	 the	
breakdown	of	state	institutions	in	Yemen	and	subsequent	lack	of	policy	and	control.	
They	 believe	 (or	 are	 led	 to	 believe	 by	 smugglers)	 that	 this	 vacuum	 provides	 an	
opportunity	to	enter,	travel	through	and	exit	the	country	unnoticed.	Smuggling	and	
trafficking	networks	have	also	taken	advantage	of	Yemen’s	deteriorating	situation	to	
establish	profitable	transnational	networks	that	operate	with	relative	impunity	in	the	
country.	
	
7. Political	 unrest	 in	 Ethiopia	 influenced	 migration	 patterns.	 Unrest	 in	 Ethiopia	
following	violent	clashes	between	protestors	and	the	state	in	2016	was	described	by	
many	 respondents	 (both	migrants	 and	 key	 informants)	 as	 a	 significant	 underlying	
factor	 behind	 the	 migration	 choices	 and	 patterns	 of	 many	 Ethiopian	 nationals.	
However,	while	some	interviewees	made	the	link	between	unrest	and	increased	out-
migration,	others	said	they	thought	that	Ethiopia’s	current	State	of	Emergency	had	
contributed	to	falling	rates	of	out-migration.	Available	data	would	appear	to	support	
the	latter	hypothesis,	with	the	number	of	Ethiopian	arrivals	in	Yemen	declining,	from	
a	 high	 of	 12,106	 in	 June	 2016	 to	 4,747	 in	 March	 2017.	 While	 the	 proportion	 of	
Oromos	moving	to	and	through	Yemen	may	have	increased	over	the	last	two	years,	
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the	absolute	numbers	of	Ethiopians	on	these	routes	 in	the	wake	of	political	unrest	
has	 decreased.2	 This	 could	 be	 as	 a	 result	 of	 restrictions	 on	movements	 under	 the	
State	 of	 Emergency,	 or	 due	 to	 policies	 and	 events	 in	 the	 wider	 region	 that	 are	
encouraging	Ethiopians	to	either	stay	put	or	use	alternative	routes.		
	
8. Drought	and	potential	famine	in	the	region	does	not	appear	to	have	contributed	to	
migration	 along	 the	 routes	 in	 question.	 The	 drought	 and	 severe	 food	 shortage	
affecting	 the	 Horn	 of	 Africa	 region	 has	 been	 described	 by	 analysts	 and	
commentators	 as	 a	 major	 driver	 of	 migration	 and	 displacement.	 Some	 migrants	
interviewed	as	part	of	this	research	cited	drought	as	a	reason	for	moving	to	Yemen;	
one	Somali	was	planning	to	travel	to	Saudi	Arabia	to	help	his	 family	after	they	 lost	
their	 animals	 and	 crops	 to	 drought.	 Overall,	 however,	 few	 migrants	 linked	 their	
movement	specifically	to	drought.	This	suggests	that	while	the	drought	may	be	one	
of	a	number	of	reasons	for	migrating	to	Yemen	and	beyond,	it	is	not	necessarily	the	
main	 driver.	 This	 is	 substantiated	 by	 the	 available	 data	 which	 shows	 an	 overall	
downward	trend	in	movements	to	and	from	Yemen	in	recent	months.	Drought	does	
not,	therefore,	appear	to	be	linked	to	a	significant	increase	in	migration	between	the	
Horn	of	Africa	and	Yemen.	This	may	be	because	drought-affected	communities	often	
lack	 the	 resources	 and	 ability	 to	 engage	 in	 long-distance	 migration,	 or	 any	
movement	at	all.	Indeed,	while	people	may	not	be	moving	in	large	numbers	to	and	
from	Yemen,	 this	 does	 not	mean	 that	 drought	 is	 not	 driving	migration	 elsewhere.	
Those	 who	 are	 able	 to	 move	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 migrate	 to	 nearby	 urban	 areas,	
internally	within	their	own	country,	or	to	neighbouring	countries	than	to	attempt	to	
cross	 the	 sea	 to	 Yemen	 and	 beyond.	 Those	 experiencing	 extremely	 depleted	
resilience	and	resources	no	longer	have	the	funds	to	pay	for	their	journey,	and	stay	
put	or	move	shorter	distances	rather	than	leaving	the	region.		
	
9. A	 ‘culture	 of	 migration’	 fuels	 the	 flow	 of	 people	 out	 of	 the	 region.	 Common	
traditions	or	 cultures	of	migration	have	emerged,	which	 shape	migrants’	 decisions	
and	 choices	 about	when,	where	 and	how	 to	move.	 These	 traditions	or	 cultures	of	
migration	 become	 established	 and	 strengthened	 over	 time	 by	 the	 formation	 of	
determined	routes,	recognised	agents	and	diasporic	groups	in	destination	countries.	
When	 asked	why	 they	had	decided	 to	migrate,	 respondents	 indicated	 that	 friends	
and	family	members	had	migrated	before	them,	and	that	this	had	encouraged	them	
to	 follow,	 often	 along	 the	 same	 routes	 and	 using	 the	 same	 brokers	 and	 agents.	
Migrants	 who	 successfully	 reached	 their	 intended	 destination	 seem	 to	 be	
particularly	 influential	 in	 these	 decisions;	 giving	 would-be	 migrants	 advice,	
encouragement	and	even	 financial	 support	 in	order	 to	make	the	 journey.	As	social	
capital	grows	and	gains	momentum,	this	helps	to	perpetuate	the	ongoing	popularity	
of	different	routes	over	time.	For	example,	a	large	number	of	migrants	already	take	
the	 Arabian	 Sea	 route,	 which	 encourages	 others	 to	 follow	 in	 the	 same	 footsteps.	
Information	 about	 the	 route	 becomes	more	widely	 available	 and	 shared,	 ensuring	
that	the	route	is	better	known	and	trusted.		
	
                                                
2	 The	 proportion	 of	 Oromos	 registered	 in	 Yemen	 has	 risen	 significantly	 from	 64%	 in	 2014	 to	 95%	 in	 2016	
(RMMS,	2016)	
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10. Families	can	be	motivations	for	migration	but	they	can	also	help	discourage	young	
people	from	leaving.	The	desire	to	help	families	is	a	factor	behind	many	decisions	to	
migrate:	 to	 diversify	 household	 incomes,	 improve	wellbeing,	 and	 fund	 educational	
opportunities	for	family	members.	However,	 families	can	also	act	as	an	obstacle	to	
migration,	 and	 actively	 work	 to	 deter	 members	 from	moving.	 In	 general,	 families	
expressed	 mixed	 feelings	 towards	 the	 migration	 of	 their	 children,	 in	 spite	 of	 the	
potential	 for	 remittances	 and	 improved	 employment	 and	 educational	 prospects.	
Respondents	 in	 Puntland	 were	 particularly	 concerned	 by	 the	 increase	 in	 young	
Somalis	undertaking	journeys	to	Europe,	with	one	interviewee	stating,	“the	kids	you	
used	to	see	 in	the	neighbourhood	have	all	gone.	 It	 is	 like	the	city	 [Bossaso]	has	no	
young	kids	anymore.”	What	is	more,	while	families	play	a	central	role	in	many	cases	
of	migration	 (providing	 information,	 support	and	 loans),	 there	 is	 growing	evidence	
that	migrants	 are	 choosing	 to	migrate	 independently	 and	without	 the	 approval	 of	
family	 members.	 The	 ‘leave	 now,	 pay	 later’	 scheme	 increasingly	 adopted	 by	
smugglers	to	entice	would-be	migrants	negates	the	need	to	involve	family	members	
in	 the	 decision	 to	migrate,	whilst	 also	 implicating	 them	 later	 on	 in	 the	 associated	
costs.	 Of	 the	 Somali	 migrants	 interviewed	 in	 Puntland,	 none	 had	 informed	 their	
families	of	their	 intention	to	travel	 to	Europe,	but	were	expecting	them	to	pay	the	
costs	 of	 the	 journey	 once	 they	 received	 a	 call	 from	 the	 smugglers	 demanding	
payment.	In	this	scenario,	the	family	may	find	itself	subsequently	involved	in	paying	
for	 a	 journey	 it	 never	 agreed	 to	 or	 even	 knew	 was	 occurring,	 with	 significant	
consequences	for	the	economic	security	of	the	wider	household.	Families	reported	
having	to	sell	assets	or	use	savings	in	order	to	pay	for	their	release.	The	controversial	
‘leave	 now,	 pay	 later’	 arrangement	 is	 most	 common	 amongst	 Somalis,	 and	 may	
explain	 why	 Somali	 families	 in	 Puntland	 and	 Somaliland	 had	 particularly	 negative	
perceptions	of	migration.	
	
11. Decisions	about	which	route	to	take,	where	they	are	possible,	depend	on	a	range	
of	factors	including	cost	and	ease	of	access.	Respondents	frequently	cited	the	lack	
of	 law	 enforcement	 and	 ease	 of	 passage	 through	 Somaliland	 and	 Puntland	 as	 a	
reason	behind	 the	 route’s	popularity	with	migrants	 and	 smugglers	 alike.	 They	also	
suggested	that	local	law	enforcement	officials	there	were	more	open	to	bribes,	and	
that	 detention	 and	 deportations	 were	 therefore	 less	 common	 than	 in	 Djibouti,	
where	 the	 authorities	 and	police	 are	 perceived	 to	 be	much	more	 vigilant	 and	 less	
corruptible.	The	presence	of	‘good’	or	trustworthy	smugglers	along	particular	routes	
may	 also	 increase	 their	 popularity	 among	 migrants,	 who	 believe	 that	 this	 will	
facilitate	 access	 and	 improve	 their	 chances	 of	 reaching	 their	 intended	destination.	
Respondents	 who	 chose	 the	 Arabian	 Sea	 route	 widely	 believed	 that	 smugglers	 in	
Somalia	were	more	trustworthy	than	those	operating	in	Djibouti	and	Yemen.	While	
danger	 and	 risk	 were	 certainly	 taken	 into	 account,	 migrants’	 resilience	 and	
determination	 to	 reach	 their	 intended	 destination	 ‘at	 any	 cost’	meant	 that,	 while	
they	might	make	some	adjustment	to	their	journey,	these	factors	were	generally	not	
enough	to	deter	them	from	continuing	along	their	chosen	route.	Journey	time	was	
least	 likely	 to	 influence	decisions	 about	 routes,	 so	 long	as	 extended	 journey	 times	
did	not	have	a	cost	implication.	Overall,	however,	migrants’	ability	to	decide	on	the	
route	 may	 be	 limited,	 and	 respondents	 in	 Puntland	 consistently	 stated	 that	
smugglers,	not	migrants,	decide	the	final	route.	What	is	more,	as	smugglers’	scope	of	
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geographic	control	expands	to	both	maritime	and	overland	sections	of	the	journey,	
the	decision-making	space	available	to	migrants	is	likely	to	shrink	further	in	favour	of	
the	smugglers.		
	
	
Smuggling	Activities	
	
12. There	has	been	an	expansion	of	smuggling	activities	particularly	over	land	routes.	
A	 combination	 of	 growing	migrant	 numbers,	 substantial	 profits,	 and	 an	 operating	
environment	 of	 relative	 impunity	 has	 led	 to	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 scale	 and	 scope	 of	
smuggling	 activities	 in	 recent	 years	 in	 Puntland,	Djibouti	 and	 Yemen.	 Respondents	
claim	that	smugglers	and	their	brokers	are	well	known	and	easy	to	find,	and	yet	live	
without	interference	from	the	authorities.	 Indeed,	the	research	team	was	provided	
with	 the	 names	 and	 contact	 numbers	 of	 Puntland	 smugglers	 by	 a	 government	
official.	 The	 increase	 in	 scope	 and	 scale	 of	 smuggling	 activities	 is	 most	 clearly	
highlighted	 by	 the	 expansion	 of	 smugglers’	 geographic	 reach	 to	 include	 both	
maritime	and	overland	sections.	While	maritime	 routes	have,	 for	 some	 time,	been	
made	with	the	assistance	of	networks,	the	overland	sections	through	Somalia	were	
typically	made	independently.	Since	2015,	smugglers	have	extended	their	reach	and	
control	 over	 the	 overland	 sections	 through	 a	 network	 of	 operatives	 positioned	 in	
Somaliland	and	Puntland,	 thereby	encouraging	or	coercing	migrants	 to	utilise	 their	
services	 much	 earlier	 in	 their	 journey.	 This	 expansion	 in	 geographic	 control	 has	
further	 reduced	 migrants’	 ability	 to	 choose	 the	 routes	 and	 conditions	 of	 their	
journey,	 increased	 the	 possibilities	 for	 exploitation	 and	 abuse,	 and	 increased	 the	
potential	profits	available	to	the	smugglers.	
	
13. Organised	 crime	 groups	 are	 carrying	 out	 ‘smuggling	 with	 aggravated	
circumstances’.	This	 is	 defined	 as	 practices	 that	 endanger	 the	 life	 or	 safety	 of	 the	
people	 being	 moved,	 as	 well	 as	 inhumane	 or	 degrading	 treatment.	 This	 report	
highlights	numerous	examples	of	abuse,	torture,	degradation,	risk	of	 life	and	death	
of	 migrants	 at	 the	 hands	 of	 smugglers.	 In	 these	 scenarios,	 the	 migrant-smuggler	
relationship	 is	 no	 longer	 based	 on	 the	 definition	 of	 a	 consensual	 transnational	
transaction,	 but	 one	 that	 crosses	 the	 line	 between	 smuggling	 and	 trafficking.	
Sources,	 including	 smugglers	 themselves,	 describe	 a	 deliberate	 shift	 in	 smuggling	
from	 facilitating	 movement	 to	 the	 buying	 and	 selling	 of	 human	 beings.	 In	 this	
context,	migrants	are	 increasingly	coerced	or	 forced	 into	using	smugglers’	services,	
and	report	being	picked	up	or	“captured”	by	smugglers	who	oblige	them	to	pay	for	
their	 services,	 or	 risk	 facing	 detention	 or	 abuse.	 It	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 many	
migrants	don’t	necessarily	want	to	use	smugglers	to	facilitate	their	journey,	as	it	can	
be	more	expensive	and	leave	migrants	with	less	control.	Smugglers’	ability	to	coerce	
migrants	into	using	their	services	is	linked	to	the	relative	impunity	under	which	they	
operate	 and	 the	 irregular	 status	 of	 migrants.	 In	 this	 unequal	 balance	 of	 powers,	
smugglers	 are	 able	 to	 extort	 large	 fees	 to	 cover	 the	 costs	 of	 transport,	 food	 and	
protection,	and	migrants	may	struggle	to	negotiate	on	prices	or	appeal	for	help	from	
the	authorities.		
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14. Smuggling	 activities	 and	 networks	 are	 facilitated	 by	 state	 collusion.	 Numerous	
interviews	 highlighted	 the	 involvement	 of	 government	 officials	 from	 Somalia,	
Djibouti,	Yemen	and	Saudi	Arabia	in	these	networks.	These	include	officials	from	the	
police,	military	and	intelligence	services,	as	well	as	border	guards,	coast	guards	and	
customs	authorities.	Allegations	against	state	actors	range	from	turning	a	blind	eye	
to	 irregular	 migration	 in	 exchange	 for	 bribes,	 to	 active	 involvement	 in	 facilitating	
smuggling	and	trafficking,	and	even	participation	in	trafficking,	abuse	and	torture	of	
victims.	 In	 Puntland,	 for	 example,	 migrant	 respondents	 reported	 widespread	
collusion	 between	 police	 and	 security	 officers	 and	 the	 smuggling	 networks,	
particularly	 in	migration	 ‘hotspots’.	Respondents	 from	the	Ministry	of	Security	and	
the	 police	 themselves	 also	 confirmed	 these	 allegations	 to	 the	 research	 team.	
Interviews	further	indicated	that	the	boats	used	to	transport	migrants	from	Bossaso	
are	 owned	 by	 government	 officials,	 suggesting	 that	 collusion	 is	 also	 taking	 place	
amongst	the	higher	ranks.		
	
15. Migrants	make	distinctions	between	“good	and	bad”	smugglers.	While	the	actions	
of	 traffickers	 can	 in	 no	 way	 be	 justified,	 it	 should	 not	 be	 assumed	 that	 all	 those	
associated	 with	 smuggling	 are	 necessarily	 exploitative	 or	 abusive.	While	 it	 is	 true	
that	a	great	many	smugglers	carry	out	or	threaten	to	carry	out	violent	acts	of	abuse	
on	migrants,	others	may	offer	much	needed	support	and	reportedly	do	not	engage	
in	 abuse	 of	 their	 clients.	 For	 example,	 one	 female	 migrant	 who	 found	 herself	
stranded	without	money	to	pay	for	her	journey	and	at	risk	of	abuse	and	exploitation,	
said	 she	was	 lent	 the	money	 by	 a	 smuggler	 she	 had	met	 on	 the	 Ethiopian-Somali	
border.	 Furthermore,	 for	 Yemeni	 refugees	 and	 Somali	 returnees,	 smugglers	 may	
ultimately	 offer	 a	 vital	 lifeline	 to	 those	 wanting	 to	 flee	 conflict	 and	 instability	 in	
Yemen.	 In	 this	context,	 smugglers	are	not	universally	viewed	 in	a	negative	 light,	 in	
particular	 amongst	 migrants	 and	 local	 communities	 from	 where	 they	 operate.	
Migrants	reported	spending	time	looking	for	‘trustworthy’	or	‘good’	smugglers,	and	
also	 looked	 to	 share	 details	 and	 information	 of	 ‘safe’	 smugglers	 within	 migrant	
networks.	In	Obock	and	certain	neighbourhoods	of	Djibouti	town,	there	is	a	common	
perception	 that	 smugglers	 are	 not	 organised	 criminals	 per	 se,	 but	 normal	 people	
responding	 to	 economic	 opportunities.	 Nevertheless,	 this	 perception	 can	 be	
problematic	 when	 shared	 by	 agents	 of	 the	 law,	 as	 it	 can	 make	 them	 more	
amendable	to	corruption	and	participation.	
	
	
Experiences	and	Outcomes	of	Migration	
	
16. Despite	 enormous	 and	 varied	 challenges,	 most	 migrants	 do	 not	 regret	 their	
decision	 to	 leave	 their	 country.	 Challenges	 suffered	 by	migrants	 typically	 include	
widespread	protection	risks	and	abuse,	as	well	as	general	hardship,	including	a	lack	
of	access	to	food	and	water,	basic	services,	shelter,	livelihoods,	insecurity	and	harsh	
climatic	conditions.	Yemen	is	a	centre	for	much	of	this	abuse,	due	to	a	reduction	in	
in-country	 protection	 and	 assistance,	 and	 a	 general	 breakdown	 in	 law	 and	 order,	
which	 has	 allowed	 smugglers	 and	 traffickers	 to	 operate	with	 impunity.	 In	 spite	 of	
this,	most	migrants	do	not	regret	 their	decision	to	migrate,	and	prefer	 to	continue	
with	their	 journey	rather	than	return	to	their	country	of	origin	no	matter	what	the	
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consequences.	 This	 also	 highlights	 how	movement	 can	 be	 an	 important	means	 of	
protection	for	people	in	contexts	of	conflict,	persecution	and	abuse,	where	they	feel	
they	have	no	choice	but	to	leave	their	place	of	origin	and	move	elsewhere.	Fear	of	
return	can	increase	migrants’	tolerance	of	abuse	and	hardship	along	their	journey,	as	
can	the	risk	of	economic	destitution	that	they	and	their	families	could	face	if	they	are	
not	successful	 in	reaching	their	 intended	destination,	as	many	will	have	sold	assets	
and	 taken	 out	 loans	 in	 order	 to	 pay	 for	 the	 journey.	 Religion	 and	 the	 feeling	 that	
their	 fate	 is	 predetermined	 may	 also	 be	 factors	 behind	 migrants’	 tolerance	 of	
hardship	and	abuse.	A	number	of	migrant	respondents	said	they	felt	their	migration	
decisions	and	consequences	were	out	of	their	control	and	in	the	hands	of	God.	To	a	
certain	 degree,	 such	 sentiments	 remove	 migrants’	 agency,	 and	 make	 them	 more	
likely	to	accept	their	circumstances,	even	if	the	outcome	is	not	positive.	
	
17. Migrants	 are	 aware	 of,	 but	 are	 not	 dissuaded	 by,	 the	 risks	 and	 dangers	 of	
migration.	 The	 known	 risks	 do	 not	 outweigh	 the	 potential	 benefits	 of	 migration.	
While	awareness	may	encourage	migrants	to	adjust	or	reconsider	which	route	they	
take,	 it	 is	not	enough	to	deter	them	from	migrating	 in	the	first	place	or	continuing	
with	 their	 journey.	 Furthermore,	 as	 decisions	 often	 extend	 to	 family	 members,	
friends,	 fellow	migrants,	and	smugglers	and	traffickers,	an	understanding	of	who	 is	
making	 the	 decisions	 around	 these	 questions	 is	 key	 to	 effectively	 formulating	 and	
targeting	 policies	 and	 programmes	 that	 seek	 to	 manage	 irregular	 migration.	 To	
mitigate	against	risk,	it	is	common	for	migrants	to	take	precautionary	steps,	such	as	
arranging	for	family	members	to	set	aside	money	to	pay	ransoms,	or	women	taking	
contraceptives	 to	avoid	pregnancy	 if	 raped.	Young	Somalis	hoping	 to	 reach	Europe	
from	Puntland	not	only	expressed	awareness	of	the	risk	of	kidnap,	abuse	and	torture	
at	the	hands	of	smugglers	once	they	reached	Libya,	they	also	knew	that	the	threat	of	
this	 could	 help	 to	 leverage	 payment	 from	 family	 members.	 Many	 of	 the	 Somalis	
interviewed	were	not	planning	to	tell	 their	 families	of	 their	 intention	to	 leave	and,	
lacking	 the	 funds	 to	 pay	 the	 smugglers	 themselves,	 felt	 sure	 that	 their	 relatives	
would	 feel	compelled	 to	pay	 the	costs	of	 the	 journey	on	 their	behalf,	 for	 fear	 that	
they	might	be	subjected	to	torture	and	abuse	if	they	did	not.	
	
18. Host	 communities	 expressed	 mixed	 feelings	 towards	 migrants.	 Transit	
communities,	such	as	Obock	and	Bossaso,	have	been	impacted	by	the	influx	of	large	
numbers	 of	 migrants	 travelling	 to	 and	 from	 Yemen.	 Complaints	 about	 migrants	
commonly	centred	around	poor	sanitation,	the	spread	of	disease,	competition	over	
jobs,	 cultural	 differences	 and	 inter-ethnic	 clashes	between	migrants.	Nevertheless,	
most	respondents	recognised	that	migration	has	both	positive	and	negative	impacts,	
highlighting	 also	 new	 economic	 opportunities	 associated	 with	 new	 businesses,	
markets	and	skills.	This	somewhat	nuanced	response	can	be	attributed	to	a	number	
of	factors.	Firstly,	migrants	on	their	way	to	Yemen	are	in	transit,	and	most	will	pass	
through	in	a	matter	of	days	or	weeks	(although	refugees	and	returnees	from	Yemen	
are	likely	to	stay	for	longer	periods	of	time).	Secondly,	levels	of	interaction	between	
migrants	and	communities	may	be	limited	by	language	barriers,	camp	residency,	or	
the	 actions	 of	 smugglers	 who	 house	 them	 in	 specific	 neighbourhoods	 and	 place	
limits	on	their	movements	and	interactions.	Thirdly,	different	members	or	groups	of	
the	 community	 are	 impacted	 both	 positively	 and	 negatively,	 and	 to	 greater	 and	
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lesser	 extents,	 depending	 on	 a	 range	 of	 factors,	 including	 levels	 of	 interaction,	
socioeconomic	 status,	 and	 personal	 experience.	 Finally,	 community	 perceptions	 of	
migration	 may	 shift	 over	 time.	 A	 number	 of	 community	 respondents	 in	 Obock	
described	how	migration	has	economically	benefitted	their	community	 in	 the	past,	
but	now	the	situation	 is	no	 longer	sustainable	as	services	and	resources	are	under	
too	much	pressure.	
	
19. Smuggling	 has	 generated	 huge	 profits,	 but	 the	 benefit	 to	 local	 economies	 is	
variable.	 Smuggling	 in	 migrants	 represents	 a	 multi-million-dollar	 industry;	 the	
networks	that	operate	the	Red	Sea	and	Arabian	Sea	maritime	crossings	together	are	
estimated	 to	 earn	 at	 least	 US$	 14.7	 million	 per	 year.3	 Nevertheless,	 those	 who	
benefit	 directly	 or	 indirectly	 from	 this	 industry	 represent	 a	minority	 of	 the	 overall	
population,	 and	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 whether	 the	 wider	 economy	 stands	 to	 gain.	 Most	
community	 respondents	 in	 Puntland	 suggested	 that,	 in	 their	 experience,	 the	
presence	of	migrants	had	little	impact	on	the	local	economy.	It	is	true	that	migrants	
represent	 a	 potential	 market	 for	 local	 businesses,	 however	 the	majority	 are	 poor	
with	 little	 disposable	 income,	 and	 the	 amount	 they	 spend	 in	 transit	 is	 likely	 to	 be	
minimal.	Furthermore,	in	places	like	Bossaso,	smugglers	tend	to	keep	migrants	away	
from	the	 local	community	by	 lodging	them	in	separate	housing	units	and	providing	
their	 own	 food.	Migrants’	 movements	 are	 often	 limited,	 and	 they	 are	 sometimes	
kept	 under	 armed	 guard,	 which	 reduces	 their	 potential	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	
economy.	 Some	 migrants	 boost	 the	 local	 economy	 by	 taking	 up	 employment	 or	
livelihood	opportunities,	or	establishing	their	own	businesses.	The	economic	benefits	
of	working	migrants	has	not	gone	unnoticed	by	governments	in	the	region,	with	the	
Government	 of	 Djibouti	 recently	 moving	 forward	 with	 new	 legislation	 to	 allow	
refugees	 to	 work	 in	 the	 country.	 However,	 their	 impact	 on	 the	 labour	 market	 is	
mixed,	 and	 perceptions	 varied	 depending	 on	 who	 was	 asked	 and	 how	 they	 were	
affected.	 Respondents	 from	 the	 private	 sector	 and	 a	 number	 of	 institutions	
recognised	the	potential	benefits	of	migration	to	the	 labour	market.	They	asserted	
that	 migrants	 bring	 new	 skills	 in	 farming,	 catering	 and	 construction,	 which	 can	
benefit	 local	 businesses	 and	 the	 economy.	 In	 contrast,	 community	 respondents	
tended	to	see	migrants’	contribution	to	 labour	markets	as	 less	positive,	as	 it	had	a	
more	direct	 impact	on	their	own	livelihoods	and	wellbeing,	placed	additional	strain	
on	 already	 high	 levels	 of	 unemployment,	 and	 drove	 down	 local	 wages	 due	 to	
increased	competition.		
	
20. Migrants	are	not	necessarily	associated	with	insecurity.	Given	the	securitisation	of	
migration	 in	 popular	 rhetoric	 and	 discourse,	 it	was	 surprising	 that	 communities	 in	
Puntland	and	Djibouti	did	not	perceive	migrants	as	more	of	a	security	threat.	Most	
local	 respondents	 saw	migrants	 as	 a	 relatively	 peaceful	 group	 that	 did	 not	 pose	 a	
threat	 to	 the	 community.	 Linkages	 between	 migrants	 and	 insecurity	 were	 more	
commonly	 made	 by	 government	 respondents,	 who	 were	 uneasy	 about	 a	 lack	 of	
control	over	who	was	coming	and	going.	Government	respondents	were	particularly	
                                                
3	This	figure	is	a	conservative	estimate	based	on	the	number	of	migrants	moving	along	these	routes	multiplied	
by	 typical	costs	of	 the	sea	crossings.	Sea	crossings	 represent	only	a	small	part	of	 the	total	 journey	revenues	
and	it	is	likely	that	many	more	migrants	are	taking	these	routes	than	suggested	by	official	data,	suggesting	that	
actual	revenue	will	be	significantly	higher	when	overland	routes	are	also	taken	into	consideration.	
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concerned	with	the	growing	presence	of	criminal	groups	involved	in	smuggling	and	
trafficking,	and	their	links	with	an	influx	of	weapons	and	connections	with	extremist	
groups.	 These	 groups	 are	 often	 armed	 and	 dangerous,	 and	 are	 known	 to	 control	
strategic	 areas	 of	 the	 towns	 and	 coastal	 areas.	 In	 these	 scenarios,	 insecurity	 has	
more	to	do	with	the	criminal	networks	than	migrants	themselves.	
	
21. Official	mechanisms	of	assistance,	protection	and	support	provided	by	states,	UN	
agencies	 and	 NGOs	 are	 extremely	 limited	 due	 to	 a	 lack	 of	 funding,	 capacity,	
political	interest,	challenges	of	security	and	access,	and	apprehension	at	the	scope	
and	scale	of	the	issue.	In	this	context,	grassroots	support	can	play	an	important	role	
in	 filling	 vital	 gaps.	While	 pressures	between	 communities	 and	migrants	 exist,	 this	
research	has	identified	a	number	of	cases	where	local	residents	provide	life	changing	
support	 to	 migrants	 in	 danger	 or	 in	 distress.	 Members	 of	 the	 community	 give	
migrants	 food,	 clothes,	 medical	 assistance,	 and	 sometimes	 money.	 Some	
respondents	 also	 reported	 intervening	when	migrants	were	being	harassed	by	 the	
authorities,	helping	migrants	with	translations,	and	guiding	them	to	particular	places	
or	 offices	 where	 they	 could	 access	 support	 and	 assistance.	 Due	 to	 their	 irregular	
status,	migrants	may	be	wary	of	approaching	official	channels	of	support,	for	fear	of	
being	 registered,	 arrested	or	 deported,	 and	may	be	more	 likely	 to	 seek	 assistance	
from	informal	community-based	structures.	What	is	more,	they	may	be	unaware	of	
official	 mechanisms	 for	 support,	 or	 experience	 language	 or	 cultural	 barriers	 in	
accessing	 these.	 In	 this	 context,	policy	and	programmes	should	 seek	 to	 strengthen	
and	 build	 upon	 grassroots	 structures	 of	 support	 through	 funding	 and	 capacity	
building.			
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1.	Introduction	
	
Migration	between	the	HoA	and	Yemen	has	been	taking	place	for	many	years	and	occurs	in	
both	directions.	It	and	involves	a	range	of	migrants,	including	so-called	economic	migrants,	
refugees,	asylum	seekers,	victims	of	trafficking	and	unaccompanied	migrant	children,	from	
Ethiopia,	Somalia	and	Yemen	and,	to	a	lesser	extent,	from	other	countries	in	the	region.	In	
this	sense,	this	migration	can	be	described	as	mixed,	both	in	terms	of	who	is	migrating,	but	
also	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 motivations	 and	 drivers.4	 Furthermore,	 a	 significant,	 if	 unknown	
proportion	of	people	moving	to	and	from	Yemen	have	protection	needs	that	would	classify	
them	as	refugees,	even	if	they	are	not	official	recognised	as	so.		
A	 number	 of	 interesting	 and	 important	 observations	 have	 become	 evident	 from	 regional	
tracking	data.	In	spite	of	ongoing	conflict	in	Yemen,	migrants	continue	to	move	towards	and	
through	 Yemen,	 often	 in	 the	 hope	 of	 securing	 employment	 opportunities	 in	 Saudi	 Arabia	
and	 other	 Gulf	 Cooperation	 Council	 (GCC)	 countries,	 or	 engaging	 in	 onward	migration	 to	
Sudan,	 Libya	 and	 Europe.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	widely	 predicted	 drop	 in	migrants	 along	 this	
route	 (in	 the	 wake	 of	 escalated	 conflict	 in	 Yemen),	 there	 has	 been	 an	 upward	 trend	 in	
migrant	 arrivals	 in	 Yemen,	 with	 a	 record	 high	 of	 117,095	 in	 2016,	 although	 with	 some	
subsequent	slowing	since	then.			
At	 the	same	time,	escalation	of	conflict	 in	Yemen	has	caused	some	people	 (both	Yemenis	
and	people	who	are	originally	from	the	HoA)	to	relocate	to	the	HoA,	in	particular	to	Djibouti,	
Puntland	 and	 Somaliland.	While	much	 of	 this	 report	 focuses	 on	migration	 from	 Puntland	
and	Djibouti	to	Yemen,	it	will	also	take	into	account	the	significant	counter	flow	of	refugees	
and	migrants	from	Yemen	to	the	HoA.	This	counter	flow	is	important	in	understanding	and	
contextualising	the	migration,	conflict	and	instability	dynamics	of	the	wider	region.		
In	this	context,	the	report	examines	who	is	migrating,	with	a	particular	focus	on	nationality,	
gender,	socioeconomic	status	and	age.	It	also	seeks	to	map	out	the	routes	undertaken,	and	
provide	 an	 analysis	 of	 who	 decides	 on	 the	 routes,	 and	 what	 factors	 are	 behind	 these	
decisions.	A	key	question	is:	what	is	driving	migration	between	the	HoA	and	Yemen	despite	
the	dangers	of	the	journey	and	the	deteriorating	security	situation	in	Yemen?	The	causes	of	
movement	are	analysed	through	three	inter-related	components.	The	first	are	the	changing	
economic,	 social,	 political	 and	 security	 conditions,	 which	 may	 have	 a	 direct	 impact	 on	
migrants’	 lives	 and	opportunities.	 It	 is	 assumed	 that	 a	deterioration	 in	 living	 conditions	 is	
likely	to	contribute	to	people’s	incentives	to	move.	Secondly,	while	migrants	may	describe	in	
some	 detail	 the	 rationale	 for	 their	 behaviour,	 their	 range	 of	 choices	 is	 likely	 to	 be	
constrained	 or	 shaped	 by	 socio-political	 structures	 that	 determine	 what	 options	 are	
available	to	them.	These	structures	include	state	policies,	cultures	of	migration,	and	family	
and	social	networks.	Thirdly,	and	adopting	a	forward-looking	lens,	this	section	considers	the	
possible	implications	for	migration	of	a	deterioration	of	conditions	in	the	wider	region,	with	
a	focus	on	conflict	 in	Yemen,	political	uncertainty	and	unrest	 in	Ethiopia,	and	drought	and	
potential	famine	in	the	region.	Understanding	the	balance	of	these	components	in	shaping	
the	flows	of	migration	will	give	guidance	about	the	most	effective	direction	for	programme	
interventions.		
                                                
4	For	an	overview	of	terms	and	their	definitions,	refer	to	Annex	6	for	a	glossary	of	key	terms	used.			
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In	order	to	better	understand	the	drivers,	routes	and	choices	around	migration,	a	section	of	
the	report	is	dedicated	to	smuggling	and	trafficking	networks	that	operate	between	the	HoA	
and	 Yemen.	 Evidence	 suggests	 that	 the	 scale	 and	 scope	 of	 smuggling	 and	 trafficking	
networks	has	increased	in	recent	years,	and	the	report	seeks	a	better	understanding	of	how	
and	where	these	networks	operate,	who	is	 involved	and	their	 linkages	with	other	criminal	
activities.	 A	 key	 theme	 is	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 these	 networks	 are	 involved	 in	 facilitating	
people’s	movements	between	the	HoA	and	Yemen.	If	the	use	of	migration	routes	is	driven	
by	networks	of	smugglers	working	in	collaboration	with	corrupt	officials,	we	may	expect	to	
see	more	 violations	 of	migrants’	 rights	 and	 deteriorating	 quality	 of	 governance,	 including	
officials’	resistance	to	attempts	to	manage	the	migration.	In	contrast,	if	migrants	are	more	
active	in	choosing	the	route,	with	a	clearer	sense	of	what	they	hope	to	achieve	by	using	it,	
we	may	see	them	exercising	more	control	over	the	process.	Here,	the	strongest	resistance	
to	migration	management	may	arise	from	the	migrants	themselves.	
The	research	also	attempts	to	better	understand	migrants’	experiences,	and	to	ascertain	to	
what	extent	 they	are	successful	 in	meeting	their	objectives	 for	moving.	 Journeys	between	
the	 HoA	 and	 Yemen	 are	 often	 characterised	 by	 danger	 and	 risk,	 particularly	 for	
undocumented	and	vulnerable	migrants.	Migrants	frequently	report	incidents	of	abuse	from	
unscrupulous	smugglers	and	traffickers,	state	officials,	criminal	groups,	local	communities	or	
other	migrants.	 They	 also	 experience	 significant	 hardship	 en	 route	 and	on	 arrival	 at	 their	
destination.	Many	complain	of	a	lack	of	access	to	food	and	water,	basic	services,	shelter	and	
livelihoods,	 as	well	 as	 challenges	 of	 security	 and	 climate.	 In	 this	 context,	 this	 report	 also	
explores	which	migrants	are	most	vulnerable	during	the	journey.	It	examines	the	extent	to	
which	migrants	are	aware	of	 the	 risks	 they	may	 face,	either	before	or	during	 their	 travel,	
and	the	implications	of	this	on	their	migration	decisions.		
Some	migrants	move	relatively	quickly	on	to	their	next	transit	destination.	Others	may	stay	
on	for	a	number	of	weeks,	months	and	even	years,	while	they	work	to	save	up	for	the	next	
section	of	their	journey,	wait	for	smugglers	to	organise	the	next	section	of	their	journey,	or	
recover	 from	 illness	 or	 destitution.	 Regardless	 of	 the	 length	 of	 stay,	 the	 impact	 of	 large	
numbers	of	migrants	on	relatively	low	population	and	impoverished	areas	can	be	significant,	
with	the	potential	for	both	positive	and	negative	outcomes	for	local	populations,	authorities	
and	infrastructures.	The	report	examines	the	effect	of	migration	on	local	economies,	labour	
markets,	 health,	 security	 and	 local	 values.	 It	 charts	 the	 sometimes	 complex	 relationship	
between	migrants	 and	host	 communities,	 and	 the	perceptions	held	by	 each	 group	of	 the	
other.	 The	 report	 explores	who	 stands	 to	 gain	 or	 lose	 from	 these	 interactions,	 and	what	
would	be	the	consequence	of	a	reduction	in	migrant	levels.	Particular	emphasis	is	given	to	
Bossaso	 and	 Obock,	 and	 the	 impact	 of	 relatively	 large	 numbers	 of	 migrants	 on	 these	
communities.		
States	 (at	 the	 national,	 regional	 and	 international	 level),	 local	 authorities,	 UN	 agencies,	
donors,	international	and	national	NGOs,	civil	society	and	other	local	organisations	all	have	
a	 role	 to	 play	 in	 addressing	 and	 responding	 to	 migration	 between	 the	 HoA	 and	 Yemen.	
Ongoing	 activities	 generally	 focus	 on	 efforts	 to	 manage	 and	 reduce	 these	 movements	
through	regulations,	border	controls	and	cross-country	agreements.	Additionally,	a	number	
of	projects	and	programmes	seek	to	respond	to	the	humanitarian	and	developmental	needs	
and	challenges	 faced	by	 local	 communities	and	migrants,	 in	particular	 refugees,	 internally	
displaced	persons	(IDPs),	victims	of	trafficking	and	unaccompanied	migrant	children	(UMC).	
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Nevertheless,	it	seems	that	policy	and	programmes	are	not	achieving	their	intended	goals.	
In	 spite	 of	 efforts	 to	 reduce	 and	manage	 irregular	migration,	 and	 counter	 smuggling	 and	
trafficking,	the	networks	facilitating	these	movements	remain	resilient	and	far-reaching	and	
the	 numbers	 continue	 to	 rise.	 Furthermore,	 migrants	 continue	 to	 live	 in	 deplorable	
conditions	during	the	journey	and	upon	arrival	at	their	intended	destination,	suffering	from	
abuse	and	hardship,	illness	and	death.	In	this	context,	it	is	useful	to	consider	the	impact	of	
migration	management	 policy	 on	 the	 individuals	 involved,	 and	 subsequently	 analyse	who	
stands	to	lose	and	gain	from	these	efforts.	A	mapping	of	some	of	the	organisations	working	
with	migrants	 across	 the	 region,	 as	well	 as	 the	 governmental	ministries	 and	departments	
involved	in	migration	in	Puntland,	Djibouti	and	Yemen	can	be	found	in	Annexes	3	and	4.		
The	final	section	of	this	report	builds	on	the	above-mentioned	findings	in	order	to	identify	
gaps	 and	 opportunities	 for	 future	 programming.	 These	 will	 ultimately	 be	 shaped	 by	
underlying	socioeconomic	and	political	structures,	such	as	government	policy,	national	and	
regional	 capacity,	 and	 available	 funding.	 Furthermore,	 given	 the	 transnational	 nature	 of	
migration,	 successful	 interventions	 may	 involve	 multiple	 geographies,	 including	 places	 of	
origin,	 transit	 and	 departure	 and	 a	 range	 of	 actors	 and	 stakeholders	 of	 different	
nationalities.	Five	key	recommendations	on	gaps	and	opportunities	have	been	identified:		
1. Provide	greater	protection	and	assistance	to	migrants;	
2. Adopt	a	more	holistic	approach	to	smuggling	and	trafficking;		
3. Expand	opportunities	for	regular	migration;		
4. Support	local	communities	affected	by	migration;	
5. Improve	data	collection	and	monitoring.	
	
1.1.	Overall	objectives	and	research	questions	
This	 research	 aims	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 identification	 of	 areas	 of	 effective	 policy	
interventions	by	achieving	the	following	objectives:	
	
1. To	provide	a	 rigorous,	 research-based	analysis	 that	 improves	understanding	of	 the	
causes	 and	 consequences	 of	 dangerous	 and	 exploitative	 migration	 between	 the	
Horn	of	Africa	and	Yemen;	
2. To	understand	the	actual	and	potential	role	of	policy	interventions	in	mitigating	the	
impacts	of	this	migration	in	areas	of	origin	and	transit	in	the	Horn	of	Africa.	
	
In	 order	 to	 achieve	 these	 objectives,	 the	 research	 addresses	 the	 following	 core	 research	
questions:		
	
1. What	 is	 driving	 the	 growth	 in	 migration	 from	 the	 HoA	 to	 Yemen	 despite	 the	
dangers	of	the	journey	and	the	deteriorating	security	situation	in	Yemen?	
• Who	is	migrating?		
• Why	are	they	migrating?	What	are	the	main	drivers?	
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• What	 routes	 are	migrants	 taking	 and	who	 is	making	decisions	 about	which	
routes	to	use?	
• What	is	driving	the	increase	in	migrant	numbers	along	these	routes?		
• Are	 migrants	 aware	 of	 the	 risks	 of	 irregular	 migration	 (including	
smuggling/trafficking	 networks)	 and	 the	 dangers	 of	 travelling	 through	
conflict-affected	Yemen?		
	
2. To	 what	 extent	 are	 smuggling	 and	 trafficking	 networks	 involved	 in	 facilitating	
these	movements?	
• How	and	where	do	they	operate?		
• Who	is	 involved	 in	the	smuggling	and	trafficking	 industry,	and	do	they	have	
links	to	other	criminal	activities?		
	
3. What	is	the	impact	of	these	movements	on	the	lives	of	migrants?		
• Are	people	successful	in	achieving	their	objectives	for	migrating?	
• What	difficulties	do	they	encounter?	
• What	are	the	consequences	(financial,	legal,	physical,	etc)	of	migration	along	
these	routes?	
	
4. What	is	the	impact	of	these	movements	on	local	communities	and	wider	society?		
• Do	migrants	have	a	positive	or	a	negative	impact	on	Bossaso	and	Obock?			
• What	 is	 their	 impact	 on	 issues	 such	 as	 employment,	 basic	 services,	 clan	
dynamics,	local	conflict	and	instability,	crime	rates,	etc?		
	
5. What	are	the	existing	policy	and	programme	responses	to	this	migration?		
• What	services	and	support	are	provided	to	vulnerable	migrants	and	victims	of	
trafficking?	
• What	are	 the	perspectives	of	government	bodies	 (at	 the	 local,	 regional	and	
national	level),	and	what	has	been	the	policy	response	to	these	movements?	
• What	 are	 other	 actors	 (civil	 society,	 NGOs,	 UN	 agencies,	 etc)	 doing	 to	
respond	to	this	migration?			
	
6. What	are	the	gaps	and	opportunities	for	future	policy	and	programming?	
	
	
1.2.	Methodology	
1.2.1.	Field	Work	
The	 research	 takes	 a	 comparative	 approach,	 looking	 at	 migration	 through	 the	 two	main	
gateways	 between	 the	 HoA	 and	 Yemen:	 Puntland	 and	 Djibouti.	 Research	 teams	 were	
established	in	Puntland,	Djibouti	and	Yemen,	each	comprising	of	a	Coordinator	and	between	
one	to	three	Field	Investigators.	In	Puntland,	the	researchers	focused	their	work	on	Bossaso,	
Qardo	 and	 Garowe.	 In	 Djibouti,	 the	 focus	 was	 Djibouti	 town	 and	 Obock.	 In	 Yemen,	 the	
teams	 were	 located	 in	 Sana’a,	 Aden,	 and	 Al	 Hodeidah.	 The	 final	 selection	 of	 these	 field	
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locations	was	made	through	consultations	with	the	field	researchers	and	main	stakeholders,	
including	national	government,	UN	and	NGOs,	and	the	EU.			
Image	1:	Research	locations	in	Puntland,	Djibouti	and	Yemen	
	
The	research	teams	carried	out	qualitative	primary	data	collection	through	semi-structured	
interviews,	 key	 informant	 interviews	 and	 focus	 group	 discussions.5	 In	 order	 to	 ensure	
comparability	of	 findings,	 a	 set	of	 common	 research	protocols	was	developed	 for	each	of	
the	following	sets	of	respondents:	
• Somali	and	Ethiopian	migrants	travelling	from	the	HoA	to	Yemen.	
• Somali,	 Ethiopian	and	Yemeni	migrants	and	 refugees	 travelling	 from	Yemen	 to	 the	
HoA.	
• Key	 informants	 from	 institutions,	 including:	 representatives	 of	 local,	 national	 and	
regional	 state	authorities;	UN	agencies,	 local	and	 international	NGOs;	 international	
organisations;	and	donors.			
• Community	key	informants	including:	community	leaders,	activists	and	elders;	police	
and	 security	 personnel;	 café,	 restaurant	 and	 hotel	 owners;	 religious	 leaders;	
teachers	and	doctors;	migrant	and	diaspora	groups;	school	and	university	students;	
traders	and	shop	keepers;	and	private	sector	representatives,	among	others.		
• People	 involved	 in	 smuggling	 and	 trafficking	 networks,	 including:	 agents,	 brokers,	
middlemen,	transporters,	smugglers	and	traffickers.		
                                                
5	 Interviews	 lasted	 an	 average	 of	 one	 hour,	 and	 focus	 group	 discussions	 were	 conducted	 over	 a	 space	 of	
around	three	hours.		
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Focus	group	discussions	(FGDs)	were	also	conducted	in	Puntland	and	Djibouti	with	a	range	
of	 community	members	 from	areas	where	migrants	 settle	or	 transit,	 as	well	 as	 groups	of	
migrants.	On	average,	15	people	participated	in	each	FGD.	The	purpose	of	these	discussions	
was	 to	 collect	 information	 on	 the	 impact	 of	 migration	 on	 local	 communities,	 and	 their	
perception	of	migrants	 and	 their	movements.	 Four	 topics	 for	 the	 focus	 group	discussions	
were	identified:	
	
1. What	changes	have	you	seen	in	the	number	and	profile	of	migrants	passing	through	
your	community?		
2. Who	is	involved	in	organizing	people’s	migration	to/from	Yemen?		
3. What	impact	do	migrants	have	on	the	community?		
4. What	is	the	government	doing	to	support	you	and/or	migrants?	
	
Field	 activities	 were	 conducted	 between	 January	 and	 June	 2017	 in	 Puntland	 (January	 –	
March),	Yemen	(April	–	May)	and	Djibouti	(May	–	June).	In	total,	283	interviews	and	8	focus	
group	discussions	involving	123	people,	were	carried	out	by	the	research	teams	across	the	
three	country	locations.	Ten	interviews	with	Key	Informants	were	also	carried	out	in	Nairobi	
(Kenya)	 and	 Addis	 Ababa	 (Ethiopia).	 This	 brings	 the	 total	 number	 of	 people	 consulted	 as	
part	 of	 this	 study	 to	 416.	 For	 a	 full	 overview	 of	 the	 different	 respondents	 and	 groups	
engaged	 as	 part	 of	 this	 research	 through	 interviews	 or	 focus	 group	 discussions,	 refer	 to	
Annex	1.		
Table	 1:	 Breakdown	 of	 the	 numbers	 and	 categories	 of	 people	 involved	 in	 interviews	 and	
FGDs	as	part	of	this	research.		
Location	 Migrants	
Community	
Key	
Informants	
Institution	
Key	
Informants	
Smugglers	
and	
Traffickers	
FGD	
Participants	 Totals	
Puntland	 60	 20	 16	 4	 63	 163	
Djibouti	 60	 20	 26	 4	 60	 170	
Yemen	 41	 13	 18	 1	 -	 73	
Ethiopia	 -	 -	 4	 -	 -	 4	
Kenya	 -	 -	 4	 -	 -	 4	
Other	 -	 -	 2	 -	 -	 2	
Totals	 161	 53	 70	 9	 123	 416	
	
	
1.2.2.	Desk	Review	
In	 addition	 to	 collecting	 primary	 data,	 the	 research	 team	 carried	 out	 an	 extensive	 desk	
review	 of	 existing	 literature,	 reports	 and	 data	 from	 academics,	 UN	 agencies,	 NGOs,	
government	bodies	and	other	sources,	on	migration	between	the	HoA	and	Yemen.	Findings	
and	data	from	the	desk	review	have	been	incorporated	throughout	the	report	to	enhance	
the	coverage	of	the	final	output,	and	a	full	bibliography	can	be	found	in	Annex	2.	The	desk	
review	was	supplemented	by	a	comprehensive	mapping	exercise	in	order	to	catalogue	the	
relevant	 activities	 and	 programmes	 being	 carried	 out	 by	 governments,	 donors,	 UN	 and	
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other	agencies,	international	NGOs,	local	NGOs	and	civil	society	actors,	details	of	which	can	
be	found	in	Annexes	3,	4	and	5.		
	
1.2.3.	Report	Structure		
The	report	structure	broadly	follows	the	research	questions	outlined	above,	and	is	divided	
into	five	main	sections.		
1. The	first	section	explores	what	 is	driving	the	growth	 in	migration	from	the	Horn	of	
Africa	 (HoA)	 to	 Yemen	 despite	 the	 dangers	 of	 the	 journey	 and	 the	 deteriorating	
security	situation	in	Yemen.		
2. The	second	section	considers	the	extent	to	which	smuggling	and	trafficking	networks	
are	involved	in	facilitating	these	movements.		
3. The	third	section	examines	the	impact	of	these	movements	on	the	lives	of	migrants	
4. The	fourth	section	examines	the	 impact	of	these	movements	on	 local	communities	
and	wider	society.		
5. The	 fifth	 section	 considers	 the	 existing	 policy	 and	 programme	 responses	 to	 this	
migration.		
6. Finally,	 the	 sixth	 identifies	 a	 set	 of	 gaps	 and	 opportunities	 for	 future	 policy	 and	
programming.			
	
1.3.	Challenges	
The	project	faced	a	number	of	challenges,	particularly	with	regards	to	conducting	field	work:	
• Insecurity	 is	 commonplace	 in	 the	 research	 locations,	 in	 particular	 Bossaso	 and	
Yemen,	 where	 indiscriminate	 attacks	 by	 extremist	 groups	 or	 rival	 parties	 was	
routine.	During	the	field	work	in	Bossaso,	there	were	at	least	seven	violent	security	
incidents	between	 January	and	February	2016.	Conducting	 research	 in	Yemen	was	
especially	 dangerous	 for	 the	 researchers	 involved	 and,	 on	 one	 occasion,	 the	 team	
was	caught	up	 in	heavy	crossfire	 in	Aden,	which	 fortunately	 left	no	one	hurt.	As	a	
consequence,	access	and	travel	around	the	country	was	extremely	limited	and	risky.		
• Migration	 remains	 a	 sensitive	 issue,	 and	 securing	 the	 necessary	 government	
approvals	from	relevant	Ministries	and	Departments	was	a	time-consuming	process.	
In	the	case	of	Djibouti,	this	delayed	the	start	of	field	work	by	nearly	six	months,	and	
various	ministries	 at	 all	 levels	needed	 to	be	 involved	 in	 the	process.	 It	 is	not	 clear	
why	 the	 authorities	 postponed	 granting	 their	 approval,	 however	 contacts	 on	 the	
ground	 suggest	 that	 this	 occurs	 fairly	 regularly,	 and	 that	 outright	 rejection	 of	
research	 proposals	 is	 also	 not	 uncommon.	 In	 spite	 of	 the	 delays	 incurred,	 it	 was	
important	for	the	research	team	to	follow	the	necessary	protocol,	in	order	to	ensure	
subsequent	buy-in	and	acknowledgement	of	the	research	findings	by	the	authorities.		
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• Language	 was	 a	 significant	 barrier	 to	 conducting	 the	 research,	 and	 the	 teams	
needed	to	be	constituted	of	people	able	to	communicate	in	Somali,	Amharic,	Oromo,	
Tigrinya,	 Arabic,	 Afar,	 French	 and	 English	 so	 as	 to	 be	 able	 to	 communicate	 with	
migrants,	 host	 communities	 and	 the	 wider	 research	 team.	 Transcripts	 were	 often	
written	 in	 the	 local	 or	 national	 language,	 before	 being	 translated	 into	 English	 for	
analysis	by	the	REF	team.			
• Collecting	 information	 on	 transnational	 journeys	 involving	 multiple	 countries	 of	
origin,	 transit	and	destination	 is	challenging.	The	teams	were	able	 to	carry	out	key	
informant	 interviews	 in	 Ethiopia	 and	 Kenya,	 however	 findings	 would	 have	 been	
further	 enriched	with	 additional	 field	 work	 in	 sending	 and	 receiving	 locations	 like	
Ethiopia,	 Saudi	 Arabia	 and	 Europe.	 Within	 Somalia,	 dedicated	 fieldwork	 in	
Somaliland	 (another	 key	 transit	 location)	 would	 also	 have	 contributed	 some	
additional	and	interesting	insights.6		
• Obtaining	accurate	data	on	migration	between	the	HoA	and	Yemen	is	a	challenge.	
The	most	reliable	and	widely	quoted	data	is	that	collected	by	UNHCR	and	partners,	
much	 of	which	 has	 been	 included	 in	 this	 report.	 However,	 there	 are	 a	 number	 of	
gaps	 associated	 with	 this	 data.	 For	 example,	 the	 figures	 do	 not	 include	migrants,	
refugees	and	asylum	seekers	not	served	by	UNHCR	programmes.	The	patrol	 teams	
do	not	 function	at	night	and	do	not	cover	 the	 full	 length	of	 the	Yemeni	coast,	and	
would	not	therefore	capture	the	many	migrants	who	arrive	outside	of	these	hours	or	
in	unpatrolled	locations.	Many	people	use	the	services	of	smugglers	to	facilitate	their	
journey	 undetected,	 making	 it	 difficult	 for	 monitoring	 groups	 to	 pick	 them	 up.	
Finally,	 in	a	context	of	conflict	and	insecurity,	detailed	and	accurate	data	collection	
and	monitoring	of	the	Yemeni	coast	is	further	complicated.	Data	on	migration	is	also	
collected	 by	 other	 sources	 both	 governmental	 and	 non-governmental;7	 however,	
much	 of	 this	 has	 been	 undermined	 by	 inaccuracies,	 bias	 and	 inconsistencies.	
Furthermore,	 this	 data	 is	 not	 always	 widely	 shared	 or	 coordinated	 and,	 due	 to	
different	 methodologies	 and	 systems,	 cannot	 easily	 be	 used	 to	 make	 national	 or	
regional	 comparisons	 with	 other	 data	 sources.	 Many	 of	 these	 shortfalls	 are	
attributed	 to	 a	 lack	 of	 dedicated	 training,	 capacity,	 funding	 and	 equipment,	 and	 a	
reluctance	 on	 the	 part	 of	 government	 institutions	 to	 share	 sensitive	 or	 restricted	
information.	 Furthermore,	 as	 a	 number	 of	 different	 entities	 are	 simultaneously	
                                                
6	Fieldwork	 in	Somaliland	 is	being	commissioned	 in	 July	2017	and	will	be	appended	to	this	 report	when	 it	 is	
completed.		
7	 In	Puntland,	mixed	migration	data	 is	primarily	collected	by	Department	of	Refugees,	Returnees	and	Mixed	
Migrants,	 which	 sits	 within	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Interior.	 The	 Department	 has	 a	 number	 of	 ‘mixed	 movement	
monitors’	 in	 place	 to	 track	 and	 record	 data	 on	 migrants	 passing	 through	 Puntland,	 and	 releases	 monthly	
reports	 on	 the	 findings.	 The	 Bossaso	MRC	 also	 collects	 data	 on	migrants	 passing	 through	 its	 premises,	 and	
additional	 data	 on	 maritime	 and	 security	 issues	 are	 gathered	 by	 the	 PMPF	 and	 the	 Puntland	 Intelligence	
Agency.	 In	 Djibouti,	 data	 is	 also	 being	 collected	 by	 a	 number	 of	 state	 agencies,	 including	 the	 army,	 the	
gendarmerie,	border	police	and	the	Etat	Majeur.	IOM	Djibouti	has	also	been	active	in	collecting	data.	It	has	a	
database	 of	 around	 6,000	migrants	 interviewed	 since	 2011,7	 and	 has	 recently	 launched	 flow	monitoring	 (a	
component	of	its	Displacement	Tracking	Matrix	(DTM)).7	The	organisation	is	also	working	with	the	University	
of	 Louvain	 in	 Belgium	 to	 understand	which	 institutions	 are	 collecting	 data,	 and	what	 kind	 of	 data	 they	 are	
collecting.	
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collecting	 data,	 a	 formal	 and	 structured	 system	 of	 coordination	 has	 often	 been	
lacking	(RMMS,	2017).		
	
2.	What	 is	Driving	the	Growth	 in	Migration	from	the	HoA	to	Yemen	
Despite	 the	 Dangers	 of	 the	 Journey	 and	 the	 Deteriorating	 Security	
Situation	in	Yemen?	
	
	
2.1.	Migration	Numbers	and	Trends		
	
Migration	 between	 the	 HoA	 and	 Yemen	 has	 been	 taking	 place	 for	 many	 years	 for	 the	
purposes	 of	 trade,	 livelihoods,	 family	 reunification,	 religious	 pilgrimage,	 educational	
opportunities	and	in	times	of	emergency.	Yemen	and	the	HoA	are	separated	by	the	narrow	
strait	of	Bab	al-Mandab,	and	their	close	proximity	has	encouraged	long-standing	migration	
flows	in	both	directions,	as	well	as	deep	political,	economic,	social	and	religious	ties.	A	surge	
in	the	oil	market	in	the	1970s	created	a	demand	for	unskilled	migrant	workers	in	the	Arab	
Peninsula	 from	 the	 HoA	 and	 beyond.	 During	 the	 1990s,	 shortly	 after	 the	 unification	 of	
Yemen	 in	 1991,	 large	 numbers	 of	 Ethiopian	 labour	 migrants	 began	 moving	 to	 Yemen	 in	
search	of	employment	opportunities	(IOM,	2014).	These	were	joined	around	the	same	time	
by	 Somalis	 moving	 to	 Yemen	 as	 refugees	 to	 escape	 war	 and	 a	 deteriorating	 security	
situation	in	Somalia.		
Journeys	between	the	HoA	and	Yemen	have	traditionally	been	made	across	two	sea	routes:	
the	 Red	 Sea	 via	 Djibouti	 and	 the	 Arabian	 Sea	 via	 Puntland.	 The	 popularity	 of	 these	 two	
routes	has	ebbed	and	flowed	over	time,	and	the	possible	reasons	behind	these	changes	will	
be	 explored	 in	more	detail	 in	 Section	 2.3.	 Since	 2014,	 the	Arabian	 Sea	 crossing	 gained	 in	
popularity	to	become	the	preferred	route	for	migration	(see	Figure	1	below).	In	2014,	54%	
of	migrants	arrived	in	Yemen	through	the	Arabian	Sea	route,	a	figure	which	rose	significantly	
to	 85%	 and	 84%	 in	 2015	 and	 2016,	 respectively.	 2017	 figures	 so	 far	 seem	 to	 point	 to	 a	
similar	trend,	though	with	some	reduction	as	74%	of	migrants	arrived	through	the	Arabian	
Sea	route	in	the	months	of	January	to	April.		
In	 order	 to	 understand	 the	 size	 of	 the	 flows	 of	 migrants	 between	 the	 HoA	 and	 Yemen,	
secondary	data	from	UNHCR,	the	Danish	Refugee	Council	(DRC),	Regional	Mixed	Migration	
Secretariat	(RMMS)	and	partners	has	been	included	in	this	report	(for	ease	of	reference,	this	
group	 will	 hitherto	 be	 referred	 to	 as	 UNHCR	 and	 partners	 in	 the	 report).	 UNHCR	 and	
partners	have	been	collecting	data	on	new	arrivals	and	refugee	registrations	in	Yemen	on	a	
daily	basis	since	2006	through	monitoring	patrol	teams	positioned	along	the	coastal	roads	of	
the	 Red	 Sea,	 Gulf	 of	 Aden	 and	 Arabian	 Sea.1	 Due	 to	 issues	 of	 access,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 the	
actual	number	of	recorded	migrants	moving	between	the	HoA	and	Yemen	is	higher	than	the	
available	statistics	suggest.	Indeed,	data	from	other	sources	suggests	this	is	likely	to	be	the	
case.	 For	 example,	 IOM	 respondents	 in	 Djibouti	 claim	 that	 up	 to	 400	 migrants	 transit	
through	the	country	every	day,	amounting	to	146,000	per	year,	which	is	significantly	higher	
than	the	18,457	migrants	recorded	as	arriving	in	Yemen	in	2016.		
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Figure	 1:	 Percentage	 of	 migrants	 arriving	 in	 Yemen	 via	 the	 Red	 Sea	 and	 Arabian	 Sea	
crossings	between	2008	and	2017	(Data	source:	UNHCR	and	partners)	
	
	
2.1.1.	Migration	from	the	HoA	to	Yemen	
While	 the	 number	 of	migrants	 crossing	 from	 the	HoA	 into	 Yemen	has	 fluctuated	 year	 on	
year,	 data	 collected	 by	 UNHCR	 and	 its	 partners	 on	migrant	 arrivals	 in	 Yemen	 since	 2006	
points	to	an	overall	upward	trajectory,	with	a	record	number	of	117,095	arrivals	recorded	in	
2016	(see	Figure	2,	below).	What’s	more,	 it	 is	 likely	that	the	figures	for	2016	under-report	
the	scale	of	movement,	as	there	has	been	a	reduction	in	monitoring	missions	in	the	wake	of	
conflict	 in	 Yemen.	 It	 is	 estimated	 that	 between	 January	 2006	 and	 December	 2016,	 over	
800,000	people	have	made	the	crossing	to	Yemen.	Included	in	the	flows	towards	Yemen	are	
migrants,	 refugees	 and	 asylum	 seekers	 from	 Ethiopia	 and	 Somalia,	 as	 well	 as	 smaller	
numbers	of	Yemeni	returnees,	Eritreans,	Djiboutians	and	Sudanese.		
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Figure	2:	New	arrivals	in	Yemen	from	2006	to	2016	(Data	Source:	UNHCR	and	partners)	
	
Some	migrants,	 in	particular	Somalis,	Yemenis	and	small	numbers	of	Ethiopians,	 intend	to	
remain	 in	 Yemen.	 They	 plan	 to	 seek	 employment	 opportunities	 there	 (for	 example,	 qat	
farming,	 domestic	 or	 low-skilled	work),	 obtain	 refugee	 status,	 or	 return	 to	 lives	 they	 had	
fled	 when	 the	 conflict	 in	 Yemen	 escalated.	 Somalis	 enjoy	 prima	 facie	 refugee	 status	 in	
Yemen	and,	 prior	 to	 the	2015	escalation	of	 conflict	 in	 Yemen,	 244,204	 recognised	 Somali	
refugees	were	residing	in	camps	or	urban	areas	(IOM,	2015).	While	some	migrants	choose	
to	stay	in	Yemen,	others	find	themselves	trapped	there,	either	by	conflict	or	a	lack	of	funds,	
and	unable	to	continue	with	their	journey.		
Indeed,	for	the	majority	of	migrants,	the	intention	is	not	to	stay	in	Yemen,	but	to	continue	
on	 to	 the	 GCC	 states,	 in	 particular	 Saudi	 Arabia.	 This	 is	 the	 most	 popular	 destination	
amongst	 Ethiopians,	 who	 have	 an	 established	 tradition	 of	 taking	 up	 low-skilled	 work	
(typically	 as	 domestic	 and	manual	 labourers).	 The	Government	 of	 Ethiopia	 believes	 there	
are	currently	around	400,000	undocumented	workers	in	Saudi	Arabia	(APA,	2017).	Following	
the	Gulf	Wars,	there	was	a	strategic	shift	to	non-Arab	migrant	labour	workforces	in	the	GCC,	
resulting	 in	 increased	 employment	 from	 Asian	 and	 African	 countries,	 in	 particular	 the	
Philippines,	Indonesia,	Sri	Lanka,	India,	and	Ethiopia	(Fernandez,	2014).	Nearly	all	Ethiopian	
migrants	 interviewed	 as	 part	 of	 this	 research	 expressed	 a	 desire	 to	 reach	 Saudi	 Arabia.	
Likewise,	interviews	conducted	with	Ethiopian	migrants	by	RMMS	found	that	87%	intended	
to	move	on	to	Saudi	Arabia	and	find	work,	8%	were	planning	to	seek	asylum	in	Yemen,	and	
5%	hoped	to	work	in	Yemen	(RMMS,	2016).		
In	spite	of	the	year	on	year	 increase	in	recorded	arrivals	 in	Yemen,	there	was	a	consistent	
perception	 amongst	 many	 Puntland,	 Djibouti	 and	 Yemeni	 key	 informants	 (including	
governmental,	 non-governmental,	 communities	 and	 smugglers)	 that	 the	 numbers	 of	
Ethiopian	migrants	 passing	 along	 the	Arabian	 Sea	 and	Red	 Sea	 routes	has	 reduced	 in	 the	
past	12	months	(leading	up	to	May	2017).8	The	Puntland	Maritime	Police	Forces	(PMPF)	also	
reported	a	reduction	in	the	number	of	boats	departing	for	Yemen.	In	the	case	of	the	Arabian	
                                                
8	This	observation	was	noted	by	Bossaso	offices	of	UNHCR,	DRC,	Puntland	Maritime	Police	Forces	(PMPF),	as	
well	as	a	large	number	of	community	respondents,	such	as	landlords,	restaurant	owners,	and	private	sector.		
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Sea,	this	perception	is	supported	by	the	data,	which	shows	that,	while	2016	may	have	been	
a	record	year,	there	has	been	a	noticeable	decline	in	the	monthly	arrivals	since	June	2016	
(see	Figure	3	below).	When	asked	to	account	for	the	fall	in	migrants,	respondents	typically	
pointed	 to	 greater	 restrictions	 placed	 on	 movement	 by	 the	 Ethiopian	 authorities,	 an	
increase	 in	 the	 costs	 of	 the	 journey,	 and	 tighter	 border	 controls	 by	 Saudi	 Arabia	 (these	
factors	shall	be	explored	in	more	detail	in	Section	2.4.3	below).	However,	it	is	also	possible	
that	constrained	access,	brought	about	by	conflict	and	insecurity	in	Yemen,	is	affecting	the	
accuracy	of	data	on	migrant	numbers	collected	by	monitoring	teams	operating	in	the	area.		
The	 majority	 of	 respondents	 in	 Djibouti	 (mainly	 community	 interviewees)	 also	 reported	
seeing	 a	 decrease	 in	 the	 number	 of	 Ethiopian	migrants	 during	 the	 past	 year	 or	 so,	 often	
attributing	this	fall	to	an	increase	in	border	controls,	checkpoints	and	migrant	and	smuggler	
arrests	by	the	authorities.	Nevertheless,	this	downward	trend	is	not	apparent	from	the	data	
on	Red	Sea	arrivals	from	Djibouti,	where	the	number	of	Somalis	has	remained	more	or	less	
stable,	and	the	number	of	Ethiopians	has	seen	an	increase	since	a	drop	in	November	2016	
(see	 Figure	 4).	 The	 popularity	 of	 these	 two	 routes	 has	 ebbed	 and	 flowed	 over	 time	 and,	
while	 the	 Arabian	 Sea	 remains	 significantly	 more	 popular	 (attracting	 around	 74%	 of	
migrants	so	far	in	2017),	this	modest	shift	could	signal	a	growing	popularity	for	the	Red	Sea	
route.	It	is	also	possible,	and	perhaps	more	likely,	that	constrained	access,	brought	about	by	
conflict	 and	 insecurity	 in	 Yemen,	 is	 affecting	 the	 accuracy	 of	 data	 collected	 on	 migrant	
numbers,	 suggesting	 that	migration	 levels	may	 in	 fact	 be	 continuing	much	 as	 before	 and	
without	 a	 reduction.	 In	 either	 case,	 these	 flows	 should	 be	 monitored	 over	 the	 coming	
months	to	track	any	changes	and	trends.		
In	addition	to	movements	towards	Yemen	and	Saudi	Arabia,	a	growing	minority	of	mainly	
Somali	migrants	choose	to	migrate	to	Europe	via	Yemen.9	This	route	 involves	multiple	sea	
crossings	 from	 Puntland	 to	 Yemen,	 and	 then	 Yemen	 to	 Sudan,	 followed	 by	 overland	
journeys	through	Sudan	and	Libya	or	Egypt,	before	another	sea	crossing	to	Europe.	Evidence	
suggests	that	this	journey	is	most	popular	with	young	Somali	men.	Women	tend	to	migrate	
through	a	more	formal	system	of	agent-facilitated	employment,	and	travel	by	air.	The	route	
to	 Europe	 is	 also	 significantly	 more	 expensive	 than	 the	 route	 to	 Saudi	 Arabia,	 so	 only	
migrants	 with	 sufficient	 resources	 or	 support	 are	 able	 to	 move	 in	 this	 direction.	 Exact	
numbers	 of	 Somalis	moving	 along	 this	 route	 are	 not	 available,	 but	 figures	 are	 unlikely	 to	
match	 those	 taking	 the	more	conventional	and	cheaper	 route	 that	passes	 through	Kenya,	
Ethiopia,	Sudan,	Libya	or	Egypt	and	then	onto	Europe.10	 Indeed,	data	on	arrivals	 in	Yemen	
indicates	a	more	or	 less	 constant	 flow	of	 Somali	 arrivals	 into	Yemen,	which	 suggests	 that	
there	has	not	been	a	radical	uptake	of	this	route	in	recent	months	(see	Figure	3).	
Nevertheless,	 the	 research	 team	was	 able	 to	 interview	 a	 number	 of	 Somalis	 planning	 to	
undertake	 this	 journey,	 and	 Puntland	 respondents	 were	 extremely	 concerned	 by	 the	
increase	 in	 Somalis	moving	 in	 this	 direction.	 According	 to	 one	 interviewee,	 “the	 kids	 you	
used	to	see	 in	 the	neighbourhood	have	all	gone.	 It	 is	 like	 the	city	 [Bossaso]	has	no	young	
kids	anymore.”	Respondents	accused	smugglers	of	actively	encouraging	 this	new	route	by	
allowing	migrants	 to	 leave	 Puntland	without	 having	 to	 pay	 any	 of	 the	 costs	 upfront.	 This	
phenomenon	shall	be	explored	in	more	detail	below.		
                                                
9	This	route	was	highlighted	by	a	number	of	different	respondents	including	those	from	key	governmental	and	
non-governmental	institutions,	as	well	as	community	representatives.		
10	 The	 overland	 route	 through	 Ethiopia	 and	 Sudan	 costs	 around	 US$	 4,000	 to	 6,000,	 which	 is	 substantially	
cheaper	than	the	Yemen	equivalent,	which	costs	between	US$	8,000	to	10,000.	
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Figure	 3:	 Numbers	 of	 Ethiopian	 and	 Somali	 migrants	 arriving	 in	 Yemen	 via	 the	 Arabian	
Sea/Puntland	in	2016	and	2017	(Data	source:	UNHCR	and	partners).		
	
	
Figure	 4:	 Numbers	 of	 Ethiopian	 and	 Somali	 migrants	 arriving	 in	 Yemen	 via	 the	 Red	
Sea/Djibouti	in	2016	and	2017	(Data	source:	UNHCR	and	partners).	
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“In	the	case	of	Somali	youth,	the	smugglers	
lure	them	to	take	the	trip	by	taking	them	to	
Libya	without	paying	any	money	in	
advance.	Later,	they	call	their	family	to	pay	
ransom	to	release	their	kids.	This	has	
happened	a	lot,	and	many	families	suffered	
in	this	process.”	Key	informant,	Qardo.	
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asylum	 seekers	 and	 returnees	 from	 Yemen,	 Somalia	 and	 Ethiopia,	 as	 well	 as	 smaller	
numbers	 of	 Djiboutian	 and	 Sudanese	 returnees	 and	 Eritrean	 refugees.	 UNHCR	 estimates	
that	95,807	people	have	left	Yemen	for	the	HoA	since	the	start	of	the	conflict	 in	Yemen.11	
Most	 of	 these	 movements	 occurred	 during	 the	 five	 months	 immediately	 following	 the	
escalation	of	conflict	 (March	 to	 July	2015),	after	which	 the	scale	of	migration	slowed	 (see	
Figure	5).	In	addition,	the	Yemen	Task	Force	for	Population	Movement	(TFPM)	believes	that	
nearly	2	million	people	are	 internally	displaced	 in	Yemen,	 constituting	around	11%	of	 the	
total	 population	 (Task	 Force	 on	 Population	 Movement,	 2017).	 UNHCR	 and	 humanitarian	
agencies	 are	 concerned	 that	 recent	 military	 escalations	 in	 Taizz	 and	 Al	 Hodeidah	
governorates	 could	 displace	 an	 additional	 100,000	 to	 500,000	 people,	 and	 at	 the	 time	of	
research	 were	 pre-positioning	 humanitarian	 supplies	 and	multi-sector	 service	 hubs	 along	
major	displacement	routes	(UNHCR,	2017).12	
While	most	of	the	displaced	are	likely	to	remain	in	Yemen,	many	choose	to	move	towards	
the	 HoA.	 So	 far,	 the	 majority	 have	 moved	 to	 Djibouti	 (39%)	 and	 Somalia	 (39%),	 with	 a	
smaller	 proportion	 registered	 as	 migrating	 to	 Ethiopia	 (15%)	 and	 Sudan	 (7%).13	 Within	
Somalia,	 UNHCR	 estimates	 that	 most	 migrants	 arrive	 in	 Puntland	 (68%),	 followed	 by	
Somaliland	(31%)	and	South	Central	(1%).	Some	Somali	returnees	may	remain	in	Somaliland	
and	 Puntland	 either	 in	 IDP	 camps	 or	 integrated	 within	 the	 community,	 but	 the	majority	
intend	to	travel	further	south,	possibly	to	their	place	of	origin,	or	to	Mogadishu	where	they	
may	be	able	 to	access	employment	and	more	 support.	According	 to	data	 released	by	 the	
Somalia	Inter-Agency	Task	Force	on	Yemen,	just	over	50%	of	Somali	refugees	and	returnees	
intend	to	travel	to	Mogadishu,	followed	by	Hargeisa,	Kismayo,	Bossaso,	Baidoa,	Marka	and	
Afgoye	 (UNHCR,	 2016).	 It	 is	 also	 worth	 noting	 that	 nearly	 as	 many	 people	 (90,880)	 are	
estimated	 by	 UNHCR	 to	 have	 fled	 to	 the	 GCC,	 namely	 Oman	 (51,000)	 and	 Saudi	 Arabia	
(39,880).		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
                                                
11	UNHCR	began	collecting	this	data	from	1	April	2015,	and	these	figures	were	last	updated	on	30	April	2017	at	
http://data.unhcr.org/yemen/regional.php.		
12	Hadi	 government	 forces	 launched	 ‘Operation	Golden	 Spear’	 in	 January	 2017	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 drive	 back	 al	
Houthi-Saleh	forces	in	Taiz	and	Lahij	governorates.	
13	37,428	people	are	registered	as	arriving	from	Yemen	to	Djibouti;	36,763	to	Somalia;	14,570	to	Ethiopia;	and	
7,046	to	Sudan	(as	of	30	April	2017).	
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Figure	5:	Number	of	migrant	arrivals	from	Yemen	to	Djibouti	and	Somaliland,	Puntland	and	
South	Central	(Data	Source:	UNHCR)		
	
Relatively	 few	 Yemenis	 are	 so	 far	making	 the	 journey	 to	 Europe.	 After	 conflict	 in	 Yemen	
escalated	 in	March	 2015,	 there	was	 a	 small	 peak	 in	 the	 number	 of	 Yemenis	 recorded	 as	
arriving	on	the	borders	of	Europe	(see	Figure	6),	and	several	Yemeni	respondents	indicated	
a	desire	to	travel	to	Europe	if	conditions	allowed.	According	to	data	collected	by	IOM	and	
National	Authorities,	155	Yemenis	were	registered	as	arriving	in	Italy	and	Greece	during	the	
first	half	of	2016	(IOM,	2017).	This	compares	to	3,181	Ethiopians,	6,445	Somalis	and	15,444	
Eritreans	 (IOM,	 2017).	 Wealthier	 Yemenis	 in	 Djibouti	 generally	 move	 to	 Malaysia,	 Saudi	
Arabia,	 Sudan	 and	 India;	 however,	 the	 majority	 of	 Yemenis	 remain	 in	 Yemen	 or	 move	
nearby	 to	 Djibouti	 or	 Somalia,	 due	 to	 a	 lack	 of	 resources	 and	 diasporic	 connections,	 and	
strong	regional	ties	(RMMS,	2016).		
Figure	6:	Arrivals	of	Yemeni	migrants	to	Europe	(Source:	Frontex)	
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2.2.	Who	is	migrating?			
	
2.2.1.	Nationality	
Ethiopians	 and	 Somalis	 represent	 nearly	 all	 of	 the	migrants	moving	 towards	 Yemen,	with	
the	 former	 constituting	 the	 significant	 majority.	 Of	 the	 117,095	 people	 who	 made	 the	
journey	in	2016,	83%	were	Ethiopians,	and	17%	were	Somalis	(UNHCR	and	partners).	Broken	
down	by	 route,	 Ethiopians	made	up	98%	of	 all	migrants	moving	 along	 the	Red	 Sea	 route	
though	 Djibouti,	 and	 80%	 of	 migrants	 along	 the	 Arabian	 Sea	 route	 through	 Puntland.	
Migrants	of	other	nationalities	appear	 in	very	small	numbers	among	the	official	data.	The	
research	team	was	able	to	 interview	a	number	of	Eritrean	migrants	 in	Yemen,	particularly	
around	Sana’a.	It	is	possible	that	Eritreans	are	posing	as	Ethiopian	migrants	when	transiting	
through	Djibouti,	believing	that	they	will	face	less	resistance	from	the	authorities	and	transit	
communities.	This	belief	was	shared	by	a	number	of	local	researchers	interviewed	as	part	of	
this	project,	although	research	did	not	uncover	evidence	in	support	of	this.	This	approach	is	
not	unusual	and,	due	to	shared	language	and	cultural	affinities,	Ethiopians	have	been	known	
to	pose	as	Eritreans	when	migrating	to	Europe,	as	Eritreans	stand	a	better	chance	of	being	
granted	asylum	(TesfaNews,	2015).	If	this	is	true,	it	would	suggest	that	the	actual	numbers	
of	Eritreans	migrating	through	Yemen,	and	possibly	on	to	Europe,	are	greater	than	official	
data	would	suggest.	What’s	more,	the	data	tracks	migrant	arrivals	into	Yemen,	and	does	not	
therefore	include	those	migrants	from	the	HoA	who	fly	directly	to	GCC	countries	or	Europe	
(which	includes	a	much	higher	proportion	of	women,	as	discussed	above).		
According	to	biodata	of	Ethiopian	returnees	assisted	by	IOM,	most	migrants	originated	from	
Oromia	(37%),	Amhara	(33%),	Southern	Nations,	Nationalities,	and	Peoples'	Region	(SNNPR)	
(18%)	 and	 Tigray	 (10%).	 The	 majority	 are	 from	 the	 Oromo	 ethnic	 group.	 Oromos	 are	
Ethiopia’s	 largest	 ethnic	 group,	 and	 it	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 they	 are	 well	 represented	
amongst	migrants.	Nevertheless,	 the	proportion	of	Oromos	 registered	 in	Yemen	has	 risen	
significantly	 from	64%	 in	2014	to	95%	 in	2016	(RMMS,	2016).	The	rise	 in	Oromo	migrants	
has	 been	 widely	 attributed	 to	 political	 unrest	 in	 Ethiopia,	 an	 assumption	 that	 shall	 be	
explored	in	more	detail	in	Section	2.4.3.	Many	respondents	also	reported	seeing	an	increase	
in	 the	 number	 of	 Tigrayans	 and	 Amharas	 moving	 along	 these	 routes.	 Of	 the	 migrants	
continuing	to	Europe	via	Yemen,	most	are	Somalis.	However,	unconfirmed	reports	suggest	
that	 a	 small	 number	 of	 Ethiopians	may	 also	 use	 this	 route.	 Approximately	 80%	of	 Somali	
nationals	travelling	to	Yemen	come	from	the	Banadir,	Shabelle	Hoose,	Shabelle	Dhehe,	Bay	
and	Bari	regions.	About	36%	of	Somali	nationals	came	from	the	Hawiye	clan	with	30%	from	
the	Digil-Mirifle	clan	(RMMS,	2017).	
Moving	in	the	opposite	direction	from	Yemen	to	the	HoA,	Somalis	and	Yemenis	make	up	the	
majority,	constituting	35%	and	30%	of	the	totals	respectively	(see	Table	2,	below).	Many	of	
these	 Somalis	 had	 been	 living	 in	 Yemen	 as	 refugees,	 often	 for	 years.	 At	 the	 end	 of	
November	2016	there	were	278,342	refugees	and	asylum	seekers	in	Yemen,	91%	of	whom	
were	from	Somalia	(RMMS,	2016).		
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Table	 2:	Movements	 of	 Yemenis,	 Somalis,	 other	 nationalities	 and	 national	 returnees	 from	
Yemen	to	Djibouti,	Somalia,	Ethiopia	and	Sudan	(UNHCR,	2016)	
Movements	of/to	 Djibouti	 Somalia	 Ethiopia	 Sudan	 Total	
Yemenis	 19,636	 5,316	 1,475	 1,896	 28,323	
Somalis	 297	 31,129	 2,515	 49	 33,990	
Other	nationalities	 15,531	 318	 171	 1,301	 17,321	
National	returnees	 1,964	 -	 10,409	 3,800	 16,173	
Total	 37,428	 36,736	 14,570	 7,046	 95,807	
	
Figure	 7:	 Preferred	 destinations	 for	 Yemeni	 and	 Somali	migrants	within	 the	HoA	 (UNHCR,	
2016)	
	
	
2.2.2.	Age	and	Gender	
In	terms	of	age	and	gender,	young	men	make	up	the	majority	of	migrants	moving	towards	
Yemen	by	sea.	When	describing	migrants	travelling	along	this	route,	respondents	from	key	
institutions	and	communities	commonly	reported	single	young	males.	Likewise,	the	majority	
of	 migrants	 interviewed	 by	 this	 project	 fit	 this	 profile.	 Data	 on	 the	 number	 of	 women	
migrating	to	Yemen	by	sea	is	 limited,	but	anecdotal	evidence	suggests	that	between	20	to	
30%	 of	 Ethiopian	 migrants	 are	 female.14	 During	 interviews	 and	 FGDs	 in	 Bossaso,	
respondents	reported	an	increase	in	the	number	of	Ethiopian	female	migrants	in	the	past	six	
months.	This	is	substantiated	by	research	from	Ethiopia,	which	shows	that	there	has	been	a	
marked	 increase	 in	 the	 number	 of	 women	 working	 away	 from	 home	 (WIDE,	 2016).	 This	
                                                
14	 This	 estimate	was	 given	during	 interviews	with	 representatives	 from	UNHCR,	DRC,	RMMS,	 IOM	and	 local	
authorities.	
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could	be	attributed	to	changing	cultural	norms,	as	well	as	to	the	2013	ban	by	the	Ethiopian	
government	 on	 mainly	 domestic	 workers	 from	 travelling	 abroad,	 which	 compelled	 more	
women	to	engage	 instead	 in	 irregular	migration	to	the	GCC.	This	suggests	that	while	male	
migrants	 continue	 to	 outnumber	 their	 female	 counterparts,	 the	 proportion	 of	 women	
migrating	 is	 likely	 to	be	growing.	Moreover,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	women	are	migrating	 in	 larger	
numbers	than	is	often	assumed,	as	they	are	often	less	visible	than	their	male	counterparts.	
Saudi	and	Ethiopian	crackdowns	and	travel	bans	on	foreign	domestic	workers	over	the	past	
few	 years	 may	 have	 pushed	 many	 women	 into	 alternative	 routes,	 and	 made	 their	
movements	less	visible.	Sources	in	Djibouti	suggest	that	women	make	up	a	large	percentage	
of	 those	 crossing	 the	 border,	 but	 they	 are	 not	 seen	 at	 the	 points	 where	 people	 seek	
assistance,	 and	are	 instead	moved	 in	 vehicles	between	 smugglers’	 houses	 and	during	 the	
journey	carry	out	domestic	work	in	private	homes,	which	again	limits	their	visibility	in	public	
spaces.	 IOM	Director	 for	East	and	HoA,	 Jeffrey	 Labovitz,	 reported	 that	women	are	 largely	
invisible	because	smugglers	take	them	to	Saudi	Arabia	by	car	to	work	as	domestic	servants	
(Schlein,	 2016).	 On	 the	 whole,	 it	 would	 seem	 that	 female	migrants’	 journeys	 tend	 to	 be	
better	organised	and	financed,	with	better	information	about	how	much	the	full	journey	will	
cost	them,	which	may	allow	them	to	travel	more	surreptitiously	(RMMS,	2015).	It	 is	worth	
noting	 that	 this	does	not	mean	that	women	themselves	are	necessarily	 in	control	of	 their	
journeys.	 In	many	cases,	 they	travel	with	an	escort,	and	have	 little	personal	knowledge	of	
the	 risks,	 logistics	 or	 costs	 of	 the	 journey	 they	 are	 undertaking.	 One	 female	 Ethiopian	
interviewed	 in	 Djibouti	 stated,	 “I	 have	 no	 idea	 what	 routes	 I	 am	 taking,	 and	 I	 take	 no	
decisions.	I	am	just	following	the	group	of	people	I	am	travelling	with,	which	include	two	of	
my	cousins.”		
As	 gender-disaggregated	 data	 is	 limited,	 migrant	 registrations	 recorded	 at	 the	 Migrant	
Response	 Centres	 (MRCs)	 in	 Obock	 and	 Bossaso	 can	 be	 a	 useful	 resource	 in	 monitoring	
gender	 patterns.	 Although,	 as	 most	 migrants	 do	 not	 report	 to	 MRCs	 (for	 fear	 of	 being	
identified	and	deported	by	the	authorities,	or	because	they	are	unaware	of	their	existence)	
it	 is	 possible	 that	 these	 figures	 may	 not	 be	 a	 true	 representation	 of	 the	 distribution	 of	
migrants.	According	to	IOM	figures	from	2016,	88%	of	migrants	evacuated	from	Yemen,	and	
97%	of	migrants	stranded	in	Obock	were	male.	Unaccompanied	migrant	children	(UMC),	for	
the	most	part	male,	also	made	up	a	significant	proportion	of	those	evacuated	from	Yemen	
(18%)	and	those	stranded	 in	Obock	 (26%).	At	 the	Bossaso	MRC,	data	 is	broken	down	 into	
‘Ethiopian	migrants’	and	‘Yemeni	refugees/	Somali	returnees’	(see	Table	3	below).	Amongst	
the	category	of	‘Ethiopian	migrants’	travelling	to	Yemen,	85%	were	male,	and	there	were	no	
children	under	18	years	registered	at	the	MRC.		
Table	3:	Proportion	of	migrants	registered	at	the	Bossaso	MRC	(January	2015	to	July	2016).15	
Year	 2015	 2016	
Gender	 Male	 Female	 Children	 Male	 Female	 Children	
Ethiopian	Migrants	 85%	 15%	 0%	 72%	 28%	 0%	
Yemeni	 Refugees/	
Somali	returnees	 22%	 29%	 38%	 47%	 28%	 25%	
	
                                                
15	These	figures	were	shared	with	the	research	team	by	the	Director	of	the	MRC	in	Bossaso.	
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Travelling	 in	 the	 opposite	 direction,	 the	 data	 on	 ‘Yemeni	 refugees/Somali	 returnees’	
highlights	a	very	different	gender	profiling	(see	Table	3).	The	male-female	balance	is	more	
equal,	and	children	represent	a	much	larger	proportion	of	the	numbers;	over	a	third	in	2015	
and	 a	 quarter	 in	 2016.	 Inter-agency	 data	 collected	 by	 the	 Somalia	 Task	 Force	 on	 Yemen	
estimates	the	gender	breakdown	of	arrivals	from	Yemen	as	52%	male,	48%	female	(UNHCR,	
2016).	In	terms	of	age,	46%	are	under	18	years,	51%	under	60	years,	and	3%	over	the	age	of	
60.	When	taken	together,	women	and	children	make	up	71%	of	arrivals.	This	is	corroborated	
by	 2016	 figures	 on	 arrivals	 from	 Yemen	 to	 Somaliland	 and	 Puntland	 collected	 by	 the	
Ministry	of	 Interior;	of	 the	3,378	recorded	arrivals,	39%	were	children,	35%	men	and	26%	
women.	 It	 is	 not	 unusual	 for	women	 and	 children	 to	make	up	 a	 significant	 proportion	 of	
displaced	migrants	who,	for	the	most	part,	are	fleeing	conflict	in	Yemen.	Nevertheless,	the	
figures	serve	as	a	reminder	that	not	all	people	moving	along	these	routes	are	young	male	
economic	migrants,	as	is	often	described	in	much	of	the	literature,	and	that	programme	and	
policy	should	be	developed	with	adequate	consideration	of	these	groups.		
Whilst	 some	 data	 is	 available	 on	 child	 refugees	 and	 returnees	 arriving	 in	 the	 HoA	 from	
Yemen,	information	on	the	numbers	of	children	and	youth	migrating	towards	Yemen	is	less	
clear.	The	2015	Trafficking	in	Persons	(TIP)	report	estimates	that	20%	of	the	91,000	migrants	
who	 arrived	 in	 Yemen	 in	 2014	 were	 unaccompanied	 children	 (US	 Department	 of	 State,	
2015),	 a	 statistic	 shared	 by	 IOM.	 This	 figure	 does	 not	 include	 accompanied	 children	 but,	
based	 on	 updated	 arrival	 figures,	 would	 suggest	 that	 23,419	 unaccompanied	 children	
entered	Yemen	in	2016,	and	4,339	in	the	first	five	months	of	2017.16	Based	on	these	figures,	
the	route	via	Yemen	is	seeing	more	unaccompanied	children	than	any	other	route	out	of	the	
HoA	(RMMS,	2016).	While	this	project	was	not	able	to	 interview	any	child	migrants,	these	
figures	 are	 backed	 up	 by	 interviews	with	 key	 informants	working	with	UMCs,	 particularly	
those	 interviewed	 in	 Djibouti.	 IOM	 staff	 in	 Djibouti	 suggested	 that	 as	 many	 as	 30%	 of	
migrants	are	UMCs.	A	large	number	of	child	migrants,	particularly	Ethiopians,	intend	to	stay	
in	 the	 Djiboutian	 capital.	 Of	 the	 154	 children	 receiving	 support	 from	 Caritas,	 nearly	 all	
reportedly	wanted	to	stay	in	the	city,	and	were	not	planning	to	move	elsewhere.	In	terms	of	
children’s	nationalities,	local	organisations	working	with	street	children	in	Djibouti	reported	
to	 the	 researchers	 that	 60%	 are	 Ethiopian,	 20%	 are	 Somalis,	 and	 the	 remaining	 20%	 are	
Djiboutian	nationals,	while	 IOM	staff	 estimated	 that	 95%	of	UMCs	were	Ethiopians.	 Local	
NGOs	 interviewed	 in	 Yemen	 also	 expressed	 concern	 about	 the	 increasingly	 young	 age	 of	
children	moving	along	these	routes,	with	many	aged	between	12	and	17	years.		
	
2.2.3.	Socioeconomic	background	
Ethiopian	migrants	 travelling	 to	 Yemen	 are	 typically	 described	 by	 interviewees	 as	 having	
limited	education	and	 low	economic	status,	especially	 those	of	Oromo	origin	who	tend	to	
come	from	poor	families.	Most	are	primary	or	secondary	school	drop	outs,	although	a	few	
have	 university	 degrees.	 Of	 those	 interviewed	 44%	 had	 primary	 education,	 14%	 had	
secondary,	 1%	 had	 tertiary	 education,	 and	 39%	 had	 no	 education	 at	 all.	 	 Nearly	 all	 the	
Ethiopian	 migrants	 interviewed	 complained	 of	 the	 high	 costs	 of	 living	 in	 Djibouti	 and	
Bossaso,	and	56%	of	Ethiopian	respondents	in	Puntland	had	had	to	borrow	money	in	order	
to	 pay	 for	 medications,	 food	 and	 rent.	 In	 other	 cases,	 migrants	 went	 without	 medical	
                                                
16	Between	January	and	May	2017.		
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attention,	food	and	other	provisions,	slept	in	open	areas	and	often	resorted	to	begging	due	
to	 a	 lack	 of	 money.	 These	 examples	 suggest	 that	 most	 Ethiopian	 migrants	 come	 from	
relatively	poor	backgrounds	with	little	disposable	income.		
Evidence	suggests	 that	Somali	migrants	 travelling	 through	Yemen	may	be	more	diverse	 in	
terms	of	 their	 socioeconomic	and	educational	background.	The	 research	 found	 that	while	
some	 Somali	 migrants	 come	 from	 poor	 families,	 others	 are	 relatively	 better	 off.	 This	 is	
supported	by	the	growing	popularity	amongst	young	Somalis	to	migrate	to	Europe	through	
Yemen;	a	 journey	 that	can	cost	up	 to	US$	10,000;	considerably	more	 than	the	alternative	
cost	(on	average	USS	800	to	US$	900)of	travelling	to	the	GCC.	The	assumption	that	Somalis	
may	be	better	off	than	their	Ethiopian	counterparts	is	also	supported	by	differences	in	their	
means	 of	 travel	 through	 Djibouti.	 Most	 Ethiopians	 make	 much	 of	 the	 journey	 on	 foot,	
whereas	 Somalis	 migrants	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 travel	 by	 vehicle,	 perhaps	 due	 to	 greater	
financial	assets,	or	better	access	to	smuggling	networks.		The	educational	status	of	Somalis	
also	tends	to	be	more	mixed	than	Ethiopians.	According	to	one	of	the	international	NGOs	in	
Bossaso,	Somali	migrants	travelling	to	Yemen	and	beyond	may	have	no	education,	or	they	
may	be	educated	up	to	secondary	and	tertiary	level.		
Migrating	 in	 the	opposite	direction,	 from	Yemen	to	 the	HoA,	Yemeni	 refugees	and	Somali	
returnees	typically	come	from	a	range	of	socioeconomic	backgrounds.	This	is	because	their	
reason	for	moving	is	principally	due	to	conflict	(rather	than	economic	circumstances),	which	
indiscriminately	affects	a	wide	section	of	the	population.	While	migration	between	the	HoA	
and	Yemen	is	generally	seen	as	cheaper	than	alternative	routes	going	to	Europe	or	heading	
south,	it	is	worth	noting	that	movement	still	comes	at	a	cost,	and	only	those	with	a	certain	
amount	of	 financial	or	 social	 capital	will	be	able	 to	move	across	borders,	 if	 at	all.	 Yemeni	
refugees	 interviewed	 in	Djibouti	 generally	had	assets	 to	 sell,	 and	describe	 selling	off	 their	
property,	 gold	 and	 other	 goods	 in	 order	 to	 pay	 for	 the	 journey	 to	 Djibouti.	 In	 contrast,	
poorer	segments	of	Yemeni	society	may	not	have	valuable	assets	to	sell,	and	are	therefore	
more	 likely	to	move	internally	within	the	country	to	neighbouring	governorates,	or	not	be	
able	to	move	at	all.		
	
2.3.	What	routes	are	migrants	taking	and	why?		
This	 section	 examines	 migrants’	 routes	 to	 and	 from	 the	 HoA	 and	 Yemen.	 As	 has	 been	
described	above,	the	Red	Sea	and	Arabian	Sea	crossings	are	the	two	main	connecting	routes	
between	the	HoA	and	Yemen,	and	their	popularity	has	oscillated	over	time.	This	section	will	
begin	 by	 providing	 a	 detailed	mapping	 of	 the	 routes	 that	migrants	 take.	While	migrants’	
journeys	typically	follow	these	traditional	crossing	points,	their	specific	paths	and	intended	
destinations	vary	depending	on	their	choices	and	circumstances.	As	well	as	identifying	and	
mapping	 the	 specific	 routes,	 the	 section	 also	 seeks	 to	 understand	 why	 and	 how	 and	 by	
whom	 decisions	 are	 taken	 about	which	 route	 to	 use.	 In	 order	 to	 better	 understand	why	
some	 routes	 are	 more	 popular	 than	 others,	 it	 also	 considers	 how	 factors,	 such	 as	 state	
policy,	associated	risks	and	dangers,	access,	costs	and	journey	time,	influence	the	popularity	
of	different	routes	amongst	migrants	and	those	who	facilitate	their	journeys.		
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2.3.1.	Mapping	the	routes	
	
Image	2:	Regional	map	of	migratory	routes	
	
Image	3:	Djibouti	map	of	migratory	routes	
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Image	4:	Puntland	map	of	migratory	routes	
	
	
2.3.2.	Who	decides	on	the	route?		
In	 seeking	 answers	 to	 this	 question,	 there	 are	 a	 number	 of	 decisions	 to	 consider:	 the	
decision	to	migrate	in	the	first	place,	as	well	as	decisions	about	which	route	to	use,	how	long	
the	journey	will	take,	and	the	final	destination.	Those	involved	in	these	decisions	include	the	
migrants	 themselves,	 family	 members,	 friends	 and	 fellow	 migrants,	 and	 smugglers	 and	
traffickers.	An	understanding	of	who	is	making	the	decisions	around	these	questions	is	key	
to	 effectively	 formulating	 and	 targeting	 policies	 and	 programmes	 that	 seek	 to	 manage	
irregular	 migration.	 For	 example,	 awareness	 campaigns	 that	 target	 migrants	 may	 have	 a	
limited	impact	in	cases	where	decisions	around	migration	are	taken	by	family	members	or	
smugglers.	Likewise,	policies	that	focus	on	migrants	through	arrest	and	detention	do	little	to	
deter	the	activities	of	smugglers	and	traffickers	who,	in	many	cases,	are	central	to	decision	
making	about	how	and	where	to	migrate.			
The	ability	to	decide	often	depends	on	who	is	holding	the	 information	about	the	different	
routes.	 In	 some	 cases,	migrant	 respondents	 report	 having	 information	 about	 the	 journey	
beforehand	 through	 friends,	 family	 and	 other	 contacts.	 In	 other	 cases,	 they	 pick	 up	
information	as	they	go	along	from	other	migrants	embarking	on	the	same	journey,	or	from	
smugglers.	 Other	 research	 along	 these	 routes	 found	 that	 most	 migrants	 (49%)	 obtained	
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information	 from	 family	 and	 friends,	 18%	 of	migrants	 were	 informed	 by	 smugglers;	 17%	
gathered	information	from	returnee	migrants	and	16%	relied	on	migrants	in	the	destination	
country	 (Altai	 Consulting,	 2016).	 However,	 in	 many	 cases,	 migrants	 reported	 having	 no	
information	 about	 the	 route	 at	 all,	 particularly	 once	 they	 crossed	 into	 Yemen.	 In	 these	
cases,	migrants	had	little	decision	making	power	about	the	routes,	and	admitted	having	to	
rely	completely	on	other	migrants	or	smugglers.		
It	 is	also	worth	noting	that	 ‘who	decides’	may	shift	and	change	over	 time.	When	deciding	
which	routes	to	take,	the	power	to	decide	may	alternate	between	the	different	actors	along	
the	 journey.	 At	 the	 start	 of	 their	 journey,	migrants	 interviewed	by	 this	 project	 tended	 to	
make	 their	 own	 decisions	 about	 the	 route	 to	 take,	 as	 they	 are	 often	 travelling	 regularly	
through	 their	 own	 country	 as	 nationals	 and	 do	 not	 need	 to	 employ	 the	 services	 of	
smugglers.	 For	 example,	 most	 Somali	 migrants	 travelled	 independently	 through	 Somalia,	
following	 the	main	 road	 north	 to	 Bossaso,	 and	 only	 employed	 the	 services	 of	 smugglers	
once	they	needed	to	cross	the	sea	and	transit	through	Yemen.	Under	this	scenario,	migrant	
interviewees	 travelled	using	 their	own	means	and	arrangements,	and	were	more	 likely	 to	
make	 their	 own	 decisions.	 The	 same	 can	 be	 said	 for	 Ethiopian	migrants	 travelling	 to	 the	
Ethiopian	border,	although	in	the	context	of	the	State	of	Emergency	in	Ethiopia,	movements	
of	all	nationalities,	including	Ethiopians,	have	been	constrained.		
Once	 migrants	 cross	 the	 border	 out	 of	 their	
country	of	origin,	their	ability	to	decide	on	their	
route	may	weaken	 in	 favour	of	 the	smugglers.	
When	 Ethiopians	 cross	 into	 Somalia,	 it	
becomes	more	 likely	 that	 they	will	 engage,	 or	
be	 coerced	 into	 engaging,	 the	 services	 of	
smugglers.	In	Somaliland	(for	migrants	on	their	way	to	Puntland’s	Bossaso	port,	as	well	as	to	
smaller	ports),	 this	process	 tends	 to	occur	 in	migration	 ‘hotspots’	 such	as	Tog	Wajaale	or	
Guumays,	 where	 agents	 linked	 to	 the	 networks	 are	most	 active.	When	making	maritime	
crossings,	migrants	nearly	always	rely	on	smugglers	to	arrange	the	journey	as	they	require	
boats,	 crew	 and	 knowledge	 of	 the	 crossing.	 Once	 they	 engage	 the	 services	 of	 smuggling	
networks,	 migrants	 describe	 having	 little	 choice	 or	 information	 about	 their	 route.	 Their	
freedom	of	movement	is	limited,	and	they	are	transferred	from	one	staging	post	to	another	
with	little	 idea	of	where	they	are,	which	route	they	will	take,	or	how	long	the	journey	will	
last.	According	to	one	respondent,	once	under	the	control	of	smugglers,	migrants	have	little	
or	no	choice	about	the	route,	the	means	of	travel,	or	the	points	of	departure	–	“they	have	
very	 little	 say	 in	 the	whole	matter”.	 Indeed,	when	asked	why	migrants	 chose	a	particular	
route,	 respondents	 in	 Puntland	 consistently	 reported	 that	 it	 is	 the	 smugglers,	 not	 the	
migrants	who	choose	the	final	route.		
Finally,	migrants’	ability	to	actively	decide	may	be	stripped	away	in	contexts	of	conflict	and	
instability,	where	they	may	feel	that	they	have	little	choice	but	to	move	elsewhere	in	search	
of	 safety.	 Yemeni	 refugees	 and	 Somali	 returnees	 fleeing	 violence	 and	 conflict	 in	 Yemen	
faced	 a	more	 limited	 range	 of	 options	 than	 economic	migrants	 looking	 to	 improve	 their	
living	standards.	Likewise,	Ethiopian	Oromo	respondents	fleeing	state	persecution	often	felt	
that	the	only	choice	available	to	them	was	to	move	to	avoid	detention	and	abuse.	
“The	migrants	don’t	have	a	choice,	the	
trafficking	groups	decide.”	MRC,	Bossaso.	
	
“All	roads	are	chosen	by	smugglers,	we	
just	have	to	follow	them.”	Migrant,	Obock	
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Overall,	 therefore,	 there	 is	no	definitive	answer	 to	 the	question	of	who	decides.	Decision	
making	 about	 migration	 generally	 involves	 a	 range	 of	 people	 whose	 influence	 ebbs	 and	
flows	over	 time,	depending	on	 the	 information	 they	have,	 the	 stage	of	 their	 journey,	 the	
involvement	of	smugglers	and	traffickers,	and	their	reasons	for	migrating	in	the	first	place.		
	
2.3.3.	What	factors	influence	decisions	about	migration	routes?		
A	 range	 of	 factors	 influence	 decisions	 about	 migration	 routes.	 This	 section	 examines	 a	
number	of	potential	determinants,	including	cost,	access,	danger	and	risk,	and	journey	time;	
however,	there	are	likely	to	be	many	additional	factors	behind	decisions	about	which	route	
to	 take.	 Cultures	 of	 migration,	 and	 family	 and	 social	 networks	 also	 play	 a	 role,	 and	 are	
explored	 in	more	detail	 in	Section	2.4.2.	Given	that	migrants’	choice	of	 route	 is	 limited	to	
the	 Red	 Sea	 or	 Arabian	 Sea	 crossings,	 the	 relevance	 of	 these	 factors	 is	 tested,	 where	
possible,	 against	 decision	making	 and	 the	 trends	 in	 popularity	 along	 these	 two	 different	
routes.	
The	relative	weight	of	these	factors	depends	on	the	decision	maker	and	his	or	her	individual	
context	 and	 circumstances.	 While	 migrant	 respondents	 often	 voiced	 similar	 rationales	
behind	their	decision	making,	the	prevailing	factors	often	varied	depending	on	issues	such	
as	 age,	 gender	 and	 socioeconomic	 background.	 Time	 is	 another	 determinant,	 and	 the	
importance	 or	 influence	 of	 these	 factors	 has	 shifted	 over	 the	 years,	 as	 contexts	 and	
situations	change,	and	as	journeys	progress.	This	is	most	clearly	underlined	by	the	oscillating	
popularity	of	 the	Red	Sea	and	 the	Arabian	Sea	 routes	 in	 response	 to	evolving	events	and	
trends	 (see	 Figure	 1).	 In	 this	 context,	 final	 decisions	 may	 be	 made	 through	 a	 complex	
calculation	of	these	different	factors,	or	they	may	be	made	on	impulse	or	in	response	to	an	
unexpected	 event	 before	 or	 during	 the	 journey.	 According	 to	 one	 Ethiopian	 migrant	
interviewed	in	Sana’a,	“my	decision	came	overnight,	when	I	heard	that	migrants	who	go	to	
Saudi	Arabia	live	in	comfortable	conditions.”	In	general,	however,	decisions	are	rarely	made	
based	 on	 one	 issue	 alone,	 but	 a	 number	 of	 contributing	 factors	 of	 relevance	 for	 that	
individual.		
While	 a	 range	 of	 factors	 undoubtedly	 contribute	 to	 decision	 making,	 broadly	 speaking,	
factors	 such	 as	 the	 cost	 of	 the	 journey	 and	 access	 were	 most	 commonly	 cited	 as	 key	
determinants	 across	 a	 range	 of	 respondents,	 suggesting	 that	 they	 play	 a	 central	 role	 in	
influencing	 decisions	 about	 migration	 routes.	 Danger	 and	 risk	 were	 certainly	 taken	 into	
account,	but	migrants’	resilience	and	determination	to	reach	their	intended	destination	‘at	
any	 cost’	 meant	 that,	 while	 they	 might	 make	 some	 adjustment	 to	 their	 journey,	 these	
factors	were	generally	not	enough	to	deter	them	from	continuing	along	their	chosen	route.	
Finally,	 journey	 time	 was	 least	 likely	 to	 influence	 decisions	 about	 routes,	 so	 long	 as	
extended	 journey	 times	 did	 not	 have	 a	 cost	 implication.	 While	 all	 migrants	 expressed	 a	
desire	 to	 reach	 their	 intended	 destination	 as	 quickly	 as	 possible,	 many	migrants	 did	 not	
have	sufficient	funds	for	the	entirety	of	their	journey	and	had	to	work	or	wait	for	funds	to	
be	transferred	so	that	they	could	continue	on	their	way.	
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Cost	of	the	journey	
Cost	 is	major	key	 factor	behind	the	popularity	of	different	 routes	amongst	migrants,	 their	
families	 and	 smuggling	 and	 trafficking	 networks.	 This	 is	 not	 surprising	 given	 the	 relative	
poverty	 of	most	migrants	 in	 the	 region,	 the	 economic	 and	 financial	 drivers	 behind	many	
decisions	 to	migrate,	 and	 the	 potential	 profits	 to	 be	made	 by	 the	 networks	 that	 operate	
there.	 Migration	 through	 Yemen	 (also	 known	 as	 the	 Eastern	 route)	 is	 cheaper	 than	
alternative	migration	routes,	such	as	the	Western	or	Southern	route,	however	the	costs	are	
still	 significant	 for	 the	 majority	 of	 migrants	 who	 come	 from	 impoverished	 families	 and	
communities.		
Based	on	interviews	with	migrants	and	smugglers,	the	average	costs	of	the	five	main	routes	
have	been	outlined	below	in	Table	4.	The	five	main	routes	are:	(i)	Ethiopia	to	Saudi	Arabia	
via	Bossaso;	 (ii)	Ethiopia	to	Saudi	Arabia	via	Obock;	 (iii)	Puntland	to	Europe;	 (iv)	Yemen	to	
Puntland;	and	 (v)	Yemen	 to	Djibouti.	The	average	costs	of	 smaller	 sections	of	 the	 journey	
can	be	calculated	from	the	individual	journey	sections,	also	highlighted	in	the	table	below.		
	
Table	4:	Average	journey	costs		
Route	 Range	(US$)	 Average	(US$)	
Journey	1:	Ethiopia	to	Saudi	Arabia	(via	Bossaso)	 	 	
	 Ethiopia-Somali	border	to	Bossaso	 200	–	300	 240	
	 Bossaso	to	Yemen	 120	–	15017	 125	
	 Yemen	to	Saudi	Arabia	 500	–	550	 525	
	 Total	 820	–	1,000		 892	
Journey	2:	Ethiopia	to	Saudi	Arabia	(via	Djibouti)	 	 	
	 Ethiopia-Djibouti	border	to	Obock	 70	–	400	 200	
	 Obock	to	Yemen	 60	–	200	 130	
	 Yemen	to	Saudi	Arabia	 500	–	550		 525	
	 Total	 630	–	1,150	 855	
Journey	3:	Puntland	to	Europe	 7,500	–	10,000	 8,850	
Journey	4:	Yemen	to	Puntland	 0*	–	70	 	
Journey	5:	Yemen	to	Djibouti	 60	-	90	 75	
	
*	Most	of	 the	 refugees	and	 returnees	 interviewed	who	 crossed	 from	Yemen	 to	Puntland	had	been	
offered	free	passage	by	humanitarian	and	other	organisations.	
	
As	outlined	 in	Table	4,	 journey	costs	vary	significantly,	even	along	the	same	routes,	which	
makes	 it	difficult	 to	establish	a	definitive	price.	Costs	vary	depending	on	 the	distance	and	
directness	of	the	route,	the	relative	level	of	safety,	means	of	travel	(on	foot	or	by	vehicle),	
and	 whether	 a	 smuggler	 is	 involved	 or	 not.	 Smugglers	 and	 their	 brokers	 tend	 to	 offer	 a	
range	 of	 different	 ‘packages.’	 Wealthier	 migrants	 can	 purchase	 a	 complete	 and	 more	
expensive	 package	 to	 their	 destination,	 and	 can	 generally	 expect	 to	 receive	 a	 better	 and	
safer	service	than	poorer	migrants	who	must	rely	on	a	combination	of	self-reliance	and	ad	
hoc	services	bought	en	route	(UNODC,	2013).	Many	of	the	migrants	interviewed	in	Puntland	
                                                
17	Although	one	 smuggler	 admitted	 to	 requiring	up	 to	US$	250	 from	Somali	migrants,	who	he	perceived	 as	
being	wealthier,	and	therefore	able	to	pay	higher	fees.			
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stated	 that	 they	 chose	 to	 take	 the	Arabian	 Sea	 route	 specifically	because	 they	had	heard	
that	 it	was	cheaper	than	the	Red	Sea	route,	which	might	help	to	explain	why	the	Djibouti	
rate	 is	 less	 popular	 than	 journeys	 via	 Puntland.	 One	 migrant	 had	 previously	 made	 the	
journey	 via	 Djibouti,	 but	 opted	 for	 Puntland	 on	 the	 second	 attempt	 because	 of	 the	
difference	in	price.	This	example	is	significant	as	repeat	migrants	are	generally	tempted	to	
return	 to	 the	 routes	 they	 know	on	 subsequent	 journeys.	While	 journeys	 through	Djibouti	
can	cost	as	little	as	US$	630	(compared	to	US$	820	through	Puntland),	the	average	costs	of	
the	 two	 routes	 are	 not	 in	 fact	 that	 different	 (US$	 855	 in	 comparison	 to	 US$	 892).	 This	
suggests	 that	 the	perception	of	 costs	may	be	as	 relevant	as	actual	 costs	 in	understanding	
why	migrants	decide	on	particular	routes.	For	example,	many	migrants	did	not	have	detailed	
information	on	specific	costs	before	or	during	their	journey,	and	often	relied	on	hearsay	or	
rumour	when	deciding	on	which	route	to	take.		
In	many	 instances,	migrants’	 control	over	
costs	 may	 be	 limited.	 In	 general,	 they	
were	 able	 to	 negotiate	 the	 fees	 of	 the	
journey,	 or	 a	 particular	 section	 of	 the	
journey,	 upfront	 with	 agents	 or	 brokers	
affiliated	 with	 smugglers,	 or	 with	 the	
smugglers	themselves.	However,	many	also	reported	being	forced	to	pay	unanticipated	and	
unplanned	 for	 payments,	 generally	 to	 members	 of	 the	 smuggling	 networks	 or	 corrupt	
officials.	Furthermore,	prices	varied,	and	migrants	reported	receiving	a	range	of	rates	from	
different	brokers.	For	example	different	routes	varied	in	price,	and	even	costs	for	the	same	
route	may	be	higher	or	 lower,	depending	on	 the	means	of	 travel,	whether	on	 foot	or	 the	
type	of	vehicle,	and	whether	 food,	drink	and	accommodation	costs	are	 included.	 In	 some	
cases,	 prices	 depended	 on	 nationality,	 and	 how	 much	 disposable	 income	 they	 were	
perceived	to	have.	For	example,	one	smuggler	in	Bossaso	stated	that	whilst	Ethiopians	pay	
around	US$	100	for	the	sea	crossing	to	Yemen,	Somalis	are	expected	to	pay	more,	as	they	
can	 afford	 the	 higher	 price.	 Travelling	 in	 the	 opposite	 direction,	 Yemeni	 refugees	 fleeing	
conflict	 reported	 being	 able	 to	 cross	 the	 Arabian	 Sea	 for	 free	 thanks	 to	 support	 from	
humanitarian	 organisations	 and	 local	 groups	 that	 chartered	 boats	 on	 their	 behalf	 to	 help	
them	escape	conflict.	In	other	cases,	the	cost	of	the	maritime	crossing	varied	depending	on	
how	many	people	were	on	the	boat.	Age	may	also	play	a	role,	as	migrant	mothers	reported	
paying	 half	 the	 usual	 cost	 for	 their	 children	 to	 move	 across	 the	 Gulf	 of	 Aden	 by	 boat,	
although	it	is	not	clear	whether	cheaper	costs	extend	to	unaccompanied	migrant	children.		
The	 timing	 of	 payments	 and	 implications	 for	 cash	 flow	 is	 also	 important.	 When	 using	
smugglers	 for	 shorter	 journeys,	 migrants	 tend	 to	 pay	 the	 costs	 upfront,	 or	 in	 smaller	
portions.18	In	some	instances,	migrants	were	able	to	leave	the	money	with	a	trusted	contact	
at	the	place	of	departure,	who	would	then	transfer	the	funds	to	the	smugglers	upon	their	
safe	arrival	at	the	destination,	thereby	reducing	the	risk	of	being	defrauded	by	smugglers.19	
                                                
18	For	example,	migrants	travelling	from	the	Ethiopian-Somali	border	to	the	coast	of	Yemen,	tended	to	pay	the	
cost	 of	 transport	 from	 Tog	 Wajaale	 to	 Bossaso,	 and	 then	 Bossaso	 to	 Yemen	 as	 two	 separate,	 upfront	
payments.	
19	This	arrangement	may	be	more	acceptable	if	the	person	holding	the	money	is	from	the	same	clan	or	ethnic	
group	as	the	smugglers.	It	also	requires	having	a	trusted	contact	at	the	point	of	departure,	and	was	therefore	
commonly	cited	by	Somali	migrants	crossing	from	Bossaso	to	Yemen,	who	had	relatives	or	friends	in	Bossaso	
with	whom	they	could	deposit	the	money	in	the	interim.	
“Once	in	Tadjourah,	the	smuggler	ordered	us	to	
pay	more	than	the	agreed	price,	and	said	he	
would	denounce	us	to	the	Government	if	we	
refused	to	pay.”	Ethiopian	migrant,	Obock 
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When	 journeys	 are	 longer,	 or	 more	 expensive,	 smugglers	 allow	 and	 actively	 encourage	
migrants	 to	 pay	 later	 or	 in	 instalments.	 A	 number	 of	 Somali	 respondents,	 who	 were	
planning	to	travel	to	Europe,	reported	being	allowed	to	move	from	Somalia	to	Libya	without	
payments	being	made	first.20	Once	in	Libya,	the	first	of	a	series	of	payments	is	demanded	by	
the	smugglers	from	the	migrants’	families.	This	‘leave	now,	pay	later’	agreement	has	been	
developed	 by	 smugglers	 to	 make	 migration	 more	 attractive	 and	 accessible	 to	 young	
migrants	who	could	not	otherwise	afford	 the	costs	of	 journeying	 to	Europe	 (Ali,	2016).	 In	
one	 case,	 smugglers	 reportedly	 allowed	 a	 group	 of	 female	 Ethiopian	 migrants	 travelling	
through	Djibouti	to	travel	first,	and	then	repay	the	fees	once	they	had	found	work	in	Saudi	
Arabia.	However,	this	does	not	seem	to	be	common	practice	in	Djibouti,	where	respondents	
typically	paid	upfront	instalments	for	the	different	sections	of	the	journey.	Greater	flexibility	
over	 payments	 may	 also	 be	 linked	 to	 smugglers’	 preference	 not	 to	 carry	 large	 sums	 of	
money	 on	 their	 persons,	 as	 this	 puts	 them	 at	 greater	 risk	 of	 being	 identified	 by	 the	
authorities,	and	having	their	income	confiscated.	In	recent	years	and	with	the	sophistication	
of	 mobile	 transfers,	 smugglers	 increasingly	 request	 money	 transfers	 made	 by	 family	
members	or	the	migrants	themselves	instead	of	cash	payments	(RMMS,	2017).	
	
Access	
Access	is	another	important	factor	behind	migration	decisions	and	the	relative	popularity	of	
different	 routes.	 Access	 is	 determined	 by	 a	 number	 of	 different	 factors,	 including	
geographic	proximity,	established	networks	and	information	about	the	route,	the	nature	of	
the	 terrain,	 levels	 of	 assistance	 they	may	hope	 to	 receive,	migration	management	efforts	
and,	linked	to	this,	the	chance	of	interception	by	the	authorities,	and	the	risk	of	subsequent	
detention	 and	 deportation.	 In	 this	 context,	 access	 is	 closely	 correlated	 with	 migrants’	
likelihood	of	 success	 in	 reaching	 their	 intended	destination.	 It	 is	 therefore	a	key	decision-
making	factor	for	nearly	all	migrants	who	do	not	wish	lose	their	investment	in	their	journey	
if	they	are	unable	to	reach	their	intended	destination.		
The	issue	of	access	has	been	a	key	driver	behind	the	relative	popularity	of	the	Arabian	Sea	
route	 over	 the	 Red	 Sea	 option	 in	 recent	 years.	 Respondents	 frequently	 cited	 the	 lack	 of	
effective	 law	 enforcement	 and	 ease	 of	 passage	 through	 Somaliland	 and	 Puntland	 as	 a	
reason	behind	the	route’s	popularity	with	migrants	and	smugglers	alike.	Generally	speaking,	
the	 border	 between	 Ethiopia	 and	 Somalia	 is	 not	 closely	 monitored,	 particularly	 on	 the	
Somalia	side,	which	enables	Ethiopian	migrants	to	cross	relatively	easily	from	Ethiopia	into	
Somalia.	 Since	 the	 State	 of	 Emergency	 was	 declared	 in	 Ethiopia	 in	 October	 2016,	 some	
migrant	interviewees	reported	that	Ethiopian	migrants,	allegedly	Oromos	in	particular,	have	
been	stopped	from	crossing	the	border	by	both	Ethiopian	and	Somali	(both	Somaliland	and	
Puntland)	 security	 forces	and	 returned	 to	Ethiopia.	Respondents	also	 suggested	 that	 local	
authorities	 in	Somaliland	and	Puntland	were	more	open	to	bribes,	and	that	detention	and	
deportations	were	therefore	less	common	than	in	Djibouti,	where	the	authorities	and	police	
are	perceived	to	be	much	more	vigilant	and	less	corruptible.		
                                                
20	Typically,	migrants	are	requested	to	pay	for	the	sea	crossing	from	Bossaso	to	Yemen	only	(between	US$	120	
–	150)	and	do	not	need	to	pay	the	more	expensive	onward	costs	until	they	arrive	in	Libya.	
 	 44	
For	 Yemeni	 refugees	 and	migrants,	 access	 determined	 by	 distance	 is	 an	 important	 factor	
behind	 their	 decision-making.	 For	 example,	 due	 its	 geographical	 proximity,	 Djibouti	 is	
particularly	 popular	 with	 Yemeni	 refugees	 from	 Aden,	 Taiz	 and	 Bab	 el	 Mandeb	 (RMMS,	
2016).	 Close	historical,	 cultural,	 social	 and	 linguistic	 ties	between	Djibouti	 and	Yemen	are	
also	contributing	factors.	Linked	to	this	is	the	nature	of	the	terrain,	and	Ethiopian	migrants	
described	being	deterred	 from	choosing	the	Djibouti	 route	due	to	the	 long	distances	over	
rough	roads	that	they	would	need	to	walk	in	order	to	avoid	checkpoints.		
The	presence	of	smugglers	along	particular	routes	may	also	increase	their	popularity	among	
migrants,	who	believe	that	this	will	facilitate	access	and	improve	their	chances	of	reaching	
their	intended	destination.	Many	migrants	had	little	practical	information	about	their	route,	
and	 were	 completely	 reliant	 on	 smugglers,	 or	 other	 migrants,	 to	 guide	 them.	 Likewise,	
smugglers	can	offer	protection	from	corrupt	officials	and	armed	groups	by	paying	bribes	on	
migrants’	behalf	and	making	use	of	their	networks.	On	the	other	hand,	migrant	respondents	
tended	 to	be	 fearful	of	 smugglers	and	 traffickers	 located	on	 the	Red	Sea	coast	of	Yemen,	
who	were	perceived	to	be	more	dangerous	and	likely	to	be	involved	in	kidnapping,	torture	
and	extortion.	In	these	scenarios,	the	presence	of	smugglers	is	not	always	a	draw,	and	the	
increase	 in	 abuse	 and	 extortion	 along	 these	 routes	 has	 led	 migrants	 to	 differentiate	
between	 ‘good’	 and	 ‘bad’	 smugglers.	 The	 common	 perception	 that	 smugglers	 in	 Djibouti	
and	Yemen	are	less	trustworthy	than	those	operating	in	Somalia	has	been	a	factor	in	leading	
many	migrants	to	choose	the	Arabian	Sea	route	over	the	Red	Sea	option.		
	
Danger	and	risk	
Migrants	 are	 subjected	 to	 a	 number	 of	 dangers	 and	 risks	 along	 the	 journey,	 including	
exposure	to	the	elements,	physical	violence,	sexual	assault,	abduction	and	torture,	mental	
abuse	 and	 discrimination,	 economic	 deprivation,	 detention	 by	 the	 authorities,	 extortion,	
trafficking	and	enslavement,	dehydration,	 starvation	and	 loss	of	 life	 (RMMS,	2014).	When	
migrants	are	able	to	choose	their	own	route,	their	awareness	or	perception	of	the	risks	and	
dangers	along	certain	channels	can	be	a	critical	factor	behind	their	decision	making,	and	is	a	
key	 reason	 for	 why	 the	 Arabian	 Sea	 route	 has	 proven	 more	 popular	 in	 recent	 years.	
Migrants	interviewed	in	Puntland	were	very	aware	of	the	greater	risk	of	danger	and	abuse	
at	the	hands	of	unscrupulous	smugglers,	traffickers	and	other	criminal	gangs	along	the	Red	
Sea	 route,	 particularly	 upon	 arrival	 in	 Yemen.	 This	 is	 confirmed	 by	 data	 from	 UNHCR	
monitoring	 missions,	 which	 shows	 that	
abuse	 and	 kidnapping	 are	 much	 more	
common	along	the	Red	Sea	route	(RMMS,	
2016).	 Additionally,	 migrants’	 awareness	
of	 the	 concentration	 of	 fighting	 in	 the	
western	 governorates	 of	 Yemen,	 and	
numerous	 airstrikes	 in	 Taiz	 and	 Al	
Hodeidah	 in	 particular	 may	 also	 be	 a	
factor	behind	decisions	to	migrate	via	the	
Arabian	Sea	route	instead	of	via	Djibouti.		
“I	did	not	know	about	Yemen	before,	but	I	had	
heard	a	few	people	talk	about	it.	I	expected	it	to	
be	a	wonderful	country,	but	when	I	arrived	I	was	
astonished.”	Ethiopian	Oromo	migrant,	Aden.	
	
“I	did	not	know	about	the	travel	dangers.	I	
thought	it	was	safe.	I	did	not	hear	from	anyone	
that	there	were	risks.”	Ethiopian	migrant,	Sana’a.	
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However,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 the	 extent	 to	which	migrants	 are	 aware	of	 the	dangers	 and	 risks	
involved.	 Level	 of	 knowledge	often	depends	 on	 the	 phase	of	 the	 journey,	 and	 is	 likely	 to	
increase	as	the	journey	progresses.	Pre-departure,	migrants’	knowledge	and	awareness	may	
be	 limited	 to	 information	 they	 can	 gather	 from	 family	 and	 friends.	 However,	 once	 they	
begin	 the	 journey,	 this	 is	 usually	 supplemented	 with	 information	 from	 other	 migrants,	
smugglers	 and	 communities,	 as	 well	 as	 first-hand	 experience	 of	 the	 dangers	 and	 risks.	
Socioeconomic	 and	 educational	 background	 can	 also	 determine	 levels	 of	 awareness	 and	
knowledge.	Migrants	travelling	to/through	Yemen	tend	to	be	less	knowledgeable	than	those	
travelling	 to	 Europe,	 possibly	 in	 part	 because	 of	 their	 lower	 incomes	 and	 educational	
attainment.	 Some	women,	 particularly	 those	 travelling	with	 an	escort,	 also	demonstrated	
less	 awareness	 about	 the	 risks,	 routes	
and	 costs	 of	 their	 journey.	 In	 any	 case,	
testimony	 from	 migrants	 indicates	 that	
smugglers	 have	 repeatedly	 lied	 about	
the	 safety	of	areas,	encouraging	people	
to	 keep	 travelling	 in	 large	 numbers	 in	
spite	 of	 the	 dangers.	 What’s	 more,	
migrants	 themselves	may	 contribute	 to	
untruths,	 as	 those	 who	 reach	 their	
destination	frequently	fail	to	give	the	full	
picture	of	what	they	endured,	preferring	
to	give	 friends	and	 relatives	back	home	
a	 more	 positive	 version	 of	 their	
experience	(UNHCR,	2017).	
For	many	migrants,	however,	the	dangers	and	risks	are	well	known,	but	do	not	outweigh	the	
potential	 benefits	 of	 migration,	 and	 therefore	 may	 have	 less	 of	 an	 impact	 on	 decision-
making	 than	 is	 commonly	 assumed.	 A	 significant	 number	 of	 migrants	 have	 made	 the	
journey	once	or	multiple	times	before,	and	are	therefore	likely	to	be	aware	of	the	risks	and	
dangers	 involved	 from	previous	 experience.21	Most	migrants	 interviewed	by	 this	 research	
admitted	 to	 knowing	 of	 the	 risks,	 but	 migrating	 anyway,	 and	 even	 taking	 precautionary	
steps	 to	minimise	 the	 consequences.	 This	 includes	 arranging	 for	 family	members	 to	 keep	
aside	 money	 to	 pay	 ransoms	 to	 smugglers,	 and	 women	 taking	 contraceptives	 before	
embarking	on	their	journey	to	prevent	pregnancy	if	raped.	Accounts	of	migrants	knowing	of	
the	dangers	and	risks,	but	migrating	anyway,	are	backed	up	a	number	of	different	studies.	
According	to	IOM	and	RMMS,	80%	of	Ethiopian	migrants	are	aware	of	a	range	of	abuses	and	
risks22,	 and	 longitudinal	 research	 conducted	 by	WIDE	 since	 1994	 indicates	migrants	 have	
been	 aware	 of	 the	 dangers	 and	 risks	 for	 some	 time,	 but	 choose	 to	 migrate	 irregularly	
nonetheless	(RMMS,	2014)	(WIDE,	2016).23		
                                                
21	RMMS	estimate	that	25%	of	migrants	are	repeat	migrants	(RMMS,	2014),	and	one	migrant	 interviewed	 in	
Bossaso	had	made	the	journey	to	Saudi	Arabia	six	times	in	the	past	seven	years.		
22	These	include	extortion	and	robbery,	exhaustion,	dehydration,	starvation	and	deprivation	of	sleep,	mild	to	
moderate	or	extreme	physical	violence,	criminal	kidnapping	for	ransom	and	degrading	treatment	and	verbal	
and	sexual	abuse.	
23	 Ethiopia	 WIDE	 is	 an	 ongoing	 longitudinal	 study	 of	 twenty	 rural	 communities	 which	 began	 in	 1994.	
Subsequent	 rounds	of	 fieldwork	were	 carried	out	 in	 2003	 and	 in	 three	 stages	 between	early	 2010	 and	 late	
2013.	There	are	plans	to	revisit	the	communities	in	the	future.	
“I	know	all	the	risks,	including	loss	of	life,	
harassment,	detention,	and	so	on.”	Ethiopian	
female	migrant,	Bossaso.	
	
“I	know	the	risks	of	losing	my	life	at	sea,	but	I	am	
willing	to	do	it,	whatever	happens.”	Ethiopian	
migrant,	Bossaso.	
	
“I	know	that	running	away	contains	many	risks	
but	in	either	case	we	will	die.	Therefore,	I	said,	let	
me	search	for	my	destiny.”	Somali	migrant,	Aden.	
	
“I	know	that	the	journey	is	very	dangerous,	and	if	I	
do	not	pay	the	smugglers,	they	will	torture	me	in	
Yemen.”	Ethiopian	migrant,	Obock	
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Taking	this	concept	further,	young	Somalis	hoping	to	reach	Europe	from	Puntland	not	only	
expressed	 awareness	 of	 the	 risk	 of	 kidnap,	 abuse	 and	 torture	 at	 the	 hands	 of	 smugglers	
once	they	reached	Libya,	but	they	also	knew	that	the	threat	of	this	could	help	to	leverage	
payment	from	family	members.	Many	of	the	Somalis	interviewed	were	not	planning	to	tell	
their	 families	 of	 their	 intention	 to	 leave	 and,	 lacking	 the	 funds	 to	 pay	 the	 smugglers	
themselves,	 felt	 sure	 that	 their	 relatives	 would	 feel	 compelled	 to	 pay	 the	 costs	 of	 the	
journey	on	their	behalf,	for	fear	that	they	might	be	subjected	to	torture	and	abuse	if	they	
did	not.		
In	sum,	it	would	seem	that	knowledge	of	risks	and	dangers	may	cause	migrants	to	adjust	or	
reconsider	which	route	they	take;	however,	it	is	not	enough	to	deter	them	from	migrating	in	
the	first	place.	Furthermore,	migrants	are	less	likely	to	change	their	minds	about	migrating	
the	further	they	progress	along	their	journey,	as	the	investments	(in	terms	of	cost	and	time	
spent)	 and	 sacrifices	 (in	 terms	 of	 the	 risks	 and	 hardships	 they	 have	 already	 endured)	
increase.	While	not	all	migrants	who	are	returned	choose	to	migrate	a	second	or	third	time,	
the	fact	that	some	do	shows	that,	for	many,	the	benefits	of	migration	outweigh	the	dangers	
and	risks.		
	
Journey	Time	
It	 is	 not	 clear	 whether	 journey	 time	 influences	migration	 decisions	 in	 a	meaningful	 way.	
During	 interviews,	migrants	expressed	more	concern	around	cost,	access,	and	danger	and	
risk,	than	 journey	time,	so	 long	as	extended	journey	times	do	not	have	a	cost	 implication.	
For	example,	when	asked	why	he	had	decided	to	migrate	via	the	Arabian	Sea,	one	migrant	
described	the	alternative	Red	Sea	route	via	Djibouti	as	shorter	but	more	expensive.	Another	
described	 it	 as	 shorter	 but	more	 dangerous,	 indicating	 that,	 in	 these	 cases,	 journey	 time	
carried	 less	weight	 than	cost,	and	danger	and	risk.	The	Arabian	Sea	crossing	 is	 longer	and	
more	exposed	than	the	Red	Sea,	but	remains	significantly	more	popular,	with	over	84%	of	
migrants	 taking	 this	 route	 in	2016.24	Furthermore,	many	migrants	are	unaware	of	 journey	
times,	 suggesting	 that	 this	 is	 not	 a	 key	 factor	 in	 their	 decision	making.	 A	 2014	 survey	 of	
Ethiopian	migrants	found	that	80%	of	respondents	had	little	or	no	information	about	their	
journey	time	(RMMS,	2014).	
In	any	case,	many	migrants	do	not	have	sufficient	funds	for	the	entirety	of	their	journey,	and	
settle	temporarily	 in	transit	to	work	and	earn	for	the	next	section	of	the	 journey.	 In	some	
cases	 this	 settlement	 turns	out	 to	be	permanent.	This	 suggests	 that	 time	 implications	are	
not	a	major	consideration.	One	Ethiopian	migrant	described	spending	six	months	in	Obock	
while	 working	 to	 save	 money	 to	 cross	 into	 Yemen.	 Another	 had	 spent	 over	 two	 years	
working	and	saving	in	Djibouti.	Some	migrants	make	multiple	stops	during	the	journey,	with	
an	 Ethiopian	 migrant	 spending	 three	 months	 in	 Dire	 Dawa	 (Ethiopia),	 two	 months	 in	
Tadjourah	 (Djibouti)	 and	 two	 further	months	 in	Obock	 in	order	 to	work	and	 save	enough	
money	 to	pay	 for	 each	 leg	of	 the	 journey.	 In	 Yemen,	 some	migrants	 are	 known	 to	 spend	
years	working	as	domestic	workers	and	 in	qat	farms	 in	order	to	save	the	funds	needed	to	
                                                
24	The	trip	from	Bossaso	is	longer,	covering	around	200	nautical	miles	including	open	sea,	and	may	take	one	to	
three	days.	In	contrast,	the	Obock	route	is	only	about	100	nautical	miles	in	more	sheltered	water,	and	may	be	
completed	in	just	seven	or	eight	hours	(UNODC,	2013).	
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move	 on	 to	 Saudi	 Arabia.	 While	 migrants	 in	 this	 situation	 acknowledged	 that	 these	
situations	were	far	from	ideal,	they	also	accepted	that	it	was	sometimes	a	necessary	stage	
in	 the	 journey.	 In	 these	 scenarios,	 journey	 times	varied	greatly	among	 those	 interviewed.	
For	example,	Ethiopians	 interviewed	 in	Bossaso	had	taken	between	one	to	 ten	months	 to	
make	 their	 journey	so	 far,	with	 journeys	most	commonly	cited	as	 taking	 five	months	 (not	
including	 the	 time	 that	 they	 could	 expect	 to	 spend	 in	 Yemen	 once	 they	 had	 made	 the	
crossing).	 	 Those	 interviewed	 in	 Obock	 reported	 taking	 between	 one	 and	 seven	months,	
with	the	average	journey	taking	around	two	months	from	Ethiopia	to	Obock.		
	
2.4.	What	is	driving	migration	in	the	region?		
As	 in	 many	 contexts,	 the	 reasons	 or	
drivers	 for	 migration	 between	 the	 HoA	
and	Yemen	are	multiple,	overlapping	and	
change	 over	 time.	 Some	 of	 the	 drivers	
may	 be	 aspirational	 in	 nature,	 in	 that	
migrants	are	choosing	to	move	in	order	to	
increase	 their	 options	 in	 the	 search	 for	 a	
‘better	 life’,	 which,	 ultimately	 may	 be	
difficult	 to	 quantify	 or	 fulfil.	 Other	 drivers	 may	 carry	 less	 agency	 or	 ambition,	 whereby	
migrants	 feel	 that	 they	 have	 no	 choice	 but	 to	 move	 in	 order	 to	 escape	 unsustainable	
physical	 or	 economic	 insecurity.	 An	 understanding	 of	 the	 drivers	 of	 migration	 can	 help	
policy	 makers	 and	 programmers	 to	 address	 the	 root	 causes	 of	 migration,	 and	 tailor	
interventions	to	migrants’	needs	and	aspirations.	Furthermore,	an	appreciation	of	migrants’	
motivations	and	expectations,	and	their	relative	weights	and	pressures,	is	key	to	answering	
a	 fundamental	question	of	 this	 research:	namely,	why	do	migrants	continue	 to	migrate	 in	
spite	of	the	difficulties,	risks	and	dangers,	which,	in	many	cases,	are	known	to	them?		
Broadly	speaking,	there	exists	a	common	set	of	drivers	voiced	by	migrants	across	different	
backgrounds,	 including	 nationality,	 socioeconomic	 background,	 age	 and	 gender.	 These	
typically	include	economic	factors	(lack	of	employment	opportunities,	low	or	unsustainable	
incomes),	 social	 factors	 (lack	 of	 access	 to	 basic	 services,	 such	 as	 health	 and	 education),	
political	factors	(persecution	or	repression),	climatic	or	environmental	factors	(drought	and	
floods	 causing	 loss	 of	 harvests,	 livestock	 or	 livelihoods)	 and	 security	 factors	 (conflict	 or	
insecurity	 leading	 to	 displacement).	 	 Data	 collected	 by	DRC	 and	UNHCR	when	 registering	
refugees	 and	 asylum	 seekers	 in	 Yemen	 (2011-2013)	 highlights	 nearly	 identical	 trends	 in	
drivers	 of	 migration	 amongst	 Somali	 and	 Ethiopian	 migrants	 (RMMS,	 2014).	 ‘Seeking	
economic	 activities’,	 ‘lack	 of	 access	 to	 basic	 needs	 and	 services’	 and	 ‘insecurity’	 were	
identified	as	the	first,	second	and	third	most	important	drivers	of	migration	for	both	groups.	
In	order	to	gain	as	much	depth	as	possible,	the	drivers	of	migration	will	be	analysed	below	
through	 three	 inter-related	 components.	 First,	 there	 are	 the	 very	 chronic	 poor	 political,	
economic	and	security	 conditions	 that	have	persisted	over	many	years.	 Second,	 there	are	
the	 socio-political	 structures	 that	 shape	 the	 responses	 to	 these	 conditions.	 Thirdly,	 the	
research	explores	the	possible	implications	of	the	recent	further	deterioration	in	conditions	
in	the	region,	with	a	particular	focus	on	conflict	 in	Yemen,	political	unrest	 in	Ethiopia,	and	
drought	and	potential	famine	in	the	region.	 In	this	context,	while	drivers	may	be	linked	to	
“Multiple	factors	led	me	to	leave.	First	is	the	
conflict	between	the	government	and	the	Oromo	
community.	Second	are	economic	issues	and	
unemployment.	Thirdly,	poverty	is	a	threat	to	my	
family	and	I	want	to	help	them.	The	solution	is	to	
leave	for	a	country	that	offers	a	better	life.”	
Ethiopian	migrant,	Obock 
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migrants’	 specific	 circumstances	 or	 individual	 situations,	 they	may	 also	 be	 structural	 and	
underlying	in	nature,	over	which	migrants	can	have	little	or	no	control.		
	
2.4.1.	The	chronic	poor	economic,	social,	political	and	security	conditions	
For	 decades,	 thousands	 of	 people	 across	 the	 HoA	 have	 been	 faced	with	 very	 poor	 living	
conditions,	associated	with	socioeconomic,	political	and	security	factors,	which	stifles	their	
hopes	 for	 their	 future	 lives	 at	 home.	 This	 contributes	 to	 people’s	 incentives	 to	 move	
elsewhere,	and	is	a	principal	driver	of	migration	between	the	HoA	and	Yemen.		
	
Socioeconomic	factors	
Economic	 factors	 were	 the	most	 common	 driver	
voiced	 by	 both	 Ethiopian	 and	 Somali	 migrants	
interviewed	 during	 this	 research.	 A	 shortage	 of	
employment	 or	 livelihood	 opportunities,	 low	
salaries	 and	 land	 scarcity	 (amongst	 Ethiopians	
especially)	were	 the	main	 contributing	 factors	 to	
economic	 uncertainty.	 Amongst	 Ethiopian	
respondents,	81%	of	which	cited	economic	drivers	 for	 their	migration,	 there	was	also	 the	
perception	that	the	best	jobs	are	reserved	for	particular	groups	of	people	or	elites,	and	that	
these	 opportunities	 are	 not	 available	 to	 young	 people	 from	 rural	 backgrounds	 or	
marginalized	groups	such	as	the	Oromo.	Most	respondents	said	they	were	not	able	to	earn	
enough	money,	and	their	main	aspiration	for	moving	was	to	find	a	good	job	and	save	money	
for	 themselves	and	 their	 family.	 In	 contrast	 to	difficult	 conditions	at	home,	many	migrant	
interviewees	believed	that	it	would	be	relatively	easy	to	secure	a	well-paid	job	abroad,	and	
they	 were	 encouraged	 by	 friends	 and	 other	 migrants	 who	 described	 broadly	 positive	
experiences	in	countries	like	Saudi	Arabia.		
In	many	cases,	migrants	had	been	unable	to	secure	any	employment	at	all	in	their	country	
of	origin.	This	was	particularly	common	amongst	Somali	respondents,	many	of	whom	had	a	
good	level	of	education	(up	to	secondary	school)	and	complained	that	even	with	a	university	
degree	 they	would	 not	 be	 able	 to	 secure	 good	 jobs	 in	 Somalia.	 In	many	 other	 instances,	
migrant	respondents	had	a	job	but	felt	that	the	salary	was	too	low	to	meet	their	needs.	This	
group	of	respondents	typically	reported	working	as	drivers,	shopkeepers,	livestock	traders,	
domestic	 workers	 or	 factory	 workers.	 Female	 Somalis	 complained	 of	 unequal	 gender	
structures	 that	 prevented	 them	 from	 securing	 the	 same	 educational	 and	 employment	
opportunities	 as	 men.	 Amongst	 the	 Ethiopians,	 a	 large	 proportion	 of	 interviewees	 were	
farmers,	 and	 some	 complained	 that	 their	 lands	 had	 been	 confiscated	 or	 their	 traditional	
livelihoods	 undermined,	 leaving	 them	 with	 little	 choice	 but	 to	 migrate	 in	 search	 of	 new	
livelihood	opportunities.			
The	lack	of	educational	opportunities	in	Somalia	was	also	mentioned	as	an	important	reason	
for	moving	elsewhere.	Migrants	intending	to	travel	to	Europe	said	they	hoped	that	moving	
would	help	them	to	improve	their	education	and	go	to	a	good	university.	Education	was	also	
a	driver	amongst	Ethiopians.	Several	young	Oromo	Ethiopians	reported	that	their	decision	
“Yemen	is	better	than	Somalia.	In	
Somalia,	people	don’t	care	about	us,	
and	poverty	and	marginalisation	are	
common.	In	Yemen,	I	found	a	job	as	
domestic	worker	and	I	am	able	to	earn	
money.”	Female	Somali	migrant,	Aden.	
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to	 migrate	 stemmed	 from	 the	 government’s	 closure	 of	 their	 schools	 following	 political	
unrest,	 and	 they	 were	 no	 longer	 able	 to	 study.	 A	 lack	 of	 welfare	 support	 provided	 by	
government	was	also	listed	as	another	reason	for	Somalis	migrating	to	Europe.	There	was	a	
perception	amongst	respondents	that	European	states	would	provide	them	with	grants	and	
assistance	 to	 access	 schools	 and	 universities.	 Many	 also	 believed	 that	 they	 would	 have	
access	to	housing	and	other	financial	support.		
In	 many	 instances,	 respondents	 did	
not	 voice	 a	 well-defined	 reason	 for	
migrating,	other	than	the	search	for	a	
‘better	 life’.	 This	 group	 has	 been	
described	by	one	key	informant	as	the	
‘MTV	 Generation’,	 whose	 primary	
motive	 for	 migrating	 may	 be	
aspirational	 and	 linked	 to	 a	 desired	
lifestyle	choice,	 rather	 than	 for	purely	
economic	 reasons.	 These	 motives	
have	 been	 fuelled	 by	 socioeconomic	
advances	 in	 sending	 countries,	 which	
have	 improved	would-be	migrants’	 access	 to	 social	 media	 and	 communications	 channels,	
and	enabled	them	to	compare	their	lives	with	those	in	other	countries.	What’s	more,	as	the	
reasons	 for	 this	 type	 of	 migration	 are	 more	 abstract	 and	 difficult	 to	 define,	 measuring	
success	may	be	hard	 for	migrants	 to	quantify.	 That	 said,	a	number	of	 repeat	migrants	did	
describe	 life	 as	much	 ‘better’	 in	 Saudi	 Arabia,	 and	 this	was	 a	 reason	 for	 their	 decision	 to	
return.	According	 to	 an	 Ethiopian	migrant	 interviewed	 in	Obock:	 “in	 Saudi	Arabia,	 I	 had	 a	
well-paid	job	in	a	cafeteria,	earning	US$	200	per	month,	and	my	situation	was	much	better.”	
	
Political	factors	
Political	 factors,	 in	 particular	 the	 fear	 of	 political	 persecution,	 were	 a	 common	 driver	
amongst	Ethiopians	interviewed.	Somali	interviewees	currently	travelling	to	the	HoA	did	not	
generally	highlight	political	factors	or	state-sponsored	persecution	as	a	reason	for	migrating.	
However,	 Somalis	 returnees	 did	 raise	 these	 factors	 as	 a	 historical	 driver	 for	 their	 initial	
migration	 to	 Yemen	 over	 the	 past	 decade	
or	more.	
Forty-five	 percent	 of	 Ethiopian	
respondents,	 particularly	 Oromos,	
identified	 fear	 of	 persecution	 by	 the	
Government	 of	 Ethiopia	 as	 a	 key	 factor	
behind	 their	 decision	 to	 migrate.	 This	 is	
linked	 to	 recent	 unrest	within	 the	 country	
and	 the	 subsequent	 announcement	 of	 the	
State	 of	 Emergency	 (which	 is	 discussed	 in	
Section	 2.4.3).	 However,	 it	 is	 much	 more	
deeply	 entrenched	 and	 long-standing	 than	
this;	 it	 also	 stems	 from	 the	 historical	
“Nothing	is	better	than	home	but,	for	me,	given	
the	current	political	oppression	in	Ethiopia,	I	
feel	happier	here	[in	Bossaso].”	
	Ethiopian	Oromo	migrant,	Bossaso.	
	
“Life	became	hard	in	Ethiopia.	We	are	afraid	of	
being	targeted	by	the	Ethiopian	government	as	
they	oppress	us.	Also,	I	want	to	get	a	good	job	
in	Arab	countries,	and	earn	good	money.”	
Ethiopian	Oromo	migrant,	Bossaso.	
	
“Persecutions	against	Oromos	and	its	
consequences,	combined	with	unemployment	
and	instability	made	me	decide	to	leave	again	
and	take	my	chance.”	Ethiopian	migrant,	Obock	
	
“I	want	to	have	a	better	life	like	some	of	my	friends	in	
Europe.	I	want	to	study	at	university,	get	a	good	job	
and	have	a	decent	life	there.”	Somali	migrant,	Bossaso.	
	
“There	is	not	future	for	me	in	Somalia	and	Yemen,	and	
so	I	am	looking	for	a	better	life	in	Europe.	I	am	seeking	
work,	money	and	safety.”	Somali	migrant,	Al	Hodeidah	
	
“I	expect	that	Saudi	Arabia	is	like	heaven	where	we	can	
find	money	scattered	over	all	the	roads.”	Ethiopian	
migrant,	Sana’a.	
	
“I	believe	that	once	I	reach	Saudi	Arabia,	I	will	fulfil	my	
dreams.”	Ethiopian	migrant,	Obock	
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experience	of	the	Oromos	who	have	suffered	from	decades	of	discrimination.	Respondents	
presented	 the	 treatment	 by	 the	 government	 as	 part	 of	 a	 long	 familiar	 pattern	 of	
harassment.	Some	describe	being	arrested	and	tortured	by	the	authorities	and,	upon	their	
release,	 fleeing	 the	 country	 for	 fear	of	being	detained	again.	One	person	 claimed	 that	he	
had	been	tortured	by	the	Ethiopian	authorities	for	three	months.	Many	other	respondents	
said	 they	had	 family	members	or	 friends	who	had	been	arrested	and	detained,	 and	were	
fearful	of	being	arrested	 themselves.	Another	 respondent,	 a	university	 graduate	who	had	
worked	 for	 the	 government,	 fled	 Ethiopia	 after	 he	 was	 targeted	 by	 the	 government	 for	
participating	 in	 a	 protest;	 his	 name	 and	 photo	were	 released	 on	 state	 TV	 in	 an	 effort	 to	
secure	his	capture.	In	many	cases,	persecution	was	framed	in	terms	of	religious	persecution,	
and	 the	obstacles	 faced	by	Oromos	 in	 practising	 their	 religion	openly.	 In	 these	 examples,	
migrants	described	a	desire	to	move	to	a	Muslim	country,	such	as	Yemen	or	Saudi	Arabia,	
that	 would	 accept	 them	 as	 Muslims,	 and	 allow	 them	 to	 practice	 their	 faith	 openly	 and	
without	discrimination.	Another	Ethiopian	decided	to	move	after	his	land	and	harvest	were	
allegedly	 confiscated	 by	 the	 state	 because	 he	 was	 Oromo.	 Research	 conducted	 by	 other	
organisations	yields	similar	findings,	and	Ethiopians	interviewed	by	UNHCR	and	its	partners	
in	Yemen	consistently	reported	arbitrary	arrest,	detention,	torture	and	killings	at	the	hand	
of	 government	 officials	 as	 a	 key	 reason	 for	 migrating	 (RMMS,	 2016).	 This	 chronic	
discrimination	cannot	be	neatly	separated	from	the	recent	political	unrest	and	government	
responses	discussed	 in	section	2.4.3	below,	but	 the	end	of	 this	current	crisis	 is	unlikely	 to	
address	these	much	more	deeply	seated	grievances.		
	
Security	factors		
Insecurity,	often	as	a	result	of	conflict,	is	another	key	driver	of	migration	between	the	HoA	
and	 Yemen.	 Somali	 migrants	 interviewed	 during	 this	 research	 commonly	 cited	 a	 lack	 of	
security	 as	 a	 reason	 for	 choosing	 to	 leave	 Somalia,	 brought	 about	 by	 fighting	 between	
government	forces	and	Al-Shabaab,	as	well	as	conflict	at	the	local	level	between	clans.		
The	 escalation	 of	 conflict	 in	 Yemen	 has	 also	
had	 a	 direct	 correlation	 with	 levels	 of	 out-
migration	 from	 Yemen.	 All	 Yemeni	 refugees	
and	 Somali	 returnees	 interviewed	 as	 part	 of	
this	 research	 identified	 war,	 conflict	 and	
insecurity	as	 the	principle	driver	moving	 from	
Yemen	 to	 Somalia	 and	 Djibouti.	 Over	 98,000	
people	were	registered	by	UNHCR	in	receiving	
countries	across	the	region	in	April,	May,	June	
and	 July	 2015.	 The	Migrant	 Response	 Centre	
(MRC)	 in	 Bossaso	 also	 reported	 a	 significant	
increase	 in	 the	 number	 of	 refugees	 and	
returnees	seeking	its	services	in	April,	May,	June	and	July	2015.25	Nevertheless,	the	scale	of	
this	 out-migration	 quickly	 slowed	 after	 the	 first	 few	 months,	 and	 the	 anticipated	 larger	
                                                
25	Data	 shared	by	 the	Director	of	 the	Bossaso	MRC	 indicate	 that	 in	March	2015,	26	 refugees	and	 returnees	
were	received	by	the	MRC.	This	figure	rose	significantly	to	2,177	in	April,	to	6,008	in	May,	to	4,518	in	June,	and	
2,683	in	July,	before	going	back	down	to	182	in	August.		
“War	is	the	only	reason	I	left.	I	stayed	as	
long	as	I	could,	and	hoped	things	would	get	
better	but	the	day	my	neighborhood	was	
attacked	I	left.”	Yemeni	refugee,	Obock	
	
“When	we	left	Yemen,	we	wanted	to	reach	
a	place	where	my	family	can	be	safe	from	
conflict	and	war.	Puntland	is	more	peaceful	
than	Yemen.”	Yemeni	refugee,	Qardo.	
	
“I	left	Somalia	to	protect	my	daughter	from	
the	bad	situation	of	rape	in	Somalia.”	
Somali	migrant,	Aden	
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influx	 of	 refugees	 never	 occurred.	 Data	 from	UNHCR	 shows	 that	 the	 number	 of	 refugees	
leaving	Yemen	for	Djibouti	and	Somalia	decelerated	from	an	initial	peak	of	7,000-8,000	per	
month	 for	 the	 first	 few	months	 to	 the	hundreds	 shortly	after	 (see	Figure	5).	More	 recent	
and	ongoing	dynamics	in	the	Yemen	conflict	are	discussed	in	2.4.3.		
This	hints	at	a	more	complex	relationship	between	insecurity	and	migration	in	the	HoA	and	
Yemen.	Indeed,	understanding	security	and	its	implications	for	migration	is	complicated	by	
insecurity	 in	multiple	places	of	 origin,	 transit	 and	destination	 along	 these	 routes.	 Somalia	
and	Yemen	are	both	highly	insecure	contexts,	and	yet	people	are	moving	from,	through	and	
to	these	locations.	This	means	that	security	is	likely	to	be	an	ongoing	driver	of	migration,	as	
migrants	 cannot	 necessarily	 exchange	 insecurity	 for	 security	 through	movement	 alone.	 In	
this	 scenario,	 they	may	 find	 themselves	 in	 another	 insecure	 context,	 leading	 to	 repeat	or	
return	movements.	 For	 example,	 since	 the	 escalation	 of	 conflict	 in	 Yemen,	 nearly	 35,000	
people	have	fled	from	Yemen	to	Somalia.	However,	Somalia	is	also	a	context	of	conflict	and	
insecurity,	 and	 this	 (along	 with	 a	 number	 of	 other	 factors,	 in	 particular	 economic),	 has	
encouraged	many	of	these	migrants	to	return	again	to	Yemen,	 in	spite	of	ongoing	conflict	
there	and	before	it	may	be	safe	to	do	so.		
The	 link	 between	 insecurity	 and	 out-migration	 is	 not	 straightforward.	While	 Yemenis	 and	
Somalis	may	leave	their	place	of	origin	to	avoid	insecurity,	this	does	not	mean	that	they	or	
others	will	also	avoid	countries	of	 transit	or	destination	where	security	 is	a	concern.	With	
the	escalation	of	conflict	in	Yemen	in	March	2015,	many	had	anticipated	a	fall	in	the	number	
of	Ethiopian	and	Somali	migrants	seeking	to	travel	to	or	through	the	country.	Arrival	figures	
did	 see	a	 temporary	 reduction	during	 the	months	of	April	and	May	2015.26	However,	 this	
was	 not	 enough	 to	 prevent	 an	 overall	 increase	 (albeit	 small)	 in	 the	 number	 of	 migrants	
reaching	Yemen	in	2015	from	the	previous	year	(refer	to	Figure	2).	The	only	significant	drops	
occurred	in	2010,	conceivably	as	a	result	of	war	along	the	border	between	Yemen	and	Saudi	
Arabia	 and	 the	 Yemeni	 clampdown	 on	 Somali	 migrants,	 and	 in	 2013,	 due	 to	 the	 mass	
expulsion	of	Ethiopian	migrant	workers	by	the	Saudi	authorities	(RMMS,	2016).	In	this	sense,	
while	 insecurity	 may	 be	 a	 driver	 or	 push	 factor	 for	 migrants	 looking	 to	 flee	 insecure	
contexts,	 it	can	also	be	a	pull	 factor	for	others,	who	actively	move	towards	such	contexts.	
This	subject	will	be	explored	in	further	detail	in	Section	2.4.3.	
	
2.4.2.	Underlying	socio-political	structures	
Underlying	 socio-political	 structures	 are	 another	 important	 factor	 in	 understanding	 these	
movements,	 as	 they	 often	 shape	migrants’	 responses	 to	 the	 above-mentioned	 economic,	
political	 and	 security	 conditions.	 These	 include	 state	 policies,	 culture	 of	 migration,	 and	
family	and	social	networks,	which	can	play	a	central	role	in	determining	whether,	when	and	
how	migrants	move	or	stay	put.		
	
                                                
26	According	to	UNHCR	data,	there	were	11,003	recorded	arrivals	in	Yemen	in	March	2015.	Numbers	dropped	
in	April	2015	(4,060	arrivals)	and	May	(1,944	arrivals),	before	rising	again	 in	June	(2,044	arrivals),	 July	(3,903	
arrivals)	and	August	(7,029	arrivals).		
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State	policies	
State	policies	can	have	a	significant	impact	on	migration	and	its	drivers.	In	some	cases,	state	
policy	 is	 a	 direct	 driver	 of	migration	 in	 itself.	 The	 previous	 section	 highlighted	 how	 large	
numbers	of	Ethiopian	Oromos	are	moving	as	a	 result	of	 fear	of	political	persecution	 from	
the	 Government	 of	 Ethiopia.	 In	 other	 cases,	 state	 policy	may	 have	 very	 little	 to	 do	with	
migration,	and	yet	 still	have	an	 impact,	unintended	or	not,	on	people’s	decision	 to	move.	
For	 example,	 2010	 saw	an	 increase	of	 out-migration	of	 Ethiopian	Oromos	disillusioned	 at	
being	 excluded	 from	 the	 benefits	 of	 aid	 received	 by	 the	 Ethiopian	 government	 from	
international	donors	(RMMS,	2016).		
The	relationship	between	the	Governments	of	Ethiopia	and	Saudi	Arabia,	and	their	attempts	
to	 control	 and	manage	migration,	 presents	 a	 useful	 example	 of	 how	 far	 state	 policy	 can	
shape	 how,	 when	 and	 where	 migrants	 move.	 Since	 the	 mid	 1990s	 and	 in	 response	 to	
concerns	 of	 national	 unemployment	 and	 the	 exodus	 of	 billions	 of	 dollars	 leaving	 the	
economy	as	remittances	every	year,	the	Saudi	government	has	been	implementing	a	policy	
of	‘Saudization’,	which	seeks	to	replace	migrant	workers	with	Saudi	citizens	(RMMS,	2014).	In	
this	 context,	 the	 Saudi	 government	 has	 taken	 a	 number	 of	 steps	 to	 reduce	 irregular	
migration,	 including	 restrictions	 on	 visas,	 construction	 of	 a	 border	 wall	 with	 Yemen,	 and	
mass	 deportations	 of	 irregular	 migrants.	 Following	 the	 end	 of	 a	 seven-month	 amnesty	
period	for	undocumented	migrants,	the	authorities	expelled	more	than	160,000	Ethiopians	
between	November	2013	and	March	2014.	Large	numbers	of	Yemeni	and	Somali	migrants	
were	also	deported	during	this	campaign.	Most	recently,	Saudi	Arabia	announced	a	90-day	
amnesty	period	(starting	on	29	March	2017)	after	which	all	irregular	migrant	workers	will	be	
subject	 to	 deportation	 and	 possibly	 face	 fines	 (Toumi,	 2017).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 amid	
concerns	of	abuse	and	poor	treatment	of	 its	workers,	the	Government	of	Ethiopia	banned	
domestic	 workers	 from	 travelling	 abroad	 in	 2013,	 with	 an	 emphasis	 on	 Saudi	 Arabia,	
Lebanon	and	other	Middle	Eastern	countries.		
These	deliberate	state	policies	to	manage	migration	certainly	have	had	an	impact,	and	were	
linked	by	a	number	of	institutions	to	the	drop	in	the	numbers	of	migrants	entering	Yemen	
en	 route	 to	 the	 Gulf	 States	 in	 2013	 and	 2014	 (see	 Figure	 2).27	 However,	 their	 long-term	
impact	remains	limited,	and	the	numbers	of	migrants	moving	from	Yemen	and	on	towards	
Saudi	 Arabia	 has	 continued	 to	 climb.	 This	 suggests	 that	 even	 the	 most	 targeted	 and	
stringent	 state	 policies	 may	 ultimately	 have	 a	 limited	 long-term	 impact	 on	 shaping	
migration,	 as	 migrants	 and	 those	 facilitating	 their	 movements	 find	 alternative	 and	 often	
more	 dangerous	 means	 and	 routes	 to	 reach	 their	 intended	 destinations.	 With	 legal	
opportunities	for	migration	curtailed,	Ethiopian	migrants	looking	to	undertake	domestic	and	
manual	work	in	Saudi	Arabia	have	been	pushed	towards	irregular	migration	channels,	to	the	
benefit	 of	 the	 smugglers	 and	 traffickers	 who	 have	 gained	 increasing	 control	 over	 these	
routes.		
	
	
                                                
27	The	number	of	migrants	arriving	in	Yemen	dropped	from	a	high	of	107,532	in	2012	to	65,319	in	2013	and	
91,592	in	2014	(UNHCR).		
 	 53	
Culture	of	migration	
Common	traditions	or	‘cultures	of	migration’	
have	 emerged,	 which	 shape	 migrants’	
decisions	 and	 choices	 about	 when,	 where	
and	 how	 to	 move.	 These	 traditions	 or	
cultures	 of	 migration	 become	 established	
and	 strengthened	 over	 time	 by	 the	
formation	of	determined	routes,	 recognised	
agents	 and	 diasporic	 groups	 in	 destination	
countries.	 When	 asked	 why	 they	 had	
decided	 to	 migrate,	 many	 interviewees	
indicated	 that	 friends	 and	 family	members	 had	migrated	 before	 them,	 and	 that	 this	 had	
encouraged	them	to	 follow,	often	along	the	same	routes	and	using	the	same	brokers	and	
agents.	 Migrants	 who	 successfully	 reached	 their	 intended	 destination	 seem	 to	 be	
particularly	 influential	 in	 these	 decisions.	 They	 give	 would-be	 migrants	 advice,	
encouragement	and	even	 financial	 support	 in	order	 to	make	the	 journey.	As	social	capital	
grows	and	gains	momentum,	 this	helps	 to	perpetuate	 the	ongoing	popularity	of	different	
routes	 over	 time.	 For	 example,	 a	 large	 number	 of	migrants	 already	 take	 the	Arabian	 Sea	
route,	 which	 encourages	 others	 to	 follow	 in	 the	 same	 footsteps.	 Information	 about	 the	
route	becomes	more	widely	available	and	shared,	ensuring	that	the	route	is	better	known	
and	trusted.	Likewise,	the	relatively	new	route	from	Puntland	to	Europe	via	Yemen	seems	to	
be	 gaining	 in	 popularity	 as	 growing	 social	 capital	 and	 other	 facilitating	 networks	 help	 to	
open	up	the	route	to	a	wider	audience.		
In	 many	 instances,	 migrants	 reported	 travelling	 with	 a	 group	 of	 two	 or	 more	 friends,	
relatives	or	acquaintances	from	the	same	neighbourhood	or	community,	particularly	when	
travelling	 through	Djibouti.	 	According	 to	one	Ethiopian	 interviewee,	 “I	 am	 travelling	with	
my	 cousin.	 We	 are	 always	 together,	 and	 we	 plan	 to	 continue	 our	 journey	 together.”	
Travelling	with	a	group,	rather	than	alone,	may	be	a	means	of	improving	personal	security	
along	 dangerous	 routes.	 However,	 it	 also	 suggests	 that	 people	 from	 similar	 backgrounds	
may	choose	to	migrate	along	similar	routes	due	to	shared	cultures	of	migration	built	up	over	
time.	These	 findings	are	backed	up	by	 longitudinal	 research	 in	Ethiopia,	which	 found	 that	
people	 from	 certain	 communities	 tend	 to	 migrate	 in	 different	 ways	 depending	 on	
longstanding	or	more	 recent	 traditions	of	migration	 (WIDE,	 2016).	 For	 example,	 in	 SNNPR,	
migrants	 from	Girar	 tend	 to	 follow	 the	Gurage	 tradition	 of	 urban	migration,	while	 in	Aze	
Debo’a,	 migration	 to	 South	 Africa	 had	 become	 a	 ‘tradition’	 in	 recent	 years.	 In	 Harresaw	
(East	 Tigray)	migrants	 have	 built	 on	 trade	 links	 with	 Saudi	 Arabia	 through	 Afar.	 In	 Adele	
community	(Oromiya)	it	has	become	a	tradition	for	women	to	migrate	seasonally	to	Djibouti	
as	 domestic	 workers,	 and	 men	 to	 move	 there	 with	 the	 qat	 trade	 for	 men,	 with	 some	
continuing	their	journey	to	Yemen	and	Saudi	Arabia	(WIDE,	2016).		
	
	
	
“When	my	friends	came	back	from	their	
migration,	they	told	me	about	the	advantages	
of	migrating	and	helped	me	to	save	the	money	
I	needed	to	travel.	That	was	why	I	decided	to	
migrate.”	Ethiopian	migrant,	Sana’a.	
	
“I	chose	to	migrate	because	in	my	youth	I	have	
often	seen	young	people	in	my	neighbourhood	
who	succeeded	in	becoming	rich	through	
migration”.	Ethiopian	migrant,	Obock.	
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Family	and	social	networks		
Family	 and	 social	 networks	 were	 an	
important	 framing	 factor	 in	 determining	
migration	 choices	 and	 patterns	 amongst	
those	 interviewed	by	 this	 project.	 In	 some	
instances,	 families	 actively	 pushed	 or	
pressurised	 would-be	 migrants	 into	
moving,	 in	 order	 to	 improve	 and	 diversify	
household	 income	 streams.	 In	 other	
instances,	migrants	may	make	the	decision	
to	move,	out	of	concern	for	the	welfare	of	
the	 family.	 When	 asked	 why	 they	 were	
migrating,	a	number	of	respondents	voiced	
their	desire	to	support	relatives,	to	improve	
the	wellbeing	of	their	children	in	particular	
by	providing	 them	with	better	 educational	
opportunities,	by	securing	a	better	paid	job	
abroad.	 On	 some	 occasions,	 the	 desire	 to	
establish	and	support	a	 family	was	 framed	
within	gendered	stereotypes	of	roles	and	duty.	“As	a	man,	I	must	earn	enough	to	take	care	
of	my	 family,”	 stated	 one	migrant.	 However,	 female	migrants	 also	 expressed	 a	 desire	 to	
support	relatives	and	children	as	their	principal	reason	for	migrating,	suggesting	that	typical	
gendered	roles	are	being	challenged	by	migration.		
In	other	scenarios,	families	acted	as	an	obstacle	to	migration,	and	actively	worked	to	deter	
relatives	from	moving.	One	Somali	migrant	believed	that	the	only	obstacle	to	migrating	was	
from	 his	 family	 who,	 if	 they	 suspected	 him	 of	 moving,	 would	 try	 to	 stop	 him	 and	 even	
inform	the	police	at	the	checkpoints.	An	Ethiopian	migrant	interviewed	in	Obock	described	
stealing	 the	money	he	needed	to	migrate	 (nearly	US$	500)	 from	his	mother,	as	his	 family	
were	against	his	decision	 to	move.	 In	 this	 context,	 it	 is	worth	noting	 that	different	 family	
members	may	perceive	migration	differently	depending	on	a	number	of	 factors,	 including	
their	age,	background	and	past	experience	of	migration.28	Nationality	can	also	play	a	role,	
and	 negative	 associations	 of	 migration	 were	 particularly	 common	 amongst	 Somali	
communities	in	Puntland	and	Somaliland.		
Once	the	decision	to	migrate	has	been	made,	social	capital	through	the	presence	of	family	
members,	 friends,	 or	 migrants	 from	 similar	 clans	 or	 religious	 and	 ethnic	 backgrounds	
contributes	to	migrants’	decision-making	about	which	routes	to	take.29	Migrants	can	obtain	
information,	support,	loans,	shelter	and	employment	opportunities	through	these	networks,	
and	 interviewees	 reported	 receiving	 financial	 support	 from	 relatives	 at	 home	 and	 in	 the	
diaspora.	At	times,	this	assistance	has	proved	lifesaving,	and	respondents	reported	receiving	
                                                
28	Research	suggests	that	older	people	are	more	likely	to	associate	migration	with	poverty,	whereas	younger	
people	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 connect	 migration	 with	 income	 generation	 and,	 more	 broadly,	 with	 ideas	 of	
modernity	and	success	(WIDE,	2016).	
29	 Social	 capital	 is	 defined	 by	 the	 Organisation	 for	 Economic	 Cooperation	 and	 Development	 (OECD)	 as	
“networks	 together	 with	 shared	 norms,	 values	 and	 understandings	 that	 facilitate	 co-operation	 within	 or	
among	groups”.	
“I	wanted	to	change	my	life.	I	wanted	to	
change	my	family’s	life.	I	wanted	to	spend	on	
myself,	get	married	and	help	my	family.”	
Ethiopian	migrant,	Sana’a.	
	
“I	wanted	to	build	a	house	for	my	children	and	
wife.	This	was	the	main	goal:	just	to	build	two	
rooms,	a	bathroom	and	kitchen	for	my	
children.”	Ethiopian	migrant,	Sana’a.	
	
“My	wife	insisted	that	we	leave	and	search	for	
a	better	life,	rather	than	staying	and	living	in	
poor	conditions.”	Ethiopian	migrant,	Bossaso.	
	
“My	mother	got	the	information	about	the	
route	and	the	journey	from	a	friend	who	had	
travelled	before,	and	shared	information	
about	the	route,	cost,	which	boat	to	use,	and	
which	smuggler	would	help	me	to	arrive	
safely.”		Somali	migrant,	Aden.	
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much-needed	food,	water	and	money	via	these	networks.	Likewise,	families	may	be	called	
upon	 to	 pay	 ransoms	 on	 behalf	 of	 relatives	 who	 have	 been	 kidnaped	 by	 smuggling	 and	
trafficking	groups.	In	Yemen,	migrants	reported	their	family	members	paying	ransoms	of	up	
to	 US$	 2,000,	 without	 which	 they	 would	 have	 been	 subjected	 to	 ongoing	 torture	 and,	
potentially,	death	(IOM,	2015).	Families	interviewed	in	Bossaso	described	paying	ransoms	of	
between	US$	8,000	 to	10,000	 to	 cover	 the	 costs	of	 their	 children’s	 journey	 to	Europe	via	
Yemen	and	Libya.30		
While	families	play	a	central	role	in	many	cases	of	migration,	there	is	growing	evidence	that	
people	are	choosing	to	migrate	independently	and	without	the	approval	of	family	members.	
The	 ‘leave	now,	pay	 later’	scheme	increasingly	adopted	by	smugglers	negates	the	need	to	
involve	other	family	members	in	the	decision	to	migrate,	even	if	it	also	implicates	them	later	
on	 in	 the	 associated	 costs	 (Ali,	 2016).	 Of	 the	 Somali	migrants	 interviewed	 in	 Bossaso	 and	
planning	to	travel	to	Europe,	none	had	informed	their	families	of	their	migration	plans,	but	
were	expecting	them	to	pay	the	costs	of	the	 journey	once	they	received	the	call	 from	the	
smugglers.	In	this	scenario,	the	family	may	find	itself	subsequently	involved	in	paying	for	a	
journey	 it	never	agreed	 to	or	even	knew	was	occurring,	with	significant	consequences	 for	
the	economic	security	of	the	wider	household.	This	highlights	how	the	risks	and	benefits	of	
migration	are	often	experienced	by	the	wider	family	unit,	and	not	just	the	person	migrating,	
as	families	have	to	sell	assets	or	use	savings	in	order	to	send	a	family	member	abroad	or	pay	
for	 their	 release.	 The	 controversial	 ‘leave	 now,	 pay	 later’	 migration	 is	 most	 common	
amongst	 Somalis,	 and	 may	 explain	 why	 Somali	 families	 in	 Puntland	 and	 Somaliland	 had	
particularly	negative	perceptions	of	migration.		
	
2.4.3.	Deterioration	of	conditions	in	the	region	
Yemen,	 Ethiopia	 and	 Somalia	 have	 all	 experienced	a	deterioration	of	 conditions	 in	 recent	
years	 for	 reasons	of	 conflict,	 political	unrest	 and	 climatic	 instability.	 Such	 conditions	have	
often	 given	 rise	 to	 greater	 levels	 of	 migration,	 and	 many	 analysts	 and	 observers	 have	
attributed	 the	 growth	 in	migration	 between	 the	 HoA	 and	 Yemen	 to	 these	 factors.	When	
planning	 for	 this	 project,	 the	 research	 team	 logically	 considered	 the	 potential	 for	 similar	
patterns	 and	 trends.	 Indeed,	 during	 interviews,	 a	 large	 number	 of	 respondents	 from	
government	and	institutions	often	cited	these	factors	to	justify	record	movements	to	Yemen	
in	2016.		
Nevertheless,	a	more	thorough	analysis	of	the	available	data	shows	that,	while	the	number	
of	Somalis	arriving	in	Yemen	has	remained	more	or	less	stable,	there	has	been	a	68%	drop	in	
the	 number	 of	 Ethiopians	 since	 the	 high	 of	 June	 2016.	 While	 it	 is	 true	 that	 patterns	 of	
movement	 fluctuate	 over	 the	 year	 due	 to	 weather,	 political	 and	 religious	 conditions	
(migration	 numbers	 tend	 to	 peak	 over	 Ramadan),	 a	 comparison	 of	 monthly	 migration	
numbers	 in	 2016	 and	 2017,	 also	 suggests	 a	 significant	 and	 sustained	 drop	 over	 the	 last	
seven	months	(see	Table	5).		
                                                
30		One	Somali	respondent	described	how	the	family	had	received	a	call	from	his	brother	in	Sudan,	saying	that	
if	 the	 family	 did	 not	 pay	 US$	 6,500	 to	 cover	 the	 costs	 of	 the	 journey	 from	 Somalia	 to	 Libya,	 he	would	 be	
tortured	by	the	traffickers	who	were	now	holding	him	captive.	Three	weeks	later,	the	family	received	another	
call	from	an	affiliated	trafficking	group	in	Libya	demanding	an	additional	US$	1,500	to	transport	the	brother	to	
Italy,	and	then	on	to	Austria.			
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Table	 5:	 Monthly	 comparisons	 of	 Ethiopian	 arrivals	 in	 Yemen	 (Data	 source:	 UNHCR	 and	
partners)	
Month	 2015	 2016	 2017	 %	Difference	
October	 11,429	 6,209	 	 -46%	
November	 3,001	 4,090	 	 +36%	*	
December	 11,234	 4,209	 	 -63%	
January	 	 9,193	 3,943	 -57%	
February	 	 6,569	 3,703	 -44%	
March	 	 8,665	 4,747	 -45%	
April	 	 10,218	 4,709	 -54%	
*	Arabian	sea	crossings	in	November	2016	saw	a	significant	drop	due	to	adverse	weather	conditions	
brought	about	by	cyclones	Chapala	and	Magh,	and	so	 this	 figure	should	be	viewed	as	an	anomaly	
(RMMS,	2017).	
This	 would	 suggest	 that,	 while	 the	 recent	 deterioration	 of	 conditions	 may	 have	 had	 a	
significant	impact	on	people’s	movement	choices	and	patterns,	it	has	not	necessarily	led	to	
an	increase	in	out-migration	along	routes	to	Yemen,	as	commonly	expected	or	assumed	in	
much	 of	 the	 literature.	 This	 implies	 that	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 deterioration	 of	
conditions	 and	migration	 remains	 complex,	 and	underpinned	by	 a	 range	of	 other	 factors,	
such	as	increases	in	the	costs	of	the	journey,	tightening	of	border	controls,	and	the	current	
threat	of	deportation	from	Saudi	Arabia	(although	it	is	worth	noting	that	migrant	flows	had	
already	been	 falling	before	 the	Saudi	announcement	on	deportations	was	made	 in	March	
2017).	Exploring	these	factors	further	would	require	more	research	examining	 later	stages	
of	people’s	migration	trajectory.	It	is	also	possible	that	the	data	does	not	reflect	the	actual	
situation	 on	 the	 ground,	 as	 ongoing	 conflict	 in	 Yemen	 continues	 to	 have	 an	 impact	 on	
monitoring	missions	 in	 the	 country,	 and	 the	 total	 number	of	 arrivals	 into	Yemen	 could	 in	
fact	 be	 much	 higher	 than	 the	 data	 is	 able	 to	 suggest	 (RMMS,	 2017).	 In	 this	 context	 of	
uncertainty,	 this	 section	 avoids	making	 any	 clear	 statements	 of	 fact,	 but	 rather	 seeks	 to	
explore	 a	 number	 of	 different	 and	 potential	 avenues	 and	 influences	 that	may	 be	 driving	
migration	trends.		
The	 deterioration	 of	 conditions	 in	 the	 region	 may	 also	 have	 had	 consequences	 for	 the	
numbers	of	migrants	arriving	in	Europe.	Data	from	Frontex	shows	that	people	recorded	as	
being	from	Ethiopia	and	Somalia	on	the	borders	of	Europe	increased	from	8,261	in	2014	to	
20,429	 in	 2015	 (see	 Figure	 8)	 to	 just	 under	 11,935	 in	 2017.	 	 Prior	 to	 2015,	 only	 a	 small	
number	 (several	 hundred)	 of	 Ethiopians	 were	 recorded	 on	 the	 border	 of	 Europe.	 This	
changed	in	2015	and	2016,	when	2,735	and	3,660	Ethiopians	reached	Europe	respectively.	
The	 route	 through	 Libya	 to	 the	 Central	 Mediterranean	 was	 the	 most	 commonly	 used.	
However,	as	 indicated	earlier	 in	 the	 report,	 the	 route	 to	Europe	via	Yemen	appears	 to	be	
growing	in	popularity,	especially	amongst	Somalis.	That	said,	data	collected	by	UNHCR	and	
RMMS	shows	a	decline	in	HoA	arrivals	to	Europe	during	2016	and	2017,	mainly	attributable	
to	a	90%	fall	in	the	number	of	Eritreans,	who	are	reportedly	finding	it	increasingly	difficult	to	
reach	Europe	due	to	a	tightening	of	border	controls	in	Sudan	(RMMS,	2017).		
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Figure	8:	Arrivals	of	Ethiopian	and	Somali	migrants	to	Europe	(Source:	Frontex)	
	
	
Conflict	in	Yemen	
Since	 fighting	 escalated	 in	 Yemen	 in	 March	 2015,	 the	 current	 situation	 in	 the	 country	
continues	to	deteriorate	significantly.31	OCHA	describes	the	country	as	being	in	protracted	
crisis,	characterised	by	widespread	poverty,	conflict,	poor	governance	and	weak	rule	of	law,	
including	widely	 reported	 human	 rights	 violations	 (UNOCHA,	 2017).	 The	 economy	 is	 near	
collapse,	public	and	private	services	have	all	but	disappeared,	and	Yemenis	have	lost	most	
of	their	livelihoods	and	savings	(Yemen	Mixed	Migration	Task	Force,	2017).	Over	17	million	
people	do	not	have	access	to	adequate	food	and	frequently	miss	meals,	and	seven	million	
Yeminis	are	ever	closer	to	starvation	(UNOCHA,	2017).	Conflict	continues	to	devastate	the	
country's	 health	 facilities;	 less	 than	 half	 are	 fully	 functional	 and	 many	 public	 health	
professionals	 have	 not	 been	 paid	 in	 months	 (UN,	 2017).	 This	 has	 severely	 undermined	
efforts	to	contain	a	cholera	outbreak	brought	about	by	collapsing	national	health,	water	and	
sanitation	systems.	The	disease	has	since	spread	to	20	out	of	22	governorates,	and	claimed	
the	lives	of	1,300	people,	and	affected	200,000	more	(as	of	24	June	2017)	(WHO,	2017).		
Now	entering	 into	 its	 third	 year,	 the	 conflict	 in	 Yemen	has	 also	 resulted	 in	 high	 levels	 of	
displacement	 and	 migration.	 UNHCR	 estimates	 that	 over	 2	 million	 people	 are	 internally	
displaced,	 and	 over	 180,000	 people	 have	 fled	 the	 country	 to	 either	 the	 HoA	 or	 GCC	
countries.	 However,	 in	 spite	 of	 these	 large	 figures,	 migrants	 from	 the	 HoA	 have	 not	
necessarily	 responded	 as	 might	 be	 expected.	 Logically,	 places	 of	 conflict	 are	 often	
characterised	 by	 increased	 out-migration	 and	 reduced	 in-migration	 as	 people	 look	 for	
                                                
31	 Fighting	 is	 taking	 place	 between	 two	 rival	 governments.	 On	 the	 one	 side,	 there	 is	 the	 internationally	
recognized	government	of	President	Abed	Rabbo	Mansour	al-Hadi,	which	is	currently	based	in	Aden	and	has	
the	backing	of	a	coalition	of	allies	including	the	US,	UK,	France,	and	Saudi	Arabia	(RMMS,	2017).	On	the	other	
side,	are	the	Houthi	rebels,	who	have	taken	over	Sana’a,	and	are	allegedly	backed	by	Iran.	In	addition,	a	range	
of	 tribal	militias	 and	 insurgent	 groups,	 some	with	 ties	 to	 Al	 Qaeda	 and	 the	 Islamic	 State	 group,	 control	 or	
operate	within	certain	territories.	
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greater	 safety	 and	 security	 elsewhere.	 While	 the	 numbers	 of	 people	 displaced	 remain	
considerable,	the	scale	of	the	out-migration	from	Yemen	quickly	slowed	after	the	first	few	
months,	 and	 the	 anticipated	 larger	 influx	 of	 refugees	 into	 neighbouring	 countries	 never	
occurred,	 in	 spite	 of	 ongoing	 conflict.	 Furthermore,	 according	 to	 interviews	 with	 key	
informants	 and	 the	 migrants	 themselves,	 Somali	 returnees	 and	 Yemeni	 refugees	 are	
increasingly	opting	to	return	to	Yemen,	in	spite	of	the	dangers	they	may	face	there,	and	as	a	
result	of	diminished	living	standards	in	Puntland	and	Djibouti.		
At	the	same	time,	the	expected	reduction	in	in-migration	by	Ethiopian	and	Somali	migrants	
also	 did	 not	 materialise.	 Many	 Ethiopian	 and	 Somali	 migrants	 say	 they	 have	 been	
encouraged	by	the	breakdown	of	state	institutions	in	Yemen	and	subsequent	lack	of	policy	
and	control.	They	believe	(or	are	led	to	believe	by	smugglers)	that	this	vacuum	provides	an	
opportunity	 to	enter,	 travel	 through	and	exit	 the	country	unnoticed.	 Indeed,	a	number	of	
Yemeni	 authorities	 interviewed	 as	 part	 of	 this	 research	 described	 the	 government’s	
response	 to	 migration	 as	 significantly	 weaker	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 conflict.	 The	 conflict	 has	
dramatically	reduced	border	security	along	the	Yemeni-Saudi	border,	with	border	posts	on	
both	 sides	 of	 the	 frontier	 destroyed	 (RMMS,	 2017).	 According	 to	 official	 data	 shared	 by	
Yemen’s	Ministry	of	Interior,	4,000	migrants	were	deported	in	2015	in	contrast	to	1,000	in	
2016	 (although	 it	 has	 not	 been	 possible	 to	 reconfirm	 these	 figures).	 Smuggling	 and	
trafficking	 networks	 have	 also	 taken	 advantage	 of	 Yemen’s	 deteriorating	 situation	 to	
establish	profitable,	transnational	networks	that	operate	with	impunity	in	the	country.	One	
member	of	a	smuggling	group	interviewed	in	Bossaso	claimed	that	before	the	escalation	of	
conflict	in	Yemen,	his	boats	were	regularly	targeted	by	the	Yemeni	Navy	patrolling	the	sea.	
Since	 then,	 patrols	 seem	 to	 be	 less	 regular	 and	 effective,	 although	 smugglers	 do	 report	
being	disrupted	by	 the	PMPF	and	 the	Saudi-led	 coalition.	 	 In	 this	 scenario,	 a	 lack	of	 state	
policy	and	control	can	be	as	much	of	a	factor	in	determining	migration	levels	and	choices	as	
the	 introduction	of	migration	management	policy.	 Similar	 trends	have	been	seen	 in	other	
war-torn	 settings,	 such	 as	 Libya,	 where	 a	 breakdown	 in	 law	 and	 order	 encouraged	 large	
numbers	of	migrants	to	seek	transit	to	Europe.	
While	the	numbers	of	those	affected	by	insecurity	in	Yemen	should	not	be	underestimated,	
the	 anticipated	 levels	 of	 migration	 both	 in	 and	 out	 of	 the	 country	 have	 not	 matched	
common	 expectations.	 There	 may	 be	 a	 number	 of	 reasons	 behind	 this	 outcome.	 Firstly,	
most	Yemenis	lack	the	financial	resources	and	social	capital	to	migrate	far	from	their	place	
of	origin.	As	 indicated	by	 the	 large	number	of	 IDPs	 (around	1	 in	10	of	 the	population	are	
internally	 displaced),	 many	 Yemenis	 chose	 to	 flee	 within	 Yemen	 rather	 than	 abroad,	
returning	to	their	place	of	origin	if	and	when	stability	was	restored.	Those	that	did	choose	to	
move	further	afield,	did	so	to	neighbouring	countries,	where	the	number	of	arrivals	did	not	
meet	 the	 expected	 influx.	Another	 reason	 for	 staying	 ‘close	by’	 is	 the	 fear	 of	 leaving	 and	
losing	 property,	 as	 land	 disputes	 are	 common	 in	 Yemen	 (RMMS,	 2016).	 Secondly,	 large	
numbers	 of	 Ethiopian,	 Somali	 and	 Yemeni	 migrants	 may	 be	 more	 disposed	 to	 tolerate	
hardship	and	risk	than	is	generally	assumed,	and	will	therefore	be	more	willing	to	stay	put	
or	move	towards	danger	than	expected,	particularly	if	they	perceive	their	place	of	origin	as	
one	of	danger	or	hopelessness.	As	described	earlier	in	the	report,	most	migrants	are	aware	
of	the	risks	and	dangers	of	the	journeys	and	do	not	regret	their	decision	to	move	even	when	
they	 have	 experienced	 injury,	 abuse,	 indebtedness	 and	 severe	 hardship.	 Thirdly,	 many	
migrants	 perceive	 contexts	 of	 insecurity	 and	 conflict	 as	 an	 advantage	 rather	 than	 a	
hindrance.	Authorities	 that	 are	distracted	or	weakened	by	 conflict	may	be	 less	 vigilant	or	
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concerned	 with	 irregular	 migration,	 giving	 migrants	 a	 better	 chance	 of	 passing	 through	
undetected.		
In	these	scenarios,	conflict	in	Yemen	has	certainly	had	a	significant	impact	on	the	movement	
choices	and	patterns	of	different	groups	of	people.	Perhaps	unexpectedly,	however,	 it	has	
led	 to	 large	 flows	 of	 migrants	 travelling	 in	 both	 directions	 as,	 depending	 on	 their	
circumstances,	hopes	and	expectations,	migrants	are	both	moving	towards	and	away	from	
insecurity	in	Yemen,	or	having	little	choice	but	to	stay	put.			
		
Unrest	in	Ethiopia	
Following	 violent	 clashes	 between	 protesters	 and	 state	 authorities,	 the	 Government	 of	
Ethiopia	declared	a	six-month	State	of	Emergency	in	October	2016	granting	the	authorities	
the	power	to	restrict	opposition	activities	and	 impose	curfews.	The	order	was	renewed	 in	
March	2017	for	a	 further	six	months.	 In	November	2016,	 the	Government	announced	the	
arrest	 of	 more	 than	 11,000	 people,	 mainly	 from	 the	 Oromia	 and	 Amhara	 regions.	 In	 a	
statement	 to	 the	 European	 Parliament	 in	 October	 2016,	 Human	 Rights	 Watch	 (HRW)	
accused	 the	Ethiopian	 security	 forces	of	using	excessive	and	unnecessary	 lethal	 force	and	
killing	at	 least	500	protestors	(Human	Rights	Watch,	2016).	As	has	been	outlined	earlier	 in	
this	report,	political	 factors,	 in	particular	the	fear	of	political	persecution,	were	a	common	
driver	amongst	the	Ethiopians	interviewed	by	this	research.	Furthermore,	the	proportion	of	
Ethiopian	Oromos	 registered	 in	 Yemen	by	UNHCR	and	 its	 partners	has	 risen	 sharply	 from	
64%	 in	 2014	 to	 95%	 in	 2016	 (RMMS,	 2016).	 Oromia	 was	 the	 focal	 point	 for	 many	 anti-
government	protests	and	violent	clashes	over	 land,	political,	economic	and	cultural	 rights,	
and	Oromos	have	been	at	the	centre	of	arrests	and	detention	by	the	authorities.	
Political	unrest	in	Ethiopia	has	often	been	described	as	a	significant	underlying	factor	behind	
the	 migration	 choices	 and	 patterns	 of	 many	 Ethiopian	 nationals.	 Nevertheless,	 the	
relationship	between	unrest	in	Ethiopia	and	patterns	of	migration	is	not	so	straightforward.	
While	 some	 organisations	 have	made	 the	 link	 between	 recent	 unrest	 and	 increased	 out-
migration,	 others	 have	 used	 Ethiopia’s	 current	 State	 of	 Emergency	 as	 an	 explanation	 for	
perceived	falling	rates	of	migration.	The	Government	of	Ethiopia	has	placed	restrictions	on	
movements,	 and	 respondents	 reported	 that	 Ethiopian	 migrants,	 allegedly	 Oromos	 in	
particular,	 are	 being	 stopped	 from	 crossing	 the	 border	 by	 both	 Ethiopian	 and	 Somali	
security	forces	and	returned	to	Ethiopia.	A	number	of	Ethiopian	interviewees	attempting	to	
cross	the	border	with	Djibouti,	described	being	detained	or	narrowly	evading	arrest,	by	the	
Ethiopian	 forces	 patrolling	 the	 area.	Most	 interviewees	 in	 Puntland,	 Yemen	 and	 Djibouti	
reported	a	reduction	in	Ethiopians	crossing	to	Yemen;	assertions	that	are	substantiated	by	
available	data	(see	Section	2.1.1.).		
While	the	proportion	of	Oromos	moving	through	Yemen	may	have	increased	significantly	in	
the	last	three	years	(according	to	data	collected	by	UNHCR,	DRC	and	RMMS),	the	absolute	
numbers	of	Ethiopians	moving	through	Yemen	in	the	wake	of	political	unrest	has	decreased.	
This	could	be	as	a	result	of	a	range	of	policies	and	events	in	Ethiopia	and	the	wider	region	
that	are	encouraging	Ethiopians	to	use	alternative	routes,	stay	put	in	Ethiopia,	or	to	remain	
in	 neighbouring	 countries.	 It	 remains	 unclear	 which	 specific	 factors	 may	 be	 behind	 the	
reduction	in	migrant	numbers,	but	interviews	carried	out	by	this	and	other	research	point	to	
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a	 range	of	possibilities.	These	 include:	 restrictions	on	movements	of	Ethiopians	under	 the	
ongoing	 State	 of	 Emergency;	 renewed	 deportations	 from	 Yemen	 since	 September	 2016	
(RMMS,	 2017);	 drought	 and	 its	 erosion	 of	 resilience,	 livelihoods	 and	 opportunities	 for	
migration	(see	more	on	this	in	the	next	section);	an	increase	in	the	costs	of	the	journey	as	
smugglers	extend	their	geographic	reach,	and	borders	become	harder	to	cross;	worsening	
conditions	of	conflict,	insecurity,	hardship	and	abuse	in	Yemen	(although,	as	argued	above,	
this	can	also	serve	as	a	pull	factor	to	migrants	who	believe	this	will	enable	them	to	transit	
Yemen	 undetected);	 and	 tighter	 border	 controls	 by	 Saudi	 Arabia,	 including	 the	 threat	 of	
deportation.	 It	 is	 also	 possible	 that	 constrained	 access,	 brought	 about	 by	 conflict	 and	
insecurity	 in	 Yemen,	 is	 affecting	 the	 accuracy	 of	 data	 collected	 on	 migrant	 numbers,	
suggesting	 that	migration	 levels	may	 in	 fact	 be	 continuing	much	 as	 before	 and	without	 a	
reduction.		
	
Drought	and	potential	famine	in	the	region	
Severe	and	consecutive	drought	across	Somalia	has	reduced	water	sources,	depleted	crop	
harvests	 and	 livestock	 stocks,	 and	undermined	 local	 resilience	 and	 livelihoods.	 6.7	million	
people	(over	half	of	the	country’s	population)	are	now	acutely	food	insecure,	of	which	3.2	
million	 are	 coping	 with	 severe	 food	 insecurity	 (as	 of	 May	 2017)	 (FSNAU	 Somalia,	 2017).	
Furthermore,	severe	drought,	rising	prices,	continued	insecurity	and	access	limitations,	and	
depressed	 rain	 forecasts	 point	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	 famine	 in	 Somalia	 in	 2017	 (UNOCHA,	
2017).	 Southwestern	 Ethiopia	 and	 northeastern	 Kenya	 are	 also	 suffering	 the	 impacts	 of	
drought,	and	an	estimated	2.7	million	Kenyans	and	5.6	million	Ethiopians	will	require	food	
assistance	 in	 2017	 (UNOCHA,	 2017).	 Ongoing	 drought	 in	 Djibouti	 since	 2008	 and	 the	
associated	 water	 shortages	 have	 affected	 large	 sections	 of	 the	 population.	 Incidents	 of	
malnutrition,	malaria	and	diarrheal	disease	have	risen.	Pastoralists	and	those	living	in	rural	
communities	are	particularly	affected.	Livestock	has	suffered	as	a	result	of	water	shortages,	
and	stocks	have	reduced,	 forcing	many	to	move	to	urban	settings.	 In	Yemen,	drought	has	
left	some	17	million	people	(nearly	60%	of	the	population)	food	insecure,	and	an	estimated	
462,000	 children	 are	 suffering	 from	 severe	 acute	malnutrition	 (as	 of	April	 2017)	 (UNHCR,	
2017).		
Drought	and	famine	are	a	major	driver	of	migration	within	the	HoA.	The	2011	famine	was	
linked	to	the	out-migration	of	large	numbers	of	Somalis	to	Yemen	(RMMS,	2016).	Past	and	
present	droughts	in	Ethiopia	have	led	to	similar	movements	of	Ethiopians	nationals.	Almost	
all	 Ethiopian	arrivals	 in	 Yemen	 interviewed	by	UNHCR	and	 its	 partners	 cited	drought	 as	 a	
reason	 for	migrating	 (RMMS,	2016).	However,	 this	 research	points	 to	 somewhat	different	
findings.	Some	migrants	 interviewed	as	part	of	this	research	cited	drought	as	a	reason	for	
moving;	one	Somali	said	he	was	planning	to	travel	 to	Saudi	Arabia	to	help	his	 family	after	
they	 lost	 their	 animals	 and	 crops	 to	 drought.	Overall,	 however,	 few	migrants	 linked	 their	
migration	specifically	 to	drought,	 suggesting	 that	while	drought	and	potential	 famine	may	
be	one	of	a	number	of	reasons	for	migrating	to	Yemen	and	beyond,	they	are	not	the	main	
driver	 of	movements	 towards	 or	 from	 Yemen.	 This	 is	 substantiated	 by	 the	 available	 data	
which	 shows	 an	 overall	 downward	 trend	 in	 movements	 to	 and	 from	 Yemen	 in	 recent	
months,	and	does	not,	as	yet,	suggest	a	significant	rise	or	spike	 in	out-migration	 linked	to	
drought	and	potential	famine	(refer	back	to	Figures	3	and	5,	and	Figure	9	below).		
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Figure	9:	Somali	and	Ethiopian	arrivals	in	Yemen	across	the	Arabian	Sea	and	Red	Sea	routes	
(Data	source:	UNHCR	and	partners)	
	
Communities	 affected	 by	 drought	 often	 lack	 the	 resources	 and	 ability	 to	 engage	 in	 long-
distance	 migration,	 or	 any	 movement	 at	 all,	 as	 their	 resources	 and	 resilience	 become	
increasingly	 depleted.	 Conflict	 and	 the	 threat	 of	 famine	 in	 Yemen	 and	 the	 reduction	 in	
humanitarian	space	(due	to	airstrikes,	ground	clashes	and	bureaucratic	 impediments)	may	
also	act	as	a	deterrent	to	drought-affected	communities	looking	for	support	and	assistance.	
What’s	more,	in	recent	years,	the	Government	of	Ethiopia,	with	support	from	international	
partners,	 has	 taken	 proactive	 steps	 to	 plan	 for	 and	 respond	 to	 recurring	 drought	 in	 the	
region	by	establishing	early	warning	systems,	welfare	safety	nets,	food	reserves	and	better	
infrastructure	to	 improve	resilience	and,	potentially,	reduce	the	need	for	drought-affected	
Ethiopians	to	move	abroad	(UN,	2017).	Viewed	from	this	perceptive,	drought	does	not	yet	
appear	 to	 be	 driving	 larger	 numbers	 of	 Ethiopians	 and	 Somalis	 to	 Yemen,	 or	 vice	 versa.	
What	is	more,	drought	may	even	have	contributed	to	a	reduction	in	migration,	as	would-be	
migrants	and	their	families,	experiencing	depleted	resilience	and	resources,	no	longer	have	
the	funds	to	pay	for	their	journey,	and	stay	put	instead	of	moving.		
To	 be	 clear,	 while	 drought-affected	 communities	 may	 not	 be	 moving	 in	 large	 numbers	
towards	 Yemen	 and	 beyond,	 this	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 drought	 is	 not	 driving	 migration	
elsewhere.	 Those	 who	 are	 able	 to	 move	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 migrate	 internally	 to	 nearby	
urban	areas	within	their	own	country,	or	to	neighbouring	countries	than	to	attempt	to	cross	
the	sea	to	Yemen	and	beyond.	An	estimated	738,600	Somalis	and	843,000	Ethiopians	have	
been	 internally	 displaced	 between	 November	 2016	 and	 May	 2017	 (OCHA,	 2017).	 5,128	
drought-affected	 Somalis	 have	 also	 crossed	 into	 Ethiopia,	 and	 a	 further	 2,500	 into	 Kenya	
(Ibid).		
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3.	To	what	extent	are	smuggling	and	trafficking	networks	involved	in	
facilitating	people’s	movements?	
	
The	scale	and	scope	of	 smuggling	and	 trafficking	activities	have	 increased	 in	 recent	years,	
together	with	the	revenue	they	earn	and	the	scale	and	severity	of	the	abuses	they	inflict	on	
migrants	 (Human	 Rights	 Watch,	 2014).	 These	 networks	 have	 evolved	 over	 time	 to	 span	
borders	across	Ethiopia,	Somaliland,	Puntland,	Djibouti,	Yemen,	Saudi	Arabia,	and	beyond.	
This	shift	in	scope	and	professionalism	can	be	attributed	to	a	number	of	factors.		
Firstly,	 with	 the	 increase	 in	 migrants	 travelling	 along	 these	 routes,	 there	 has	 been	 a	
significant	 growth	 in	 demand	 for	 smugglers’	 services.	 The	 number	 of	migrants	 arriving	 in	
Yemen	from	the	HoA	has	risen	from	approximately	25,000	 in	2006	to	around	100,000	per	
year	since	2011.	Growing	demand	can	also	be	attributed	to	the	changing	profile	of	migrants.	
Up	 until	 2008,	 Somalis	 constituted	 the	 bulk	 of	 those	 crossing	 from	 Puntland	 to	 Yemen.	
Smuggling	 services	 to	 facilitate	 this	 journey	 were	 not	 in	 high	 demand,	 as	 Somalis	 were	
engaging	in	legal	migration	within	their	own	country.	Somalis	and	migrants	from	the	Somali	
region	 of	 Ethiopia	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 journey	 to	 Bossaso	 without	 recourse	 to	 smugglers,	
particularly	 if	 they	know	 the	 route	and	keep	 to	areas	where	 they	have	 clan	 ties	 (UNODC,	
2013).	Over	 the	past	nine	years,	 the	number	of	Ethiopians	migrating	 through	Somalia	has	
increased	dramatically,	 and	a	network	of	 smugglers	has	 emerged	 in	 Somaliland,	 Puntland	
and	beyond,	 to	 facilitate	 their	 journey	 as	 ‘irregular	migrants’.	Additionally,	 in	 an	effort	 to	
manage	migration,	 states	 in	 the	 region	 have	 taken	 actions	 to	 strengthen	 border	 control,	
making	it	harder	for	migrants	to	cross	from	one	country	to	another.	This	has	worked	to	the	
smugglers	 advantage,	 as	 more	 migrants	 are	 obliged	 to	 seek	 their	 services	 in	 order	 to	
traverse	increasingly	difficult	and	hostile	routes.		
Secondly,	the	potential	profits	linked	to	smuggling	and	trafficking	are	substantial,	which	has	
encouraged	a	growing	supply	of	 individuals	and	groups	seeking	to	offer	their	services.	The	
maritime	 crossing	 to	 Yemen	 can	 only	 be	 made	 with	 the	 assistance	 of	 smugglers,	 and	
therefore	serves	as	a	point	where	clear	calculations	on	cost	can	be	made	(UNODC,	2010).	
According	to	2016	figures	from	UNHCR	and	partners,	98,638	migrants	arrived	in	Yemen	via	
the	Arabian	Sea,	and	an	additional	18,457	arrived	via	 the	Red	Sea.	Based	on	the	reported	
costs,	migrants	 pay	 $125	 and	 $130	 via	 the	 Arabian	 and	 Red	 Sea	 routes	 respectively.	 The	
networks	 that	 facilitate	 these	 sea	 crossings,	 therefore,	 stand	 to	make	 a	minimum	of	US$	
14.7	million	 (US$	 12.3	million	 across	 the	Arabian	 Sea	 and	US$	 2.4	million	 across	 the	 Red	
Sea).	There	are	some	costs	associated	with	the	boats	and	fuel,	and	payments	for	protection	
will	also	be	needed.		Nevertheless,	this	amount	of	revenue	represents	a	sizeable	economy	
and	has	 attracted	many	 to	 the	business	of	 smuggling.	 Large	numbers	 travel	 on	 the	boats	
from	 Puntland,	 with	 sources	 and	 imagery	 indicating	 that	 between	 two	 and	 three	 boats	
depart	 each	 day,	 each	 carrying	 75	 to	 110	 people,	 representing	 large	 profits	 for	 the	
individuals	 involved.32	What’s	more,	 the	 sea	 crossings	 represent	 only	 a	 small	 part	 of	 the	
total	journey	revenues	and	it	is	likely	that	many	more	migrants	are	taking	these	routes	than	
suggested	 by	 official	 data.	 This	 means	 that	 the	 full	 scale	 of	 potential	 revenue	 will	 be	
                                                
32	When	imagery	has	been	available	of	the	boats,	it	has	shown	long,	open	craft	with	large	numbers	of	people	
(between	75	and	130)	pressed	together.	
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significantly	higher	when	overland	routes	are	also	taken	into	consideration	(refer	to	Table	4	
in	Section	2.3.3).			
Thirdly,	smugglers	and	traffickers	appear	to	
operate	with	relative	impunity	as	a	result	of	
a	 lack	of	sustained	or	meaningful	response	
from	 local	 or	 national	 authorities.	 In	 spite	
of	 high-level	 rhetoric	 and	 the	 adoption	 of	
international	 and	 national	 smuggling	 and	
trafficking	 legislation,	 in	 practice,	 states	
have	 failed	 to	 challenge	 the	 networks	 on	
the	 ground.	 According	 to	 the	 US	 State	
Department,	 “Somaliland	 and	 Puntland	
authorities	 sustained	 minimal	 efforts	 to	
combat	 trafficking”,	 and	 that,	 despite	
possessing	functioning	legal	systems,	they	demonstrated	limited	law	enforcement	capacity	
when	it	came	to	trafficking	investigations	or	prosecutions	(US	Department	of	State,	2016).	
Respondents	interviewed	as	part	of	this	research	consistently	accused	the	authorities	of	not	
doing	enough	 to	 combat	 smuggling	and	 trafficking	along	 these	 routes,	 and	directly	 linked	
this	 inaction	 with	 government	 corruption	 and	 the	 growth	 in	 smuggling	 and	 trafficking	
activities	in	the	region.	In	Puntland,	respondents	claimed	that	members	of	the	networks	are	
well	known	and	easy	to	find,	and	yet	live	without	interference.	Indeed,	the	researchers	were	
provided	with	a	list	of	names	and	contact	numbers	of	Bossaso	smugglers	by	a	government	
official.	Many	of	 the	same	 launching	points	have	been	used	 for	years	and	all	 respondents	
were	familiar	with	their	names	and	locations.	What’s	more,	armed	militia	affiliated	with	the	
smugglers	 continue	 to	 control	 Mareero,	 one	 of	 the	 main	 departure	 points	 for	 Yemen,	
without	 obstruction	 from	 the	 government.	 All	 of	 these	 examples	 serve	 to	 underline	 the	
impunity	with	which	 criminal	networks	 carry	out	 their	business.	 Smuggling	and	 trafficking	
networks	 appear	 to	 function	 with	 most	 impunity	 in	 Yemen.	 According	 to	 Human	 Rights	
Watch	 (HRW),	 “a	 multi-million-dollar	 trafficking	 and	 extortion	 racket	 has	 developed	 in	
Yemen	 based	 on	 the	 migrants’	 passage”	 (Human	 Rights	 Watch,	 2014).	 The	 HRW	 report	
identifies	Haradh	(a	northern	Yemeni	border	town)	as	a	central	location	for	these	networks,	
and	estimates	 that	smuggling	and	trafficking	activities	make	up	80%	of	 the	 local	economy	
there.		
In	 spite	 of	 the	 growth	 and	 notoriety	 of	 these	 criminal	 networks,	 detailed	 and	 concrete	
information	around	their	activities	remains	limited.	Knowledge	of	the	number	and	structure	
of	 trafficking	 groups	 is	 particularly	 poor,	 and	 a	 lack	 of	 prosecutions	 has	 limited	 the	
availability	 of	 public	 and	 confirmed	 information.	 What’s	 more,	 there	 have	 been	 major	
changes	in	how	and	where	these	networks	operate	since	the	escalation	of	conflict	in	Yemen,	
which	implies	a	need	to	update	earlier	studies	on	human	smuggling	and	people	trafficking	
via	 the	country.	This	 section	 is	a	 starting	point	 in	consolidating	and	 re-examining	some	of	
these	 findings,	 however	 further	 extensive	 and	 investigative	 research	 is	 recommended	 to	
uncover	 greater	 detail.	 The	 remainder	 of	 this	 section	 outlines	 how	 and	 where	 these	
networks	operate,	who	is	involved,	and	their	links	to	other	criminal	activities.		
	
“As	a	member	of	the	police,	we	are	supposed	
to	deal	with	security	issues	at	the	borders,	
however	because	of	a	lack	of	capacity	and	
funding,	we	are	literally	doing	nothing	to	stop	
the	flow	of	Ethiopian	migrants.	Some	of	our	
force	are	even	facilitating	these	movements.”	
	Key	informant,	Bossaso.	
	
“There	are	so	many	smugglers	in	Bossaso.	You	
just	have	to	search	for	them	in	the	market.”	
Female	Somali	returnee,	Bossaso.	
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3.1.	How	does	the	trade	in	humans	operate?		
It	 is	 important	 to	 differentiate	 between	 smuggling	 and	 trafficking	 networks.	 The	 main	
differences	 between	 smuggling	 and	 trafficking	 relate	 to	 consent	 and	 transnationality.	
Smuggling	 involves	the	consent	of	those	being	smuggled.	 In	contrast,	victims	of	trafficking	
have	never	consented,	or	an	initial	consent	has	been	rendered	meaningless	by	the	improper	
means	of	the	traffickers	(UNODC,	2009).	Smuggling	is	always	a	transnational	movement,	as	
it	involves	illegally	moving	a	person	across	a	border	into	another	country,	whilst	a	trafficked	
person	 does	 not	 necessarily	 need	 to	 move	 across	 a	 border	 (UNODC,	 2009).	 Levels	 of	
exploitation	and	how	offenders	generate	their	income	also	provide	additional	differences.		
While	smuggling	was	widely	reported	to	and	witnessed	by	the	research	teams,	this	project	
uncovered	 fewer	 details	 on	 human	 trafficking.	 This	 does	 not	mean	 that	 trafficking	 is	 not	
occurring,	and	it	is	clear	that	the	opportunities	for	these	groups	are	very	real	in	the	region.	
Djibouti	city	has	a	large	port	and	a	major	truck	route	that	transports	goods	from	land-locked	
Ethiopia.	Ports	and	trucking	routes	are	common	sites	for	sex	work,	and	the	demand	for	sex	
workers	is	in	Djibouti	is	high,	with	women	involved	in	this	sector	typically	described	as	being	
from	Somalia	and	Ethiopia.	Trafficking	in	persons	has	also	been	highlighted	as	a	key	risk	in	
Yemen	and	Saudi	Arabia.	Migrant	workers	are	most	vulnerable	to	trafficking	in	Saudi	Arabia,	
particularly	 female	 domestic	 workers	 due	 to	 their	 isolation	 inside	 private	 residences	 (US	
Department	 of	 State,	 2016).	 In	 Yemen,	 conflict	 and	 lawlessness	 have	 left	 vulnerable	
populations,	such	as	migrant	workers,	women	and	children,	at	significant	risk	of	trafficking	
(US	Department	of	State,	2016).			
As	indicated	by	the	experiences	of	migrants	in	the	HoA,	the	boundaries	between	smuggling	
and	trafficking	can	easily	become	blurred	and	overlap.	For	example,	a	migrant	may	start	off	
being	 smuggled,	but	 subsequently	be	deceived	and	sold	off	 to	 traffickers,	or	be	 forced	 to	
work	 by	 the	 smugglers	 under	 exploitative	 conditions	 in	 order	 to	 pay	 additional	 fees.	
Furthermore,	smuggled	and	trafficked	people	are	often	moved	along	the	same	routes,	and	
criminal	networks	may	engage	in	both	smuggling	and	trafficking	activities.	Migrants	tend	to	
be	 passed	 from	 one	 criminal	 group	 to	 the	 next,	 within	 a	 network	 of	 actors	 and	 groups.	
Evidence	 shows	 that	 although	 they	may	 initially	 contract	 the	 services	of	 a	 smuggler,	 they	
may	be	subsequently	passed	on	to	a	trafficker	and	exploited.	This	blurring	of	lines	explains	
why	the	terms	smuggling	and	trafficking	are	often	used	 inter-changeably,	 including	by	the	
migrants	and	key	informants	interviewed	by	this	research.		
Migrants’	 descriptions	 of	 their	
experience	 of	 smuggling	 suggests	 that	
the	organised	crime	groups	are	carrying	
out	 ‘smuggling	 with	 aggravated	
circumstances’,	a	term	whose	definition	
is	 included	 in	 the	 Protocol	 against	 the	
Smuggling	 of	Migrants.	 Smuggling	with	
aggravated	 circumstances	 describes	
circumstances	that	endanger	the	life	or	
safety	of	the	people	being	smuggled,	as	
well	 as	 inhumane	 or	 degrading	
treatment	 (Sahan,	 2016).	 This	 research	 identified	 numerous	 cases	 of	 abuse,	 torture,	
“Previously,	migration	was	simple	and	normal.	A	
smuggler	was	just	like	a	guide	who	assists	you	and	
receives	a	wage	in	return.	Nowadays,	it	is	different.	
Smuggling	is	an	organised	network	of	selling	
humans.	This	change	is	due	to	the	greed	of	
smugglers	and	those	who	buy	and	sell	human	
beings.”	Ex-smuggler,	Sana’a.	
	
	“I	am	not	a	free	man,	I	am	under	[the	smugglers’]	
mercy.”	Ethiopian	migrant,	Bossaso.	
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degradation,	risk	of	life	and	death	of	migrants	at	the	hands	of	smugglers.	In	these	scenarios,	
the	 migrant-smuggler	 relationship	 is	 no	 longer	 based	 on	 the	 definition	 of	 a	 consensual	
transnational	transaction,	but	one	that	crosses	the	line	between	smuggling	and	trafficking.	
Interviewees,	including	smugglers	themselves,	describe	a	deliberate	shift	in	smuggling	from	
facilitating	movement	 to	 the	 buying	 and	 selling	 of	 human	 beings.	 The	 different	 networks	
often	work	 in	 a	 syndicate	 selling	migrants	 from	one	 group	 to	 the	 next	 as	 they	 pass	 from	
country	 to	 country.	 According	 to	 respondents,	 the	 Somaliland,	 Puntland	 and	 Yemeni	
networks	typically	buy	and	sell	migrants	from	each	other	for	as	little	as	US$	50	per	person.	
Migrants’	treatment	often	depends	on	the	service	they	can	afford,	and	smugglers	and	their	
brokers	 tend	 to	 offer	 a	 range	 of	 different	 ‘packages’.	Wealthier	migrants	 can	 purchase	 a	
complete	 package	 to	 their	 destination,	 and	 can	 generally	 expect	 to	 receive	 a	 better	 and	
safer	service	than	poorer	migrants	who	must	rely	on	a	combination	of	self-reliance	and	ad	
hoc	services	bought	en	route	(UNODC,	2013).	
Interviews	 with	 key	 informants	 suggest	 that	 a	 number	 of	 networks	 operate	 along	 these	
routes,	each	with	their	own	agents	and	operatives	located	at	intervals	along	the	routes,	who	
are	responsible	 for	recruiting,	 transporting	and	receiving	migrants	at	 the	various	stages	of	
their	 journey.	 Roles	 and	 responsibilities	 within	 the	 networks	 are	 clearly	 defined,	 with	
different	 individuals	 or	 groups	 within	 the	 networks	 responsible	 for	 different	 tasks.	 For	
example,	some	of	its	members	focus	on	recruitment,	others	deal	with	transport	and	logistics	
between	locations,	and	others	are	charged	with	receiving	and	securing	migrants	in	transit	or	
coastal	locations.	While	organised	internally,	it	is	less	clear	whether	these	groups	adhere	to	
common	structures	or	modes	of	operation.	For	example,	some	of	the	groups	use	their	own	
boats	and	vehicles	 to	 transport	migrants,	while	others	 rely	on	public	 transport	or	 rentals.	
Likewise,	accommodation	options	range	from	dedicated	camps,	rooms	in	private	houses	or	
makeshift	 shelters.	 It	 seems	 likely	 that	only	 criminal	 groups	with	 strong	 financial	 backing,	
through	dedicated	financiers,	would	have	the	means	to	purchase	such	assets	upfront.	These	
groups	are	more	likely	to	be	the	ones	to	accept	‘leave	now,	pay	later’	payment	terms,	which	
require	greater	cash	flow	and	more	significant	investment.			
The	 process	 of	 acquiring	 smuggling	
services	varies	significantly.	In	many	cases,	
brokers	or	agents	of	the	smugglers	do	not	
actively	 recruit	 migrants;	 rather	 it	 is	 the	
migrants	 who	 approach	 them,	 either	
through	 word	 of	 mouth,	 or	 at	 common	
transit	points.	 In	other	 instances,	migrants	
are	 actively	 recruited	 by	 the	 network.	 For	 example,	 brokers	 in	 Somalia	 commonly	 target	
youth	in	high	schools	and	universities,	or	offer	them	tempting	‘leave	now,	pay	later’	deals.	
Increasingly,	 however,	 migrants	 are	 actively	 coerced	 or	 forced	 into	 using	 smugglers’	
services.	 It	 is	worth	noting	that	many	migrants	don’t	necessarily	want	to	use	smugglers	to	
facilitate	 their	 journey,	 as	 it	 can	be	more	expensive	 and	 leave	migrants	with	 less	 control.	
One	migrant	stated	that	moving	between	the	border	and	Bossaso	had	been	relatively	easy	
and	cheap	in	previous	years,	however	on	this	trip	he	was	required	to	employ	the	services	of	
smugglers,	 and	 the	 journey	was	much	more	 arduous	 and	 expensive	 as	 a	 result.	Migrants	
describe	 being	 picked	 up	 or	 “captured”	 by	 smugglers	 who	 oblige	 them	 to	 pay	 for	 their	
services,	or	 risk	 facing	detention	or	abuse.	Another	migrant	 reported	being	deceived	by	a	
broker	who	 locked	him	 in	his	 house,	 and	 threatened	 to	hand	him	over	 to	 the	 authorities	
“Before	two	years	ago,	we	used	to	come	to	
Bossaso	without	arranging	with	smugglers.	
Now	they	kidnap	us	and	control	our	movement.	
We	are	transported	in	trucks	and	locked	in	
rooms,	and	we	can’t	complain	to	the	police,	
because	they	don’t	care.”	Migrant,	Bossaso.	
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unless	he	agreed	 to	pay	him.	The	agent	beat	him	with	a	metal	 stick,	 and	 threatened	him	
with	a	knife,	until	he	agreed	to	pay	the	rates.		
Smugglers’	 ability	 to	 coerce	 migrants	 into	 using	 their	 services	 is	 linked	 to	 the	 relative	
impunity	 under	 which	 they	 operate.	 In	 Somaliland	 and	 Puntland,	 for	 example,	 it	 was	
reported	that	arrangements	exist	between	the	smugglers	and	corrupt	police	forces,	which	
leaves	migrants	in	a	weak	bargaining	position.	In	this	context	of	unequal	balance	of	powers,	
smugglers	 were	 able	 to	 extort	 large	 fees	 to	 cover	 the	 costs	 of	 transport,	 food	 and	
protection,	 and	migrants	 struggle	 to	 negotiate	 on	 prices	 or	 appeal	 to	 the	 authorities	 for	
help.	 These	 descriptions	 correspond	 to	 the	 definition	 of	 smuggling	 with	 aggravated	
circumstances,	described	earlier.		
	
3.2.	Where	do	they	operate?		
The	geographic	reach	of	smugglers	and	traffickers	has	expanded	in	recent	years	to	include	
both	maritime	and	overland	sections.	The	maritime	crossings	from	Puntland	or	Djibouti	to	
Yemen	have	for	some	time	been	made	with	the	assistance	of	networks,	generally	from	the	
departure	 points	 of	 Obock	 and	 Bossaso.	 In	 contrast,	 until	 recently,	 overland	movements	
through	 Somalia	 were	 generally	 made	 independently,	 without	 assistance.	 Since	 2015,	
smugglers	 and	 traffickers	 have	 increasingly	 extended	 their	 reach	 and	 control	 over	 the	
overland	sections	through	a	network	of	operatives	positioned	in	Somaliland	and	Puntland,	
encouraging	migrants	to	utilise	their	services	much	earlier	and	at	various	points	at	the	start	
or	along	the	journey	in	Ethiopia,	Somalia,	Djibouti	or	Yemen.	Ethiopian	migrants	who,	over	
the	 years,	 have	 made	 repeated	 attempts	 to	 travel	 along	 this	 route	 reported	 seeing	
substantial	differences	in	their	experience	of	these	networks	over	time.	Whereas	previously	
they	had	travelled	independently	across	the	overland	routes,	they	were	now	compelled	to	
use	 the	 services	 of	 smugglers.	 Eighty	 percent	 of	 Ethiopian	 interviewees	 moving	 through	
Somalia	used	smugglers	to	facilitate	both	their	overland	and	sea	journeys.	In	Djibouti,	67%	
of	interviewed	migrants	reported	using	smugglers	on	both	overland	and	maritime	sections	
of	 their	 journey.33	 Smugglers	were	 particularly	 popular	 for	 crossing	 the	 Ethiopian	 border,	
and	 at	 various	 sections	 of	 the	 journey	 through	 Djibouti.	 This	 included	 journeys	made	 by	
vehicle	or	on	foot,	as	smugglers	were	essential	to	guiding	migrants	safely	through	off	route	
tracks	in	isolated	and	mountainous	areas	of	the	country,	in	order	to	avoid	checkpoints.	This	
expansion	of	smugglers’	leverage	and	influence	over	both	overland	and	maritime	routes	has	
reduced	migrants’	say	over	the	routes	and	conditions	of	their	journey.	It	has	also	increased	
the	potential	profits	for	the	networks,	as	they	are	now	in	control	of	 longer	sections	of	the	
journey.		
Identification	of	the	geographical	points	from	where	smugglers	and	traffickers	operate	is	an	
important	 resource	 in	combating	these	criminal	groups,	and	one	that	should	put	pressure	
on	law	enforcement	to	proactively	act	against	the	networks.		As	indicated	above,	smugglers	
and	traffickers	have	extended	their	geographical	scope	to	 include	overland	sections	of	the	
journey.	 In	 some	 cases,	 this	 extends	 to	 migrants’	 place	 of	 origin,	 where	 they	 are	 first	
connected	 with	 brokers,	 often	 through	 family,	 friends	 and	 other	 contacts.	 Generally,	
                                                
33	 This	 corresponds	with	 findings	by	other	 studies,	which	 found	 that	 64%	of	 Ethiopian	migrants	 and	asylum	
seekers	who	crossed	into	Djibouti	on	route	to	Yemen	had	recruited	the	services	of	smugglers	(RMMS,	2016)	
 	 67	
however,	 smuggling	 activities	 begin	when	migrants	 cross	 an	 international	 border	 and	 are	
now	moving	irregularly	through	a	foreign	country.	At	this	stage,	migrants	are	most	likely	to	
require	smugglers’	services	to	facilitate	their	journey,	undetected	by	the	authorities	and,	in	
many	cases,	in	an	unknown	terrain	and	language.		
	
3.2.1	Djibouti	
In	 Djibouti,	 the	 smuggling	 process	 can	 start	 as	 soon	 as	 migrants	 cross	 the	 border	 from	
Ethiopia	or	 Somaliland,	 in	places	 like	Galilée	or	Galafi,	 Loyada	and	Balho.	However,	 some	
migrants	choose	to	walk	to	larger	hubs,	such	as	Ali	Sabieh,	Dikhil,	Djibouti	town	Ouéa	and	
PK51,	before	being	picked	up	by	smugglers.	34	From	the	border,	migrants	are	smuggled,	or	
make	their	own	way,	through	Lac	Assal,	Tadjourah	town	and	Obock.		
Generally	 speaking,	 migrants	 who	 can	 afford	 it,	 pay	 one	 smuggler	 to	 take	 them	 from	
Ethiopia/Somaliland	to	Yemen.	A	cheaper	option	is	to	use	smugglers	to	cross	the	border	into	
Djibouti,	 and	 then	 walk	 the	 remainder	 of	 the	 way	 to	 Obock.	 One	 Ethiopian	 migrant	
described	walking	by	foot	from	Galafi	with	a	group	of	250	other	migrants.	 	 In	some	cases,	
migrants	walk	independently.	However,	others	described	walking	and	still	paying	smugglers	
                                                
34	PK51	is	located	at	the	intersection	of	the	roads	from	Ali	Sabieh,	Tadjourah	and	Djibouti.	
Image	5:	Fishing	boats	on	the	shore	at	Obock.	Smugglers	often	use	these	sorts	of	vessels,	
as	well	as	larger	versions,	to	transfer	migrants	to	Yemen.		
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to	 facilitate	 their	 safe	 passage	 past	 the	 authorities	 and	 checkpoints,	 and	 to	 avoid	 getting	
lost.	 Somalis	 are	more	 likely	 to	use	 smugglers	 and	 travel	 by	 vehicle	 than	Ethiopians,	who	
tend	to	be	poorer	and	less	able	to	pay.	Oromos	are	the	most	likely	to	traverse	Djibouti	on	
foot,	whereas	Tigrayans	typically	have	more	funds	to	pay	a	smuggler	to	transport	them	by	
truck.		
Once	migrants	 reach	Obock,	 they	may	 spend	 some	 time	waiting	 in	 town	 for	a	boat	 to	be	
organised	 to	 take	 them	 across	 the	 Red	 Sea.	 Departure	 points	 are	 typically	 from	 isolated	
coastal	locations,	often	to	the	north	of	Obock,	such	as	Gueheré,	Gorah,	Angar	and	Godoria.	
The	 boat	 journey	 to	 Yemen	 takes	 between	 seven	 and	 eight	 hours,	 although	 it	 can	 be	 as	
quick	as	four.		
	
3.2.2.	Somaliland	and	Puntland	
Agents	affiliated	with	the	smuggling	and	trafficking	networks	are	largely	based	in	Jijiga	(on	
the	 Ethiopian	 side	 of	 the	 border)	 and	 Tog	 Wajaale	 (on	 the	 Somaliland	 side).	 Agents	 or	
brokers,	reportedly	generally	Ethiopians,	can	be	easily	found	in	bus	stations,	cafes	and	tea	
shops,	and	carry	out	the	initial	negotiations	with	migrants.	Once	a	fee	is	agreed,	the	broker	
collects	the	money	and	arranges	the	 journey	 in	coordination	with	smugglers	who	pick	the	
migrants	 up	 at	 designated	 collection	 points	 along	 the	 way,	 typically	 in	 Guumays	 and	
Bossaso.	 The	 full	 journey	 from	 Tog	 Wajaale	 to	 Bossaso	 typically	 takes	 3-6	 days,	 and	
traverses	through	Hargeisa	(where	smugglers	and	their	brokers	are	also	reported	to	be	very	
active),	 Berbera,	 Burco	 and	 Guumays.	 Dhahar,	 a	 popular	 transit	 location	 for	 migrants	
passing	from	western	Puntland	to	Bossaso,	is	another	smuggling	‘hotspot’,	with	at	least	25	
groups	 identified	 there	 by	 the	 Puntland	 Ministry	 of	 Interior.35	 Another	 route	 identified	
involved	 entering	 Somaliland	 via	 Gashamo	 (a	 village	 in	 Ethiopia),	 then	 travelling	 through	
Somaliland	to	Oog,	before	being	transferred	to	Al	Hamdullah	in	Puntland.	
Up	until	the	transit	location	of	Guumays,	migrant	interviews	report	travelling	largely	without	
difficulties,	and	they	move	along	the	main	road	by	public	bus	in	relative	comfort.	However,	
on	arrival	in	Guumays,	migrants	travelling	independently	(without	smugglers)	describe	being	
forced	 off	 buses,	 detained	 and	 handed	 over	 to	 smuggling	 networks	 by	 corrupt	 officials	
working	in	collusion	with	the	networks.	From	Guumays,	migrants	take	two	different	routes.	
One	 route	 is	 along	 the	main	 road	 via	 Tukaraq	 (in	 Sool	 region)	 and	 is	most	 popular	 with	
poorer	 migrants	 who	 may	 have	 connections	 in	 Garowe	 or	 Qardo	 and	 opt	 to	 travel	
independently	from	smugglers,	often	on	foot	(Refugee	Affairs	Division	Bossaso,	2016).	The	
second,	more	expensive	and	more	popular	route,	is	off	road	and	by	truck,	along	rough	roads	
via	 Derero,	 Dhahar,	 Heylaan	 and	 Al	 Hamdullah	 (just	 south	 of	 Bossaso)	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	
checkpoints.	According	to	reports,	this	route	is	most	popular	with	female	migrants,	with	up	
to	90%	of	 female	migrants	 in	Puntland	travelling	along	this	route	(Refugee	Affairs	Division	
Bossaso,	 2016).	 Migrant	 respondents	 taking	 this	 second	 route	 described	 the	 two-day	
journey	 from	 Guumays	 to	 Al	 Hamdullah	 as	 extremely	 difficult	 and	 uncomfortable.	
Conditions	 are	 cramped,	with	 trucks	 typically	 carrying	 between	 120	 to	 150	migrants	 at	 a	
time,	and	there	is	no	food	and	little	water	to	sustain	them.	Once	the	vehicles	approach	the	
                                                
35	 As	 reported	 by	 the	 September	 2016	 Entry	 Monitoring	 Monthly	 Updated	 produced	 by	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Interior,	Refugee	Affairs	Division	(RAD).		
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outskirts	of	Bossaso,	migrant	interviewees	report	being	told	to	disembark	and	walk	the	rest	
of	the	journey	off	road,	in	order	to	avoid	the	police	checkpoint	at	the	entrance	to	the	town.		
Some	 Somalis	 use	 agents	 or	 brokers	 to	 facilitate	 their	 journey	 from	 their	 place	 of	 origin	
onwards.	This	practice	is	most	common	with	women	and	children	who,	for	cultural	or	age	
reasons,	may	not	be	able	to	travel	alone.	Somalis	migrating	from	South	Central	Somalia	tend	
to	follow	the	main	road	north.	This	route	converges	from	South	Central	to	Hiran	region	and	
then	 follows	 the	main	 road	 through	Galgaduud,	Galkayo,	Garowe	 and	Bossaso.	However,	
most	Somalis	will	travel	independently	until	Bossaso,	from	where	smuggling	operations	will	
begin	once	they	are	ready	to	make	the	sea	crossing	to	Yemen.	Known	as	dulaal,	magafi	or	
mukhala	in	Somali,	these	agents	or	brokers	are	easily	located	in	Bossaso	town.	The	brokers	
negotiate	 the	 price	with	 the	migrants,	 and	 arrange	 the	 journey	 to	 Yemen	 and	 beyond	 in	
coordination	with	operatives	based	in	Yemen,	Sudan	and	Libya.	
While	 some	 migrants	 do	 cross	 the	 sea	 to	 Yemen	 from	 Somaliland,	 this	 option	 is	 not	 as	
popular	as	Bossaso	due	to	the	presence	of	a	Somaliland	military	base	on	the	coast	between	
Zeila	 and	 Lughaya	 and	 the	 active	 presence	 of	 their	 coastguard	 that	 patrol	 and	 detain	
irregular	 vessels	 (Altai	 Consulting,	 2016).	 The	 majority	 of	 migrants	 cross	 to	 Yemen	 from	
Bossaso,	where	they	board	boats	from	particular	departure	points	located	in	coastal	villages	
of	 Mareero,	 Shimbero,	 Ceelaayo	 and	 Laasqoray.	 Mareero	 is	 the	 most	 frequently	 used	
departure	 point	 as	 it	 is	 not	 under	 the	 control	 of	 government,	 and	 paid,	 armed	 militia	
affiliated	with	the	smugglers	protect	the	area.	According	to	migrants,	it	is	also	cheaper	than	
the	other	options	(around	US$	120),	and	is	nearer	to	town,	which	means	that	migrants	can	
walk	to	the	departure	point.	Ceelaayo	is	less	popular,	as	the	airport	and	PMPF	are	located	
along	 that	 road,	 which	 makes	 it	 difficult	 for	 smugglers	 to	 transport	 migrants	 past	 these	
secured	areas.	 It	 is	also	more	expensive	(around	US$	150)	and	further	away	from	Bossaso	
team,	 involving	 additional	 transportation	 by	 truck.	 The	 journey	 across	 the	 Gulf	 of	 Aden	
takes	approximately	18	to	24	hours.	Migrants	usually	depart	Bossaso	at	night	time.		
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3.2.3.	Yemen	
Once	migrants	arrive	in	Yemen,	Yemeni	smugglers	wait	for	them	at	 isolated	coastal	arrival	
points.	Migrants	who	can	afford	it	will	have	purchased	packages	that	include	being	met	by	
trucks	upon	arrival	at	the	Yemeni	coast	and	smuggled	directly	to	Saudi	Arabia.	Others	may	
purchase	follow-on	packages	 from	the	Yemeni	smugglers,	or,	 if	 they	cannot	afford	 it,	may	
choose	 to	 walk	 from	 the	 coast	 to	 major	 cities	 (such	 as	 Aden	 and	 Sana’a)	 from	 where	
smugglers	operate,	or	even	as	far	as	the	Saudi	border.		
Boats	from	Obock	typically	land	in	towns	in	Taiz	and	Lahj	governorates.	Following	the	Saudi-
led	takeover	of	Bab	Al	Mandeb,	the	maritime	route	has	shifted	somewhat	and	most	boats	
now	 arrive	 in	 Lahj,	 rather	 than	 Mokha.	 Migrants	 arriving	 in	 Taiz	 and	 Al	 Hodeidah	
governorates	 generally	 move	 north	 to	 Al	 Hodeidah	 city.	 From	 there,	 some	 will	 continue	
northwards	 to	Haradh	and	onto	border	 crossings	 to	Saudi	Arabia,	although	 this	 route	has	
reportedly	been	cut	off	 in	recent	months.	Others	report	moving	towards	Sana’a,	and	then	
up	 to	 Saudi	 Arabia	 through	 Sa’dah.	 In	 other	 cases,	 migrants	 land	 or	 pass	 through	 Aden,	
Rada’a	and	Marib.	Crossing	points	into	Saudi	Arabia	are	often	made	from	Midi,	Baqim	and	
Albuqa’a.		
Boats	from	Bossaso	arrive	along	the	governorates	of	Shabwa	and	Hadhramout,	between	Al	
Mukalla	 and	 Ahwar,	 and	 even	 as	 far	 as	 Shokra.	 Around	 Al	 Mukalla,	 these	 arrival	 points	
include	 Ba’ir	 Ali,	 Ololka,	 Hassa,	 Stiin,	 Mayfa’ah,	 Ash	 Shihr,	 Heybellaj,	 Jalah,	 Shugerat,	 Al-
Qubaya	and	Sharj-Ben-Taleb.	Ba’ir	Ali	has	become	a	popular	arrival	point	in	recent	years,	as	
Image	6:	Migrants	detained	by	PMPF	in	Ceelayo	(Source:	PMPF)		
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security	 is	generally	considered	to	be	better	there.	 In	contrast,	coastal	points	along	Abuan	
governorate	 have	 reportedly	 become	 less	 popular.	 Other	 respondents	 indicated	 that	
migrants	 travel	by	 sea	 from	Bossaso	 to	Al-Kharaz,	possibly	 attracted	 to	 the	 refugee	 camp	
located	there.	Somali	migrants	hoping	to	reach	Europe	travel	overland	to	the	Red	Sea	coast,	
typically	to	Mokha,	from	where	they	take	a	second	boat	to	Sudan.	From	there,	they	travel	
overland	through	Sudan,	to	either	Libya	or	Egypt,	and	then	on	to	Europe.	A	large	number	of	
Somalis	who	undertake	this	journey	first	register	as	refugees	with	UNHCR	in	Yemen,	before	
continuing	their	journey.		
	
3.3.	Who	is	involved?		
Smuggling	 and	 trafficking	 networks	 are	 made	 up	 of	 a	 range	 of	 different	 people,	 with	
different	 levels	 of	 involvement	 and	 responsibility	 within	 the	 organisation.	 In	 terms	 of	
nationality,	smugglers	and	traffickers	originate	from	a	range	of	different	countries,	including	
Somalia,	Ethiopia,	Yemen,	Djibouti	and	Saudi	Arabia.	In	Djibouti,	the	majority	of	smugglers	
are	 reportedly	Djiboutian	Afars,	 typically	between	18	 to	25	years,	and	Ethiopians.	Somalis	
and	Ethiopians	dominate	 the	 Somaliland	and	Puntland	 routes.	Given	 the	 large	number	of	
Ethiopians	on	the	move,	brokers	are	often	Ethiopian,	whereas	the	transporters	are	Somalis,	
as	 they	 are	 better	 placed	 to	 negotiate	 checkpoints	 and	 the	 authorities.	 Once	 the	 vessels	
reach	the	coast	of	Yemen,	Yemeni	smugglers	take	over.	Although	respondents	suggest	that,	
in	 the	 case	 of	 Djibouti,	 Yemeni	 boat	 crews	 may	 also	 control	 the	 Red	 Sea	 crossing.	 A	
significant	 number	 of	 migrants	 crossing	 the	 Bab	 al-Mandab	 strait	 from	 Djibouti	 cited	 a	
notorious	group	called	Abdul	Qawi,	which	they	accused	of	abduction,	abuse,	extortion	and	
rape.	However,	 it	would	seem	that	groups	across	the	Yemeni	coast	are	referred	to	by	this	
name,	suggesting	that	this	is	the	name	of	a	large	hostage-taking	network,	or	that	the	term	
has	become	synonymous	with	hostage	taking	in	general	(RMMS,	2012).		
In	 terms	 of	 vocational	 background,	 interviews	 suggest	 that	 many	 of	 the	 smugglers	 and	
traffickers	 are	 former	 pirates	 who	 engaged	 in	 smuggling	 when	 the	 profitability	 of	 piracy	
declined.	 Individuals	 and	 businesses	 that	 provide	 services,	 whether	 transportation,	 food,	
communications	and	accommodation,	are	also	directly	and	indirectly	involved	in	smuggling	
and	 trafficking	 networks.	 These	 include	 boat	 owners,	 boat	 crews,	 restaurant	 and	 café	
owners,	 telephone	 centre	 owners,	 policeman,	 businessmen,	 truck	 owners	 and	 landlords	
(Mixed	Migration	Taskforce	Somalia,	2008).	According	to	key	 informants	 in	Puntland,	 local	
businessmen	 are	 known	 to	 invest	 in	 smuggling	 activities	 by	 financing	 the	 costs	 of	
transportation,	and	then	 later	splitting	the	profits	with	the	network	 itself.	Companies	that	
provide	money	 transfer	 services	 are	widely	 used	 by	 all	 those	 involved	 in	migration.	 They	
play	a	beneficial	role	to	migrants	and	their	families	looking	to	send	and	receive	money.	Due	
to	the	high	incidence	of	theft	along	migratory	routes,	migrants	reported	preferring	to	send	
and	receive	money	by	transfer,	rather	than	by	cash.	However,	money	transfer	systems	also	
facilitate	 and	 equip	 the	 criminal	 activities	 of	 transnational	 smuggling	 and	 trafficking	
networks,	who	 increasingly	 prefer	 to	 operate	 using	 cash	 transfers	 rather	 than	 hard	 cash.	
What’s	more,	 the	process	 for	sending	and	receiving	payments	 is	often	 informal,	making	 it	
difficult	 for	 authorities	 to	 trace	 payments	 for	 criminal	 investigations.	 Any	 response	 to	
control	 and	 regulate	 these	 systems	 should	 carefully	 consider	 both	 these	 positive	 and	
negative	outcomes.			
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Numerous	 interviews	 highlighted	 the	 involvement	 of	 government	 officials	 from	 Somalia,	
Djibouti,	Yemen	and	Saudi	Arabia	in	these	networks.	These	include	officials	from	the	police,	
military	and	 intelligence	services,	as	well	as	border,	coast	guards	and	customs	authorities.	
Allegations	 against	 state	 actors	 range	 from	 turning	 a	 blind	 eye	 to	 irregular	 migration	 in	
exchange	for	bribes,	to	active	involvement	in	facilitating	smuggling	and	trafficking,	and	even	
participation	 in	 trafficking,	 abuse	 and	 torture	 of	 victims.	 Migrant	 respondents	 reported	
widespread	collusion	between	Somaliland	and	Puntland	police	and	security	officers	and	the	
smuggling	 networks,	 particularly	 in	 migration	 ‘hotspots’	 such	 as	 Guumays.	 Respondents	
from	the	Ministry	of	Security	and	the	police	themselves	also	confirmed	these	allegations	to	
the	 research	 team.	 Interviews	 further	 indicated	 that	 some	of	 the	boats	used	 to	 transport	
migrants	from	Bossaso	are	owned	by	government	officials,	suggesting	that	collusion	is	also	
taking	 place	 amongst	 the	 higher	 ranks.	 In	 Yemen,	 migrant	 interviewees	 describe	 similar	
levels	of	collusion	between	state	and	smugglers.	Authorities	at	a	checkpoint	 in	 Issa	Salem	
(Taiz	governorate)	reportedly	arrest	and	sell	migrants	to	smugglers	and	traffickers.	Security	
officials	 also	demand	bribes	 from	migrants	at	 checkpoints.	 Those	who	pay	are	allowed	 to	
continue	their	 journey,	and	those	who	do	not	are	arrested	and	handed	over	to	the	police.	
One	interviewee	described	having	to	make	these	payments	at	every	check	point	along	the	
route	to	Saudi	Arabia.		
Concerns	that	local	authorities	are	implicated	in	the	smuggling	and	trafficking	networks	are	
reinforced	 by	 the	 reluctance	 of	 some	 local	 government	 officials	 to	 fight	 trafficking	 and	
smuggling	 or	 target	 the	 transit	 and	 departure	 points	 frequented	 by	 the	 networks.	 As	
indicated	earlier,	smugglers,	their	whereabouts,	and	areas	of	operation	are	widely	known	to	
the	authorities,	and	yet	are	rarely	targeted	by	the	police	or	security	sectors.	When	arrests	
do	occur,	they	appear	to	be	of	lower	level	members,	who	are	often	subsequently	released	
without	 charge	or	 trial.	Community	 respondents	 complained	 that,	 in	 some	cases,	 it	 is	 the	
Puntland	officials	 themselves	who	have	 lobbied	 for	 the	 release	 of	 suspected	 smugglers.36	
However,	 it	 is	not	always	clear	whether	the	failure	to	prosecute	is	brought	about	by	weak	
capacity	and	a	lack	of	resources,	or	networks	of	protection.	In	Yemen,	state	knowledge	and	
active	 complicity	of	 smuggling	 and	 trafficking	was	documented	 in	 a	2014	 investigation	by	
Human	Rights	Watch	(HRW).	Government	officials	in	Haradh	were	able	to	provide	HRW	with	
a	 list	 of	 those	 running	 migrant	 camps	 in	 the	 vicinity,	 and	 the	 evidence	 suggested	 that	
officials	 themselves	 held	migrants	 in	 custody	 before	 turning	 them	over	 to	 smugglers	 and	
traffickers	for	money	(Human	Rights	Watch,	2014).		
While	the	actions	of	traffickers	can	in	no	way	be	justified,	it	should	not	be	assumed	that	all	
those	associated	with	smuggling	are	necessarily	exploitative	or	abusive.	Those	operating	at	
the	lower	levels	are	likely	to	have	less	comprehensive	oversight	or	complicity	than	the	high-
level	decision	makers.	While	it	is	true	that	a	great	many	smugglers	carry	out	or	threaten	to	
carry	 out	 violent	 acts	 of	 abuse	 on	migrants,	 others	may	 offer	much	 needed	 support.	 For	
example,	 one	 female	migrant	who	 found	 herself	 stranded	without	money	 to	 pay	 for	 her	
journey	 and	 at	 risk	 of	 abuse	 and	 exploitation,	 said	 that	 she	 was	 lent	 the	 money	 by	 a	
smuggler	 she	had	met	on	 the	Ethiopian-Somali	border.	 Furthermore,	 for	Yemeni	 refugees	
and	Somali	returnees,	smugglers	may	ultimately	offer	a	vital	lifeline	to	those	wanting	to	flee	
conflict	and	instability	 in	Yemen.	 In	this	context,	smugglers	are	not	universally	viewed	in	a	
                                                
36	 This	 was	 reportedly	 the	 case	 with	 the	 unexplained	 release	 of	 a	 prominent	 Ethiopian	 smuggler	 called	
Mohamed	Dheere.	
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negative	 light,	 in	 particular	 amongst	 migrants	 and	 local	 communities	 from	 where	 they	
operate.	 Migrants	 interviewed	 differentiate	 between	 ‘good’	 and	 ‘bad’	 smugglers.	 They	
reported	spending	time	looking	for	‘trustworthy’	smugglers,	and	also	looked	to	share	details	
and	 information	 about	 ‘safe’	 smugglers	 within	 migrant	 networks.	 In	 Obock	 and	 certain	
neighbourhoods	 of	 Djibouti	 town,	 there	 is	 a	 common	 perception	 that	 smugglers	 are	 not	
organised	 criminals	 per	 se,	 but	 are	normal	people	 responding	 to	economic	opportunities.	
This	 perception	 can,	 however,	 be	 dangerous,	 as	 it	 undermines	 attempts	 to	 tackle	 the	
activities,	 especially	 at	 the	 community	 level.	 It	 is	 particularly	 problematic	 when	 such	
perceptions	extend	to	law	enforcement,	as	it	encourages	agents	of	the	law	to	turn	a	blind	
eye	 to	 these	 activities,	 and	 may	 make	 them	 more	 amendable	 to	 corruption	 and	
participation.		
	
3.4.	Links	to	other	criminal	activities	
The	networks	that	smuggle	and	traffic	people	are	also	accused	of	involvement	in	the	illegal	
smuggling	of	goods,	such	as	weapons	and	ammunition,	 food,	medical	supplies,	drugs,	 fuel	
and	oil,	exotic	animals,	cultural	property	and	other	commodities.	Concerns	have	also	been	
raised	that	the	routes,	and	even	migrants	themselves,	may	have	links	to	extremist	groups	in	
the	region,	although	such	connections	are	not	substantiated	and	are	very	difficult	to	prove.		
Yemen	has	traditionally	imported	around	90%	of	its	food	staples;	however,	the	supply	chain	
has	 broken	down	 as	 critical	 infrastructure	 has	 been	damaged,	 populations	 displaced,	 and	
rebels	 have	 sought	 to	 control	 or	 block	 supplies.	 The	 port	 of	 Al	 Hodeidah	 has	 been	
particularly	 targeted	by	airstrikes	by	 the	Saudi-led	coalition,	 reducing	the	number	of	ships	
and	imports,	and	limiting	the	flow	of	commodities	and	food	staples,	medical	supplies,	and	
other	goods	into	that	part	of	the	country.	This	situation,	coupled	with	a	general	breakdown	
in	 law	and	order,	opens	a	significant	space	for	the	 illegal	smuggling	of	much-needed,	high	
demand	goods	and	commodities.		
Weapons	 smuggling	 on	 maritime	 routes	 to	 Yemen	 has	 also	 been	 considerable,	 and	 a	
number	of	key	informants	from	governmental	and	security	institutions	in	Bossaso	claim	that	
the	boats	smuggling	migrants	from	Bossaso	into	Yemen	ferry	small	caches	of	weapons	and	
ammunition	 on	 the	 journey	 back	 to	 Puntland.	 The	 research	 team	 saw	 photographic	
evidence	of	stores	of	weapons	and	ammunitions	purportedly	seized	in	Bossaso.	What	is	less	
clear	 is	 who	 these	 weapons	 are	 destined	 for.	 According	 to	 a	 number	 of	 sources,	 the	
weapons	are	supplied	to	militant	groups	affiliated	with	Islamic	State	(IS)	and	Al	Shabaab	(AS)	
based	in	Puntland,	although	no	evidence	was	provided	to	substantiate	this	claim.	Allegedly,	
the	boats	drop	the	weapon	supplies	bound	for	Al	Shabaab	in	two	coastal	locations;	Shuwra	
and	 Hiir	 Yare.	 Weapon	 supplies	 bound	 for	 IS-affiliated	 groups	 are	 delivered	 to	 Dikad	
Rahman,	 also	 in	 Puntland.	 This	 information	 should	 be	 treated	 with	 caution	 until	 it	 is	
confirmed	by	actual	 seizures	of	weapons.	However,	a	 large	quantity	of	homemade	bomb-
making	equipment	was	discovered	and	seized	by	the	Puntland	authorities	in	May	2017.		
While	there	may	be	some	connection	between	extremist	groups	and	smuggling	networks,	it	
is	less	clear	whether	these	groups	have	sought	benefit	from	the	migrants	themselves,	as	has	
been	 the	 case	 in	 other	 contexts.	 In	 Libya,	 IS	 targeted	 Ethiopian	 and	 Eritrean	 migrants,	
releasing	several	execution	videos.	The	maritime	routes	from	Turkey	to	Greece	also	gained	
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notoriety	when	a	number	of	IS	operatives	posing	as	migrants	and	refugees	used	the	routes	
in	order	to	enter	Europe	undetected.	So	far,	there	are	no	confirmed	reports	that	the	HoA-
Yemen	 routes	 have	 been	 used	 by	 extremist	 fighters.	 However,	 as	migrants’	 routes	 often	
coincide	geographically	with	the	 locations	of	these	groups,	there	 is	potential	 for	crossover	
even	though	no	tangible	evidence	of	this	was	uncovered	by	the	research.	Al	Qaeda	 in	the	
Arabian	 Peninsula	 (AQAP)	 and	 Ansar	 al	 Sharia	 operate	 on	 Yemen’s	 southern	 coastline,	
particularly	to	the	west	of	Al	Mukalla.37	Islamic	State	(IS)	has	announced	group	presence	in	
Puntland	and	a	number	of	Yemeni	governorates	(see	text	box	below).	Many	of	these	areas	
coincide	 with	 the	 Arabian	 Sea	 departure	 and	 arrival	 points	 used	 by	 migrants	 crossing	
between	Puntland	and	Yemen,	particularly	to	the	west	of	Al	Mukalla.	It	will	be	important	to	
conduct	ongoing	mapping	of	this	issue,	in	order	to	monitor	the	potential	threat	of	nexuses	
or	interactions	between	migrants	and	extremist	groups.		
In	addition	to	extremist	groups	using	migrants’	routes	to	their	own	advantage,	there	is	also	
a	 risk	of	migrants	being	 recruited	 as	 fighters	 to	 their	 cause.	 In	 Yemen,	Resistance	 Forces,	
and	possibly	also	pro-government	militias,	are	known	to	recruit	migrants	and	even	Yemeni	
IDPs,	and	it	is	alleged	that	extremist	groups	are	doing	the	same	(Al	Qalisi,	2015).	Community	
respondents	 in	 Puntland	 recounted	 how	 a	 young	 Somali	migrant	 was	 captured	 by	 an	 IS-
affiliated	group	in	Yemen,	and	only	released	after	his	father	travelled	to	Yemen	and	paid	a	
ransom.	Others	have	suggested	that	Ethiopian	Oromos	are	proactively	recruited	as	they	are	
considered	 to	be	good	 fighters,	 inexpensive	 to	hire,	and	 relatively	easy	 to	 recruit	 (RMMS,	
2017).	Within	 Puntland,	 respondents	 from	 the	 Puntland	 Intelligence	 Agency	 (PIA)	 accuse	
smugglers	and	traffickers	of	exchanging	migrants	(particularly	those	who	have	been	unable	
to	 pay	 ransom)	 for	 cash	with	militias	 and,	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent,	with	 Al	 Shabaab	 and	 an	 IS-
affiliated	 group	 based	 in	 Puntland	 IS.	 The	 same	 sources	 report	 that	 up	 to	 20	 Oromo	
migrants	 have	 been	 recruited	 to	 work	 as	 paid	 fighters	 by	 ISIS,	 reportedly	 earning	 up	 to	
US$100	 per	 month.	 These	 claims	 are	 backed	 up	 by	 other	 research,	 which	 also	 found	
evidence	 of	 Oromos	 being	 recruited	 as	 IS	 fighters	 in	 Puntland	 (Sahan,	 2017).	 Given	 the	
poverty	 and	 hardship	 experienced	 by	most	 Ethiopian	 and	 Somali	migrants,	 it	may	 not	 be	
surprising	 that	 they	 are	 tempted,	 or	 coerced,	 to	 take	 up	 paid	 employment	 opportunities	
with	 extremist	 groups	 in	 Puntland	 and	 Yemen.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 connection	 is	 still	 not	
proven,	 and	 respondents	 typically	 gave	 a	 range	 of	 answers,	 sometimes	 conflicting,	
suggesting	that	further	investigation	and	testimony	is	required	before	any	firm	conclusions	
can	be	reached.	
                                                
37	The	port	city	of	Al	Mukalla	was	used	as	the	centre	of	AQAP	operations	for	more	than	a	year	from	early	2015,	
with	the	group	holding	open	rallies	in	the	city	in	2016	to	protest	against	US	drone	strikes.		In	April	2016,	the	
coalition	 reportedly	 regained	 control	 of	 the	 city,	 however	 risk	 intelligence	 reports	 released	 to	 the	media	 in	
March	2017	indicate	that	AQAP	continues	to	hold	coastal	territory	to	the	west	of	Al	Mukalla.	
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4.	What	is	the	impact	of	these	movements	on	the	lives	of	migrants?		
Irregular	 migration	 between	 the	 HoA	 and	 Yemen	 is	 dangerous,	 involving	 contact	 with	
criminal	groups,	risky	sea	crossings	and	exposure	to	the	elements,	and	significant	hardship	
along	the	journey.	As	discussed	above,	migrants	between	the	HoA	and	Yemen	face	a	wide	
range	 of	 risks	 at	 all	 stages	 of	 the	 migration	 process.	 Some	 migrants	 never	 reach	 their	
intended	 destination	 due	 to	 forced	 or	 voluntary	 return,	 permanent	 settlement	 in	 transit	
locations,	and	death	during	the	journey.	Other	migrants,	who	are	still	en	route	or	arrived	at	
their	destination,	 regret	 their	decision	to	migrate	as	a	result	of	 their	negative	experiences	
along	 the	 journey.	 One	 migrant	 interviewed	 in	 Bossaso	 had	 suffered	 from	 malaria,	 was	
severely	weakened	and	in	debt,	and	wanted	to	go	back	to	Ethiopia.	A	female	interviewee,	
left	traumatised	by	her	experience	with	
smugglers	 and	 now	 destitute	 in	
Bossaso,	 also	 wished	 to	 return	 home.	
Another	 female	migrant	who	had	been	
kidnapped	and	raped	by	traffickers,	and	
was	 then	 injured	 in	 a	 road	 accident,	
also	 regretted	 her	 decision	 to	 migrate	
and	 wished	 to	 return	 to	 Ethiopia.	 A	
number	 of	 migrants	 interviewed	 in	
prisons	 in	 Yemen,	 and	 living	 in	
deplorable	 and	 uncertain	 conditions,	
also	 expressed	 a	 desire	 to	 return	 back	
to	their	country	of	origin.		
“I	don’t	know	what	I	am	going	to	face	on	the	rest	of	
my	journey,	and	I	wish	to	go	back	home	to	
Ethiopia.”	Ethiopian	migrant,	Bossaso.	
	
“I	didn’t	know	things	were	that	terrible	and	hard.	If	
I	had	known	this,	I	wouldn’t	have	left	my	home	
town.	And	if	I	was	capable	of	paying	my	way	back,	I	
would	go	back.”	Ethiopian	female	migrant,	Bossaso.	
	
“Migrants	living	conditions	are	horrible,	inhuman.	
Theirs	rights	are	not	respected.	During	
deportations,	they’re	mistreated”.	Community	
respondent,	Obock.	
	
Islamic	State	in	Puntland	and	Yemen	
	
A	group	affiliated	with	IS	is	active	in	Puntland	and	led	by	the	cleric	Abdulqadir	Mumin.	
The	group	was	originally	part	of	Al	Shabaab	but	split	away	in	October	2015.	While	its	
geographic	reach	is	limited	to	Ali	Saleebaan	territory	(with	bases	at	Qandala,	Dhaadaar,	
Balli	Dhidin	and	Xorgoand),	its	membership	has	reportedly	expanded	to	300	fighters,	and	
has	the	potential	to	expand	to	a	more	serious	threat	(Sahan,	2017).		
	
In	Yemen,	IS	presence	first	emerged	in	late	2014,	when	jihadist	fighters	announced	their	
allegiance	 to	 the	 group.	 Since	 then,	 IS	 has	 sought	 to	 build	 a	 stronger	 presence	 in	 a	
number	 of	 Sunni-dominated	 locales	 in	 the	 Aden,	 Hadramawt,	 Sanaa,	 Taizz,	 Lahij,	
Shabwah	and	al-Bayda	governorates	(Kuoti,	2016).	The	group’s	first	major	attacks	in	the	
country	 struck	 two	 mosques	 in	 Sana’a	 in	 March	 2015.	 The	 local	 clan	 dynamics	 and	
sectarian	divisions	of	Yemen’s	civil	war	could	benefit	 IS,	however	most	analysts	believe	
that	 its	 strategy	 in	 Yemen	 is	 not	 sustainable,	 as	 it	 uses	 violence	 at	 levels	 outside	 of	
Yemeni	norms,	has	a	foreign	leadership	body	in	Yemen,	and	refuses	to	work	within	local	
customs	(Zimmerman,	2016).	
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However,	in	spite	of	the	abuse	and	hardships,	most	migrants	do	not	regret	their	decision	to	
migrate	(although	it	is	worth	highlighting	that	many	of	the	migrants	interviewed	are	still	in	
transit,	have	not	yet	reached	their	intended	destination,	and	may	still	regret	their	decision	
later	 on	 in	 their	 journey	 or	 once	 they	 reach	 their	 intended	 destination).	 One	 Ethiopian	
respondent	reported	that	his	legs	had	been	beaten	and	injured	by	smugglers	who	restricted	
his	movements	and	freedom,	that	he	had	 lost	money	and	was	 in	debt,	was	sick	but	could	
not	access	health	services,	and	had	nowhere	to	sleep	and	no	sanitation	facilities	in	Bossaso.	
Nevertheless,	when	asked	whether	he	was	better	off	after	moving	than	he	would	have	been	
had	 he	 stayed	 in	 Ethiopia,	 he	 replied	 that	 he	was.	 Not	 only	 do	 these	 examples	 highlight	
migrants’	 determination	 to	 move,	 no	 matter	 what	 the	 consequences,	 they	 also	 call	 into	
question	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 campaigns	 that	 seek	 to	 deter	 them	 from	moving	 by	 raising	
awareness	 of	 the	 risks,	 dangers	 and	 difficulties.	 As	 discussed	 in	 Section	 2.3.3.,	 many	
migrants	are	already	aware	of	these	risks	and	are	prepared	to	make	the	journey	regardless,	
making	it	unlikely	that	such	campaigns	will	be	very	effective.		
Resilience	 to	 abuse	 and	 hardship	 can	 also	 be	 explained	 in	 a	 number	 of	 ways.	 Firstly,	
migration	 is	 often	 an	 important	 means	 of	 protection	 in	 itself,	 particularly	 in	 contexts	 of	
conflict	and	persecution	where	people	may	feel	their	safety	can	be	best	assured	by	moving	
elsewhere	either	temporarily	or	permanently.	In	these	scenarios,	return	(whether	forced	or	
voluntary)	 can	 bring	 about	 substantial	 and	 greater	 risks	 than	 migration.	 Most	 Oromos	
reported	fear	of	arrest,	detention	and	torture	by	the	Ethiopian	authorities	as	a	reason	for	
moving,	and	a	return	to	Ethiopia	could	put	them	in	very	real	danger.	However,	many	of	the	
migrants	 detained	 in	 Puntland,	 Djibouti,	 Yemen	 and	 Saudi	 Arabia	 are	 deported	 without	
adequate	time	for	proper	refugee	status	determination	(RSD),	meaning	that	genuine	asylum	
seekers	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 included	 in	 the	 numbers	 of	 returnees.38	 Economic	 reasons	 are	 a	
second	 factor	 behind	 people’s	 resilience.	 Migrants	 who	 return	 to	 their	 country	 of	 origin	
before	 succeeding	 in	 reaching	 their	 intended	 destination	 face	 a	 real	 risk	 of	 economic	
hardship	for	themselves	and	their	families,	who	may	have	sold	assets	and	taken	out	loans	in	
order	 to	 pay	 for	 the	 journey	 costs.	 Thirdly,	 a	 number	 of	 migrant	 respondents	 expressed	
migration	 decisions	 and	 consequences	 as	 being	
out	of	their	control	and	in	the	hands	of	God.	To	a	
certain	 degree,	 these	 sentiments	 remove	
migrants’	agency,	and	make	them	more	likely	to	
accept	their	circumstances,	even	 if	the	outcome	
is	not	positive.		
	
4.1.	Protection	risks	and	abuse	
Cases	of	abuse	are	widely	documented	by	
a	 number	 of	 reports,	 studies,	 institutions	
and	the	media.	These	include	incidents	of	
murder,	 theft,	 sexual	 violence,	 economic	
exploitation,	 abandonment,	 prostitution,	
                                                
38	For	example,	following	a	terrorist	attack	in	Djibouti	in	May	2014,	the	government	has	increased	monitoring,	
detentions,	 and	 deportations	 of	 migrants	 without	 the	 benefit	 of	 refugee	 status	 determination	 (Green	 &	
Snyder,	2017).	
“If	the	benefit	of	migration	is	measured	by	the	
simple	amounts	that	migrants	make	as	income,	
transfer,	and	save,	then	they	have	benefitted.	If	
we	measure	the	bad	treatment	against	them,	
then	there	is	no	benefit	because	it	has	caused	
them	deep	harm.”	Key	informant,	Sana’a.	
“This	is	God’s	will	and	it	is	determined	by	
Him.	I	have	nothing	to	do	with	this	
matter.	I	travelled	at	a	certain	time	
because	God	wanted	that	to	happen	at	
that	time.”	Ethiopian	migrant,	Sana’a.	
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trafficking,	arbitrary	detention	and	refoulement	(Mixed	Migration	Taskforce	Somalia,	2008).	
Migrants	interviewed	as	part	of	this	research	reported	experiencing	many	of	these	abuses,	
or	 of	 knowing	 of	 incidents	 affecting	 other	 migrants.	 Reports	 also	 indicate	 that	 the	
prevalence	and	severity	of	risks	and	abuses	has	increased	in	recent	years:	80%	of	Ethiopian	
migrants	hoping	or	planning	to	leave	Ethiopia,	and	92%	of	returnees	believed	this	to	be	the	
case	in	a	2014	study	(RMMS,	2014).		
Yemen	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 focal	 point	 for	much	 of	 the	 abuse	 that	 is	 occurring,	 in	 particular	
during	 sea	 crossings	 and	 disembarkation,	 and	 during	 transit	 through	 the	 country.	 There	
have	been	cases	of	migrants	being	beaten,	stabbed,	shot,	burned,	asphyxiated,	suffocated,	
dehydrated	 and	 thrown	 overboard	 during	 the	 crossings	 to	 Yemen.	 Migrant	 respondents	
reported	being	forced	to	disembark	several	hundred	metres	from	the	shore	and	then	made	
to	swim	to	land,	which	has	led	to	a	number	of	deaths	of	those	unable	to	swim.	Upon	arrival	
in	 Yemen,	 groups	 of	 kidnappers	 are	 often	waiting	 to	 pick	 up	migrants	 as	 they	 disembark	
from	boats,	particularly	along	the	Red	Sea	coast	(Human	Rights	Watch,	2014).	They	may	be	
working	in	coordination	with	the	smugglers,	or	may	pick	up	migrants	as	they	travel	through	
Yemen.	 In	many	cases,	 they	pay	 the	boat	crews	 for	 the	migrants,	and	 then	demand	a	 fee	
from	 the	migrants	 themselves.	 Those	 unable	 or	 unwilling	 to	 pay	 are	 kidnapped,	 taken	 to	
isolated	camps	 in	Yemen	and,	 in	many	cases,	 tortured	until	 they	or	 their	 families	pay	 the	
ransom	 fee	 (Human	 Rights	 Watch,	 2014).	 A	 number	 of	 migrant	 interviewees	 had	 either	
experienced	 this	 for	 themselves,	 or	 heard	 of	 other	 migrants	 who	 had.	 In	 2015,	 it	 was	
reported	that	6,093	migrants	were	abducted	upon	arrival	in	Yemen	(RMMS,	2017).	Figures	
captured	in	the	same	year	indicate	that	as	many	as	34%	of	migrants	who	came	to	IOM	for	
urgent	 assistance	 had	 been	 kidnapped	 and	 extorted	 (IOM,	 2016).	 In	 a	 fairly	 new	
phenomenon,	migrants	 are	 being	 kidnapped	 and	 held	 for	 ransom	not	 just	 on	 arrival,	 but	
numerous	times	while	transiting	through	Yemen;	in	addition	to	the	other	risks	to	migrants,	
this	depletes	their	and	their	families’	resources	and	savings,	making	it	harder	to	secure	their	
release.		
A	number	of	 factors	are	behind	the	 increased	 levels	of	abuse	 in	Yemen.	Firstly,	 it	 is	much	
harder	for	asylum	seekers	and	refugees	to	access	international	protection	in	Yemen.	UNHCR	
acknowledges	that	they	are	often	unable	to	register	migrants’	asylum	applications	or	have	
their	presence	documented	by	the	Yemeni	authorities	(UNHCR,	2016).	Other	development	
and	 humanitarian	 organisations	 have	 seen	 their	 operations	 and	 activities	 significantly	
curtailed	 by	 conflict	 and	 violence,	 thereby	 cutting	 off	 another	 channel	 of	 assistance	 for	
vulnerable	migrants.	Secondly,	smuggling	and	trafficking	networks	appear	to	function	with	
the	most	 impunity	 in	Yemen,	and	many	of	 the	protection	 risks	and	abuses	are	associated	
with	these	networks.	As	highlighted	earlier	in	this	report,	the	escalation	of	conflict	in	Yemen	
has	led	to	the	breakdown	of	state	institutions	and	subsequent	lack	of	policy	and	control.	In	
this	 context,	 smuggling	 and	 trafficking	 networks	 have	become	 firmly	 established,	 and	 are	
able	to	exploit	and,	in	many	cases,	abuse	migrants	with	little	reaction	from	state	actors.		
Abuse	of	migrants	typically	occurs	in	migration	‘hot	spots’	located	along	the	main	migratory	
corridors.	In	Somaliland	and	Puntland,	a	number	of	migrants	reported	suffering	abuse	in	the	
key	transit	locations	of	Tog	Wajaale,	Guumays	and	Bossaso.	In	Yemen,	locations	like	al	Bahr,	
Raas	Al	Arah,	Atta	(Al	Jawf	governorate),	Shafar	and	Haradh	(Hajja	governorate),	Al	Thabet	
Warqo	(Sa’dah	governorate)	and	Issa	Salem	were	highlighted	as	high	risk	zones	for	migrants.	
In	Djibouti,	a	number	of	migrants	reported	being	held	hostage	by	smugglers	 in	Tadjourah,	
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who	 demanded	 additional	 payments	 not	 previously	 agreed.	 Those	 unable	 to	 pay	 were	
threatened	 with	 torture,	 and	 families	 were	 contacted	 to	 make	 the	 payments	 on	 the	
migrants’	 behalf.	 All	 migrants	 travelling	 to	 Obock	 must	 pass	 through	 Tadjourah	 at	 some	
point	along	their	journey,	regardless	of	their	border	crossing,	and	so	it	is	not	surprising	that	
the	 town	 has	 become	 a	 place	where	 abuse	 is	 common.	 Boat	 crossings	 and	 zones	where	
migrants	 disembark	 from	 boats	 are	 also	 considered	 to	 be	 risky.	 Specific	 threats	 aboard	
vessels	 include	 a	 lack	 of	 safety	 equipment,	 overloading,	 and	 placing	 people	 in	 confined	
spaces	next	to	engines	where	they	are	at	risk	of	carbon	monoxide	poisoning.	A	further	risk	
point	occurs	when	migrants	are	forced	overboard	by	smugglers	near	the	surf	line	in	Yemen,	
as	organised	crime	groups	avoid	 landing	on	shore,	where	the	 likelihood	of	 interception	by	
the	authorities	is	higher.			
A	 range	of	 individuals	are	 reportedly	 involved	 in	 committing	human	 rights	and	protection	
abuses	against	migrants.	These	include	smugglers	and	traffickers,	who	are	widely	implicated	
as	 perpetrators	 of	 abuse	 of	 migrants	 under	 their	 charge.	 During	 interviews,	 migrants	
reported	 being	 physically	 assaulted	 and	 attacked,	 enduring	 degrading	 or	 humiliating	
treatment,	being	threatened	with	rape,	or	actually	raped.	However,	it	is	worth	noting,	that	
migrants	 interviewed	did	differentiate	between	 ‘good’	and	 ‘bad’	smugglers,	and	 looked	to	
share	 details	 and	 information	 of	 ‘safe’	 smugglers	 within	migrant	 networks.	 This	 suggests	
that	there	are	economic	incentives	for	smugglers	to	treat	migrants	well,	as	those	known	for	
having	a	bad	reputation	within	migrant	networks	are	less	likely	to	attract	as	many	potential	
clients.	Other	criminal	actors	such	as	militias,	bandits	and	thieves,	have	also	been	accused	of	
assaulting,	 abusing	 and	 robbing	migrants.	 A	 migrant	 moving	 through	 Puntland	 described	
eight	armed	men	stopping	their	vehicle,	shooting	and	wounding	the	migrants,	and	killing	a	
female	Ethiopian	who	was	among	his	group.	In	Obock,	interviewees	described	being	robbed	
of	 their	 money	 and	 phones,	 sometimes	 at	 knife	 point	 in	 places	 like	 Lac	 Assal,	 with	 Afar	
smugglers	and	residents	often	being	accused	of	being	behind	these	attacks.	Finally,	migrants	
themselves	 have	 been	 known	 to	 carry	 out	 incidents	 of	 abuse	 against	 fellow	migrants.	 In	
Puntland,	community	respondents	reported	occasional	violent	clashes	between	Oromo	and	
Tigrayan	 migrants	 in	 Bossaso.	 In	 Yemen,	 migrant	 interviewees	 described	 tensions	 and	
physical	 violence	 between	 Ethiopian	 and	 Somali	 migrants,	 reportedly	 brought	 about	 by	
cultural	 differences.	 Sexual	 and	 gender-based	 violence	 (SGBV)	 and	 domestic	 violence	 can	
also	occur	within	groups	of	migrants,	often	exacerbated	by	the	stress	and	limited	livelihood	
opportunities	(Altai	Consulting,	2016).		
State	 authorities	 also	 play	 a	 role;	 in	 particular,	 the	 police,	military	 and	 even	 government	
officials.	In	Yemen,	Ethiopian	migrants	are	routinely	and	arbitrarily	picked	up	and	detained	
by	 security	 forces,	 without	 recourse	 to	 protection	 mechanisms	 or	 the	 chance	 to	 seek	
asylum.	This	project	interviewed	a	number	of	Ethiopian	and	Somali	migrants	in	detention	in	
Al	Hodeidah,	who	 reported	deplorable	 conditions,	with	 little	 food,	water,	medical	 care	or	
electricity,	and	no	idea	of	how	or	when	they	would	be	released.		Between	2,000	and	3,000	
Ethiopian	migrants	are	thought	to	be	held	in	prisons	across	Yemen,	and	it	is	not	clear	when	
they	will	be	released,	or	what	will	happen	to	them	(RMMS,	2016).	According	to	the	Eritrean	
Migrants’	Community	in	Yemen,	some	150	Eritreans	have	been	held	in	detention	for	over	a	
year,	 with	 little	 sign	 of	 release.	 Once	 deported,	 it	 is	 common	 practice	 for	 the	 Yemeni	
authorities	 to	 force	 the	 migrants	 to	 disembark	 at	 isolated	 sections	 of	 the	 Djiboutian	
coastline,	often	at	some	distance	from	shore.	The	migrants	must	then	make	their	own	way	
by	 foot	 back	 to	Obock	 or	 other	 locations,	 often	 suffering	 from	dehydration	 and	 a	 lack	 of	
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food.	 IOM	 estimates	 that	 at	 least	 24	migrants	 died	 due	 to	 deportation	 conditions	 during	
October	and	November	2016,	a	statement	confirmed	by	the	Djiboutian	authorities.	In	other	
incidents,	five	Ethiopian	migrants	drowned	in	October	2016	after	being	forced	to	disembark	
off	shore	from	Obock,	and	six	migrants	died	from	hunger	and	thirst	after	being	deported	by	
the	Yemeni	authorities	and	having	to	walk	two	days	back	to	Obock	(RMMS,	2016).	
In	 Puntland,	 migrants	 held	 in	 state	 detention	 facilities	 also	 describe	 appalling	 conditions	
with	 a	 lack	 of	 food,	 water	 and	 sanitation.	 Two	 Ethiopians	 allegedly	 died	 in	 custody	 in	
Puntland	during	the	field	research,	as	a	result	of	ill	treatment	and	a	lack	of	food.	Elsewhere,	
the	Djiboutian	military	has	been	accused	of	 carrying	out	 SGBV	against	migrants	 travelling	
between	Loyada	and	Obock	(Altai	Consulting,	2016).	HRW	has	accused	the	Saudi	authorities	
of	 detaining	 and	 deporting	 migrants	 and	 refugees	 under	 deplorable	 conditions.	 In	 2014,	
Saudi	 Arabia	 expelled	 12,000	 Somalis	without	 allowing	 them	 to	make	 refugee	 claims	 and	
holding	 them	 in	 detention	 in	 crowded	 and	 poorly	 serviced	 detention	 centres,	 with	 some	
reporting	 being	 beaten	 by	 security	 forces	 (Human	 Rights	Watch,	 2014).	When	 the	 Saudi	
authorities	 expelled	 more	 than	 160,000	 Ethiopians	 between	 November	 2013	 and	March	
2014,	they	were	accused	of	serious	abuses	during	the	process	of	detention	and	deportation,	
including	 attacks	 by	 security	 forces	 and	private	 citizens,	 inadequate	detention	 conditions,	
and	abuse	in	detention	prior	to	deportation	(Human	Rights	Watch,	2015).	
	
4.2.	Hardship	
Migrants	also	 face	a	 range	of	hardships	during	 their	 journey,	 including	a	 lack	of	access	 to	
food	and	water,	basic	services,	shelter	and	livelihoods,	as	well	as	challenges	of	security	and	
climate.	Whereas	 the	 above-mentioned	 protection	 risks	 and	 abuse	 are	 propagated	 upon	
migrants	by	 individuals	or	groups,	hardships	are	associated	with	 the	general	conditions	of	
journey,	 in	particular	the	social,	political,	economic,	security	and	environmental	structures	
along	 the	different	 routes.	 	 In	Yemen,	 conflict	and	 insecurity	has	worsened	conditions	 for	
migrants,	as	their	access	to	basic	services,	livelihoods,	and	support	mechanisms	have	been	
severely	 undermined.	 As	 shall	 be	 explored	 in	 more	 detail	 in	 Section	 6,	 there	 are	 few	
development	or	humanitarian	initiatives	that	specifically	target	migrants,	which	leaves	them	
exposed	to	these	hardships	without	adequate	support	or	assistance.	 In	this	context,	many	
migrants	are	 living	under	extremely	difficult	conditions	and	may	be	forced	 into	precarious	
activities	or	behaviours,	such	as	begging,	sleeping	rough	and	sex	work.		
Unsustainable	 levels	 of	 hardship	 are	 perhaps	 best	 captured	 by	 the	 situation	 of	 Yemeni	
refugees	and	Somali	returnees	who	fled	Yemen.	Acute	living	conditions	faced	in	Djibouti	and	
Somalia	 have	 forced	 growing	 numbers	 to	 return	 to	 Yemen	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 dangers,	 and	
before	 security	 conditions	 have	 sufficiently	 improved.	 All	 refugees	 and	 returnees	
interviewed	by	this	project	describe	extremely	difficult	living	conditions,	such	as	inadequate	
food,	 income,	 shelter	 and	 livelihoods,	 and	 reported	 receiving	 little	 support.39	 Two	 female	
Somali	returnees	said	they	planned	on	returning	to	Al	Kharas	town	in	Yemen	in	the	hope	of	
accessing	 the	 camp	 and	 getting	 support	 from	 UNHCR.	 Conflict	 and	 insecurity,	 and	 the	
                                                
39	When	they	first	returned	to	Somalia,	they	received	food	rations,	registration	cards	(for	those	who	had	been	
registered	as	refugees	in	Yemen),	as	well	as	some	money	(US$	120	per	person)	to	return	to	their	hometown.	
However,	following	this	initial	package	of	support	respondents	reported	receiving	no	additional	assistance.	
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accompanying	 economic	 decline	 in	 Yemen	 have	 significantly	 undermined	 already	 difficult	
living	conditions	 in	Yemen.	Services	and	means	of	 support	provided	by	governmental	and	
international	 organisations	 have	 been	 rolled	 back,	 health	 and	 educational	 facilities	 have	
been	 undermined	 and	 targeted	 by	 airstrikes,	 and	 livelihood	 opportunities	 have	 been	
significantly	reduced.	In	this	context,	returnees	are	likely	to	suffer	ongoing	hardships,	with	
reports	 showing	 that	many	 returnees	 are	 not	 able	 to	 return	 ‘home’,	 but	 find	 themselves	
internally	displaced	in	isolated	coastal	villages	in	Yemen,	becoming	IDPs	within	their	country	
(RMMS,	2016).		
	
4.2.1.	Poor	Access	to	Basic	services	
Given	 the	 difficult	 conditions	 and	 circumstances	 of	 migrants’	 journeys,	 many	 of	 those	
interviewed	 were	 suffering,	 or	 had	 suffered	 from,	 serious	 health	 issues.	 These	 included	
malaria,	fatigue,	and	injuries	sustained	from	car	accidents	or	beatings.	A	number	of	female	
respondents	were	pregnant,	and	needed	rest	and	medical	support,	such	as	ultrasound	scans	
and	 medication.	 Nevertheless,	 a	 key	 problem	 for	 migrants	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 access	 to	 health	
services.	 Refugees	 and	 those	 registered	 with	 UNHCR	 and	 the	 government	 generally	 fare	
marginally	 better	 than	 irregular	 migrants,	 whose	 access	 to	 medical	 services	 is	 more	
complicated	and	expensive.		
In	Puntland,	new	arrivals	from	Yemen	who	register	with	UNHCR	and	government	authorities	
can	 access	 a	 number	 of	 health	 and	 protection	 services	 at	 the	 two	 reception	 centres	 in	
Bossaso	(IOM,	2015).40	Food	and	water,	sanitation	facilities	and	family	tracing	services	are	
also	 provided.	 Unregistered	 migrants	 can	 visit	 the	 MRCs	 in	 Obock	 and	 Bossaso	 for	
emergency	 medical	 assistance.	 However,	 services	 and	 funding	 are	 limited	 and,	 in	 many	
cases,	 already	 over-stretched.	 Migrants	 are	 able	 to	 use	 public	 health	 centres,	 but	 many	
choose	not	to	for	fear	of	being	identified	and	deported	by	the	authorities,	or	because	of	a	
lack	of	funds.41	In	any	case,	most	of	the	health	facilities	in	Puntland	are	privately	owned,	and	
migrants	 who	 use	 them	must	 pay	 for	 consultations	 and	 treatment.	Migrants	 complained	
that	purchasing	medicines	is	expensive,	and	many	had	fallen	into	debt	when	trying	to	treat	
an	 illness.	 Language	 was	 also	 a	 potential	 barrier	 for	 migrants	 unable	 to	 describe	 their	
symptoms	or	needs	to	medical	staff.		
In	Djibouti,	refugees	residing	in	camps	have	access	to	health	facilities,	although	respondents	
lamented	that	these	often	comprised	of	unventilated	tents,	rather	than	solid	structures,	and	
that	 the	 services	 provided	 were	 minimal.	 One	 Yemeni	 interviewed	 in	 Markazi	 camp	
complained	that	she	was	suffering	considerably	from	kidney	and	respiratory	diseases	due	to	
a	lack	of	adequate	medical	attention.	Unregistered	migrants	in	Djibouti	cannot	access	these	
services	 and,	 to	 improve	 the	 situation,	 some	 key	 informants	 advocated	 expanding	 public	
health	coverage	to	migrants.	The	President	of	Djibouti	recently	alluded	to	the	possibility	of	
including	migrants	within	 universal	 health	 care	 insurance	 (knowns	 as	 the	 AMU),	which	 is	
currently	only	available	to	Djiboutians.	
                                                
40	This	includes	medical	assistance	when	necessary,	vaccinations,	screening	for	some	diseases,	fitness	for	travel	
assessment,	referral	services,	refreshments,	protection	assessment	and	psychosocial	support.	
41	 The	 Bossaso	 public	 hospital	 supports	 referred	migrants	with	 free	 services,	 and,	 in	Garowe,	 they	 can	 also	
receive	medical	treatment	at	the	General	Hospital	and	Gambool	clinic,	through	funding	provided	by	IOM.	
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Young	migrants’	access	to	education	services	is	also	limited,	particularly	for	unaccompanied	
migrant	children,	without	documentation	or	guardians,	who	find	themselves	excluded	from	
a	 range	 of	 basic	 services,	 including	 education,	 health	 and	 protection.	 Some	 organisations	
provide	educational	programmes	to	fill	this	gap,	however	there	are	not	enough	to	meet	the	
needs	of	all	migrant	children.	Registered	refugee	children	may	fair	better	and,	 in	Djibouti,	
Yemeni	 refugees	 interviewed	 in	Markazi	 camp	 reported	being	able	 to	 continue	with	 their	
studies.		
	
4.2.2.	Lack	of	Shelter	
Shelter	is	another	issue	faced	by	migrants	moving	through	Djibouti,	Puntland	and	Yemen.	In	
rural	settings,	migrants	sleep	outside	 in	mountains,	 forests	or	on	beaches.	 In	urban	areas,	
migrants	commonly	reported	sleeping	out	in	the	open,	either	in	open	compounds	or	on	the	
streets,	 and	 in	 vacant	 and	 dilapidated	 buildings.	 This	 leaves	 them	 vulnerable	 to	 attack,	
robbery	and	abuse,	especially	women	and	children.		
In	Bossaso	and	Garowe,	Ethiopians	tend	to	live	in	open	and	overcrowded	settlements	either	
in	Sawiti	neighbourhood	near	to	the	port,	or	 in	Kawda	Lulyo	neighbourhood,	 to	the	north	
west	of	the	city.	For	Ethiopians	travelling	with	smugglers,	their	accommodation	is	generally	
arranged	and	controlled	by	the	networks,	and	is	of	a	very	poor	quality.	They	do	not	sleep	in	
rooms,	 but	 out	 in	 the	 open,	 sometimes	 on	 verandas,	 or	 in	 poorly	 built	wooden	 shelters.	
Those	 travelling	 independently	may	 sleep	 in	 the	 open,	 as	 they	 cannot	 or	 do	 not	want	 to	
spend	the	money	on	renting	a	room	or	a	house.	A	number	of	Ethiopian	migrants	are	also	
known	 to	 take	 shelter	 in	 the	 IDP	 camps	 in	 Garowe	 and	 Bossaso.	 Somali	 migrants	 and	
returnees	tend	to	fare	better	than	their	Ethiopian	counterparts,	using	clan	affiliations	to	find	
accommodation	amongst	the	local	community	or	in	town	until	their	departure	to	Yemen	is	
finalised.	New	arrivals	from	Yemen	can	apply	for	temporary	shelter	for	up	to	three	nights	at	
the	reception	centres	(IOM,	2015),	however	they	have	struggled	to	find	affordable,	 longer	
term	 accommodation,	 and	 interviewees	 complained	 of	 cramped	 and	 poor	 quality	
accommodation	 options.	 Many	 Yemeni	 refugees	 congregate	 in	 the	 town	 of	 Qardo,	 in	
designated	 residential	 areas	 owned	 by	 Mabruk	 Group	 Company	 or	 in	 residential	 areas	
located	to	the	west	of	the	town.		
In	Djibouti,	Markazi	camp,	not	far	from	Obock,	was	established	by	the	Djiboutian	authorities	
to	shelter	Yemeni	refugees,	in	part	due	to	its	relative	proximity	to	Yemen.	Somali	and,	to	a	
lesser	extent,	Ethiopian	and	Eritrean	refugees	tend	to	be	located	in	the	southern	camps	of	
Holl	Holl	and	Ali	Addeh.	A	large	number	of	refugees	also	reside	in	urban	settings	in	Obock	
and	Djibouti.	After	initially	adopting	a	policy	of	encampment	towards	Yemeni	refugees,	the	
Government	of	Djibouti	extended	refugee	registration	to	urban	areas,	although	assistance	is	
only	 provided	 to	 refugees	 residing	 in	 the	 camps	 and,	 according	 to	 those	 interviewed,	
refugees	 wishing	 to	 leave	 Obock	 must	 first	 secure	 a	 written	 authorisation	 from	 ONARS.	
Respondents	described	life	in	Markazi	camp	as	extremely	difficult,	with	one	Yemeni	refugee	
likening	 it	 to	 a	 prison.	 According	 to	 respondents,	 conditions	were	 better	 when	 they	 first	
arrived,	 but	 have	 since	 worsened	 each	 year.	 Respondents	 describe	 living	 in	 unventilated	
tents	 in	spite	of	 the	soaring	 temperatures,	 the	 food	rations	 they	receive	do	not	 last	 them	
until	the	end	of	the	month,	and	the	water	available	is	salty.	Electricity	in	Markazi	is	limited	
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to	 around	 three	 hours	 a	 day,	 and	 the	 camp	 becomes	 very	 dark	 at	 night	 time.	 That	 said,	
Yemeni	refugees	in	Markazi	describe	the	camp	as	safe	and	secure,	with	good	security.		
	
4.2.3.	Limited	Livelihood	Opportunities	
Livelihood	and	employment	opportunities	are	a	major	concern	 for	migrants.	Many	do	not	
have	 sufficient	money	 to	 fund	 their	 entire	 journey,	 and	 are	 obliged	 to	work	 and	 earn	 in	
transit	in	order	to	pay	for	the	next	stage	of	the	route.	Furthermore,	migrants	reported	being	
forced	to	pay	additional	and	unexpected	fees	to	smugglers,	leaving	them	without	sufficient	
money	and	in	debt.	Others	were	robbed,	or	had	to	spend	part	of	their	savings	on	medicine	
when	they	became	sick	or	injured	along	their	journey.	For	migrants	looking	to	stay,	such	as	
refugees	 and	 returnees,	 the	 need	 to	 find	 meaningful	 work	 and	 employment	 is	 equally	
pressing	to	sustain	living	conditions	and	supplement	official	assistance	received.		
Opportunities	for	migrants	to	engage	in	livelihood	activities	are	limited	in	Puntland,	Djibouti	
and	Yemen.	Irregular	status,	language,	low	skills	level,	and	limited	employment	market	were	
key	barriers	to	securing	employment.	Some	interviewed	migrants	reported	finding	work	in	
cafes	 and	 restaurants,	 or	 engaging	 in	 manual	 labour	 on	 construction	 sites,	 cleaning	 and	
garbage	collection,	and	domestic	work	 in	people’s	homes.	However,	the	available	 jobs	are	
typically	 in	 the	 informal	 sector,	 and	migrants	 complain	 of	 low	 pay	 and	 long	 hours	 (Altai	
Consulting,	 2016).42	 In	 Yemen,	 Ethiopian	 migrants	 have	 succeeded	 in	 working	 in	 qat	
plantations	in	places	like	Al-Baydha,	Dhamar	and	Ibb	governorates,	or	carry	out	low-skilled	
work,	such	as	washing	cars,	grazing	animals,	guarding	or	cleaning	streets.	According	to	key	
informants,	migrants	are	also	recruited	as	cleaners	by	hospitals,	as	they	represent	a	cheaper	
labour	 force	 than	 local	 Yemenis.	 	 While	 unregistered	 migrants’	 work	 opportunities	 are	
limited	by	 their	 irregular	 status,	 refugees	may	be	permitted	 to	work	 in	 some	 contexts.	 In	
Djibouti,	 for	example,	documented	refugees	with	a	work	permit	are	allowed	to	work,	and	
many	opt	to	move	to	Djibouti	town.	Nevertheless,	high	unemployment	rates	and	living	costs	
(accommodation,	food	and	water)	limit	this	option	to	those	with	the	savings	or	connections	
to	sustain	themselves	in	the	city.		Generally	speaking,	the	majority	are	not	able	to	find	work,	
                                                
42	A	maid	in	Garowe	typically	earns	US$	50	per	month	(equivalent	to	US$	1.65	per	day);	a	famer	in	Bossaso	can	
expect	to	earn	US$	50-60	per	month;	and	a	cleaner	or	cook	in	a	Bossaso	restaurant	will	earn	on	average	US$	
50	per	month	(Altai	Consulting,	2016).		
Image	7:	Make-shift	shelters	occupied	by	Ethiopian	migrants	in	Sawiti,	Bossaso.	
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and	 are	 forced	 to	 rely	 on	 humanitarian	 projects,	 community	 generosity	 and	 their	 own	
savings	in	order	to	survive	(IOM,	2015).		
A	 number	 of	 NGO	 key	 informants	 suggested	 income	 generation	 or	 skills	 development	
programmes	 to	 enable	migrants	 to	 utilise	 or	 develop	 their	 skills,	 and	 put	 them	 to	 use	 in	
transit	locations	in	order	to	sustain	themselves	during	their	journey.	Many	migrants	possess	
farming	and	manufacturing	skills	that	could	be	used	to	benefit	 local	economies.	There	is	a	
risk,	 however,	 that	 these	 kinds	 of	 initiatives	 could	 undermine	 the	 competitiveness	 and	
earning	 potential	 of	 local	 residents,	 who	 already	 complain	 that	 migrants	 undercut	 their	
wages	and	job	opportunities	(see	Section	5.1).	Any	income	generation	or	skills	development	
programmes	would	therefore	need	to	include	both	migrants	and	the	communities	that	host	
them.	 Another	 issue	 is	 the	 legal	 obstacles	 associated	 with	 offering	 livelihood	 support	 to	
irregular	 migrants,	 who	 are	 not	 officially	 allowed	 to	 work,	 meaning	 that	 any	 vocational	
training	 programmes	 are	 likely	 to	 face	 political	 and	 legal	 challenges.	 While	 livelihood	
schemes	may	be	beneficial	 to	refugees	or	migrants	 likely	 to	remain	 in	a	particular	area	or	
country	for	some	time,	they	may	be	less	relevant	to	the	large	numbers	of	migrants	in	transit	
who	are	generally	looking	to	move	on	with	their	journey	as	quickly	as	possible.		
	
4.2.4.	Insecurity		
Insecurity	represents	a	significant	hardship	for	 irregular	migrants	caught	up	in	conflict	and	
instability.	 In	 Yemen,	 migrants’	 security	 has	 been	 significantly	 undermined	 by	 ongoing	
conflict	in	the	country.	Coastal	areas	controlled	by	the	Houthis	are	vulnerable	to	airstrikes,	
which	have	undermined	security	at	migrant	arrival	points	in	Taiz	governorate,	in	particular	
Dhubab	and	Mokha.	The	governorates	of	Sa’adah,	Hajjah	Marib,	Sana’a,	Amran,	Al	Jawf	and	
Al	Hodeidah	have	also	been	affected	by	airstrikes,	artillery	and	fighting,	undermining	access	
and	 security	 to	migrants	 passing	 through	 these	 areas.	 A	 number	 of	migrant	 respondents	
witnessed	airstrikes	whilst	transiting	through	Yemen,	and	reported	seeing	their	friends	and	
other	migrants	killed	as	a	result.		On	16	March	2017,	42	Somalis	travelling	from	Al	Hodeidah	
to	Sudan	died	when	the	boat	they	were	travelling	in	was	attacked	by	an	Apache	helicopter	
near	 the	Bab	al-Mandeb	 strait	 (Reuters,	 2017).	A	number	of	migrants	 interviewed	by	 this	
project	 in	 Al	 Hodeidah	 prison	 reported	 being	 attacked	 by	 helicopters	 when	 travelling	 by	
boat	to	Sudan,	and	it	is	possible	that	they	were	involved	in	this	incident.	Sa’dah	governorate	
in	 north-west	 Yemen	 is	 a	 common	 crossing	 point	 for	 migrants	 wanting	 to	 reach	 Saudi	
Arabia,	 but	 is	 also	 a	 zone	 of	 conflict	 and	 insecurity.	 A	 number	 of	 respondents	 described	
treading	on	 landmines	while	 trying	to	cross	 the	Yemeni-Saudi	border	 in	Sa’dah,	and	being	
left	badly	injured	and,	in	some	cases,	with	amputated	limbs.		
In	 Djibouti,	 the	 security	 situation	 is	 more	 stable,	 and	 migrant	 respondents	 reported	 no	
security	problems.	 In	Puntland,	there	has	been	a	surge	 in	violent	attacks	carried	out	by	Al	
Shabaab	and	IS-affiliated	groups,	with	seven	incidents	occurring	in	Bossaso	alone	between	
January	 and	 February	 2016.43	 Most	 recently,	 Al	 Shabaab	 raided	 a	 military	 base,	 located	
                                                
43	On	17	 January	2017,	gunmen	reportedly	killed	 two	military	 soldiers	at	a	checkpoint.	On	25	 January	2017,	
armed	 gunmen	 shot	 and	wounded	 a	 prominent	 elder	 (Muse	 Haji	 Farah)	 who	was	 the	 brother	 of	 Puntland	
Minister	 of	 Planning	 and	 International	 Cooperation.	 On	 27	 January	 2017,	 gunmen	 attacked	 a	 local	
businessman.	On	 8	 February	 2017,	militants	 affiliated	with	 IS	 attempted	 to	 storm	 ‘Village	Hotel’,	 a	 popular	
hotel	 frequented	 by	 foreign	 nationals	 and	 government	 officials.	 On	 24	 February	 2017,	 attackers	 launched	
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60km	 south	west	 of	 Bossaso,	 killing	 up	 to	 30	 people	 and	 taking	 control	 of	 the	military’s	
weapons	and	ammunition	(Garowe	Online,	2017).	While	Al	Shabaab	attacks	generally	target	
government	 officials,	 security	 agencies	 and	 NGOs,	 they	 are	 also	 directed	 at	 hotels,	
restaurants,	banks	and	checkpoints,	where	migrants	are	likely	to	congregate.	What’s	more,	
a	 number	 of	 government	 buildings	 are	 located	 in	 Sawiti	 neighbourhood,	 near	 to	 where	
Ethiopian	migrants	often	reside.	Given	the	large	numbers	of	migrants	passing	through,	they	
may	be	caught	in	the	cross	fire	when	attacks	do	occur.	
	
4.2.5.	Extreme	Climatic	Conditions	
Climatic	 conditions	 in	 Djibouti,	 Puntland	 and	 Yemen	 are	 extremely	 harsh.	 During	 the	
summer	months	 in	Obock	 (June	 to	 September)	 temperatures	 average	41	degrees	Celsius,	
although	 have	 been	 known	 to	 rise	 as	 high	 as	 51	 degrees.	 Strong	winds	 and	 violent	 sand	
storms	known	as	‘khamsin’	occur	from	May	to	July.	Puntland	also	has	a	hot	desert	climate,	
with	 temperatures	 peaking	 from	 June	 to	 September	 to	 an	 average	 of	 39	 to	 41	 degrees.	
Temperatures	in	Yemen	are	generally	also	very	high,	particularly	in	the	coastal	regions	and	
Temperatures	 are	 generally	 very	 high	 in	 Yemen,	 particularly	 in	 the	 coastal	 regions	 and	
during	summer	months.		
Migrants	travelling	between	the	HoA	and	Yemen	
endure	 long	 journeys,	 much	 of	 this	 on	 foot,	
leaving	them	exposed	to	the	harsh	elements.	At	
the	same	 time,	access	 to	 food	and	water	along	
the	 journey	 is	 a	 key	 challenge,	 and	 migrants	
interviewed	 in	 Djibouti,	 Puntland	 and	 Yemen	
consistently	 reported	 suffering	 from	 thirst	 and	
hunger,	 and	 complained	 that	 smugglers	 provide	 them	 with	 little	 sustenance	 during	 long	
journeys.	During	the	18	to	24-hour	boat	crossing	from	Puntland	to	Yemen,	smugglers	often	
forbid	 migrants	 from	 carrying	 any	 food	 or	 water	 on-board	 as	 there	 are	 no	 washroom	
facilities.	Migrants	may	be	able	to	seek	some	reprieve	in	urban	areas	or	at	transit	locations	
along	 the	 journey,	 where	 support	 or	 facilities,	 albeit	 limited,	 may	 be	 offered.	 However,	
when	travelling	along	roads	and	in	isolated	off-track	areas,	they	are	particularly	vulnerable	
to	the	elements.	 In	Djibouti,	where	conditions	are	particularly	difficult	and	movements	on	
foot	most	common,	nearly	all	migrants	interviewed	complained	of	heat,	fatigue,	hunger	and	
thirst	as	the	main	challenges	during	their	journey.	Journeys	on	foot	can	take	days,	with	one	
migrant	describing	spending	seven	days	on	the	road	from	the	border	to	Obock.	Under	these	
circumstances,	 death	 caused	 by	 thirst	 and	 exhaustion	 is	 common,	 and	 the	 Gendarmerie	
estimates	 that	between	 two	and	 five	migrants	 transiting	 through	 the	desert	areas	 in	Afar	
region	of	Ethiopia	and	Lac	Assal	in	Djibouti	die	every	week	(Altai	Consulting,	2016).	This	has	
led	 to	a	number	of	organisations	 calling	 for	mobile	 support	units	 to	be	 funded	and	made	
available	 to	 migrants	 in	 order	 to	 provide	 much-needed	 support	 under	 harsh	 climatic	
conditions.		
                                                                                                                                                  
grenades	 at	 a	 branch	 of	 Central	 Bank.	 On	 27	 February	 2017,	 attackers	 launched	 grenades	 at	 a	 military	
checkpoint,	near	to	a	popular	restaurant	located	in	Netco	area.	On	4	March	2017,	attackers	launched	grenades	
at	the	main	court	building.			
“I’m	really	exhausted	with	the	hunger	but	
I	will	continue	my	journey.”	Ethiopian	
migrant,	Obock	
	
“We	walked	long	hours	without	water	nor	
food,	with	the	heat,	and	lack	of	means”.	
Ethiopian	migrant,	Obock	
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4.3.	Unfinished	journeys	
Due	to	the	above-mentioned	risks,	abuse	and	hardships,	a	large	number	of	migrants	never	
complete	 their	 journeys	 or	 reach	 their	 intended	 destination.	 They	 may	 be	 forcibly	 or	
voluntarily	 returned	 to	 their	place	of	origin,	deported	 to	another	country,	prefer	 to	 settle	
permanently	in	a	transit	location,	or	die	during	the	journey.		
IOM	provides	assistance	to	stranded	migrants	who	seek	assistance	for	their	voluntary	return	
to	 their	 country	of	origin.	 In	2016,	 IOM	evacuated	over	3,000	Ethiopian	migrants	by	boat	
from	Al	Hodeidah	to	Djibouti,	and	over	500	migrants	by	air	(Veerassamy,	2017).	According	
to	 interviews	 with	 its	 staff,	 the	 organisation	 receives	 15	 to	 20	 requests	 per	 week	 from	
migrants	in	Djibouti	wishing	to	return	to	their	country	of	origin.	Recently,	IOM,	UNHCR	and	
the	Federal	Government	of	Somalia	have	been	working	together	to	facilitate	the	return	of	
Somali	refugees	from	Yemen	to	Somalia.	127	Somali	refugees	were	repatriated	in	late	2016,	
followed	by	another	106	Somalis	returned	by	plane	to	Mogadishu	on	27	February	(Hiiraan	
Online,	2017).	It	 is	expected	that	more	repatriations	will	follow.	Other	migrants	have	been	
forcibly	 detained	 and	 then	deported	 (generally	 to	neighbouring	 countries,	 not	 necessarily	
their	 country	 of	 origin)	 by	 the	 Yemeni,	 Djiboutian	 and	 Puntland	 authorities,	 often	 under	
deplorable	conditions	(refer	to	Section	4.1.	for	more	on	this).		
An	unknown	number	of	migrants	also	choose	to	settle	either	permanently	or	indefinitely	in	
transit	 locations.	 Researchers	 interviewed	 a	 number	 of	 these	 people	 in	 Puntland,	 and	
discovered	 that	 many	 had	 married	 Somalis	 and	 established	 local	 businesses.	 Very	 often	
these	migrants	 provided	much-needed	 support	 to	 other	migrants	 passing	 through,	 in	 the	
form	 of	 shelter,	 food	 and	 loans.	 Establishing	 a	 sustainable	 livelihood	 was	 a	 main	 reason	
behind	decisions	to	stay,	and	some	interviewees	reported	that	they	would	choose	to	stay	in	
the	transit	areas	should	they	secure	long-term	employment.	Not	all	incidents	of	settlement	
are	 positive,	 however,	 and	 in	many	 cases,	migrants	who	 stayed	 did	 so	 through	 a	 lack	 of	
choice.	 The	 researchers	 interviewed	 a	 number	 of	 migrants	 who	 had	 become	 stranded,	
without	 sufficient	 funds	 or	 assistance	 to	 either	 continue	 their	 journey	 or	 return	 to	 their	
country	of	origin.	For	this	group,	their	living	conditions	and	prospects	are	extremely	bleak,	
and	 they	 require	 immediate	 humanitarian	 assistance.	 In	 one	 example,	 a	 female	 migrant	
from	Ethiopia	had	been	forced	to	pay	extra	fees	to	the	smugglers	who	transported	her	to	
Bossaso,	leaving	her	in	debt	and	destitute,	and	without	the	funds	to	continue	her	journey	or	
return	home.		
A	third	group	of	migrants	never	complete	their	journey	due	to	death	along	the	route,	both	
overland	and	maritime	sections.	Migrants	are	known	to	die	of	thirst,	exhaustion,	abuse	and	
drowning.	Given	 the	 large	 numbers	 of	migrants	 journeying	 between	 the	HoA	 and	 Yemen	
and	 the	 range	 of	 significant	 and	 real	 dangers	 they	 face,	 it	 is	 perhaps	 surprising	 that	 the	
number	of	recorded	deaths	is	not	higher	(see	Figure	9).	However,	official	figures	represent	
only	 a	 small	 proportion	 of	 the	 overall	 migrant	 deaths	 as	 a	 significant,	 though	
undocumented,	 number	 of	 deaths	 are	 never	 officially	 reported	 or	 recorded.44	 A	 large	
majority	of	these	deaths	are	thought	to	occur	on	sea	crossings,	and	monthly	data	from	2014	
                                                
44	Numbers	 represent	only	deaths	 that	are	 reported	by	government	authorities,	media,	 the	UN	or	NGOs,	 so	
these	are	the	minimum	of	the	actual	numbers.	
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to	2015	suggests	migrant	deaths	are	more	likely	to	occur	between	October	and	March	(see	
Figure	10).	
	
Figure	9:	Recorded	migrant	deaths	in	the	Gulf	of	Aden	and	Red	Sea	2006-2015	(IOM,	2016)	
(IOM,	2017)	
	
	
Figure	 10:	Monthly	 trends	 in	migrant	 deaths	 in	 the	 Gulf	 of	 Aden	 and	 Red	 Sea	 compared	
across	2014,	2015	and	2016.	
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4.4.	Who	is	most	at	risk?		
	
Some	groups	of	migrants	may	be	more	vulnerable	to	abuse	and	hardship	than	others.	It	 is	
widely	believed	that	migrants	who	have	recruited	the	services	of	smugglers	find	themselves	
more	 vulnerable	 to	 abuse	 and	 hardship.	 Smuggling	 and	 trafficking	 networks	 have	 been	
widely	accused	of	carrying	out	abuse	and	exploitation	of	migrants,	and	migrants	under	their	
supervision	may	therefore	be	at	greater	risk.	Furthermore,	migrants	are	often	in	a	position	
of	weakness	vis	a	vis	smugglers	and	traffickers.	They	may	be	forced	to	rely	on	them	for	food,	
accommodation	 and	 communications.	 Their	 activities	 and	 movements	 may	 also	 be	
monitored	by	armed	guards,	putting	them	at	greater	risk	of	abuse,	as	many	of	these	guards	
have	 been	 accused	 of	 looting,	 sexual	 abuse	 and	 murder	 (Mixed	 Migration	 Taskforce	
Somalia,	 2008).	Given	 the	 relative	 impunity	 under	which	 the	networks	 operate,	 and	 their	
alliance	with	corrupted	officials,	migrants	can	expect	limited	assistance	from	the	authorities,	
not	least	because	their	own	status	is	generally	irregular.		
While	the	findings	of	this	research	substantiate	claims	that	much	of	the	abuse	is	carried	out	
by	smugglers,	it	is	not	clear	that	migrants	who	have	recruited	their	services	are	necessarily	
the	most	 vulnerable.	 For	example,	migrants	 travelling	 independently	 from	smugglers	may	
be	more	vulnerable	to	abuse	from	state	officials,	as	they	cannot	rely	on	smugglers	to	bribe	
them	to	turn	a	blind	eye,	allow	them	onward	passage,	or	release	them	if	detained.	Likewise,	
migrants	 who	 choose	 to	 travel	 independently	 may	 be	 subsequently	 picked	 up	 by	 other	
smuggling	or	 trafficking	 groups	 and	 suffer	worse	 treatment.	According	 to	one	 community	
key	informant	in	Bossaso,	“migrants	must	negotiate	with	agents	in	Ethiopia	to	arrange	their	
travel	 to	 Bossaso	 and	 Yemen,	 as	 otherwise	 they	 will	 be	 captured	 and	 tortured	 by	 the	
trafficking	 groups	 to	 get	 money	 out	 of	 them.”	 Similarly,	 another	 migrant	 interviewed	 in	
Obock	 stated:	 “smugglers	 informed	 us,	 and	 it	 went	 well,	 and	 we	 suffered	 less	
inconveniences	from	police	or	thieves.”	Given	the	growing	tendency	of	smugglers	to	coerce	
migrants,	 through	 threat	or	 force,	 into	accepting	 their	 services,	migrants	who	 resist	 these	
efforts	may	place	themselves	at	even	greater	risk	of	abuse.	In	addition,	migrants	who	travel	
independently	 from	smugglers	often	do	 so	on	 foot,	 leaving	 them	extremely	 vulnerable	 to	
harsh	 climatic	 conditions	 in	 Djibouti,	 Yemen	 and	 Puntland,	 along	 whose	 routes	 many	
migrants	are	known	to	die.	Finally,	 levels	and	risk	of	abuse	at	 the	hands	of	 smugglers	are	
higher	 in	 contexts	 like	Yemen,	 than	Puntland	or	Djibouti,	meaning	 that	 risk	of	 abuse	may	
rise	 and	 fall	 as	 the	 journey	 progresses.	 While	 this	 report	 in	 no	 way	 seeks	 to	 exonerate	
smuggling	 networks,	 these	 examples	 do	 point	 to	 the	 need	 for	 a	more	 nuanced	 approach	
when	it	comes	to	evaluating	their	impacts	on	migrant	vulnerabilities.		
Migrants	 that	 do	 not	 register	 with	 governmental	 or	 non-governmental	 humanitarian	
agencies	may	also	more	susceptible	to	abuse	and	hardship.	However,	no	direct	connections	
of	this	were	uncovered	by	this	research,	and	there	are	limitations	to	this	assumption.	By	not	
registering,	 they	 may	 be	 excluded	 from	 support	 and	 assistance	 provided	 by	 these	
institutions,	as	many	NGOs	only	provide	support	to	migrants	in	possession	of	refugee	cards	
or	 official	 identification.	 This	 being	 said,	 as	 shall	 be	 explored	 in	 Section	 6,	 support	 to	
migrants	 is	extremely	 limited,	and	even	when	migrants	do	register,	 it	 is	not	clear	whether	
they	 will	 receive	 sufficient	 or	 any	 support.	 In	 any	 case,	 some	 groups	 are	 more	 likely	 to	
register	than	others:	Somalis	have	prima	facie	refugee	status	in	Djibouti	and	Yemen,	and	are	
therefore	more	 likely	to	register	than	Ethiopians,	who	do	not	gain	refugee	status	as	easily	
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and	are	generally	intending	to	move	on	to	Saudi	Arabia	as	soon	as	possible.45	Migrants	that	
register	at	 the	MRCs	can	 receive	much-needed	support	and	assistance,	however	many	do	
not	approach	them	either	because	they	are	not	aware	of	them,	or	are	suspicious	that	the	
centres	 are	 connected	 in	 some	 way	 with	 government	 agencies,	 who	 may	 subsequently	
move	to	detain	and	deport	them.		
Gender	is	another	important	consideration.	Female	migrants	are	more	vulnerable	to	abuse,	
in	 particular	 rape	 and	 sexual	 assault,	 especially	 from	 smugglers.	 A	 number	 of	 Ethiopian	
female	migrants	reported	being	held	hostage	and	repeatedly	raped	by	smugglers	in	Yemen	
for	six	months.	One	of	the	migrants	was	only	released	when	they	discovered	that	she	was	
pregnant.	Another	female	migrant	described	how	smugglers	tried	to	separate	her	from	the	
rest	of	the	migrants	after	she	was	unable	to	pay	them	an	additional	fee.	The	other	migrants	
intervened	 and	 lent	 her	 the	 money,	 without	 which	 she	 was	 sure	 she	 would	 have	 been	
abused	and	 raped	by	 the	smugglers.	 Interviews	with	 irregular	migrants	and	 their	 relatives	
highlighted	how	 female	migrants	 in	Yemen	are	being	 forced	 into	prostitution,	particularly	
those	 trapped	 by	 fighting.	 In	 support	 of	 these	 claims,	 some	 smugglers	 are	 known	 to	
routinely	distribute	condoms	to	everyone	working	within	their	network,	on	the	assumption	
that	they	will	try	to	rape	female	migrants	in	their	charge	(RMMS,	2015).	Data	collected	by	
DRC	 between	 April	 to	 December	 2013	 highlighted	 protection	 violations	 against	 female	
migrants	 in	 Yemen	 (RMMS,	 2014).	 Kidnap	 was	 the	 most	 common	 violation	 with	 58%	 of	
those	 interviewed	 claiming	 to	 be	 either	 a	 victim	 or	 a	 witness	 to	 a	 kidnapping.	 This	 was	
followed	by	physical	assault	 (17%);	 sexual	and	gender	based	violence	 (12%);	 shooting	and	
robbery/extortion	at	(6%);	interception	at	sea	(4%);	and	ransom	paid,	detention	and	forced	
landing	 (2%)	 (RMMS,	2014).	However,	 it	 should	be	noted	 that	men	are	also	vulnerable	 to	
sexual	 and	 other	 forms	 of	 abuse	 during	migration.	 In	 support	 of	 this	 claim,	 a	 number	 of	
interviewees	indicated	that	rape	was	a	risk	for	both	sexes,	particularly	as	a	form	of	abuse	for	
extracting	payment	for	ransoms	from	migrants	being	held	hostage	by	criminal	groups.		
Age	 is	 another	 factor,	 and	 children,	 especially	 unaccompanied	migrant	 children,	 are	 very	
vulnerable	 to	 protection	 risks	 and	 hardship.	 Child	 migrants,	 particularly	 those	 travelling	
without	 guardians	 or	 documentation,	 struggle	 to	 access	 education	 or	 health	 services,	 or	
claim	welfare	rights.	In	Djibouti,	sources	report	migrant	children	being	subjected	to	severe	
hardship	 and	 abuse,	 including	 being	 excluded	 from	 schools,	 sleeping	 on	 the	 streets,	 and	
engaging	 in	 risky	 activities,	 such	 as	 drugs	 taking,	 prostitution	 and	begging.	Others	 sustain	
injuries	 after	 falling	 from	 trucks	 during	 their	 journey.	 They	 are	 also	 more	 susceptible	 to	
abuse	 and	 SGBV	 at	 the	 hands	 of	 smugglers,	 criminal	 groups	 and	 the	 authorities.	 Both	
women	 and	 children	 are	 at	 greater	 risk	 of	 being	 trafficked.	 Groups	 in	Djibouti	have	 been	
accused	of	kidnapping	women	and	children,	holding	them	to	ransom	to	pay	extremely	high	
rents	 and	 forcing	 them	 into	 prostitution	 or	 domestic	 servitude	 in	 order	 to	 make	 the	
payments	(US	Department	of	State,	2016).	In	Puntland,	the	Ministry	for	Women	and	Social	
Affairs	 reported	preventing	 42	 young	 girls	 between	 the	 ages	 of	 seven	 and	 13	 from	being	
trafficked	to	Yemen	and	Saudi	Arabia	for	the	purpose	of	domestic	work	and	prostitution.	In	
spite	 of	 this,	 it	 is	worth	 noting	 that	migrant	women	 and	 children	 are	 not	 always	 passive	
victims	 to	migration,	but	may	have	 taken	an	active	and	 conscious	decision	 to	migrate	 for	
reasons	of	their	own.	When	asked	why	these	children	are	migrating,	respondents	in	Djibouti	
                                                
45	NB:	Somalilanders	are	no	longer	granted	prima	facie	refugee	status	in	Djibouti,	and	their	cases	for	refugee	
status	are	assessed	individually.		
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indicated	 that	 some	 are	 thrown	 out	 of	 home,	while	 others	 choose	 to	 leave	 of	 their	 own	
accord.	Many	migrant	children	do	not	use	smugglers,	but	travel	 independently	via	road	or	
rail	 using	 similar	 routes	 to	 adults,	 demonstrating	 a	 certain	 level	 of	 agency	 and	
determination.	Indeed,	according	to	one	interviewee,	of	a	group	of	13	children	repatriated	
back	 to	 Ethiopia,	 five	 returned	 back	 to	 Djibouti,	 bringing	 more	 unaccompanied	 child	
migrants	with	them.		
Nationality	and	ethnicity	can	also	play	role	in	the	levels	of	abuse	experienced	by	migrants.	
Migrants	 coming	 from	 countries,	 or	 parts	 of	 countries,	 that	 share	 cultural,	 language	 or	
religious	 similarities	 with	 the	 hosting	 community	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 receive	 greater	
protection	and	support	than	those	from	different	backgrounds.	For	example,	Ethiopians	in	
Puntland	are	generally	exposed	to	greater	abuse	than	Somali	migrants,	who	can	often	rely	
on	 support	 from	 clan	 and	 family	 for	 accommodation	 and	 employment	 opportunities.	
Incidents	 of	 abuse	 are	 much	 less	 common	 amongst	 Somali	 returnees	 migrating	 to	 and	
through	 Puntland,	 than	 Ethiopians	 travelling	 in	 the	 opposite	 direction.	 Ethnic	 affiliations,	
and	links	with	clan	and	family	can	serve	as	an	important	means	of	protection	and	reprieve	in	
a	 context	 where	 humanitarian	 assistance	 and	 other	 support	 is	 limited.	 Socioeconomic	
background	 and	migrants’	 access	 to	 financial	 and	 social	 capital	 can	 also	 go	 some	way	 to	
alleviating	 these	 risks.	 Wealthier	 migrants	 can	 purchase	 a	 complete	 package	 to	 their	
destination,	 and	 can	 generally	 expect	 to	 receive	 a	 better	 and	 safer	 service.	 At	 the	 same	
time,	however,	evidence	suggests	that	some	traffickers	target	Somali	migrants,	perceived	as	
wealthier	than	Ethiopians	and	with	better	connections,	for	kidnapping	and	extortion.		
To	sum	up,	 it	 is	problematic	 to	reach	any	 firm	conclusions	on	which	migrants	are	most	at	
risk	of	protection	risks,	abuse	and	hardship.	It	is	clear	that	all	migrants	are	at	risk,	but	that	
much	will	 depend	 on	 their	 individual	 circumstances,	 gender,	 age	 and	means	 of	 travel,	 as	
well	 as	 the	 social	 and	 financial	 networks	 they	 can	 rely	 on.	 Furthermore,	 it	 should	 not	 be	
assumed	 that	women	 and	 children	 are	 necessarily	 passive	 victims,	 as	many	 have	 actively	
chosen	 to	 migrate	 for	 reasons	 of	 their	 own,	 and	 live	 through	 positive	 experiences	 and	
outcomes	as	a	result.		
	
5.	What	is	the	impact	of	these	movements	on	local	communities	and	
wider	society?		
In	 addition	 to	 understanding	 the	
impact	 of	migration	 on	 the	 lives	 of	
migrants,	 this	 report	 is	 also	
concerned	 with	 its	 impact	 on	 local	
communities	and	wider	society.	The	
analysis	 will	 focus	 on	 the	 transit	
locations	 of	 Obock	 and	 Bossaso,	
which	 are	 a	 case	 in	 point	 due	 to	
small	 populations	 and	 persistent	
under-development.	Migrants	and	local	communities	suffer	many	of	the	same	hardships,	as	
poverty,	unemployment,	vulnerability	and	drought	are	a	feature	of	both	contexts,	and	the	
influx	 of	 large	 numbers	 of	 additional	 people	 is	 putting	 further	 pressure	 on	 already	
“There	was	a	time	we	thought	that	Ethiopian	migrants	
can	take	over	the	town	from	us.	They	used	to	come	in	
large	numbers,	they	were	everywhere	in	town.”	
Community	key	informant,	Bossaso.	
	
“Migrants	place	a	huge	burden	on	our	community.	We	
can’t	do	anything	to	relocate	them	and	the	government	
is	helpless.”	Somali	community	FGD,	Bossaso	
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overstretched	 social	 services,	 natural	 resources	 and	 livelihoods.	 Acknowledging	 the	
challenges	 and	 difficulties	 faced	 by	 communities	 serves	 as	 an	 important	 reminder	 of	 the	
need	 to	 implement	 policy	 and	 programmes	 that	 benefit	 both	 migrants	 and	 hosting	
communities.	Failure	to	do	so	can	create	tensions	and	discrimination,	and	has	the	potential	
to	undermine	already	strained	relations	between	these	two	groups.		
Obock’s	population	size	is	relatively	small,	especially	when	taking	into	account	the	relatively	
large	numbers	of	migrants	passing	through.	It	can	be	assumed	that	the	impact	of	migration	
on	 these	 populations	will	 be	 felt	more	 keenly	 than	 in	 larger	 and	more	 populous	 settings	
with	greater	absorption	capacity.	Djibouti	is	a	small	country	of	less	than	900,000	inhabitants	
and	1,000	 square	 km	of	 arable	 land.	While	 data	on	migrants	 is	 difficult	 to	 confirm,	 some	
estimate	 that	 migrants	 made	 up	 over	 12%	 of	 the	 entire	 population	 in	 2015,	 with	 an	
estimated	400	migrants	transiting	Djibouti	each	day	(Green	&	Snyder,	2017).	Around	70%	of	
the	population	live	in	the	country’s	capital,	Djibouti	Ville,	whose	population	is	estimated	to	
be	 624,000.	 While	 Bossaso’s	 population	 size	 is	 not	 as	 small	 as	 Obock,	 given	 the	 large	
numbers	of	migrants	crossing	 the	Arabian	Sea	every	year,	 the	 impact	of	migration	on	 the	
city	 and	 its	 population	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 substantial.46	 The	 Puntland	Ministry	 of	 Interior	 has	
described	 Bossaso	 city	 as	 “the	 biggest	 transit	 and	 destination	 point	 of	 mixed	 migration	
across	the	HoA”	(Refugee	Affairs	Division	Bossaso,	2016).		
In	addition	to	small	population	sizes,	Obock	and	Puntland	are	characterised	by	high	levels	of	
poverty	and	under-development,	meaning	that	already-strained	resources	and	services	may	
be	stretched	further	by	the	influx	of	large	numbers	of	migrants.	In	spite	of	economic	growth	
(about	 6.5%	 in	 2015-2016),	 Djibouti	 remains	 a	 poor	 country	 with	 23%	 of	 the	 population	
living	 in	extreme	poverty	and	 in	rural	areas,	96.5%	of	the	rural	population	 lives	below	the	
poverty	line	(The	World	Bank,	2017).	With	limited	natural	resources	(such	as	arable	land	and	
water)	 and	 an	 underdeveloped	 agricultural	 and	 industrial	 sector,	 livelihood	 and	
employment	opportunities	are	 limited,	and	the	country	 is	reliant	on	 imports	to	meet	food	
requirements.	 Its	 economy	 largely	 depends	 on	 foreign	 financing,	 Foreign	 Direct	
Investments,	 rents	 from	 foreign	 countries’	military	 bases,	 and	 port	 services	 (World	 Bank,	
2016).	 In	Djibouti,	over	60%	of	households	do	not	have	access	to	 improved	water	sources	
and	women	 in	 rural	 areas	often	walk	 four	 to	 five	hours	per	day	 transporting	water	 (FAO,	
2017).	 In	 Obock	 Region	 almost	 60	 percent	 of	 households	 are	 food	 insecure	 and	 acute	
malnutrition	rates	are	above	25%	(ibid).	Likewise,	in	Puntland,	poverty	remains	widespread,	
with	 rudimentary	and	 fragmented	 institutions,	and	a	 lack	of	basic	 infrastructure.	Drought,	
mentioned	earlier	in	this	report,	has	undermined	resilience	and	weakened	the	resilience	of	
local	communities,	leaving	them	extremely	vulnerable	to	shocks.	
	
	
	
	
	
                                                
46	 Bossaso’s	 population	 is	 estimated	 to	 be	 between	 600,000	 and	 700,000,	 including	 IDPs	 located	 in	 27	
temporary	camps	surrounding	the	city.	
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In	 this	 context	 of	 limited	 absorption	 capacity	 and	 underlying	 poverty	 and	 under-
development,	 it	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 some	members	 of	 the	 community	 feel	 resentment	
towards	migrants,	and	expressed	concerns	about	many	of	the	same	issues	relating	to	local	
economy,	 health	 and	 local	 values.	 Generally	 speaking,	 however,	 community	 respondents	
voiced	 mixed	 feelings	 towards	 migrants,	 recognising	 that	 migration	 brought	 about	 both	
positive	and	negative	 impacts	on	 their	 community.	The	most	 commonly	 reported	positive	
impacts	related	to	economic	opportunities	associated	with	the	opening	of	new	restaurants,	
shops	and	businesses.	This	raises	the	question	of	whether	the	local	economy	would	suffer	if	
migration	 was	 reduced	 or	 prevented.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 frequently	 cited	 complaints	
centred	 around	 poor	 sanitation,	 the	 spread	 of	 disease,	 competition	 over	 jobs,	 cultural	
differences,	 and	 inter-ethnic	 clashes	 between	 Ethiopian	migrants.	 It	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	
some	members	 of	 the	 community	 are	
bound	 to	 be	 more	 positively	 inclined	
towards	 migrants	 than	 others,	 in	
particular	 those	 who	 stand	 to	 benefit	
from	their	presence.	Migrants	may	also	
be	 used	 as	 scapegoats	 for	 common	
grievances	 that	 have	 little	 to	 do	 with	
migration,	 such	 as	 a	 lack	 of	 jobs	 and	
livelihoods,	and	limited	basic	services.		
When	 considering	 the	 impact	 of	
migration	 on	 these	 locations,	 it	 is	
important	 to	 bear	 in	 mind	 several	
“We	can	say	the	presence	of	migrants	has	both	
positive	and	negative	impacts	on	the	community.	It	is	
good	for	the	shops	and	businesses	in	the	area,	but	
social,	behavioural	and	cultural	differences	are	seen	
as	negative.”	Community	key	informant,	Bossaso.	
	
“Migrants	have	caused	some	neighbourhoods	to	
become	overcrowded	and	dirty,	and	they	engage	in	
drug	abuse	and	inappropriate	behaviour.	But	at	the	
same	time,	as	a	shop	owner	I	have	benefited	from	
their	presence,	as	they	buy	stuff	from	my	shop.”	
Community	respondent,	Bossaso.	
 
Image	8:	Main	street	running	through	Obock	(taken	during	the	month	of	Ramadan	when	
a	number	of	shops	and	businesses	were	closed).	
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points.	Firstly,	the	majority	of	migrants	are	in	transit,	and	most	will	pass	through	Puntland	
and	 Djibouti	 within	 a	matter	 of	 days	 or	 weeks.	 According	 to	 one	migrant	 interviewed	 in	
Obock:	 “We	do	 not	 have	 impacts	 because	we’re	 just	 passing	 through	without	 staying	 for	
one	 day	 in	 any	 given	 place”.	 Whilst	 the	 numbers	 may	 be	 significant,	 their	 short-term	
presence	 may	 constrain	 the	 real	 or	 long-lasting	 impacts	 of	 migration,	 both	 positive	 and	
negative.	While	migrants	moving	from	the	HoA	to	Yemen	may	stay	for	a	short	period	only,	
and	 have	 limited	 interaction	 with	 host	 communities,	 migrants	 travelling	 in	 the	 opposite	
direction,	refugees	and	returnees,	may	have	a	very	different	impact.	Refugee	and	returnee	
respondents	 generally	 report	 staying	 for	 significantly	 longer	 periods	 of	 time,	 have	 better	
access	 to	 basic	 services,	 such	 as	 health	 and	 education	 facilities,	 and,	 depending	 on	
government	policy,	may	be	granted	permission	to	work,	thereby	putting	pressure	on	 local	
labour	 market.	 Secondly,	 levels	 of	 interaction	 and	 contact	 between	 migrants	 and	 the	
community	as	a	whole	are	likely	to	be	limited.	Migrants	(in	particular	Ethiopians)	tend	to	live	
together	 in	particular	neighbourhoods	or	 in	designated	 lodgings.	 In	Bossaso,	 for	example,	
Ethiopian	migrants	live	in	Kawda	Lulyo	or	Sawiti	neighborhoods,	and	Yemeni	refugees	tend	
to	congregate	in	dedicated	settlements	in	Qardo.	Smugglers	may	restrict	their	movements	
beyond	these	areas,	and	language	differences	represent	a	major	barrier	to	communications.	
While	migrants	are	no	doubt	a	visible	presence	in	places	like	Obock	and	Bossaso,	the	extent	
to	 which	 they	 impact	 on	 the	 daily	 lives	 and	 routines	 of	 local	 communities	 may	 be	 less	
significant	 than	 commonly	 assumed.	 Thirdly,	 different	 members	 or	 groups	 of	 the	
community	are	impacted	both	positively	and	negatively,	and	to	greater	and	lesser	extents,	
depending	on	a	range	of	factors,	 including	levels	of	 interaction,	socioeconomic	status,	and	
personal	 experience.	 For	 example,	wealthier	 business	 owners	 interviewed	 by	 this	 project	
tended	 to	 be	 more	 positive	 about	 migration	 than	 poorer	 communities	 located	 near	 to	
migrant	 dwellings	 and	 who	 found	 themselves	 in	 competition	 with	 migrants	 over	 job	
opportunities.47	Finally,	community	perceptions	of	migration	may	shift	over	time.	A	number	
of	community	respondents	in	Obock	described	how	migration	has	economically	benefitted	
their	community	in	the	past,	but	that	now	the	situation	is	no	longer	sustainable	as	services	
and	resources	have	been	placed	under	too	much	pressure.		
Overall,	 however,	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 pressures	 faced	 by	 local	 communities,	 this	 report	
documents	 many	 acts	 of	 generosity	 and	 kindness	 towards	 migrants	 transiting	 through	
Bossaso	 and	 Obock.	 During	 FGDs	 in	 Bossaso,	 participants	 from	 the	 local	 community	
suggested	that	Ethiopia	was	hosting	large	numbers	of	Somali	refugees,	and	that	the	Somali	
community	 should	 show	 the	 same	 level	 of	 support	 to	 Ethiopian	 migrants.	What’s	 more,	
migrants	did	not	report	any	significant	difficulties	in	living	alongside	local	communities.	One	
Ethiopian	 interviewee	 described	 that	 while	 feeling	 like	 a	 burden	 on	 the	 community	 of	
Obock,	he	had	had	no	problems	with	the	community	while	 living	there.	This	contrasted	to	
the	experience	of	migrants	 in	Somaliland	who	reported	an	increase	in	xenophobic	attacks,	
particularly	against	Oromos	(Altai	Consulting,	2016).	These	examples	point	to	the	potential	
for	 a	 relatively	 harmonious	 relationship	 between	 migrants	 and	 local	 communities,	 and	
policy	and	programmes	should	seek	to	build	on	this.	In	this	context,	this	section	will	argue	
that	migration	represents	both	an	opportunity	and	a	challenge	to	the	communities	of	Obock	
and	Bossaso,	particularly	when	it	comes	to	the	 local	economy	and	labour	markets,	health,	
                                                
47	 In	Bossaso,	Ethiopian	Oromo	migrants	 typically	 live	 in	Kawda	Lulyo	neighborhood,	 located	north-west	 the	
city.	Ethiopian	migrants	 from	Amhara	and	Tigray	ethnic	groups	tend	to	 live	 in	Sawiti	neighborhood	near	 the	
Port	in	the	north	of	Bossaso	town.	
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security,	 and	 local	 values.	 These	 topics	 were	 consistently	 raised	 by	 community,	
governmental	 and	 civil	 society	 respondents	 during	 interviews	 and	 FGDs,	 and	 discussion	
around	these	will	take	up	the	rest	of	this	section.		
	
5.1.	Local	economy	and	labour	market	
Migrants	transiting	through	Obock	and	Bossaso	undoubtedly	stimulate	the	 local	economy.	
What	is	less	clear,	however,	is	the	extent	of	this	economic	stimulus,	and	which	individuals	or	
groups	stand	to	gain	 financially	 from	their	presence.	As	 indicated	 in	the	earlier	section	on	
costs,	smuggling	in	migrants	between	the	HoA	and	Yemen	represents	a	multi-million	dollar	
industry.	As	two	of	the	main	gateways	along	these	routes,	Obock	and	Bossaso	are	in	a	prime	
position	 to	 benefit	 financially	 from	 this	 trade.	 However,	 in	 many	 cases,	 it	 is	 the	 people	
involved	 in	 this	 industry	who	stand	to	gain,	 rather	 than	 the	wider	community	as	a	whole.	
The	 individuals	 coordinating	 the	 trade	 at	 the	 higher	 levels	 maintain	 the	 majority	 of	 the	
profits.	One	smuggler	interviewed	in	Bossaso	reported	having	20	fibre	glass	boats,	each	of	
which	 carried	 between	 100	 to	 130	 migrants	 to	 Yemen	 twice	 a	 month;	 equivalent	 to	
between	4,000	 and	 5,200	migrants	 per	month	paying	 a	 total	 of	 between	US$	 480,000	 to	
US$	624,000.	To	what	extent	do	 these	 revenues	 filter	down	 to	 the	 rest	of	 society?	Those	
operating	 at	 the	 lower	 levels	 of	 the	 smuggling	 networks,	 such	 as	 agents,	 brokers,	middle	
men,	 boat	 owners,	 crews,	 landlords	 and	 currency	 exchangers,	 certainly	 benefit	 from	 the	
trade	 in	migrants.	According	to	one	boat	owner,	of	the	US$	120	paid	to	cross	the	Arabian	
Sea,	US$	60	was	kept	by	 the	agent	and	the	other	half	by	him.	The	boat	owner	made	two	
trips	 per	 month,	 transporting	 140	 migrants	 on	 each	 trip,	 which	 would	 mean	 a	 monthly	
income	of	around	US$	14,000.		
However,	these	individuals	represent	a	minority	of	the	overall	population,	and	it	is	not	clear	
whether	the	wider	economy	stands	to	gain.	Due	to	its	small	size	and	population,	economic	
and	 livelihood	 opportunities	 in	 Obock	 are	 extremely	 limited,	 and	 the	 smuggling	 industry	
represents	 the	 major	 source	 of	 employment	 and	 income.	 According	 to	 community	
respondents:	 “the	 community	 lives	because	of	 the	 smuggling”	 and	 “the	 communities	 and	
migrants	 need	 each	 other.”	 Many	 of	 those	 involved	 in	 smuggling	 are	 young	 and	
unemployed,	whose	livelihoods	are	totally	reliant	on	smuggling.	At	the	outskirts	of	Obock,	
migrants	describe	having	to	pay	‘entry	fees	of	around	US$	23	to	groups	of	young	people	in	
order	 to	 enter	 the	 town.	 In	 Bossaso,	 the	 community	 as	 a	 whole	 seem	 less	 reliant	 on	
smuggling	 for	 economic	 and	 financial	 stimulus,	 perhaps	 because	 of	 its	 larger	 size	 and	
population.	Most	community	respondents	 in	Puntland	suggested	that,	 in	 their	experience,	
the	 presence	 of	migrants	 had	 little	 impact	 on	 the	 local	 economy.	 It	 is	 true	 that	migrants	
represent	a	potential	market	for	local	businesses,	however	the	majority	are	poor	with	little	
disposable	 income,	 and	 the	 amount	 they	 spend	 in	 transit	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 minimal.	
Furthermore,	 in	places	 like	Bossaso,	smugglers	tend	to	keep	migrants	away	from	the	 local	
community	 by	 lodging	 them	 in	 separate	 housing	 units	 and	 providing	 their	 own	 food.	
Migrants’	movements	are	often	limited,	and	they	are	sometimes	kept	under	armed	guard,	
which	reduces	their	potential	to	contribute	to	the	economy.	Reportedly,	the	groups	prevent	
migrants	 from	purchasing	mobile	phones	and	credit,	 as	 they	are	 concerned	 that	 this	may	
encourage	 the	migrants	 to	 run	 away.	 This	 further	 reduces	migrants’	 impact	 on	 the	 local	
economy,	as	they	are	less	likely	to	be	able	to	use	local	services	or	make	local	purchases.	
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As	 described	 in	 Section	 4.2.3.,	 some	
migrants	 take	 up	 employment	 or	
livelihood	 opportunities,	 often	 in	 an	
attempt	 to	 raise	 funds	 needed	 to	
continue	 their	 journey.	 Others	 have	
settled	 to	 temporarily	 or	 permanently,	
and	established	their	own	businesses.	In	
Obock,	reports	suggest	that	the	influx	of	
Yemen	 refugees	 and	 migrants	 may	 be	
boosting	 local	 economies	 by	 generating	
and	supporting	small	businesses,	such	as	
restaurants,	 communications	 and	
transport	 (Secorun,	 2016).	 Likewise,	
some	 Ethiopian	 and	 Yemeni	 migrants	 have	 settled	 in	 Bossaso,	 Garowe	 and	 Qardo,	 and	
established	tea	shops,	restaurants,	barber	shops	and	other	small	businesses,	mainly	near	to	
the	port	where	Ethiopian	migrants	 tend	 to	congregate.	The	economic	benefits	of	working	
migrants	have	not	gone	unnoticed	by	governments	 in	the	region,	with	the	Government	of	
Djibouti	 recently	 moving	 forward	 with	 new	 legislation	 to	 allow	 refugees	 to	 work	 in	 the	
country.	 Typically,	 wage-seeking	 migrants	 find	 work	 in	 farms,	 warehouses,	 cafes,	
restaurants	 or	 as	 domestic	 workers	 or	 carry	 out	 menial	 work	 as	 cleaners	 and	 porters.	
However,	their	impact	on	the	labour	market	is	mixed,	and	perceptions	varied	depending	on	
who	was	 asked	 and	 how	 they	were	 affected.	 Respondents	 from	 the	 private	 sector	 and	 a	
number	of	institutions	recognised	the	potential	benefits	of	migration	to	the	labour	market.	
They	 asserted	 that	migrants	 bring	 new	 skills,	 which	 can	 benefit	 local	 businesses	 and	 the	
economy.	For	example,	Ethiopian	migrants	from	rural	backgrounds	bring	new	farming	skills	
and	techniques	that	benefitted	the	agricultural	sector,	and	have	succeeded	in	finding	work	
in	 farms.	 Likewise,	 Yemeni	 refugees	 have	 brought	 new	 catering,	 bakery	 and	 construction	
skills	 to	places	 like	Qardo,	where	many	have	 settled.	 In	 contrast,	 community	 respondents	
tended	 to	 see	migrants’	 contribution	 to	 labour	markets	 as	 less	 positive,	 as	 it	 had	 a	more	
direct	impact	on	their	own	livelihoods	and	wellbeing,	and	placed	additional	strain	on	already	
high	 levels	 of	 unemployment.48	 They	 complained	 that	 the	 influx	 of	 migrants	 has	 pushed	
down	local	wages,	due	to	increased	competition	and	irregular	migrants’	acceptance	to	work	
for	lower	wages.		
                                                
48	 In	 Djibouti,	 unemployment	 remains	 widespread	 reaching	 39%	 in	 2015	 (according	 to	 official	 estimates),	
although	this	figure	is	higher	amongst	women	(49%)	and	in	rural	areas	(59%)	(The	World	Bank,	2017).		
“Shops	and	restaurants	in	areas	like	Sawaiti	
neighbourhood	have	economically	benefited	from	
the	presence	of	large	numbers	of	Ethiopian	
migrants.”	Community	respondent,	Bossaso.	
	
“I	don’t	think	these	immigrants	have	any	effect	on	
the	local	economy.	They	are	poor	with	little	
money.	The	only	beneficiaries	are	smugglers	and	
small	shops	near	to	where	they	stay	in	Bossaso.”	
Key	informant,	government,	Bossaso.	
	
“Migration	is	positive	for	the	community.	Little	
shops	have	been	created,	and	it	increases	
economic	life”.	Community	respondent,	Obock	
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5.2.	Health	
There	are	assumptions	 that	 the	 influx	of	migrants	places	a	significant	strain	on	basic	 local	
services,	in	particular	health	facilities.49	In	Djibouti,	the	Ministry	of	Health	has	appealed	for	
help,	claiming	that	40%	of	patients	at	health	facilities	are	migrants	(although	these	figures	
cannot	 be	 confirmed).	 In	 Bossaso,	 local	 communities	 complained	 that	 migrants	 use	 the	
General	Hospital	 for	medical	treatment	and	services.	 In	Yemen,	health	sector	respondents	
described	 migrants	 as	 a	 burden	 on	 their	 services	 as,	 due	 to	 conflict	 and	 depleted	
infrastructures,	health	facilities	are	already	under	enormous	pressure.	A	doctor	interviewed	
in	Obock	reported	attending	to	10	to	20	migrants	on	a	daily	basis,	and	reported	a	shortage	
of	 medicines,	 space	 and	 equipment	 (Altai	 Consulting,	 2016).	 Likewise,	 some	 community	
respondents	 in	 Djibouti	 complained	 that	 medical	 and	 other	 public	 services	 were	 being	
occupied	 by	 migrants.	 Nevertheless,	 in	 general,	 most	 migrants	 do	 not	 use	 public	 health	
facilities	 for	 fear	 of	 being	 reported	 to	 the	 authorities,	 due	 to	 a	 lack	 of	 funds	 to	 pay	 for	
treatments	 and	 medicines,	 and	 because	 they	 may	 be	 able	 to	 access	 alternative	 services	
offered	by	humanitarian	agencies.	What’s	more,	in	Puntland,	the	majority	of	health	facilities	
are	 privately	 owned,	 meaning	 that	 migrants	
pay	 and	 contribute	 to	 clinics	 when	 they	 use	
them,	 challenging	 the	 assumption	 that	 they	
are	a	‘drain	on	the	system’.		
In	 addition	 to	 public	 health	 facilities,	
community	 and	 government	 respondents	
interviewed	 by	 this	 project	 commonly	
complained	 about	 the	 poor	 hygiene	 and	
sanitation	 conditions	 in	 migrant	 areas.	
Community	 respondents	 in	 Djibouti	 feared	
the	 spread	 of	 disease	 by	 migrants,	 and	 an	
                                                
49	Note	that	educational	facilities	have	not	been	included	in	this	section	due	to	the	relatively	low	numbers	of	
children	 travelling	 from	 the	 HoA	 to	 Yemen,	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 most	 migrants	 are	 moving	 in	 transit,	 and	
therefore	unlikely	to	enroll	in	schools.		
“Our	neighbourhoods	have	become	
overcrowded	and	cause	huge	sanitation	
problems.	There	are	concerns	from	the	local	
people	regarding	the	behaviours	of	some	
migrants,	in	particular	drug	abuse,	opening	
shisha	spots,	and	engaging	in	prostitution.”	
Community	informant,	Bossaso.	
	
“Migrants	do	nothing	wrong,	except	that	
they	create	waste,	pollute	our	water	sources,	
and	bring	diarrhoea	and	cholera.”	
Community	informant,	Obock.	
 
Image	9:	Ethiopian	shops	and	restaurants	in	Sawiti,	Bossaso	
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outbreak	 of	 cholera	 in	 Obock	 during	 September	 and	 October	 2016	 led	 to	 a	 number	 of	
deaths,	and	was	attributed	to	the	 influx	of	migrants.50	They	also	feared	that	migrants	had	
contaminated	their	water	sources	and	were	responsible	for	poor	hygiene.	In	Bossaso,	areas	
frequented	by	migrants	are	described	by	interviewees	as	dirty	and	unhygienic	due	to	a	lack	
of	 toilets	 and	 sanitation	 facilities,	 and	 local	 communities	 fear	 the	 spread	 of	 disease	 and	
infection	as	a	result	of	open	defecation.	The	port	area,	in	particular,	where	most	Ethiopians	
reside,	 was	 described	 as	 very	 dirty.	 Respondents	 also	 linked	 migrants	 to	 sexually	
transmitted	 infections	 and	 diseases.	 They	 complained	 that	 migrants	 were	 not	 ‘medically	
screened’	and	engaged	in	sexual	activities	with	local	youth.	Many	of	these	statements	were	
anecdotal,	and	 linked	to	community	members’	perceptions	about	migrant	behaviours	and	
customs.	 The	 team	did	not	 come	across	 any	evidence	or	data	 to	 substantiate	 claims	 that	
migrants	have	led	to	an	increase	in	rates	of	HIV.		
	
5.3.	Security	
Security	 issues	were	 reported	by	 some	
community	 and	 governmental	
respondents	 as	 a	 negative	 impact	 of	
migration.	 In	 Puntland	 and	 Obock,	
residents	 complained	 that	 Ethiopian	
migrants	 engage	 in	 inter-clan	 fighting.	
In	mid-2016,	 violent	 clashes	 broke	 out	
between	Oromo	and	Tigrayan	migrants	
in	Bossaso,	which	resulted	in	the	death	
of	 one	 migrant	 and	 undermined	
security	 in	 the	 local	 area.	 As	 a	
consequence,	 Oromo	 migrants	
reportedly	now	live	in	separate	areas	to	the	Amharas	and	Tigrayans.	In	Obock,	community	
respondents	 suggested	 that	 while	 migrants	 themselves	 did	 not	 cause	 problems,	 their	
presence	does	create	conflict	between	groups	of	smugglers.	Some	respondents	speculated	
over	the	link	between	migrants	and	extremist	groups,	however,	as	indicated	in	Section	3.4.,	
any	connections	are,	as	yet,	unsubstantiated.	Overall,	however,	community	respondents	did	
not	 associate	 migrants	 with	 security	 incidents,	 admitting	 that	 they	 did	 not	 cause	 any	
security	concerns	for	the	community,	and	viewed	them	as	relatively	peaceful.	This	finding	is	
perhaps	 surprising	 as	 irregular	 migrants	 have	 typically	 been	 characterised	 as	 a	 security	
threat	in	popular	rhetoric	and	reporting.		
In	contrast	to	communities,	government	respondents	were	more	likely	to	link	migrants	with	
insecurity,	 and	 viewed	 high	 levels	 of	 uncontrolled	migration	 as	 a	 significant	 challenge	 to	
local	 and	 regional	 security.	 In	 Puntland,	 representatives	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Security	 are	
concerned	that	Somali	migrants	passing	through	Bossaso	are	aligned	with	Al	Shabaab,	and	
have	adopted	a	policy	of	 stopping	Somali	migrants	at	 control	points,	 and	 forcing	 them	 to	
turn	back.	They	were	 less	 concerned	with	Ethiopian	migrants,	 although	acknowledge	 that	
there	may	be	criminals	among	them,	who	could	seek	to	undermine	local	security.	Likewise,	
                                                
50	The	incident	led	to	between	4-50	suspected	deaths	in	Obock,	and	the	hospitalization	of	a	further	150	people	
(RMMS,	2016).	
“Sometimes	there	is	a	security	effect	on	locals	but,	
in	general,	migrants	are	peaceful	and	they	come	
looking	for	work	to	make	a	living.”		
Community	respondent,	Sana’a.	
	
“Ethiopian	migrants	don’t	have	any	problems	with	
Somali	people,	but	sometimes	they	fight	amongst	
themselves.”	Community	respondent,	Bossaso.	
	
“Migrants	are	not	a	security	problem.	All	they	
want	is	to	accomplish	their	dreams”.		
Community	respondent,	Bossaso.	
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the	 Djiboutian	 authorities	 have	 raised	 security	 concerns	 about	 the	 Somali	 and	 Yemeni	
migrant	 population,	 although	 are	 less	 preoccupied	 about	 the	 much	 larger	 numbers	 of	
Ethiopians	transiting	through	the	country	(RMMS,	2017).		
Government	 respondents	 were	 particularly	 concerned	 with	 the	 growing	 presence	 of	
criminal	 groups	 involved	 in	 smuggling	 and	 trafficking,	 and	 their	 links	 with	 an	 influx	 of	
weapons	and	connections	with	extremist	groups.	In	these	scenarios,	insecurity	has	more	to	
do	 with	 the	 smuggling	 and	 trafficking	 networks	 than	 the	 migrants	 themselves.	 These	
criminal	groups	are	often	armed	and	dangerous,	and	are	known	to	control	strategic	areas	of	
the	 towns	 and	 coastal	 areas.	 In	 January	 2016,	 a	 bus	 carrying	 Ethiopian	 migrants	 was	
stopped	near	a	police	checkpoint	at	the	entrance	to	Bossaso.	The	smugglers	controlling	the	
bus	engaged	in	a	gun	battle	with	the	security	forces,	which	left	one	Ethiopian	migrant	dead	
and	 two	 injured.	 It	 has	 also	 been	 suggested	 that	 Somaliland	 and	 Puntland	 officials	 are	
concerned	 that	 smugglers’	 relationships	 with	 certain	 clans	 and	 militias	 could	 upset	 the	
delicate	balance	of	cooperation	and	power	that	the	authorities	have	built	up	over	time	to	
collect	and	share	intelligence	to	govern	their	territory	(RMMS,	2017).	
	
5.4.	Local	values	
The	impact	of	migration	on	local	traditions	
and	 values	 was	 a	 key	 topic	 voiced	 by	
community	respondents	during	interviews	
and	FGDs	in	Puntland.	Respondents	raised	
concerns	 about	 the	 cultural	 and	 religious	
differences	 between	 Ethiopians	 and	
Somalis,	 and	 complained	 that	 Ethiopian	
migrants	 did	 not	 respect	 their	 traditional	
customs.	For	 instance,	they	were	accused	
of	 taking	and	 selling	drugs	and	alcohol,	 smoking	 shisha,	wearing	non-conservative	 clothes	
and	 engaging	 in	 inappropriate	 behaviour,	 such	 as	 kissing	 in	 public.	 The	 local	 community	
feared	 that	 their	 youth	 were	 being	 influenced	 by	 these	 practices	 and	 therefore	 at	 risk.	
Community	respondents	in	Obock	also	tended	associated	migrants	with	alcohol	and	drugs,	
although	many	 also	 admitted	 that	 it	 was	 generally	 the	 smugglers	 who	 carried	 out	 these	
activities.	They	also	complained	that	young	people	were	leaving	school	at	a	very	young	age	
to	 take	 up	 work	 opportunities	 in	 the	 smuggling	 industry,	 which	 was	 undermining	 their	
education	and	potential,	and	creating	conflict	between	parents	and	their	children.		
As	well	 as	 the	 impact	 of	 in-migration	 on	 local	 customs	 and	 traditions,	 a	 large	 number	 of	
Puntland	residents	voiced	concerns	about	the	impact	of	out-migration,	particularly	of	young	
people,	on	local	values.	In	a	relatively	new	phenomenon,	growing	numbers	of	young	Somalis	
are	 migrating	 without	 informing	 their	 parents	 or	 relatives,	 thereby	 bypassing	 traditional	
family	 structures.	 Community	 respondents	 described	 smugglers	 ‘brainwashing’	 their	
children,	and	fear	that	an	exodus	of	young	people	will	undermine	traditions	and	values.	In	
Somaliland	and	Puntland,	smuggling	has	gained	increasingly	negative	connotations	amongst	
society,	with	some	declaring	it	a	national	disaster	and	governments	seeking	to	find	ways	to	
prevent	 young	 people	 from	 departing	 (Ali,	 2016).	 In	 response,	 families	 are	 engaging	 in	 a	
“Our	kids	are	influenced	by	the	behaviour	of	
Ethiopian	migrants.	They	sometimes	imitate	
their	clothing,	hair	styles,	and	get	drugs	from	
them.”	Somali	community	FGD,	Bossaso	
	
“These	problems	came	because	migrants	are	not	
aware	of	the	local	culture.	They	are	not	given	
orientation.”	Community	Key	Informant,	Garowe	
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number	 of	 strategies	 to	 reduce	 out-migration.	 These	 include	 "hooyo	 ha	 tahriibin"51,	
whereby	parents	purchase	taxis	for	their	children	in	an	attempt	to	get	them	to	stay	and	find	
a	source	of	local	income,	or	sending	their	children	to	universities	in	neighbouring	countries	
(Osman,	2017).	
	
6.	 What	 are	 the	 existing	 policy	 and	 programme	 responses	 to	 this	
migration?		
This	 section	describes	 the	 existing	policy	 and	programme	 responses	 towards	migration	 in	
Puntland,	Djibouti	and	Yemen.	These	 range	 from	responses	by	 states,	UN	agencies,	NGOs	
and	 Migrant	 Response	 Centres	 (MRCs),	 as	 well	 as	 local-level	 or	 grassroots	 responses	
provided	by	host	 communities	 and	migrants.	A	 summary	of	 the	different	mechanisms	 for	
coordination	on	migration	is	also	given	at	the	level	of	governments,	as	well	as	in	response	to	
dedicated	task	forces,	secretariats	or	offices	that	deal	specifically	with	migration.	For	a	full	
overview	of	 the	 specific	 governmental	ministries/departments,	UN	agencies,	 international	
and	national/local	NGOs	that	work	on	migration,	refer	to	Annexes	3	and	4.		
	
6.1.	State	Response	
Quantifying	 state	 responses	 to	 migration	 can	 be	 complex.	 Policy	 is	 often	 unclear	 or	 not	
properly	or	consistently	implemented.	For	example,	the	Puntland	authorities	have	taken	an	
inconsistent	approach	to	dealing	with	national	Somali	migrants.	There	have	been	numerous	
cases	 of	 Somali	 migrants	 and	 IDPs	 from	 other	 parts	 of	 Somalia	 being	 rounded	 up	 and	
deported	by	the	Puntland	authorities	under	the	accusation	that	they	are	attempting	to	cross	
to	 Yemen	 illegally,	 or	 join	 Al-Shabaab	 or	 IS	 factions	 in	 Puntland.52	 This	 contravenes	 the	
Somali	 constitution	 and	 customary	 laws,	 which	 stipulate	 that	 Somalis,	 regardless	 of	
individual	clan	affiliations,	can	travel	within	and	reside	in	any	part	of	Somalia.	Furthermore,	
when	it	comes	to	dealing	with	refugees	in	Puntland,	Article	19	of	the	Constitution	prohibits	
non-voluntary	repatriation	and	outlines	the	rights	afforded	to	refugees	and	asylum	seekers.	
Nevertheless,	the	authorities	have	been	criticised	for	deporting	large	numbers	of	Ethiopian	
migrants	without	allowing	adequate	time	for	proper	refugee	status	determination	(RSD)	to	
ascertain	 whether	 there	 are	 genuine	 asylum-seekers	 among	 those	 being	 deported	 (IRIN,	
2006).	There	are,	however,	signs	of	progress,	as	a	new	bill	on	refugee	protection	has	been	
temporarily	 approved	 by	 the	 Puntland	 Permanent	 Committee	 (although	 at	 the	 time	 of	
writing,	not	yet	by	Parliament),	which	stipulates	that	asylum	seekers	and	refugees	cannot	be	
deported,	unless	they	pose	a	danger	to	national	security,	have	committed	a	serious	crime,	
or	can	seek	reprieve	in	another	country	where	they	also	have	nationality.	Overall,	however,	
these	 examples	 highlight	 a	 wider	 issue	 of	 state-sponsored	 distrust	 towards	 migration,	
whereby	 state	 officials	 tend	 to	 view	migrants	 as	 a	 security	 threat	 or	 burden	 to	 the	 local	
                                                
51	Loosely	translated	as	mothers	begging	their	sons	to	not	migrate	illegally.		
52	 In	 February	 2017,	 local	 media	 sources	 reported	 that	 Puntland	 authorities	 arrested,	 detained	 and	 then	
forcefully	 deported	 a	 number	 of	 Somali	 migrants	 from	 South	 Central	 Somalia	 journeying	 to	 Bossaso.	
http://puntlandi.com/sawirro-dowladda-puntland-oo-dib-u-celisay-tahriibayaal-ka-yimid-koonfurta-
soomaaliya-oo-dhawaan-lagu-qabtay-garowe-oo-ka-yimid-koonfurta-soomaaliya/		
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community,	even	when	this	may	not	be	the	case.	As	described	in	Section	5,	this	viewpoint	
often	contrasts	sharply	with	local	communities,	who	recognised	the	positives,	as	well	as	the	
negatives,	of	migration	on	the	community,	and	did	not	typically	see	migrants	as	a	security	
threat.		
The	 above-mentioned	 examples	 also	 highlight	 the	 need	 to	 differentiate	 between	 state	
policy	and	practice	when	analysing	 state	 responses	 to	migration.	 In	many	 instances,	even	
when	 states	 have	 signed	 up	 to	 and	 ratified	 international	 legislation	 relating	 to	 refugees,	
smuggling	and	trafficking	and	human	rights,	and	developed	and	enacted	legislation	of	their	
own,	the	implementation	of	corresponding	on	the	ground	responses	remains	limited	and,	at	
times,	non-existent.53	For	example,	in	2016,	the	Djiboutian	Government	passed	Law	No.	133	
On	 the	Fight	Against	Trafficking	 in	Persons	and	 Illicit	 Smuggling	of	Migrants	 (2016),	which	
followed	a	 similar	 law	 (Act	No.	 210/AN/07/5éme)	passed	 in	 2007.54	 In	 spite	of	 these	 two	
national	laws	(and	Djibouti	being	a	signatory	of	the	Protocol	to	Prevent	Suppress	and	Punish	
Trafficking	in	Persons	and	the	UN	Convention	against	Transnational	Organised	Crime)	little	
progress	has	been	made	in	arresting	the	perpetrators	or	providing	adequate	protection	and	
support	to	the	victims.	While	the	passing	of	the	new	anti-trafficking	law	has	been	seen	as	a	
positive	step,	the	authorities	have	previously	failed	to	prosecute	any	traffickers	or	complicit	
government	officials,	or	provide	protection	to	any	victims	of	trafficking	between	April	2015	
and	March	2016,	and	only	a	handful	of	arrests	have	been	made	since	then,	leading	Djibouti	
to	 be	 classified	 as	 Tier	 3	 (the	 lowest	 of	 the	 four	 available	 rankings)	 by	 the	 Trafficking	 in	
Persons	 (TIP)	Report.55	 (US	Department	of	 State,	 2016).	A	 similar	 scenario	 can	be	 seen	 in	
Puntland,	where	 interviewees	were	extremely	critical	of	a	weak	 judiciary	and	 its	 failure	to	
impose	harsh	penalties	on	those	found	guilty	of	smuggling	and	trafficking.	Boat	owners	and	
smugglers	 detained	 by	 the	 PMPF	 and	 transferred	 to	 the	 police	 station	 are	 reportedly	
released	soon	after	without	due	punishment	or	imprisonment.		
Discrepancies	 between	 official	 policy	 and	
actual	 practice	 highlight	 the	 need	 to	
differentiate	 between	 governmental	 levels	
and	 departments,	 and	 to	 take	 into	 account	
their	 contrasting	 perceptions,	 responses	 and	
capacities	 vis	 a	 vis	migration.	While	 those	 at	
the	top	may	be	willing	to	sign	up	to	policy	and	
deliver	 corresponding	 rhetoric,	 those	 at	 the	
bottom	may	be	unaware,	unwilling	or	unable	
to	 enact	 these	 on	 their	 behalf.	 Deterred	 by	
the	scale	and	scope	of	migration,	and	 lacking	
in	 capacity,	 resources	 and	 support,	 local	
authorities	 in	 the	 research	 locations	 have	
tended	to	turn	a	blind	eye	to	these	movements,	particularly	when	they	occur	along	transit	
                                                
53	For	a	full	overview	of	the	national	and	international	legislation	relating	to	the	different	countries	involved	in	
this	study,	refer	to	Annex	5.		
54	Law	No.	133	prohibits	all	forms	of	trafficking	and	distinguishes	between	trafficking	and	smuggling,	and	Act	
No.	210/AN/07/5éme	applied	to	victims	of	 trafficking,	with	a	 focus	on	vulnerable	groups,	 including	children,	
women	and	physically	or	mentally	disabled.	
55	Tier	3	is	the	lowest	of	the	four	rankings,	and	describes	“countries	whose	governments	do	not	fully	meet	the	
minimum	standards	and	are	not	making	significant	efforts	to	do	so.”	(US	Department	of	State,	2016)	
“Of	course,	each	government	department	
has	institutions	and	agencies	tasked	with	
fighting	irregular	migration,	but	in	reality,	
they	are	not	active	due	to	a	lack	of	funds.”	
Government	respondent,	Bossaso.	
	
“It	is	not	very	difficult	to	cross	Djibouti,	
especially	if	you	walk	and	pass	through	
mountain	areas”.	Ethiopian	migrant,	Obock	
	
“On	each	side	of	the	borders,	during	the	
whole	journey,	there	was	no	control	from	the	
governments.”	Ethiopian	migrant,	Obock	
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routes	 or	 in	 more	 remote	 areas.	 The	 authorities	 are	 most	 active	 in	 the	 capitals	 and	 at	
designated	checkpoints	at	the	entrance	to	major	towns,	from	where	the	majority	of	arrests	
and	deportations	tend	to	occur.	As	a	consequence,	the	smuggling	and	trafficking	networks	
have	been	able	to	operate	with	relative	impunity.	A	lack	of	funds	and	capacity	to	deal	with	
migration	 management	 or	 respond	 to	 the	 protection	 needs	 of	 vulnerable	 migrants	 was	
consistently	 raised	 by	 respondents	 during	 interviews	 and	 FGDs.	 In	 many	 instances,	 the	
authorities	are	reluctant	to	detain	migrants	as	they	lack	sufficient	resources	to	either	detain,	
deport	or	protect	them.	In	Djibouti,	 interviews	suggest	that	the	authorities	carry	out	more	
arrests	 of	 migrants	 and	 smugglers	 than	 in	 Puntland.	 Nevertheless,	 many	 respondents	
describe	 being	 arrested	 by	 the	 authorities,	 often	 on	 multiple	 occasions,	 but	 then	
subsequently	 released	without	charge.	When	the	Puntland	Maritime	Police	Forces	 (PMPF)	
intercept	 illegal	 boats	 carrying	migrants,	 it	 releases	 them	 back	 into	 Bossaso	 town	 as	 it	 is	
unable	to	provide	them	with	shelter,	food	or	support.	Similarly,	 in	Yemen,	 it	was	reported	
that	the	authorities	used	to	detain	migrants	before	the	war,	but	now	they	cannot	do	so,	as	
they	lack	the	resources	to	support	or	deport	them.	This	may	also	go	some	way	to	explaining	
why	the	authorities	are	reluctant	to	carry	out	raids	on	well-known	migrant	holding	houses,	
and	the	coastal	launch	sites	controlled	by	smugglers.		
In	 this	 context	 of	 limited	 funding	 and	 capacity,	 states	 have	 tended	 to	 focus	 on	 ‘quick	 fix’	
responses,	with	limited	impact	and	sustainability.	The	Puntland	Ministry	of	Security	imposed	
fines	on	vehicles	transporting	migrants.	However,	rather	than	reduce	smuggling,	the	policy	
has	encouraged	smugglers	 to	drive	vehicles	on	 rough,	off	 road	 tracks,	and	make	migrants	
walk	 around	 checkpoints.	 The	 Djiboutian	 authorities	 reportedly	 burn	 the	 boats	 used	 by	
smugglers,	 however	many	of	 these	 also	 function	 as	 fishing	boats	 and	 are	 owned	by	 local	
residents,	 suggesting	 that	 local	 livelihoods	 may	 be	 undermined	 at	 the	 same	 time.	 The	
authorities	 in	 Puntland,	 Djibouti	 and	 Yemen	 have	 established	 checkpoints	 at	 key	 entry,	
transit	and	exit	points;	however,	 it	 is	not	clear	how	effective	 these	are.	Migrants	 typically	
disembark	 from	 vehicles	 to	 circumvent	 these	 checkpoints	 by	 foot.	 Ethiopian	 migrants	
reported	 being	 deported	 by	 the	 Saudi	 authorities	 during	 previous	 attempts	 to	 cross	 into	
Saudi	Arabia.	However,	this	had	not	deterred	them	from	repeating	the	journey	in	a	second	
or	third	attempt	to	reach	Saudi	Arabia.	According	to	a	migrant	interviewed	in	Obock:	“After	I	
was	 deported	 from	 Saudi	 Arabia,	 I	 immediately	 wanted	 to	 go	 back,	 and	 restarted	 the	
journey	without	waiting.”	After	being	deported,	some	migrants	reported	waiting	just	one	or	
two	 weeks	 before	 reattempting	 the	 journey,	 and	 others	 admitted	 to	 undertaking	 up	 to	
seven	repeat	journeys.	As	well	as	being	ineffectual,	short-term	policies	can	have	unintended	
effects	 for	 migrants’	 protection	 and	 security.	 For	 instance,	 in	 response	 to	 the	 Yemeni	
security	 forces’	 efforts	 to	 intercept	 boats	 arriving	 on	 the	 coast,	 smugglers	 adopted	 the	
practice	of	 forcing	migrants	 to	disembark	at	some	distance	 from	the	coast,	 in	spite	of	 the	
risk	 of	migrant	 drownings.	 In	 order	 to	 reduce	 the	 risk	 of	 interception	 and	 confiscation	 of	
boats,	smugglers	also	shift	landing	points	to	increasingly	remote	areas,	where	migrants	may	
be	more	vulnerable	to	abuse	and	exploitation.		
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Coordination	between	government	ministries	is	a	major	challenge	when	it	comes	to	dealing	
with	 migration.	 A	 range	 of	 ministries	 and	 departments	 are	 impacted	 by	 migration,	 and	
should	be	in	a	position	to	contribute	to	high	level	discussions	and	policy	(these	have	been	
outlined	in	detail	in	Annex	4).	In	practice,	however,	migration	issues	tend	to	be	dominated	
by	 the	ministries	 of	 interior	 or	 security,	 typically	 because	 states	 have	 tended	 to	 perceive	
migrants	primarily	as	a	 threat	 to	 law	and	order,	and	 security.	Government	bodies	dealing	
with	other	sectors,	such	as	 justice,	health,	education,	human	rights,	 trade,	 labour,	women	
and	 children,	 generally	 have	 less	 input	 on	migration	matters.	 To	 improve	matters,	 some	
sources	have	suggested	establishing	a	dedicated	ministry	for	migration,	with	its	own	budget.	
While	such	a	ministry	would	certainly	raise	awareness	and	attention	towards	migration,	 it	
would	not	necessarily	resolve	issues	of	coordination	and,	unless	generously	funded,	may	not	
be	 very	 effective.	 Furthermore,	 its	 presence	may	 deter	 other,	 ‘non-traditional’	 ministries	
from	getting	involved	in	migration	issues,	under	the	assumption	that	migration	issues	were	
now	 being	 fully	 addressed,	 thereby	 undermining	 efforts	 to	 encourage	 a	 more	 holistic	
response	to	migration.		
It	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 necessary	 structures	 are	 not	 always	 in	 place	 to	 ensure	 proper	
communication	and	collaboration	across	the	government.	In	Puntland,	the	PMPF	frequently	
lamented	a	lack	of	support	from	the	police,	judiciary	and	other	government	agencies	when	
it	comes	to	maritime	tackling	of	smuggling	and	trafficking,	which	undermined	their	efforts.	
This	 may	 be	 a	 result	 of	 overlapping	 responsibilities	 between	 different	 government	
departments	and	a	subsequent	lack	of	clarity	of	their	respective	jurisdictions.	For	example,	
the	Ministries	of	Security,	Interior,	Justice,	and	Women	and	Family	Affairs	are	all	tasked	to	
respond	to	human	smuggling	and	trafficking	in	some	way	through	their	various	departments	
and	 agencies,	 although	 in	 practice	 the	 Security	 and	 Interior	 sectors	 have	 the	 strongest	
mandate,	 and	 are	 the	 most	 active.	 In	 Djibouti,	 there	 are	 signs	 that	 the	 government	 is	
attempting	 to	 improve	 coordination	 efforts,	 through	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 coordinating	
national	committee	on	migration	and	trafficking,	whose	membership	includes	the	Ministries	
Image	10:	Example	of	a	police	checkpoint	at	the	entrance	to	Al	Hamdullah	village,	on	the	
outskirts	of	Bossaso	
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of	Interior,	Foreign	Affairs,	and	Justice,	security	services,	and	the	international	community.	
A	 similar	 body	 was	 set	 up	 in	 Yemen	 through	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 inter-ministerial	
National	 Technical	 Committee	 for	 Combating	 Trafficking,	 which	 includes	 representatives	
from	the	ministries	of	interior,	human	rights	and	justice,	among	others.		Nevertheless,	these	
structures	are	often	undermined	by	competition	between	different	ministries	over	funding	
and	 supplies	made	 available	 by	 international	 donors	 to	 tackle	migration.	 In	 Yemen,	 roles	
and	responsibilities	often	overlap	between	the	Ministry	of	 Interior	and	Ministry	of	Foreign	
Affairs,	 with	 both	 vying	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 the	 main	 point	 of	 reference	 when	 it	 comes	 to	
migration.		
Moving	beyond	national-level	coordination,	harmonisation	at	the	regional	and	international	
level	 is	also	important	given	both	the	transnational	nature	of	migration	and	the	enormous	
challenges	 faced	 by	 governments	 in	 responding	 to	 this	 issue.	 However,	 countries	 in	 the	
region	interpret	migration	in	different	ways,	depending	on	whether	they	are	sending,	transit	
and/or	destination	countries	(or	indeed	a	mix	of	all	of	these),	and	the	associated	benefits	of	
migration	 they	 stand	 to	 gain.	 This	 can	 complicate	 efforts	 to	 respond	 to	 migration	 in	 a	
coordinated	 way.	 As	 a	 country	 of	 transit,	 questions	 have	 been	 raised	 about	 whether	
responding	 to	migration	 is	 a	primary	 security	or	economic	 concern	or	 the	Government	of	
Djibouti	(RMMS,	2017).	Most	of	the	Ethiopian	migrants	are	not	 looking	to	stay	 in	Djibouti,	
and	their	 impact	will	be	 less	consequential	than	for	countries	of	origin	or	destination.	The	
same	 can	 be	 said	 for	 Puntland	 and	 Yemen,	 although	 both	 are	 also	 places	 of	 origin	 and	
destination	for	migrants.		
Nevertheless,	 there	 are	 signs	 that	 governments	 in	 the	 region	 are	 increasingly	 looking	 to	
respond	 to	 migration	 in	 a	 more	 meaningful,	 systematic	 and	 coordinated	 way.	 Firstly,	 in	
November	2013,	a	regional	conference	on	Asylum	and	Migration	from	the	HoA	was	hosted	
in	Yemen,	and	attended	by	representatives	from	Djibouti,	Eritrea,	Ethiopia,	Somalia	and	Gulf	
states.	 The	 conference	 led	 to	 the	 Sana’a	 Declaration,	 which	 set	 out	 a	 series	 of	
recommendations	 on	 how	 to	 manage	 complex	 migration	 flows	 across	 the	 region.56	
Secondly,	some	steps	have	been	taken	to	improve	regional	coordination	and	cooperation	on	
smuggling	 and	 trafficking.	 For	 example,	 IGAD’s	 adoption	 of	 Conventions	 on	Mutual	 Legal	
Assistance	and	Extradition,	which	would	enable	smugglers	and	traffickers	to	be	arrested	in	
another	country	from	where	they	committed	their	crime.	However,	progress	has	been	slow	
as	 few	 member	 states	 have	 signed	 up	 to	 and	 ratified	 these	 Conventions.	 Finally,	 key	
informants	 reported	 that	 until	 recently	 there	 has	 been	 a	 lack	 of	 political	 will	 to	 address	
migration	 by	 governments	 who	 tended	 to	 view	 the	 topic	 as	 taboo.	 Governments	 in	 the	
region	 were	 often	 unwilling	 to	 raise	 difficult	 questions	 with	 their	 neighbours	 about	 the	
extent	 and	drivers	 of	migration,	 as	well	 as	 the	 involvement	of	 the	 authorities	 not	only	 in	
facilitating	irregular	movements,	but	also	in	abuse	and	mistreatment	of	migrants.	In	recent	
years,	the	governments	of	Ethiopia	and	Djibouti	have	become	more	open	to	discussing	and	
responding	 to	 migration,	 perhaps	 in	 response	 to	 the	 increase	 in	 initiatives	 and	 funding	
centred	around	this	issue.	For	example,	in	2016,	migrants	were	classified	as	beneficiaries	in	
                                                
56	These	recommendations	included:	Addressing	the	root	causes	of	asylum	and	migration;	Strengthening	law	
enforcement	in	cases	concerning	irregular	migration;	Increasing	support	for	irregular	migrant	return	programs;	
Enhancing	 cooperation	 in	 the	 employment	 opportunities	 field;	 Raising-awareness	 campaigns	 on	 the	 risk	 of	
irregular	migration;	Enhancing	protection	systems	in	asylum	issues;	Regional	and	international	cooperation	on	
addressing	asylum	and	migration	issues;	and	Collecting	and	analysing	data	on	refugees	and	migrants	as	well	as	
follow-up	mechanisms.		
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the	Djibouti	Humanitarian	Response	Plan	for	the	first	time.	The	Government	of	Djibouti	has	
also	stepped	up	controls	at	the	border	with	Ethiopia,	and	increased	patrols	along	the	routes	
and	areas	commonly	frequented	by	migrants.	
	
6.2.	UN	and	NGO	Response	
A	number	of	UN	agencies	and	local	and	international	NGOs	work	with	migrants	in	the	study	
areas,	 many	 of	 which	 were	 interviewed	 by	 this	 project.	 (Refer	 to	 Annex	 3	 for	 a	 full	
description	 of	 each	 of	 these	 organisations.)	 Due	 to	 the	 peripheral	 setting	 of	 some	of	 the	
research	areas,	and	the	security	risks	associated	with	these	locations,	the	impact	and	scope	
of	 these	 organisations	 remains	 limited.	 In	 Yemen,	 in	 particular,	 humanitarian	 access	 has	
been	 severely	 restricted	 since	 the	escalation	of	 conflict,	 and	UN	agencies	and	NGOs	have	
either	 limited	 their	 activities	 to	 certain	 governorates,	 or	 withdrawn	 their	 presence	
altogether.	 In	 Puntland,	 repeated	 attacks	 by	 armed	 groups	 and	 militias	 in	 Bossaso	 and	
Garowe	 have	 also	 restricted	 humanitarian	 and	 development	 activities.57	 In	 addition	 to	
insecurity,	a	lack	of	funding	has	also	undermined	UN	and	NGO	responses,	and	interviewed	
organisations	 consistently	 expressed	 concern	 about	 funding	 gaps	 and	 short-term	
programming.	This	was	particularly	the	case	for	many	of	the	local	organisations	which,	due	
to	irregular	and	limited	funding,	work	on	a	project-specific	basis,	meaning	that	they	are	only	
operational	at	times	when	dedicated	funding	is	available.	
Some	 entities	 work	 specifically	 with	 migrants,	 although	 the	 focus	 is	 often	 on	 particular	
groups,	 such	 as	 refugees,	 IDPs,	 UMCs	 or	 victims	 of	 trafficking,	 as	 opposed	 to	 irregular	
migrants	 in	 general.	 Indeed,	 many	 organisations	 admitted	 that	 their	 assistance	 was	 only	
available	 to	 registered	 asylum	 seekers	 and	 refugees,	 and	 acknowledged	 that	 this	 left	 the	
majority	of	irregular	migrants	without	access	to	any	support.	In	Puntland,	for	example,	the	
only	 facility	 offering	 support	 to	 irregular	migrants	 is	 the	Migrant	Response	Centre	 (MRC).	
Typically,	government	policy	has	made	it	easier	for	development	and	humanitarian	agencies	
to	support	registered	refugees	and	asylum	seekers	than	irregular	migrants.	For	example,	the	
Puntland	authorities	have	welcomed	Yemeni	refugees	and	Somali	returnees	(who	had	been	
living	 as	 refugees	 in	 Yemen	 for	many	 years),	 and	 has	 collaborated	with	UN	 agencies	 and	
NGOs	to	provide	 these	groups	with	assistance	and	support.	 It	 is	not	clear	whether	similar	
state-level	 support	 would	 be	 offered	 to	 programmes	 that	 target	 irregular	 migrants,	 who	
have	entered	the	country	illegally	and	are	generally	seen	as	a	social,	economic	and	security	
threat	 by	 government.	 For	 the	 most	 part,	 however,	 projects	 and	 programmes	 are	 not	
migrant-specific,	and	those	that	do	exist	tend	to	focus	on	local	development	targeting	local	
communities.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 few	 migrants	 interviewed	 by	 this	 project	 reported	
receiving	 support	 from	projects	or	 initiatives	 run	by	development	or	humanitarian	actors.	
Likewise,	 few	 key	 respondents	 were	 able	 to	 give	 details	 when	 asked	 to	 elaborate	 on	
development	and	humanitarian	projects	and	programmes	in	their	area.	A	typical	response	
was,	 “as	 far	 as	 I	 know,	 there	 are	 no	 programmes.”	 When	 migrants	 do	 report	 receiving	
                                                
57	 In	 April	 2015,	 a	 UNICEF	 vehicle	 was	 targeted	 by	 an	 Al	 Shabaab	 improvised	 explosive	 device,	 leaving	 aid	
workers	dead	(Hassan,	2015).		
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support,	these	tend	to	be	Yemeni	refugees,	however	even	they	complained	that	assistance	
was	not	consistent	or	sufficient	to	meet	their	daily	needs.58		
As	has	been	described	earlier	in	the	report,	migrants	and	communities	encounter	many	of	
the	 same	 difficulties	 and	 challenges,	 relating	 to	 general	 poverty,	 a	 lack	 of	 sustainable	
livelihoods	 and	 limited	 access	 to	 quality	 basic	 services.	 This	 represents	 an	 opportunity	 to	
expand	programmes	to	include	both	migrants	and	their	hosts.	Indeed,	initiatives	that	target	
migrants	alone	are	 likely	 to	generate	 resentment	amongst	hosting	communities,	who	 feel	
excluded	 from	humanitarian	and	development	opportunities.	At	 the	 same	 time,	however,	
migrants’	needs	can	be	quite	specific,	especially	when	it	comes	to	offering	targeted	support	
to	 stranded	migrants	who	want	 to	 return	home,	 or	 those	who	have	 suffered	 from	abuse	
and/or	 trafficking	 and	 require	 specialised	 counselling	 and	 psychosocial	 support.	 In	 this	
context,	trained	personnel	with	dedicated	funding	are	required.			
	
6.3.	Migrant	Response	Centres59	
Migrant	 Response	 Centres	 (MRCs)	 are	 located	 along	 migratory	 routes	 and	 have	 been	
established	by	IOM	and	partners	to	provide	support	and	assistance	to	migrants	along	their	
journey.	 Key	 activities	 can	 include	 registration	 and	 screening,	 provision	 of	 food	 and	 non-
food	items,	advice,	 information	and	counselling,	medical	assistance,	awareness	raising	and	
assistance	to	return.		
• The	MRC	in	Obock	was	established	in	2011	to	address	security	and	protection	issues	
faced	 by	 migrants	 in	 Djibouti.	 Managed	 by	 IOM,	 it	 provides	 assistance	 to	 5,000	
migrants	annually	 that	choose	 to	 return	 to	 their	 country	of	origin,	as	well	as	 food,	
water,	 accommodation	 and	medical	 services.	Most	 of	 the	migrants	 that	 access	 its	
services	 are	 Yemeni	 refugees;	 of	 the	 35,253	migrant	 beneficiaries	 between	March	
2015	and	April	2016,	56%	(19,653)	were	Yemeni	(Altai	Consulting,	2016).		
	
• The	MRC	 in	Bossaso	was	established	 in	2009	 to	provide	 support	and	assistance	 to	
the	 large	numbers	of	migrants	travelling	along	this	route.	 It	carries	out	registration	
and	 screening	of	migrants,	 refugees	and	 returnees,	 as	well	 as	medical	 referrals	 (in	
serious	 cases),	 awareness	 programmes,	 counselling	 and	 advocacy.	 Contrary	 to	 the	
other	MRCs	in	the	region,	the	Bossaso	MRC	does	not	directly	provide	assistance	to	
return,	but	it	refers	migrants	willing	to	return	to	the	IOM	office	in	Bossaso,	in	charge	
of	AVR	(Altai	Consulting,	2016).	
	
• In	Yemen,	IOM	manages	Migrant	Response	Points	(MRPs)	in	Aden	and	Al	Hodeidah	
to	address	the	immediate	needs	of	vulnerable	migrants.	These	are	similar	to	MRCs,	
and	provide	migrants	with	medical	care,	non-food	items,	and	temporary	shelter.	
	
                                                
58	 Yemeni	 refugees	 are	 entitled	 to	 US$	 150	 per	 month,	 free	 education	 for	 their	 children,	 and	 some	 food	
support.	 However,	 in	 the	 previous	 year,	 welfare	 support	 was	 suspended	 for	 five	 months,	 leaving	 many	
refugees	in	debt	up	to	US$	2,000	with	local	businesses,	shops	and	landlords.	
59	Also	known	as	Migration	Response	Centres.	
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MRCs	 collect	 limited	data	and	 information	about	migrants	passing	 through	 their	 facilities.	
Due	 to	 their	 strategic	 location	 along	 the	 main	 migratory	 routes,	 and	 their	 established	
connections	with	government,	UN	and	NGO	stakeholders,	 this	role	could	be	maximised	to	
improve	 data	 collection	 more	 generally.	 IOM	 has	 recently	 developed	 an	 ‘MRC	 Data	
Collection	System,’	a	 smart	phone-based	application	collects	data	on	migrant	profiles	and	
protection	 needs	 at	 a	 regional	 level,	 which	 can	 also	 help	 to	 improve	 data	 collection	 on	
irregular	migration	(RMMS,	2017).		
The	main	weakness	of	the	MRCs	is	that	the	majority	of	migrants	do	not	make	use	of	their	
services,	either	because	they	are	not	aware	of	them,	or	because	migrants’	 irregular	status	
makes	them	reluctant	to	approach	the	MRCs	for	fear	of	registration	or	deportation.	At	the	
same	time,	migrants	may	be	reluctant	to	approach	MRCs	as	they	are	aware	that	they	will	be	
offered	AVR	packages,	which	they	are	not	interested	in	receiving.	According	to	IOM	Djibouti,	
between	 3	 and	 5%	 of	 all	migrants	 stop	 at	 the	MRC	 in	 Obock,	 equating	 to	 an	 average	 of	
between	 10-15	migrants	 per	 day.	MRCs	 have	 also	 been	 criticised	 by	 some	 for	 their	 close	
alignment	with	governments,	with	 implications	for	their	 impartiality	and	the	risk	that	they	
become	migrant	 ‘holding	centres’.	According	 to	 interviews	with	 IOM	key	 informants,	 IOM	
policy	looks	to	actively	strengthen	government	oversight	and	management	of	these	centres,	
which	raises	questions	about	their	future	independence	and	places	doubt	on	the	likelihood	
that	they	will	be	able	to	attract	larger	numbers	of	migrants	in	the	near	future.	
Furthermore,	there	have	been	concerns	about	the	conditions	of	the	facilities.	According	to	a	
November	 statement	 released	 by	 IOM,	 the	 Obock	 reception	 centre	 is	 over-stretched,	
resulting	in	insanitary	conditions	that	are	a	health	risk	for	migrants	(IOM,	2016).	The	Obock	
MRC	has	the	capacity	to	support	about	100	migrants	but,	as	of	October	2016,	was	hosting	
600-700	 Ethiopian	 migrants	 (Schlein,	 2016).	 Likewise,	 in	 a	 detailed	 evaluation,	 Altai	
Consulting	described	the	 facilities	at	Obock	as	 rudimentary	and	 in	need	of	 improvements,	
with	shelter	and	water,	sanitation	and	hygiene	(WASH)	facilities	in	poor	condition,	and	men,	
women	 and	 children	 sleeping	 together	 under	 basic	 outdoor	 structures	 (Altai	 Consulting,	
2016).	This	 suggests	 that	even	 if	MRCs	did	manage	to	attract	 larger	numbers	of	migrants,	
they	would	struggle	to	meet	their	needs	due	to	structural	 limitations.	Since	the	evaluation	
was	 released,	 the	 Government	 of	 Japan	 has	 funded	 new	 premises	 including	 shelters	 for	
women	UMCs,	as	well	as	WASH	facilities	(IOM,	2017).	The	Altai	Consulting	assessment	also	
recommended	the	following	priority	areas	for	improvement	at	the	Bossaso	MRC:	increased	
awareness	about	the	centre;	staff	training	to	disseminate	information,	counselling	and	legal	
issues;	 development	 of	 protection	 issues;	 and	 development	 of	 synergies	with	 local	 NGOs	
(Altai	Consulting,	2016).	
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6.4.	Community-level	responses	
Support	 provided	 to	migrants	 at	 the	 community	 level	 is	 also	 important.	While	 pressures	
between	 communities	 and	migrants	 exist,	 this	 research	 has	 identified	 a	 number	 of	 cases	
where	 local	 residents	 provide	 life	 changing	 support	 to	 migrants	 in	 danger	 or	 distress.	
Community	 interviewees	 reported	 giving	 migrants	 food,	 clothes,	 medical	 assistance,	 and	
sometimes	money.	In	Djibouti,	food	and	water	were	the	most	common	form	of	assistance	
provided	 to	 migrants	 along	 the	 route,	 and	 in	 transit	 towns.	 Some	 respondents	 also	
intervened	 when	 migrants	 were	 being	 harassed	 by	 the	 authorities,	 assisted	 with	
translations,	 and	 guided	migrants	 to	 particular	 places	 or	 offices	where	 they	 could	 access	
support	and	assistance.	Acts	of	kindness	and	charity	were	particularly	common	during	the	
month	of	Ramadan.	To	corroborate	these	statements,	a	number	of	migrants	and	refugees	
described	 local	communities	 in	Puntland,	Djibouti	and	Yemen	as	kind	or	nice	people,	who	
welcomed	and	helped	them.	One	migrant	who	had	made	it	as	far	as	Yemen	described	the	
communities	 there	 as	 being	 the	most	 supportive;	
providing	 him	 with	 food,	 clothes	 and	 money.	
Another	 reported	 that	 a	 local	 Yemeni	 had	 saved	
his	 life	by	taking	him	to	the	hospital	when	he	had	
been	badly	injured	after	stepping	on	a	landmine.	It	
should	 be	 stated,	 however,	 that	 these	 acts	 of	
kindness	 do	 not	 occur	 on	 a	 regular	 basis	 and,	
generally,	 levels	 of	 interaction	 between	 migrants	
and	local	residents	are	somewhat	limited.		
“The	Djiboutian	citizens	we	have	met	
have	been	generous.	We	are	all	
Muslims,	and	sometimes	people	don’t	
hesitate	to	give	us	water	and	food”.	
Ethiopian	migrant,	Obock	
	
“I	share	my	food	with	migrants	every	
time	they	knock	at	my	door.”	
Community	respondent,	Obock	
	
Image	11:	MRC	in	Bossaso	
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In	 addition	 to	 local	 communities,	 assistance	
and	 support	 from	 other	 migrants	 can	 also	
function	as	a	social	security	net	for	migrants	in	
trouble	 or	 distress.	 Long-established	migrants	
in	 Puntland	 provide	 shelter	 and	 support	 to	
new	arrivals,	particularly	those	from	the	same	
ethnic	 background.	 In	 Puntland,	 Ethiopian	
nationals	 who	 have	 resided	 for	 some	 years	 in	 Bossaso,	 reported	 giving	 food,	
accommodation,	translation	assistance,	transport	and	loans	to	migrants	in	need.	One	had	a	
restaurant,	from	which	she	regularly	provided	free	meals	to	destitute	migrants,	or	those	in	
poor	 health.	 In	 Yemen,	 migrants	 from	 particular	 countries	 or	 regions	 have	 set	 up	
community-based	organisations	that	provide	support	to	migrants	from	similar	backgrounds.	
These	 include	an	Ethiopian	Somali	Regional	State	community	centre,	an	Eritrean	Migrants	
Community	(which	provides	advice	and	support	to	Eritreans	 in	detention	 in	Sana’a),	and	a	
Somali	 Youth	 Committee	 (which	 runs	 awareness	 campaigns,	 human	 rights	 training,	 and	
livelihoods	projects	for	Somali	migrants).	Migrants	‘on	the	move’	may	also	pool	their	funds	
to	 lend	 money	 to	 fellow	migrants	 in	 need.	 For	 example,	 when	 a	 female	 migrant	 was	 in	
danger	of	being	raped	by	smugglers,	the	other	migrants	in	her	group	intervened	and	loaned	
her	the	money	she	needed	to	pay	off	the	smugglers	and	avoid	abuse.		
In	 a	 context	 of	 limited	 official	 assistance	 from	 governments,	 UN	 agencies	 and	 NGOs,	
community-level	 support	provided	by	host	 communities	 and	migrants	plays	 a	 vital	 role	 in	
filling	 gaps.	 Due	 to	 their	 irregular	 status,	 migrants	 may	 be	 wary	 of	 approaching	 official	
channels	of	 support,	 for	 fear	of	being	 registered,	arrested	or	deported,	and	may	be	more	
likely	to	seek	assistance	from	informal	community-based	structures.	What’s	more,	they	be	
unaware	of	official	mechanisms	for	support,	or	experience	 language	or	cultural	barriers	 in	
accessing	these.	In	this	context,	policy	and	programmes	should	seek	to	strengthen	and	build	
upon	grassroots	structures	of	support	through	funding	and	capacity	building.			
	
6.5.	Mechanisms	for	coordination	
A	wide	range	of	mechanisms	are	 in	place	to	address	migration	 in	a	more	coordinated	and	
effective	 way.	 These	 include	 regional	 and	 national	 structures	 established	 by	 both	
governmental	 and	 non-governmental	 mechanisms.	 In	 spite	 of	 these,	 coordination	 on	
migration	remains	a	major	challenge,	suggesting	that	these	kinds	of	mechanisms	require	re-
thinking	 of	 strengthening,	 if	 they	 are	 to	meaningfully	 bring	 together	 the	 actors	 and	 their	
responses	to	migration.			
• Mixed	migration	task	forces	(MMTF)	have	been	created	through	coordination	with	
governments	and	civil	society	in	Djibouti,60	Yemen61	and	Puntland.62	Their	purpose	is	
                                                
60	In	Djibouti,	the	MMTF	is	co-chaired	by	UNHCR	and	IOM	and	its	members	include	the	Djiboutian	Red	Cross,	
DRC,	 European	Union,	 FAO,	Germany	 Embassy,	GIZ,	 ICRC,	UNICEF,	WFP,	WHO,	UNDP,	 l’Union	Nationale	 de	
Femmes	Djiboutiennes	(UNFD),	University	of	Djibouti,	UNOPS	and	the	US	Embassy.	The	following	government	
institutions	are	also	represented:	Ministry	of	 Interior,	ONARS,	police,	gendarmerie	and	coast	guard,	amongst	
others.		
61	 In	 Yemen,	 the	 MMTF	 is	 jointly	 chaired	 by	 UNHCR	 and	 IOM.	 DRC	 holds	 the	 secretariat	 for	 the	 group.	
INTERSOS,	 the	 Society	 for	 Humanitarian	 Solidarity	 (SHS),	 the	 United	 Nations	 Children’s	 Fund	 (UNICEF),	 the	
World	Food	Programme	 (WFP),	 Save	 the	Children	Sweden,	 the	Yemen	Red	Crescent,	Care	 International	and	
“The	smugglers	were	bad,	but	the	migrants	
I	travelled	with	were	good	and	we	helped	
each	other.”	Ethiopian	migrant,	Sana’a.	
	
“Migrants	are	harmless.	They	are	all	
Ethiopians.	They	are	all	like	brothers.”	
Ethiopian	migrant,	Obock	
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to	 reinforce	 cooperation,	 share	 information	 and	 coordinate	 responses	 to	 mixed	
migration.		
• IGAD	has	adopted	a	Regional	Migration	Policy	Framework	to	address	the	challenges	
related	 to	migration	governance	 in	 the	 IGAD	region,	with	 the	ultimate	objective	of	
protecting	 migrants	 and	 realizing	 the	 development	 potential	 of	 migration.	 IGAD’s	
five-year	 Migration	 Action	 Plan	 (2015-2020)	 prioritises	 labour	 migration	
management,	mobility	 of	 pastoralist	 communities,	 building	 national	 data	 systems,	
and	 free	 movement	 of	 people	 in	 the	 IGAD	 region.	 Since	 2008,	 a	 Regional	
Consultative	Process	has	been	set	up	 to	promote	dialogue	and	cooperation	on	the	
various	 issues	 related	 to	 migration.	 Through	 this	 process,	 IGAD	 Member	 States	
search	for	a	common	rationale	on	how	to	manage	mobility	of	people	and	to	reduce	
irregular	migration.		
• IGAD’s	 Regional	 Secretariat	 on	 Forced	 Displacement	 and	 Mixed	 Migration	 was	
recently	established	with	support	from	the	World	Bank.	It	aims	to	promote	dialogue	
on	migration	between	member	states,	provide	technical	assistance	to	government,	
harmonize	policy,	 conduct	 research	 in	 the	 region,	and	 improve	data	collection	and	
migration	tracking.		
• The	 AU’s	 approach	 to	 regulating	 migration	 is	 informed	 by	 the	 vision	 of	 African	
economic	 integration	 outlined	 in	 the	 1994	 Abuja	 Treaty,	 which	 aims	 to	 “achieve	
progressively	 the	 free	movement	 of	 persons,	 and	 to	 ensure	 the	 enjoyment	 of	 the	
right	 of	 residence	 and	 the	 right	 of	 establishment	 by	 their	 nationals	 within	 [the	
African	 Economic]	 Community.”	 (Achiume	 &	 Landau,	 2015).	 Efforts	 against	
trafficking	 in	 human	 beings	 and	 smuggling	 of	 migrants	 are	 guided	 by	 the	 African	
Union	Migration	Policy	Framework	for	Africa,	the	Ouagadougou	Action	Plan,	and	the	
AU	 Commission	 Initiative	 against	 Trafficking.	 	It	 has	 established	 a	 number	 of	
initiatives	and	platforms	relevant	to	migration.	These	include	the	African	Union	Horn	
of	Africa	Initiative	against	Human	Trafficking	and	Smuggling	of	Migrants,	and	the	AU	
Permanent	Representative	Committee	Sub-Committee	on	Refugees,	Returnees	and	
Internally	Displaced	Persons	in	Africa.	
	
• The	Khartoum	Process	launched	at	the	end	of	2014	is	a	high-level,	inter-continental	
political	process	that	seeks	to	harmonize	existing	AU	and	EU-led	components.	It	aims	
to	 establish	 a	 continuous	 dialogue	 for	 enhanced	 cooperation	 on	 migration	 and	
mobility,	while	identifying	and	implementing	concrete	projects	to	address	trafficking	
in	human	beings	and	the	smuggling	of	migrants	and	thus	giving	new	impetus	to	the	
regional	 collaboration	 between	 countries	 of	 origin,	 transit	 and	 destination	 in	 the	
Horn	of	Africa	and	the	European	Union.		
	
                                                                                                                                                  
the	Government	of	Yemen	are	all	current	members.	The	operation	of	the	MMTF	is	supported	by	funding	from	
the	 Swiss	Agency	 for	Development	 and	Cooperation	 (SDC),	UNHCR	and	 IOM.	 (Yemen	Mixed	Migration	 Task	
Force,	2017).	
62	 The	 Puntland	 MMTF	 is	 jointly	 chaired	 by	 IOM	 and	 UNHCR,	 and	 its	 membership	 includes	 the	 Puntland	
Ministry	of	Interior,	DRC,	OCHA	and	the	MRC.	The	Somalia	MMTF	is	also	co-chaired	by	IOM	and	UNHCR,	and	
members	include	UNICEF,	UNODC,	WFP,	NRC	and	DRC.	
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• The	Office	of	the	Special	Envoy	for	Children’s	and	Migrants	Rights	was	established	
in	 2015	 in	 Somalia,	 and	 sits	 within	 the	 Office	 of	 the	 Prime	Minister.	 Its	 role	 is	 to	
advocate	for	the	rights	of	Somali	migrants	abroad;	raise	awareness	about	migration	
issues	 and	 advise	 the	 Federal	 Government	 of	 Somalia	 on	 these	 issues;	 support	
coordination	 among	 the	 different	 ministries	 on	 migration	 management,	 and	 help	
them	to	develop	migration	policy;	and	act	as	a	focal	point	to	the	AU	and	IGAD.		
	
• The	 Federal	 Government	 of	 Somalia	 has	 created	 three	 country	 task	 forces	 to	
respond	to	migration	management.	These	include:	
o High-Level	 Task	 Force	 on	 Migration	 Management	 (led	 by	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Internal	Security),	which	is	responsible	for	policy	and	legislation.		
o Technical	 Task	 Force	 on	 Human	 Smuggling	 and	 Trafficking	 (led	 by	 the	
Ministries	 of	 Internal	 Security,	 and	 Justice	 and	 Judicial	 Affairs),	 which	 is	
responsible	for	strategy	and	programming.		
o Technical	 Task	 Force	 on	 Return	 and	 Readmission	 (led	 by	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Internal	 Security),	 which	 is	 responsible	 for	 coordinating	 returns	 and	
readmissions.		
	
• In	2015,	an	inter-agency	Somalia	Task	Force	on	Yemen	Situation	was	established	to	
improve	 coordination.	 Co-led	 by	 UNHCR	 and	 IOM,	 it	 includes	 all	 relevant	 UN	
agencies	 and	 NGOs	 involved	 in	 humanitarian	 activities.	 It	 is	 responsible	 for	
coordinating	 the	 following	 activities:	 monitoring	 and	 rescue	 at	 sea,	 reception,	
registration,	 assistance	 and	 response	 upon	 arrival,	 provision	 of	 onward	
transportation	 assistance	 to	 areas	 of	 return	 (for	 Somali	 returnees)	 and	 areas	 of	
refuge	(for	refugees)	(IOM,	2015).	
	
• A	 Child	 Protection	 Working	 Sub-Group	 has	 been	 established	 in	 Bossaso,	 with	
membership	from	international	and	local	NGOs,	and	provides	support	to	victims	of	
trafficking.	 It	 works	 under	 the	 umbrella	 of	 the	 Somali	 Protection	 Cluster	 and	 the	
National	 Child	Protection	Working	Group	 (CPWG)	 and	 is	 chaired	by	UNHCR.	 It	 is	 a	
forum	through	which	other	child	protection	programmes	in	Puntland	can	coordinate	
interventions,	create	partnerships	and	 linkages	 for	better	prioritization	of	available	
resources	and	consensus	on	issues,	to	better	prioritize	protection	and	commitment	
with	an	overall	goal	of	enhancing	the	protection	of	children.	
	
• The	 Somalia	 NGO	 Consortium	 is	 a	 voluntary	 coordination	 mechanism	 for	 NGOs	
operating	 in	 the	 country,	 which	 carries	 out	 advocacy,	 information	 sharing,	
coordination	and	representation	activities.			
	
• The	Task	Force	 for	Population	Movement	 (TFPM),	 co-led	by	 IOM	and	UNHCR	 is	 a	
Technical	Working	Group	of	the	Yemen	Protection	Cluster.	The	TFPM	implements	an	
information	 management	 tool	 that	 gathers	 data	 on	 the	 status	 and	 location	 of	
displaced	persons	across	Yemen.	
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7.	 What	 are	 the	 Gaps	 and	 Opportunities	 for	 Future	 Policy	 and	
Programming?	
As	 outlined	 in	 the	 introductory	 section	 of	 this	 report,	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 research	 is	 to	
contribute	 to	 the	 identification	 of	 areas	 of	 effective	 policy	 interventions	 by	 achieving	 the	
following	objectives:	
1. To	provide	a	 rigorous,	 research-based	analysis	 that	 improves	understanding	of	 the	
causes	and	consequences	of	dangerous	and	exploitative	migration	between	the	HoA	
and	Yemen;	
2. To	understand	the	actual	and	potential	role	of	policy	interventions	in	mitigating	the	
impacts	of	this	migration	in	areas	of	origin	and	transit	in	the	HoA.	
Based	on	the	analysis	provided	in	the	earlier	sections,	this	section	responds	to	Objective	2	
and	 the	actual	and	potential	 role	of	policy	 interventions.	This	part	of	 the	 report	does	not	
attempt	to	describe	detailed	or	specific	proposals	for	intervention.	Rather	it	identifies	gaps	
and	opportunities	for	future	policy	and	programming,	which	can	be	used	as	a	platform	for	
elaborating	more	detailed	and	extensive	plans	for	implementation.		
The	gaps	and	opportunities	detailed	below	are	an	overview	of	 the	 recommendations	 that	
emerged	 from	 stakeholder	 consultations	 (with	migrants,	 government,	 NGOs,	 civil	 society	
and	communities)	during	the	research	project.	They	relate	to	the	range	of	beneficiaries	and	
targets,	 including	 migrants,	 host	 communities,	 local	 organisations,	 and	 government	
institutions.	 Likewise,	 the	 thematic	 areas	 of	 intervention	 are	 also	 intentionally	 varied,	 in	
relation	to	the	wide	scope	of	factors	and	dynamics	linked	to	migration	along	these	routes.		
It	 is	worth	noting	that	gaps	and	opportunities	will	be	shaped	by	underlying	socioeconomic	
and	 political	 structures,	 such	 as	 government	 policy,	 national	 and	 regional	 capacity,	 and	
available	funding.	In	this	regard,	some	suggestions	may	be	more	relevant	in	some	contexts	
than	 others.	 Furthermore,	 given	 the	 transnational	 nature	 of	 migration,	 successful	
interventions	 may	 involve	 multiple	 geographies,	 including	 places	 of	 origin,	 transit	 and	
departure.	 Finally,	 the	 routes	 along	which	migrants	move	 are	 often	 located	 in	 peripheral	
and	 remote	areas,	which	 implies	 the	need	 to	engage	with	stakeholders	at	multiple	 levels,	
including	central	and	local,	when	it	comes	to	implementation.		
	
7.1.	Provide	greater	protection	and	assistance	to	migrants		
Where	are	the	gaps?		
Section	 4	 describes	 how	 migrants	 suffer	 from	 a	 range	 of	 protection	 risks	 and	 abuses	
(including	 physical	 and	 sexual	 abuse,	 robbery,	 interception,	 detention,	 exploitation	 and	
death),	as	well	as	hardships	associated	with	the	general	conditions	of	the	journey	(a	lack	of	
access	to	food	and	water,	basic	services,	shelter	and	livelihoods,	and	challenges	of	security	
and	 climate).	 These	 challenges	 occur	 in	 Djibouti	 and	 Puntland	 and,	 especially,	 in	 Yemen,	
where	a	breakdown	in	law	and	order	has	allowed	criminal	groups	to	operate	with	the	most	
impunity.	At	the	same	time,	due	to	the	peripheral	setting	of	migratory	routes,	the	security	
risks	 associated	 with	 these	 locations,	 funding	 shortages,	 and	 a	 general	 lack	 of	 capacity	
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among	 state	 institutions,	 the	protection	 and	assistance	mechanisms	available	 to	migrants	
are	 extremely	 limited.	 Support	 and	 funding	 is	 often	 restricted	 to	 recognised	migrants	 or	
particular	groups,	such	as	registered	refugees,	IDPs,	or	women	and	children.	However,	the	
majority	of	people	on	the	move	are	young,	male,	non-registered	migrants,	who	have	little	or	
no	 recourse	 to	 support	 in	 spite	 of	 demonstrating	 significant	 vulnerabilities	 and	 needs.	
Furthermore,	even	 those	migrants	 that	do	 receive	 funding	and	assistance	continue	 to	 live	
under	extremely	difficult	conditions.	This	has	driven	increasing	numbers	of	Somali	returnees	
and	Yemeni	refugees	in	Puntland	and	Djibouti	to	risk	returning	to	Yemen	before	conditions	
are	safe.	
What	are	the	opportunities?		
In	 this	 context,	 expanding	 the	 net	 of	 protection	 and	 assistance	 to	 include	 all	 migrants,	
regardless	of	their	status,	is	a	key	gap	to	be	filled	by	policy	makers	and	programmers.	This	
could	be	provided	through	a	number	of	avenues:		
1. Strengthen	 Migrant	 Response	 Centres:	 MRCs	 are	 an	 existing	 and	 functioning	
structure,	with	 funding,	 government	 buy-in	 and	 strategic	 locations	 along	 the	main	
migration	routes.	 In	this	capacity,	they	represent	a	viable	and	attractive	channel	of	
protection	 and	 assistance	 to	 migrants.	 Nevertheless,	 their	 reach	 is	 restricted	 by	
insufficient	infrastructural	and	staff	investment	and	low	migrant	attendance	(due	to	
a	combination	of	fear,	suspicion	and	lack	of	awareness	on	the	part	of	migrants).	 In	
particular,	 MRCs	 need	 to	 build	 awareness	 about	 the	 support	 they	 can	 offer,	 and	
overcome	 migrants’	 fears	 around	 government	 links	 and	 possible	 involvement	 in	
deportations.	 This	 implies	 strengthening	 the	 independence	 and	 impartiality	 of	 the	
MRCs,	possibly	through	the	structure	seen	in	Bossaso,	where	the	facility	is	managed	
by	an	independent	NGO	and	all	returns	are	processed	in	a	separate	office	managed	
by	 IOM.	 Some	 respondents	 also	 recommend	 putting	 in	 place	 more	 systematic	
referral	systems	so	that	migrants	with	particular	needs	or	concerns	can	more	quickly	
receive	the	specialised	support	they	require.		
	
2. Support	Mobile	Response	Units:	Migratory	journeys	are	often	long,	dangerous	and	
pass	through	remote	and	isolated	areas.	Many	migrants	die	due	to	heat,	thirst	and	
exhaustion,	or	are	subjected	to	abuse	and	protection	risks.	Given	limited	funding	and	
capacity,	 the	authorities	 tend	 to	 congregate	around	particular	 check	points,	 at	 the	
entrance	to	towns	or	in	urban	areas,	leaving	large	sections	of	the	routes	unpatrolled	
and	unmonitored.	Similarly,	the	existing	MRCs	in	Obock	and	Bossaso	are	located	on	
a	small	part	of	a	much	 longer	route.	Mobile	response	units	would	go	some	way	to	
responding	 to	 these	 issues,	 by	 providing	 migrants	 in	 isolated	 areas	 with	 basic	
support	 (food,	 water,	 medical	 assistance),	 protection,	 documentation	 and	 other	
forms	of	assistance.	WHO,	IOM	and	DRC	are	reportedly	looking	into	this	option,	the	
need	for	which	has	been	identified	by	a	number	of	key	informants.	ICRC	in	Djibouti	is	
also	 planning	 to	 provide	 an	 ambulance	 service	 along	 the	 migration	 corridors,	
pending	government	approval.	
	
3. Engage	 community-level	 groups	 and	 structures:	 In	 a	 context	 of	 limited	 assistance	
from	 government	 and	NGOs,	 the	 support	 provided	 to	migrants	 at	 the	 community	
level	by	residents,	local	committees,	and	civil	society	groups	is	especially	important.	
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A	number	of	these	are	founded	and	run	by	long-established	migrants,	making	them	
particularly	popular	with	migrants	who	may	be	suspicious	of	official	mechanisms	of	
support.	 These	 grassroots	 structures	 offer	 much-needed	 and	 practical	 support	 to	
migrants	on	the	ground,	and	should	be	engaged	with	and	strengthened	by	policy	and	
programmes.	This	could	be	achieved	through	greater	funding	and	capacity	building,	
and	 greater	 opportunities	 for	 partnership	 and	 collaboration	 with	 implementing	
partners.	To	reduce	the	risk	of	hostility	and	tensions,	initiatives	that	target	migrants	
with	assistance	should	also	include	support	for	host	communities.		
	
4. Promote	 greater	 coordination	 between	 stakeholders:	 Sources	 lamented	 a	 lack	 of	
coordination	 between	 government	 departments,	 implementing	 partners	 and	
donors.	 Likewise,	 as	 indicated	 earlier,	many	migrants	 are	 unaware	 of	 the	 support	
structures	 that	 are	 available	 to	 them.	 Given	 limited	 funding	 and	 growing	 needs,	
available	 resources	 should	 be	maximised	 through	 partnership	 and	 coordination	 to	
avoid	 duplication	 and	 waste,	 and	 build	 capacity.	 As	 highlighted	 in	 Section	 6.5,	 a	
number	of	mechanisms	 for	 coordination	already	exist	 in	all	 the	 research	 locations,	
and	these	should	be	strengthened	and	utilised	as	far	as	possible	to	build	consensus,	
share	 information	and	maximise	 impact.	The	fact	that	a	range	of	such	mechanisms	
already	 exist,	 and	 yet	 coordination	 remains	 a	 challenge,	 suggests	 there	 may	 be	
deeper,	 more	 structural	 issues	 at	 play	 (such	 as	 state	 policy	 or	 high-level	 vested	
interests),	which	may	be	more	difficult	to	overcome.		
	
5. Provide	specialised	support	for	vulnerable	migrants:	Sources	and	evidence	suggest	
that	women	and	children	(often	unaccompanied)	make	up	a	sizeable	proportion	of	
migrants	travelling	to	Yemen,	possible	between	20-30	per	cent	each.	Statistics	show	
that	women	and	children	are	more	vulnerable	than	men	to	being	trafficked,	and	to	
suffering	 abuse	 at	 the	 hands	 of	 unscrupulous	 smugglers.	 Unaccompanied	 and	
unregistered	migrant	children	also	face	a	lack	of	access	to	welfare	rights,	education,	
and	 health	 services.	 While	 this	 report	 advocates	 for	 greater	 assistance	 and	
protection	 for	 all	 migrants,	 regardless	 of	 their	 legal	 status	 and	 sex,	 it	 should	 be	
recognised	that	some	groups	are	particularly	vulnerable	and	may	require	specialised	
support,	 which	 is	 currently	 rarely	 available.	 Careful	 and	 considerate	 assisted	
voluntary	return	should	be	offered	to	this	group,	as	well	as	counselling,	psychosocial	
support	and	legal	assistance	both	in	transit	and	in	their	country	of	origin	should	they	
choose	to	return.			
	
6. Expand	the	net	of	support	to	migrants	through	‘non-traditional’	sectors:	Efforts	to	
manage	 migration	 should	 be	 complimented	 with	 specific	 health,	 education,	 and	
other	 ‘non-traditional’	migration	management	 sectors.	 This	 could	 be	 coupled	with	
awareness	 raising	 directed	 at	 government	 line	 departments	 (in	 particular	
agriculture,	 industry,	 trade,	education,	health	and	employment)	 to	demonstrate	 to	
them	 how	migration	 affects	 their	 area	 of	 work,	 so	 that	 it	 is	 not	 seen	 as	 purely	 a	
matter	for	security	and	immigration	authorities.	
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7.2.	Adopt	a	more	holistic	approach	to	smuggling	and	trafficking		
Where	are	the	gaps?		
Section	 3	 highlights	 how	 human	 smuggling	 and,	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent,	 trafficking,	 are	
widespread	 between	 the	 HoA	 and	 Yemen.	 Responding	 to	 increased	 demand	 and	 in	 a	
context	 of	 relative	 impunity,	 criminal	 groups	 have	 developed	 extensive	 and	 sophisticated	
transnational	networks,	and	are	seeking	new	routes	and	destinations,	 including	expanding	
their	 reach	 to	overland	sections	of	 the	 journey,	and	 increasingly	 facilitating	 journeys	 from	
Puntland	 to	 Europe	 via	 Yemen.	 A	 number	 of	 donors	 and	 organisations	 implement	 anti-
smuggling	and	trafficking	interventions	typically	centred	around	training,	capacity	building,	
policy	 development	 and	 awareness	 raising	 (refer	 to	 Annex	 3).	 International	 and	 national	
legislation	has	been	signed	and	ratified,	and	dedicated	departments,	agencies,	 task	 forces	
and	coordination	mechanisms	have	also	been	established	in	Puntland,	Djibouti	and	Yemen	
to	 specifically	 respond	 to	 these	 issues	 (see	 Annexes	 4	 and	 5).	 Nevertheless,	 efforts	 to	
respond	 to	 the	 criminal	 networks	 involved	 in	 smuggling	 and	 trafficking	 have,	 so	 far,	 had	
limited	impact,	and	the	scale	and	scope	of	smuggling	and	trafficking	activities	has	increased	
in	recent	years.		
What	are	the	opportunities?		
The	 research	 findings	 raise	 doubts	 about	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 some	 of	 the	 more	 heavy-
handed	 law	 enforcement	 efforts	 employed	 to	 crack	 down	 on	 smuggling	 and	 trafficking	
networks.	 There	 is	 certainly	 a	 place	 for	 law	 and	 security	 enforcement	 efforts.	 However	
successful	 initiatives	 to	 manage	 migration	 should	 also	 assume	 a	 wider,	 more	 holistic	
approach	that	seeks	to	understand	why	people	move	 in	the	way	they	do	and	put	 in	place	
sustainable	 alternatives.	 For	 example,	 while	 the	 actions	 of	 traffickers	 can	 in	 no	 way	 be	
justified,	it	should	not	be	assumed	that	all	those	associated	with	smuggling	are	necessarily	
exploitative	or	abusive.	In	many	cases,	they	offer	a	much-needed	service	to	migrants	who,	
with	 the	 curtailment	 of	 regular	 channels	 of	 migration,	 have	 few	 other	 means	 to	 move.	
Placing	 additional	 limitations	 on	 their	 movements	 may	 be	 counter-productive,	 as	 this	 is	
likely	to	compel	more	migrants	to	seek	smugglers’	services,	thereby	pushing	up	prices	and	
subsequent	profits	 for	the	criminal	groups.	Crackdowns	also	drive	migrants	and	smugglers	
to	 engage	 in	more	 dangerous	movements	 in	 increasingly	 remote	 areas,	making	migrants	
more	vulnerable	to	abuse.	In	this	context,	responses	must	be	wide-ranging	and	capable	of	
significantly	reducing	demand	for	people	to	undertake	irregular	migration.	While	this	report	
does	not	offer	a	fail-safe	solution	to	a	highly	complex	issue,	it	does	provide	a	set	of	general	
recommendations	and	 insights	based	on	 feedback	 from	stakeholders	and	 research	on	 the	
ground.		
1. Gather	and	make	available	more	detailed	and	extensive	information	and	evidence:	
Concrete	information	remains	limited	on	the	organised	crime	groups	operating	along	
the	HoA-Yemen	routes,	and	represents	a	research	gap,	as	most	surveys	have	tended	
to	 focus	 on	 the	 number	 of	 irregular	 migrants,	 push	 and	 pull	 factors,	 and	 threats	
along	 the	 routes.	 	 Furthermore,	 the	 civil	 war	 in	 Yemen	 and	 the	 reverse	 flow	 of	
people	towards	the	HoA	potentially	calls	into	question	studies	that	were	carried	out	
prior	to	2015	when	conditions	were	very	different.	Where	information	is	available	on	
the	 identity	 of	 human	 smugglers	 or	 corrupt	 officials,	 it	 appears	 that	mainly	 those	
operating	at	the	lower	levels	are	being	successfully	targeted.	Directed,	sustained	and	
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in-depth	 research,	with	 a	 focus	 on	 investigative	 enquiry,	 is	 required	 to	 assess	 and	
document	the	activities	and	operations	of	the	organized	crime	groups	at	the	highest	
levels.	 This	 should	 include	 the	 names	 and	 details	 of	 those	 involved	 at	 the	 top,	
information	about	 financial	 transactions	and	destinations,	and	detailed	 intelligence	
on	 allegations	 into	 corruption	 and	 collusion	 of	 state	 authorities,	 among	 others.	
These	findings	would	help	to	uncover	the	full	extent	of	smuggling	and	trafficking	in	
the	 region,	 and	provide	 the	evidence	needed	 for	 successful	 criminal	 investigations	
against	perpetrators.		
	
2. Facilitate	greater	coordination	between	stakeholders	at	national	and	international	
levels:	 Government	 sources	 commonly	 complained	 of	 a	 lack	 of	 coordination	 and	
communication	among	the	different	national	stakeholders	 involved	 in	responses	to	
smuggling	 and	 trafficking.	 A	 range	 of	 ministries	 and	 departments	 in	 Puntland,	
Djibouti	and	Yemen	are	officially	involved	in	responses	to	smuggling	and	trafficking,	
which	 has	 led	 to	 confusion	 and	 duplication	 of	 roles	 and	 responsibilities.	 In	 some	
cases,	 this	 may	 suit	 vested	 interests	 as	 different	 ministries	 compete	 to	 control	
migration	 funding,	 rhetoric	 and	 space.	 In	 this	 context,	 roles	 and	 responsibilities	
should	be	clarified,	coordination	bodies	made	accountable,	and	local	administrations	
strengthened	 to	 coordinate	 migration	 responses	 at	 the	 local	 levels.	 Beyond	 the	
national	level,	greater	government	coordination	at	regional	and	international	levels	
is	 also	 required	 if	 states	 are	 to	 respond	 effectively	 to	 the	 transnational	 nature	 of	
these	networks.	This	needs	to	be	coupled	with	serious	political	commitment	at	the	
highest	levels.	Regional	bodies	such	as	IGAD	and	the	AU	should	be	supported	in	their	
efforts	to	bring	together	different	states	and	find	common	ground	and	consensus.63	
More	could	also	be	done	 in	the	areas	of	cross-border	operations,	better	sharing	of	
intelligence	across	agencies,	and	the	development	of	regional	or	transnational	policy	
in	 order	 to	 improve	 both	 security	 and	 protection	 mechanisms	 for	 migrants	 and	
communities	in	isolated	border	areas.			
	
3. Support	 effective	 implementation	 of	 anti-smuggling	 and	 trafficking	 legislation:	
Even	when	states	have	signed	up	to	and	ratified	international	legislation	relating	to	
smuggling	and	 trafficking,	and	developed	and	enacted	 legislation	of	 their	own,	 the	
implementation	of	concrete	and	practical	responses	by	state	actors	remains	limited	
and,	 at	 times,	 non-existent.	 Deterred	 by	 the	 scale	 and	 scope	 of	 migration,	 and	
lacking	 in	 capacity,	 resources	and	 support,	 authorities	have	 tended	 to	 turn	a	blind	
eye	 to	 these	 movements.	 The	 authorities	 in	 Puntland,	 Djibouti	 and	 (as	 far	 as	
possible)	Yemen	should	be	encouraged	to	follow	up	on	these	commitments	through	
targeted	sustainable	and	 long-term	funding,	 training	and	 incentives	 that	 includes	a	
range	 of	 different	 departments	 (security,	 justice,	 health,	 education,	 maritime,	
internal	and	foreign	affairs)	at	both	central	and	local	levels.	This	and	other	research	
has	 mapped	 migration	 routes	 and	 ‘hotspots’,	 which	 already	 helps	 to	 provide	 a	
geographic	starting	point	for	preventive	efforts.		
	
4. Strengthen	 the	police	 and	 judiciary:	 It	 is	widely	 accepted	 that	 police	 and	 security	
officers	turn	a	blind	eye	to,	and	are	even	involved	with	smugglers,	allowing	them	to	
                                                
63	Within	 IGAD,	 the	 Transnational	Organised	 Crime	 pillar	within	 the	 Security	 Sector	 Program	 (ISSP)	 and	 the	
newly	formed	Regional	Secretariat	on	Forced	Displacement	and	Mixed	Migration	may	be	particularly	relevant.		
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operate	with	near	impunity.	When	arrests	do	occur,	cases	are	often	overturned,	not	
followed	through,	or	the	perpetrators	are	released	without	explanation.	This	may	be	
due	 to	 insufficient	 evidence,	 resources	 and	 space	 in	 detention	 facilities,	 but	 also	
suggests	 the	workings	of	high-level	protection	mechanisms.	Successful	punishment	
and	confiscation	of	smuggling	property	and	equipment	(where	legally	allowed)	are	a	
strong	deterrent	 to	 those	 involved	 in	 the	networks.	 To	bring	 this	 about,	 there	 is	 a	
need	 to	 link-up	 the	 actions	 of	 the	 coastal	 or	 local	 police	 forces	 with	 prosecution	
authorities.	 Furthermore,	 transparent	 and	 independent	 oversight	 of	 cases	 is	
important	 to	 ensure	 that	 cases	 are	 followed	 through,	 and	 also	 to	 identify	
opportunities	for	investigating	higher	levels	of	the	organised	crime	groups.		
	
5. Provide	 viable	 economic	 alternatives	 for	 those	 involved	 in	 smuggling:	 For	 those	
working	 at	 the	 bottom	 of	 the	 network	 (such	 as	 boat	 owners,	 crews,	 drivers	 and	
brokers)	 the	 provision	 of	 alternative	 livelihood	 and	 economic	 opportunities,	 could	
help	 to	 discourage	 them	 from	 engaging	 in	 smuggling	 activities.	 This	 could	 include	
vocational	 training,	 support	 to	 local	 industries	 and	 the	 provision	 of	 small	 loans	 to	
establish	new	businesses.	That	said,	the	profits	from	alternative	local	enterprises	are	
unlikely	match	those	of	smuggling,	meaning	that	these	kinds	of	initiatives	need	to	be	
coupled	with	law	enforcement	efforts	highlighted	above.		
	
6. Raise	 awareness	 more	 effectively:	 Awareness	 campaigns	 that	 seek	 to	 deter	
migrants	 from	 moving	 by	 warning	 them	 of	 the	 dangers	 and	 risks	 of	 irregular	
migration	are	common.	However,	most	migrants	are	already	aware	of	the	risks	and	
choose	 to	move	 nonetheless,	 which	 calls	 into	 question	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 these	
campaigns.	 Furthermore,	 smugglers	 are	 reportedly	 using	 awareness	 activities	 of	
their	own	to	counter	this	discourse,	by	showing	them	photos	of	rescues	at	sea,	and	
propagating	 the	 positive	 experiences	 of	 ‘successful’	 migrants	 who	 reach	 their	
intended	 destination.	 In	 this	 light,	 there	 is	 a	 need	 to	 focus	 on	 other	 types	 of	
awareness	campaigns,	away	from	those	that	seek	to	deter	migration.	IOM	Ethiopia	is	
planning	to	conduct	a	baseline	assessment	into	the	impact	of	awareness	campaigns	
to	better	inform	future	programming	in	this	area.	Alternative	awareness	campaigns	
could	 include	 protection	 campaigns	 that	 improve	 knowledge	 of	 support	 and	
assistance	mechanisms	to	migrants	in	need.	There	is	also	a	space	for	campaigns	that	
disseminate	 information	 around	 the	 opportunities	 and	 costs	 of	 regular	 migration	
channels.	Awareness	campaigns	that	seek	to	reduce	migrant-community	tensions	by	
disseminating	 information	about	the	reasons	behind	migrants’	movements	and	the	
challenges	and	dangers	they	face	have	also	proven	effective	in	the	past.	Grassroots	
dissemination	 of	 these	messages	 via	 local	 community	 groups	 that	 are	 trusted	 and	
known	to	migrants	and	communities	may	be	more	effective	than	high-level	national	
campaigns.	 It	 is	 possible	 that	 campaigns	 that	 focus	on	 social	 networks	 and	mobile	
text	messaging	may	 be	 less	 useful,	 as	many	migrants	 do	 not	 carry	mobile	 phones	
(Altai	Consulting,	2016).	According	to	respondents,	migrants	do	not	always	purchase	
SIM	 cards	 for	 the	 country	 they	 are	 transiting,	 and	 prefer	 not	 to	 carry	 anything	 of	
value	(such	as	phones	and	other	valuables)	for	fear	of	robbery	during	the	journey.		
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7.3.	Expand	opportunities	for	regular	migration		
Where	are	the	gaps?		
State	policy	in	the	HoA	has	tended	to	focus	on	restricting	movements	through	mechanisms	
such	as	 check	points,	 border	 controls,	 deportations,	 and	arrest	 and	detention	of	 irregular	
migrants.	 The	 continued	 growth	 in	 the	 number	 of	 migrants	 moving	 along	 these	 routes	
suggests	that	restrictive	policies,	at	least	on	their	own,	are	not	effective	in	reducing	irregular	
migration.	 As	 has	 been	 explored	 in	 this	 report,	movements	 are	 influenced	 by	 a	 range	 of	
strong	push	and	pull	factors,	as	well	as	resilient	cultures	of	migration,	which	are	not	easy	to	
challenge.	 What’s	 more,	 the	 increased	 criminalisation	 of	 migration	 (and	 accompanying	
impunity	 for	the	smugglers	and	traffickers)	pushes	migrants	to	engage	 in	riskier	and	more	
dangerous	 journeys,	 and	 at	 a	 higher	 financial	 and	 personal	 cost,	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 avoid	
detection	 from	 the	 authorities	 and	 reach	 their	 intended	 destination.	 In	 this	 context,	 a	
number	of	individuals	and	organisations	have	called	for	the	expansion	of	opportunities	for	
regular	migration	 as	 a	more	 effective	 and	humane	 approach	 to	managing	migration.	 This	
applies	to	the	Horn	of	Africa	and	Middle	East,	but	also	to	Europe.	Labour	migration	has	been	
chosen	 as	 one	 of	 the	 four	 key	 policy	 areas	 of	 the	 African	 Union	 Commission	 (AUC)’s	
Ouagadougou	+	10	Declaration	and	Plan	of	Action	on	Employment,	Poverty	Eradication	and	
Inclusive	 Development.	 Likewise,	 IGAD’s	 five-year	 Migration	 Action	 Plan	 (2015-2020)	
prioritises	 labour	 migration	 management,	 mobility	 of	 pastoralist	 communities,	 building	
national	data	 systems,	and	 free	movement	of	people	 in	 the	 IGAD	region.	These	examples	
suggest	that	there	is	an	appetite	amongst	states	for	opening	up	legal	channels	for	migration	
within	the	HoA,	which	should	be	pursued	and	encouraged	through	dialogue,	incentives	and	
regional	consensus.		
What	are	the	opportunities?		
1. Create	 better	 awareness	 of	 the	 legal	 avenues	 for	 migration:	 Opportunities	 for	
regular	 migration	 exist.	 For	 example,	 the	 Government	 of	 Ethiopia	 has	 conducted	
bilateral	 labour	 agreements	 with	 Kuwait,	 Qatar	 and	 Jordan.	 Likewise,	 Uganda	 has	
reached	 bilateral	 labour	 agreements	 with	 Saudi	 Arabia,	 Jordan	 and	 Qatar,	 and	 is	
exploring	 additional	 partnerships	 with	 Bahrain,	 UAE	 and	 Turkey,	 among	 others.	
However,	migrants	may	not	be	aware	of	or	eligible	to	apply	for	these	legal	avenues,	
or	 have	 inaccurate	 or	 missing	 information	 about	 how	 to	 access	 them.	 Policy	 and	
programmes	 should	 seek	 to	 expand	 awareness	 and	 knowledge	 of	 these	 legal	
avenues,	so	that	larger	numbers	of	migrants	apply.		
	
2. Increase	 opportunities	 and	 make	 them	 more	 inclusive:	 While	 opportunities	 for	
regular	 migration	 do	 exist,	 there	 are	 not	 enough	 to	 meet	 demand	 and,	 in	 many	
cases,	they	are	not	open	to	all	migrants.	For	example,	young	men,	who	represent	the	
majority	of	migrants,	cannot	benefit	from	agreements	on	domestic	labour	migration,	
which	make	up	the	bulk	of	bilateral	agreements.	Furthermore,	application	processes	
remain	 centralised	 in	 capital	 cities,	 excluding	 would-be	 migrants	 from	 rural	 areas	
who	cannot	afford	to	come	to	the	city	to	apply,	or	who	do	not	possess	the	necessary	
literacy	skills	to	do	so.	Policy	and	programmes	should	look	to	expand	legal	avenues	
for	 labour	 by:	 promoting	 bilateral,	 regional	 and	 sub-regional	 agreements	 between	
countries;	 encouraging	 circular	 and	 temporary	 migration	 schemes;	 expanding	
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scholarship	 and	 study	 schemes;	 and	 increasing	 resettlement	 quotas	 and	
humanitarian	visas.	This	applies	not	only	to	countries	within	the	HoA	and	the	Middle	
East,	but	also	to	Europe	where,	at	the	recent	Malta	Summit,	IOM’s	Regional	Director	
for	Europe	urged	the	EU	to	open	up	currently	non-existent	legal	avenues	for	African	
migrants	(Rankin,	2017).		
	
3. Clarify	the	costs	of	regular	migration:	Opportunities	for	regular	migration	are	often	
perceived	to	be	more	expensive,	and	therefore	less	attractive	than	irregular	means.	
Many	 recruitment	agencies	and/or	public	 employment	agencies	 in	Ethiopia	 charge	
fees	of	between	US$	200-800	to	migrants	using	their	services	(RMMS,	2015).	These	
costs	are	on	par	with	those	associated	with	irregular	movements	and,	depending	on	
the	destination	and	means	of	travel,	may	even	be	cheaper	than	the	service	offered	
by	smugglers.	Cost	was	 identified	as	a	key	factor	 in	migrants’	decision-making,	and	
financial	 incentives	 can	 be	 an	 effective	 way	 of	 encouraging	 migrants	 to	 pursue	
regular	migration	channels.	To	achieve	this,	steps	should	be	taken	to	better	regulate	
these	 organisations	 to	 ensure	 that	 fees	 remain	 competitive,	 and	 only	 include	
legitimate	 costs	 (travel,	 visa	 and	 insurance	 costs	 are	 supposed	 to	 be	 paid	 by	 the	
employer	and	not	 the	migrant).	Efforts	 should	also	be	made	to	 inform	migrants	of	
the	 actual	 costs	 of	 regular	migration	 (possibly	 through	 awareness	 campaigns)	 and	
provide	 financing	options	 for	poorer	migrants.	Finally,	 recruitment	agencies	should	
be	encouraged	to	open	up	their	services	to	more	male	migrants	and	their	skills,	as	
most	typically	focus	on	domestic	work	opportunities	that	favour	women.		
	
4. Make	regular	migration	safer:	Regular	migration	channels	are	also	associated	with	
risk	 and	 danger,	 and	 efforts	 should	 be	 made	 to	 improve	 on	 this.	 Saudi	 Arabia’s	
officially	recognised	‘kafala’	or	visa	sponsorship	system	has	been	criticised	for	tying	
female	 domestic	 workers’	 legal	 residency	 to	 their	 employers,	 thereby	 granting	
employers’	 excessive	 power	 over	 workers	 and	 facilitating	 physical,	 sexual	 and	
emotional	abuse	(Human	Rights	Watch,	2015).	Reforms	have	been	made	to	improve	
the	 system,	but	domestic	workers	are	broadly	excluded	 from	 the	Labour	 Law,	and	
abuse	continues,	including	forced	labour,	trafficking,	or	slavery-like	conditions	(ibid).	
Sending	countries	also	have	a	role	to	play,	and	should	take	steps	to:	better	regulate	
recruitment	 and	 employment	 agencies;	 provide	 greater	 oversight	 and	
implementation	of	bilateral	and	other	agreements;	generate	better	awareness	and	
strengthening	of	protection	mechanisms	in	place	for	migrants	through	pre-departure	
training	 and	 dissemination;	 establish	 embassies	 and	 deploy	 additional	 labour	
attachés	 to	 improve	 protection	 services	 offered	 abroad;	 and	 support	 and	 assist	
migrants	who	have	been	deported	or	suffered	abuse	whilst	abroad.		
	
7.4.	Support	local	communities	affected	by	migration	
Where	are	the	gaps?		
Migrants	 and	 local	 communities	 suffer	 many	 of	 the	 same	 hardships.	 Both	 Obock	 and	
Bossaso	are	struggling	to	absorb	the	 influx	of	migrants	and	refugees,	and	 living	conditions	
remain	difficult	for	both	local	residents	and	migrants.	Poverty,	unemployment,	vulnerability	
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and	drought	are	a	 feature	of	both	contexts,	and	 the	 influx	of	 large	numbers	of	additional	
people	 is	 putting	 further	 pressure	 on	 already	 overstretched	 social	 services,	 natural	
resources	 and	 livelihoods.	 This	 underlines	 the	 importance	 for	 policy	 makers	 and	
programmers	to	 implement	 initiatives	that	take	 into	account	both	migrants	and	residents.	
Failure	to	do	so	can	create	tensions	and	discrimination,	and	has	the	potential	to	undermine	
already	strained	relations	between	these	two	groups.		
What	are	the	opportunities?		
1. Expand	 livelihood	 and	 employment	 opportunities:	 Community	 respondents	
complained	of	a	 lack	of	 livelihood	and	employment	opportunities,	compounded	by	
competition	 from	 job-seeking	migrants	willing	 to	work	 at	 lower	wages.	 Policy	 and	
programmes	 should	 seek	 to	 generate	 new	 and	 sustainable	 opportunities	 for	 local	
communities.	Where	possible,	these	should	take	advantage	of	the	influx	of	migrants,	
by	building	on	the	new	skills	and	investments	they	can	bring,	and	seeking	to	tap	into	
this	 potential	market.	Another	option	would	be	 to	 establish	 employment	 schemes	
that	 include	 both	 hosts	 and	 migrants;	 however,	 this	 would	 only	 likely	 extend	 to	
migrants	 that	 have	 been	 registered	 or	 recognised	 by	 the	 state,	 such	 as	 particular	
groups	of	refugees.		
	
2. Make	 improvements	 to	water,	 sanitation	and	hygiene	 (WASH):	Poor	hygiene	and	
sanitation,	and	a	lack	of	clean	water	supplies	in	the	neighbourhoods	frequented	by	
migrants,	were	 a	 key	 concern	 amongst	 host	 communities.	Policy	 and	 programmes	
should	 seek	 to	 expand	 and	 improve	 WASH	 facilities	 in	 these	 areas,	 and	 provide	
training	 and	 behavioural	 change	 awareness	 in	 areas	 where	 open	 defecation	 is	
common.	
	
3. Organise	 awareness	 and	 solidarity	 campaigns	 for	 communities	 and	 migrants:	
Community-level	perceptions	 that	migrants	pose	a	 threat	 to	 traditional	 values	and	
culture	could	be	alleviated	through	initiatives	that	seek	to	bridge	cultural	divides	and	
promote	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 the	 experiences	 of	 both	 migrants	 and	
communities.	 These	 could	 increase	 awareness	 of	 local	 cultures	 and	 traditions,	 as	
well	as	the	drivers	and	realities	of	irregular	migration.	In	a	context	of	limited	official	
assistance	from	governments,	UN	agencies	and	NGOs,	community-level	support	fills	
a	 vital	 gap,	 and	 efforts	 to	 improve	 understanding	 and	 solidarity	 between	
communities	and	migrants	would	give	further	strength	to	such	initiatives.		
	
4. Support	resilience	programmes:	Communities	in	Puntland,	Djibouti	and	Yemen	have	
been	severely	affected	by	drought,	which	has	reduced	water	sources,	depleted	crop	
harvests	 and	 livestock	 stocks,	 undermined	 local	 resilience	 and	 livelihoods,	 and	
displaced	 communities.	 Policy	 makers	 and	 programmers	 should	 respond	 to	 these	
immediate	needs,	and	build	resilience	in	the	long	term.			
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7.5.	Improve	data	collection	and	monitoring	
Where	are	the	gaps?		
Obtaining	accurate	data	on	migration	between	the	HoA	and	Yemen	is	a	challenge.	The	most	
reliable	 data	 is	 that	 collected	 by	 UNHCR	 and	 partners	 through	 monitoring	 patrol	 teams	
positioned	 along	 the	 coastal	 roads	 of	 the	 Red	 Sea,	 Gulf	 of	 Aden	 and	 Arabian	 Sea,	 and	
compiled	by	RMMS	into	monthly	summary	reports	and	maps.	However,	there	are	significant	
gaps	in	this	data,	and	it	is	likely	that	the	actual	numbers	of	migrants	are	much	higher.	Data	
on	migration	is	also	collected	by	other	sources	(both	governmental	and	non-governmental);	
however,	 much	 of	 this	 has	 been	 undermined	 by	 inaccuracies,	 bias	 and	 inconsistencies.	
Furthermore,	 data	 is	 not	 always	 widely	 shared	 or	 coordinated	 and,	 due	 to	 different	
methodologies	 and	 systems,	 cannot	 easily	 be	 used	 to	 make	 national	 or	 regional	
comparisons	with	other	data	 sources.	Many	of	 these	 shortfalls	 are	attributed	 to	a	 lack	of	
dedicated	 training,	 capacity,	 funding	 and	 equipment,	 and	 a	 reluctance	 on	 the	 part	 of	
government	 institutions	 to	 share	 sensitive	 or	 restricted	 information.	 Furthermore,	 as	 a	
number	 of	 different	 entities	 are	 simultaneously	 collecting	 data,	 a	 formal	 and	 structured	
system	of	coordination	has	often	been	lacking.		
What	are	the	opportunities?		
• Build	on	data	collected	by	UNHCR	and	partners:	As	highlighted	above,	access	 is	a	
key	obstacle	to	data	collection,	and	insecurity	and	conflict	in	Yemen	have	limited	the	
activities	 of	 the	 monitoring	 patrols	 located	 there.	 Establishing	 additional	 patrols	
within	Puntland	and	Djibouti	could	contribute	useful	and	additional	data	and	insight,	
not	least	because	these	locations	allow	for	better	access	and	security.	According	to	
RMMS,	current	funding	shortfalls	could	undermine	existing	data	collection	activities	
in	 Yemen,	 and	 policy	 and	 programmes	 could	 look	 to	 provide	 financial	 support	 to	
maintain	these.	
		
• Improve	data	 collection	by	governmental	departments:	State	agencies	 in	Djibouti	
and	 Puntland	 are	 in	 a	 strong	 position	 to	 contribute	 to	 filling	 of	 gaps	 in	 data	
collection.	 However,	 in	 general,	 they	 lack	 coordination,	 capacity,	 resources	 and	
equipment,	and	could	be	provided	with	the	necessary	financial	and	logistical	support	
to	streamline	and	improve	their	data	collection	efforts.		
		
• Support	MRCs	and	mobile	units	to	collect	more	data:	MRCs	in	Obock,	Bossaso	and	
Yemen	 are	 strategically	 placed	 to	 contribute	 to	 data	 collection	 and,	 in	 many	
instances,	 are	 already	 accumulating	 information	 on	 migrants	 and	 their	 routes.	
However,	the	main	weakness	to	the	MRCs	is	their	reach;	in	Obock,	only	3-5%	of	all	
migrants	 stop	 at	 the	 MRC.	 This	 could	 be	 improved	 by	 taking	 steps	 to	 encourage	
more	migrants	to	utilise	their	services	(outlined	above)	and	extending	data	collection	
activities	to	mobile	units	positioned	along	the	main	migratory	routes.	
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8.	Conclusions	
	
Migration	between	the	Horn	of	Africa	and	Yemen	has	been	taking	place	for	many	years	for	
the	 purposes	 of	 trade,	 livelihoods,	 family	 reunification,	 religious	 pilgrimage,	 educational	
opportunities	and	in	times	of	emergency.	It	involves	a	range	of	migrants,	including	so-called	
economic	 migrants,	 refugees,	 asylum	 seekers,	 victims	 of	 trafficking	 and	 unaccompanied	
migrant	 children,	 from	 Ethiopia,	 Somalia	 and	 Yemen	 and,	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent,	 from	 other	
countries	 in	 the	 region.	 In	 this	 sense,	 this	 migration	 can	 be	 described	 as	mixed,	 both	 in	
terms	of	who	is	migrating,	but	also	in	terms	of	their	motivations	and	drivers.	Furthermore,	a	
significant,	 if	 unknown	 proportion	 of	 people	moving	 to	 and	 from	 Yemen	 have	 protection	
needs	that	would	classify	them	as	refugees,	even	if	they	are	not	official	recognised	as	so.	
Data	collected	over	the	last	ten	years	shows	an	upward	trajectory	in	arrivals	from	the	HoA	
to	Yemen,	with	 record	numbers	arriving	 in	2016.	However,	 there	 is	a	perception	amongst	
local	 respondents	 in	 Puntland,	 Djibouti	 and	 Yemen	 that	 there	 has	 been	 a	 reduction	 in	
Ethiopians	migrating	to	Yemen	in	the	last	year;	a	claim	which	is	substantiated	by	available	
data.	 A	 number	 of	 factors	 may	 be	 behind	 this	 recent	 reduction	 in	 migrant	 numbers,	
including:	restrictions	on	movements	of	Ethiopians	under	the	ongoing	state	of	emergency;	
drought	 and	 its	 erosion	 of	 resilience,	 livelihoods	 and	 opportunities	 for	 migration;	 an	
increase	in	the	costs	of	the	journey	as	smugglers	extend	their	geographic	reach,	and	borders	
become	harder	to	cross;	worsening	conditions	of	conflict,	insecurity,	hardship	and	abuse	in	
Yemen	(although,	contrastingly,	this	can	also	serve	as	a	pull	factor	to	migrants	who	believe	
this	will	enable	 them	to	transit	Yemen	undetected);	and	tighter	border	controls	by	 transit	
and	destination	countries.		
Young	 men	 from	 primarily	 Ethiopia,	 but	 also	 Somalia,	 represent	 the	 majority	 of	 those	
making	the	crossing	to	Yemen.	However,	a	sizeable	and	growing	number	of	female	migrants	
are	also	on	the	move,	estimated	to	be	between	20-30%,	and	attracted	by	the	considerable	
demand	for	domestic	workers	 in	the	Gulf	states.	Data	on	child	migrants	 is	 limited,	though	
key	 informants	 describe	 growing	 numbers	 of	 children	 travelling	 along	 these	 routes,	 and	
indicate	that	unaccompanied	migrant	children	could	make	up	as	much	as	20-30%	of	migrant	
flows	towards	Yemen.	While	some	migrants	stay	in	Yemen,	the	majority	are	hoping	to	make	
it	 to	Saudi	Arabia.	Large	numbers	of	mainly	Yemeni	and	Somali	migrants	also	move	 in	the	
opposite	direction	from	Yemen	to	the	HoA,	for	the	most	part	towards	Djibouti	and	Somalia.	
Among	this	group,	the	male-female	and	adult-child	balance	is	more	evenly	split,	and	arrivals	
from	Yemen	were	52%	male	and	48%	female,	with	46%	are	under	18	years	(UNHCR,	2016).		
A	growing	minority	of	mainly	Somali	migrants	are	also	choosing	to	migrate	along	a	relatively	
new	 route	 to	 Europe	 via	 Yemen,	 across	multiple	 sea	 crossings	 through	 Puntland,	 Yemen,	
Sudan,	 Libya	 or	 Egypt.	 It	 is	 not	 yet	 clear	 why	 people	 are	migrating	 to	 Europe	 along	 this	
route,	 rather	than	the	cheaper	and	more	popular	alternative	through	Ethiopia	and	Sudan.	
The	smuggling	networks,	support	structures,	and	information	and	knowledge	that	facilitate	
movements	along	this	route	have	strengthened,	making	 it	easier	to	move	along	this	route	
than	 before.	 Tempting	 ‘leave	 now-pay	 later’	 schemes	 are	 also	 being	 offered	 to	would-be	
migrants	 by	 smugglers	 operating	 in	 Puntland	 to	 encourage	 them	 to	 migrate	 to	 Europe	
through	Yemen.	Furthermore,	 the	 strengthening	of	border	 controls	 in	Sudan	and	Ethiopia	
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(particularly	 in	 the	wake	of	 the	State	of	Emergency	 in	Ethiopia)	has	made	 it	more	difficult	
and	dangerous	for	migrants	to	transit	through	these	countries.		
As	in	many	contexts,	the	reasons	or	drivers	for	migration	between	the	HoA	and	Yemen	are	
multiple,	overlapping	and	 change	over	 time.	 Economic	 factors	 (in	particular	 a	 shortage	of	
employment	 or	 livelihood	 opportunities,	 low	 salaries	 and	 land	 scarcity)	 were	 a	 principle	
reason	for	moving	for	many	Ethiopian	and	Somali	migrants.	45%	of	Ethiopian	respondents,	
particularly	 Oromos,	 identified	 fear	 of	 persecution	 by	 the	 Government	 of	 Ethiopia	 as	
another	 key	 factor.	All	 Yemeni	 refugees	 and	 Somali	 returnees	 identified	war,	 conflict	 and	
insecurity	 as	 the	 principle	 driver	 for	 their	 moving	 from	 Yemen	 to	 Somalia	 and	 Djibouti.	
However,	the	relationship	between	insecurity	and	migration	is	complicated	by	insecurity	in	
multiple	places	of	origin,	transit	and	destination,	meaning	that	migrants	cannot	necessarily	
exchange	a	place	of	 insecurity	for	one	of	security	through	movement	alone.	What’s	more,	
while	insecurity	may	be	a	push	factor	for	migrants	looking	to	flee	insecure	contexts,	 it	can	
also	be	a	pull	 factor	 for	 irregular	migrants	 looking	to	take	advantage	of	 the	breakdown	of	
law	 and	 order	 in	 places	 like	 Yemen	 to	 pass	 through	 the	 country	 undetected	 by	 the	
authorities.	 Family	 pressures	 and	 long-standing	 cultures	 of	 migration	 also	 drive	 many	 to	
migrate,	often	along	the	same	routes	and	using	the	same	brokers	and	agents	as	friends	and	
relatives	 before	 them.	However,	 there	 is	 growing	 evidence	 that	migrants	 are	 choosing	 to	
migrate	 independently	and	without	 the	approval	of	 family	members.	The	 ‘leave	now,	pay	
later’	 scheme	 increasingly	adopted	by	smugglers	 to	entice	would-be	migrants	negates	 the	
need	 to	 involve	 family	members	 in	 the	 decision	 to	migrate,	 whilst	 also	 implicating	 them	
later	on	in	the	associated	costs.	
Yemen,	 Ethiopia	 and	 Somalia	 have	 all	 experienced	a	deterioration	of	 conditions	 in	 recent	
years	 for	 reasons	 of	 conflict,	 political	 unrest,	 and	 drought	 and	 food	 shortages.	 Such	
conditions	 have	 often	 given	 rise	 to	 greater	 levels	 of	 migration,	 and	 many	 analysts	 and	
observers	 have	 attributed	 the	 year-on-year	 growth	 in	 migration	 between	 the	 HoA	 and	
Yemen	 to	 these	 factors.	 While	 the	 deterioration	 of	 conditions	 in	 the	 region	 has	 had	 a	
significant	impact	on	the	movement	choices	and	patterns	of	different	groups	of	people,	it	is	
less	clear	whether	these	have	been	a	key	driver	of	migration	through	Yemen.	For	instance,	
unrest	 in	 Ethiopia	 and	 drought	 and	 food	 shortages	 in	 the	 region	 do	 not	 seem	 to	 have	
resulted	 in	 a	 spike	 in	 out-migration	 towards	 Yemen	 and	 beyond.	 Likewise,	 conflict	 and	
insecurity	 in	Yemen	have	not	 led	to	a	 fall	 in	migrants	moving	to	and	through	the	country.	
This	 suggests	 that	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 deterioration	 of	 conditions	 in	 the	 region	
and	migration	remains	complex,	and	underpinned	by	a	range	of	other	factors.	Communities	
affected	by	deteriorating	conditions	often	lack	the	resources	and	ability	to	engage	in	long-
distance	 migration,	 or	 any	 movement	 at	 all,	 as	 their	 resources	 and	 resilience	 become	
increasingly	depleted.	Those	who	are	able	to	move	may	be	more	likely	to	migrate	internally	
to	 nearby	 urban	 areas	 within	 their	 own	 country,	 or	 to	 neighbouring	 countries	 than	 to	
attempt	sea	crossings	to	and	from	Yemen,	and	beyond.		
Smuggling	 has	 certainly	 contributed	 to	migration	 patterns	 between	 the	 HoA	 and	 Yemen,	
and	 there	 has	 been	 an	 expansion	 of	 smuggling	 activities	 particularly	 over	 land	 routes,	
brought	 about	 by	 a	 combination	 of	 growing	migrant	 numbers,	 substantial	 profits,	 and	 an	
operating	environment	of	relative	impunity.	Collusion	between	smugglers	and	state	officials	
(including	 the	 police,	 military,	 intelligence	 services,	 border,	 coast	 guards	 and	 customs	
authorities)	 is	 common,	 and	 extends	 from	 turning	 a	 blind	 eye	 in	 exchange	 for	 bribes,	 to	
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active	 involvement	 in	 facilitating	 smuggling	 and	 trafficking,	 and	 even	 participation	 in	
trafficking,	abuse	and	torture	of	victims.	Organised	crime	groups	are	carrying	out	smuggling	
with	aggravated	circumstances,	and	respondents	describe	a	deliberate	shift	from	facilitating	
movement	 to	 the	 buying	 and	 selling	 of	 human	 beings.	 In	 this	 context,	 migrants	 are	
increasingly	coerced	or	forced	into	using	smugglers’	services.	That	said,	not	all	smugglers	are	
exploitative	 or	 abusive,	 and	 migrants	 differentiate	 between	 ‘good’	 and	 ‘bad’	 smugglers.	
Furthermore,	 in	 a	 context	 of	 limited	 regular	 channels	 of	 migration	 and	 strengthened	
borders,	smugglers	can	offer	a	much-needed	service	to	migrants	who	have	few	other	legal	
means	 to	 move.	 Viewed	 from	 this	 perspective,	 heavy-handed	 law	 enforcement	 and	
crackdowns	are	 likely	 to	drive	migrants	and	smugglers	 to	engage	 in	even	more	dangerous	
movements	in	increasingly	remote	areas,	making	migrants	more	vulnerable	to	abuse.	
Migration	 between	 the	 HoA	 and	 Yemen	 is	 dangerous,	 and	 migrants	 face	 a	 range	 of	
protection	 risks	 and	 abuses	 (including	 physical	 and	 sexual	 abuse,	 robbery,	 interception,	
detention,	 exploitation	 and	 death),	 as	 well	 as	 hardships	 associated	 with	 the	 general	
conditions	 of	 the	 journey	 (a	 lack	 of	 access	 to	 food	 and	water,	 basic	 services,	 shelter	 and	
livelihoods,	and	challenges	of	security	and	climate).	Under	these	conditions,	migrants	live	in	
deplorable	 conditions	 and	 experience	 extreme	 suffering,	 with	 very	 little	 assistance	 from	
official	 channels.	 In	 spite	 of	 this,	most	 do	 not	 regret	 their	 decision	 to	migrate,	 and	were	
generally	aware	of	 these	 risks	before	or	during	 their	 journey.	While	danger	and	 risk	were	
certainly	taken	into	account,	migrants’	resilience	and	determination	to	reach	their	intended	
destination	 ‘at	 any	 cost’	 means	 that,	 while	 they	 might	 make	 some	 adjustment	 to	 their	
journey,	these	factors	are	generally	not	enough	to	deter	them	from	continuing	along	their	
chosen	route.	Fear	of	return	can	increase	migrants’	tolerance	of	abuse	and	hardship	along	
their	journey,	as	can	the	risk	of	economic	destitution	that	they	and	their	families	could	face	
if	 they	 are	 not	 successful	 in	 reaching	 their	 intended	 destination,	 as	 many	 will	 have	 sold	
assets	and	taken	out	loans	in	order	to	pay	for	the	journey.	Religion	and	the	feeling	that	their	
fate	is	‘out	of	their	hands’,	or	predetermined	by	God	can	also	explain	why	migrants	continue	
with	their	journey	in	spite	of	the	risks.			
Local	 communities	 and	wider	 society	 are	 also	 impacted	by	migration,	 in	 particular	 transit	
communities	 such	 as	 Obock	 and	 Bossaso,	 which	 are	 characterised	 by	 limited	 absorption	
capacity	and	underlying	poverty	and	under-development.	Migrants	and	these	communities	
suffer	many	of	the	same	hardships.	Poverty,	unemployment,	vulnerability	and	drought	are	a	
feature	 of	 both	 contexts,	 and	 the	 influx	 of	 large	 numbers	 of	 additional	 people	 is	 putting	
further	pressure	on	already	overstretched	social	services,	natural	resources	and	livelihoods.	
It	 is	 not	 therefore	 surprising	 that	 some	members	 of	 the	 community	 express	 resentment	
towards	migrants,	 and	 raise	 concerns	 about	 issues	 such	as	poor	 sanitation,	 the	 spread	of	
disease,	 competition	 over	 jobs,	 cultural	 differences,	 and	 inter-ethnic	 clashes	 between	
migrants.	 Perhaps	 surprisingly,	 given	 the	 securitisation	 of	 migration	 in	 popular	 discourse	
and	 rhetoric,	 community	 respondents	 did	 not	 associate	 migrants	 with	 insecurity,	 but	
instead	 viewed	 them	 as	 ‘harmless’	 and	 relatively	 peaceful.	 In	 general,	 community	
respondents	 voice	mixed	 feelings	 towards	migrants,	 recognising	 that	migration	 can	 bring	
about	both	positive	and	negative	 impacts,	particularly	with	 regards	 to	 the	 local	economy.	
This	 somewhat	nuanced	 response	can	be	attributed	 to	 the	 fact	 that	most	migrants	are	 in	
transit	 and	 levels	 of	 interaction	 with	 communities	 is	 limited	 by	 language	 barriers,	 camp	
residency,	or	 the	actions	of	smugglers	 that	seek	to	curtail	 their	movements.	Furthermore,	
migration	 affects	 different	 members	 of	 the	 community	 in	 different	 ways	 (depending	 on	
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levels	of	 interaction,	 socioeconomic	status	and	personal	experience)	and	perceptions	may	
shift	 and	 change	 over	 time.	 Overall,	 however,	 the	 research	 documented	 many	 acts	 of	
generosity	 and	 kindness	 towards	 migrants,	 suggesting	 the	 potential	 for	 a	 relatively	
harmonious	 relationship	 between	 migrants	 and	 local	 communities,	 and	 policy	 and	
programmes	should	seek	to	build	on	this.		
A	range	of	governmental	and	non-governmental	organisations	are	involved	in	responses	to	
migration.	Grassroots	support	provided	by	community	structures	and	groups	composed	of	
local	 residents,	 migrants	 and	 civil	 society	 organisations	 also	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	
meeting	 immediate	needs.	Positive	steps	and	progress	have	been	made,	and	the	focus	on	
and	interest	in	migration	has	increased	in	recent	years.	Nevertheless,	efforts	have	continued	
to	be	undermined	by	a	lack	of	coordination,	limited	funding	and	capacity,	inconsistencies	in	
policy	and	practice,	and	difficulties	of	accessing	remote	and	sometimes	dangerous	migration	
locations.	 These	 challenges	 have	 been	 compounded	 by	 the	 sheer	 scope	 and	 scale	 of	
migration,	the	growing	professionalism	of	smuggling	activities,	and	the	significant	needs	of	
migrants	and	host	communities	along	these	routes.		
In	 this	 context,	 a	 number	 of	 gaps	 and	 opportunities	 for	 programme	 and	 policy	 emerged	
from	 stakeholder	 consultations.	 Firstly,	 policy	 makers	 and	 programmers	 should	 provide	
greater	 protection	 and	 assistance	 to	 all	 migrants,	 regardless	 of	 their	 status,	 through:	
strengthening	MRCs;	 supporting	mobile	 response	units;	 engaging	 local	 community	 groups	
and	 structures;	 providing	 specialised	 support	 for	 vulnerable	migrants;	 and	 expanding	 the	
net	 of	 support	 to	 migrants	 through	 ‘non-traditional’	 sectors.	 Secondly,	 a	 more	 holistic	
approach	 to	 smuggling	 and	 trafficking	 should	 be	 adopted,	 which	 includes:	 gathering	 and	
making	available	more	detailed	and	extensive	information	and	evidence;	facilitating	greater	
coordination	between	stakeholders	at	national	and	international	levels;	supporting	effective	
implementation	of	 anti-smuggling	 and	 trafficking	 legislation;	 strengthening	 the	police	 and	
judiciary;	providing	viable	economic	alternatives	for	those	involved	in	smuggling;	and	raising	
awareness	 more	 effectively.	 Thirdly,	 opportunities	 for	 regular	 migration	 should	 be	
expanded	 by:	 creating	 better	 awareness	 of	 the	 legal	 avenues	 for	 migration;	 increasing	
opportunities	and	making	them	more	inclusive;	clarifying	the	costs	of	regular	migration;	and	
making	 regular	 channels	 safer.	 Fourthly,	 policy	makers	 and	 programmers	 should	 support	
local	 communities	 affected	 by	 migration	 through:	 greater	 livelihood	 and	 employment	
opportunities;	 improvements	 to	 water,	 sanitation	 and	 hygiene;	 awareness	 and	 solidarity	
campaigns	for	communities	and	migrants;	and	resilience	programmes.	Finally,	efforts	should	
be	made	 to	 improve	data	 collection	and	monitoring	by:	building	on	 the	data	 collected	by	
UNHCR	 and	 partners;	 improving	 data	 collection	 by	 governmental	 departments;	 and	
supporting	MRCs	and	mobile	units	to	collect	more	data.		
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Annex	1:	Overview	of	the	different	respondents	and	groups	engaged	as	part	of	this	research	through	interviews	or	focus	group	
discussions.		
	
	 Government	Institutions	 Non-governmental	Institutions	 Community	Representatives	
Puntland	
• Army	
• Bossaso	City	Council	
• Bossaso	Municipality	
• Bossaso	Port	Immigration		
• Department	of	Immigration	
• Department	 of	 Refugees,	 Returnees	 and	
Mixed	Migrants	
• Ministry	of	Finance	
• Ministry	of	Interior	
• Ministry	of	Justice	
• Ministry	of	Security	
• Ministry	of	Women	and	Family	Affairs	
• Office	 of	 the	 Special	 Envoy	 for	 Children’s	
and	Migrants	Rights		
• Puntland	Intelligence	Agency	
• Puntland	Maritime	Police	Forces	(PMPF)	
• Puntland	Police	Force	
• Danish	Refugee	Council	(DRC)	
• GRT	Somalia	
• IOM	Somalia	
• Migrant	Response	Centre	(MRC)	
• Save	the	Children	
• Somafal	Development	Organisation	
• Tadamun	Social	Society	(TASS)	
• UNHCR	Somalia	
• Boat	crew		
• Boat	owners	
• Business	people	
• Community	activists	
• Community	elders	
• Dhabshiil	representative	
• Doctors		
• Hotel	owners	
• Neighbourhood	council	
• Oromo	Community	Committee	
• Restaurant	owners	
• Somtel	Telecommunications	
• Smugglers	
• Teachers	
• Traders	and	shop	owners	
• University	students	
• Women	activists	
	
Djibouti	
• Agence	 Djiboutienne	 de	 Développement	
Social	(ADDS)	
• Coast	Guards	
• Conseil	Régional	d'	Obock	
• Gendarmerie	
• IGAD	
• Ministry	of	Interior	
• National	Committee	against	Smuggling	and	
Trafficking	
• Office	Française	de	Protection	de	Réfugiés	
et	Apatrides	
• ONARS	
• Action	Plus	Obock	
• Association	 pour	 la	 Promotion	 et	 la	
Protection	des	Droits	des	Enfants	Mineurs	
(APPDEM)	 		
• Caritas	
• DRC	
• Expertise	France	
• FAO	Djibouti	
• International	Committee	of	the	Red	Cross	
(ICRC)	
• IOM	Djibouti	
• SOS	Sahel	
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	 Government	Institutions	 Non-governmental	Institutions	 Community	Representatives	
• Prefet	of	Obock	
• Union	 Nationale	 des	 femmes	
Djiboutiennes	(UNFD)	
• US	Embassy	
	
	
• UNFPA	Djibouti	
• UNICEF	Djibouti	
• University	of	Djibouti	
• WFP	
• WHO	Djibouti	
Yemen	
• Authority	of	Migration	and	Passports	
• Department	of	Tourist	Police	
• Ministry	of	Human	Rights	
• Ministry	of	Interior	
• National	 Organization	 for	 Combating	
Human	Trafficking	
• Police	Force	
• ADRA	
• Al-Takaful	Social	Association	
• IOM	Yemen	
• Society	for	Humanitarian	Solidarity	(SHS)	
• Somalian	Refugee	Commission	
• Sustainable	Development	Foundation	
• UNHCR	Yemen	
• Doctors	
• Eritrean	Migrants’	Community	
• Human	rights	worker	
• Medical	worker	
• Ogaden	Community	Group	
• Oromo	Community	Group	
• Shopkeepers	
• Somalia	Youth	Committee		
Ethiopia,	 Kenya	 and	
elsewhere	
• Administration	 for	 Refugee	 and	 Returnee	
Affairs	(ARRA)	
• IGAD	 Regional	 Secretariat	 on	 Forced	
Displacement	and	Mixed	Migration	
• Altai	Consulting	
• Human	Rights	Watch		
• IOM	Ethiopia	
• NGO	Pastoralist	Forum	Ethiopia		
• Regional	 Mixed	 Migration	 Secretariat	
(RMMS)	
• UNHCR	Ethiopia	
• Researcher	 at	 the	 University	 of	
Amsterdam	
• UNODC	Eastern	Africa	
• UNODC	HQ	
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Annex	3:	Overview	of	UN	agencies,	international	and	national/local	NGOs	working	with	migrants	in	the	study	areas.		
Table	6:	Detail	on	some	of	the	main	organisations	working	with	migrants	across	the	region.		
Organisation	 Main	activities	
Danish	 Refugee	 Council	
(DRC)		
DRC	 and	 partners	 implemented	 a	 27-month	 (December	 2013-March	 2016)	 project	 funded	 by	 the	 EU	 called	 ‘Strengthening	
Protection	 for	Refugees,	Asylum	Seekers	and	Migrants	 in	 the	Horn	of	Africa’	 in	Djibouti,	 Somalia	and	Yemen.	The	aim	of	 this	
project	was	 to	aid	and	assist	 refugees,	asylum	seekers,	and	migrants	 in	 the	HoA	and	Yemen	by:	preventing	and	documenting	
rights	violations	against	migrants;	raising	awareness	about	the	risks	of	irregular	migration;	reducing	onward	or	repeat	migration.		
European	Union	(EU)	 In	addition	to	other	projects	referenced	in	this	table,	the	EU	is	supporting	a	number	of	projects	in	the	region	though	the	Trust	
Fund	facility.	These	include:		
• RE-INTEG:	which	 aims	 to	 support	 a	 sustainable	 and	durable	 reintegration	of	 refugees,	 returnees	 from	Yemen,	 Kenya,	
Europe	and	other	areas	of	departure	and	IDPs	in	Somalia,	and	to	anchor	populations	within	Somalia.	
• ‘Facility	 on	 Sustainable	 and	 Dignified	 Return	 and	 Reintegration	 in	 support	 of	 the	 Khartoum	 Process’,	 which	 aims	 to	
facilitate	orderly,	safe,	regular	and	responsible	migration	management	through	the	development	and	implementation	of	
sustainable	return	and	reintegration	policies	and	processes.	
• ‘Towards	Free	Movement	of	Persons	and	Transhumance	in	the	IGAD	region’,	which	aims	to	facilitate	the	free	movement	
of	persons	in	the	IGAD	region	in	order	to	enhance	regional	economic	integration	and	development.		
• ‘Collaboration	 in	 Cross-Border	 Areas’,	 which	 aims	 to	 address	 the	 drivers	 of	 instability,	 irregular	 migration	 and	
displacement,	initially	in	cross-border	areas	of	Ethiopia,	Kenya,	Somalia	and	Sudan.	
Expertise	 France,	 IOM,	
DRC	and	RMMS	
Expertise	France	and	partners	are	implementing	an	EU-funded	programme	called	‘Addressing	mixed	migration	flows	in	Eastern	
Africa’,	which	aims	to	support	countries	in	Eastern	Africa/Horn	of	Africa	in	addressing	mixed	migration	flows	and	to	strengthen	
the	link	between	refugees/forced	displacement	and	development.	Specifically,	the	programme	will:		
• Assist	 national	 authorities	 in	 the	 setting-up	 or	 the	 strengthening	 of	 safe	 and	 rights-respectful	 reception	 offices	 for	
migrants.	
• Support	 and	 facilitate	 the	 fight	 against	 criminal	 networks	 by	 capacity	 building	 and	 assistance	 to	 partner	 countries	 in	
developing	evidence-based	policies	and	conducting	criminal	investigations.	
• Support	local	authorities	and	NGOs	in	the	provision	of	livelihoods	and	self-reliance	opportunities	for	displaced	persons	
and	host	communities.	
GIZ,	UNODC	and	IOM	 GIZ	and	partners	are	implementing	a	€40	million	EU	funded	project	called	Better	Migration	Management.	This	project	aims	to	
improve	migration	management	 in	 the	region,	and	 in	particular	 to	curb	 the	 trafficking	of	human	beings	and	the	smuggling	of	
migrants	within	and	from	the	Horn.	It	will	provide:		
• Capacity	building	in	the	form	of	training	and	technical	assistance	and	the	provision	of	appropriate	equipment.		
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• Support	for	policy	development	and	implementation	for	better	migration	and	border	management.	
• Support	to	the	identification,	assistance	and	protection	of	people	in	need.	
• Awareness-raising	about	the	dangers	of	irregular	migration	and	the	benefits	of	alternative	options.	
Human	 Rights	 Initiative	
and	 Global	 Food	
Security	 Project	 (Centre	
for	 Strategic	 and	
International	 Studies	
(CSIS))		
CSIS	is	carrying	out	research	into	the	linkages	among	human	rights,	food	security,	migration,	and	displacement	with	a	focus	on	
the	HoA	 and	 Yemen.	 In	 particular,	 it	 is	 looking	 to	 investigate	 the	 degree	 to	which	 food	 security	 is	 a	 factor	 in	migration	 and	
displacement	and	how	migrants	and	refugees	cope	with	food	insecurity,	physical	insecurity,	and	other	challenges	while	on	the	
move.	
HRW	 HRW	 is	 engaged	 in	 research	 and	 advocacy	 work	 on	 a	 number	 of	 related	 topics,	 including:	 the	 closure	 of	 Dadaab;	 internal	
displacement	 in	 Somalia	 in	 the	 context	 of	 drought	 and	 famine,	 and	 the	 closure	 of	 routes	 to	 Kenya;	 the	 plight	 of	 Ethiopian	
migrants	in	Kenya;	and	conditions	for	migrants	in	Libya,	and	along	the	routes	to	Europe.		
ILO	 ILO	is	implementing	the	project:	“Development	of	a	Tripartite	Framework	for	the	Support	and	Protection	of	Ethiopian	Women	
Domestic	Migrant	Workers	 to	 the	GCC	 States,	 Lebanon	and	 Sudan.”	 The	project	 also	 aims	 at	making	 regular	migration	more	
accessible	in	order	to	curb	irregular	migration	and	ensure	safety	and	rights	for	the	migrants.	It	provides	support	to	the	Ethiopian	
government	on	migration	governance	and	the	development	of	bilateral	agreements.	Due	to	the	number	of	Ethiopians	being	sent	
back	 to	 Ethiopia	 from	 the	 Kingdom	of	 Saudi	 Arabia	 over	 the	 past	months,	 the	 project	 focus	 has	 partly	 shifted	 to	 support	 to	
reintegration	measures.	
IOM	 IOM	works	with	migrants	in	Djibouti,	Puntland	and	Yemen	through	the	following	activities:	
• Assisted	voluntary	return	and	reintegration	
• Behaviour	change	communication	interventions	
• Livelihoods	support	for	potential	migrants	through	training,	business	loans	and	job	placements.		
• Capacity	building	and	training	for	government	authorities	in	migration	management	and	border	management		
• Provision	of	basic	protection	needs	(food,	health	and	non-food	items)	
Regional	 Durable	
Solutions	 Secretariat	
(ReDSS)	
ReDSS	was	created	in	March	2014	with	the	goal	of	improving	programming	and	policy	through	advocacy	in	support	of	durable	
solutions	for	displacement	affected	communities	in	East	and	Horn	of	Africa.	Its	four	central	pillars	are:	research	and	information	
management;	capacity	development;	advocacy	and	policy;	and	coordination.			
Regional	 Mixed	
Migration	 Secretariat	
(RMMS)	
RMMS	 is	 a	 regional	 hub	 aiming	 to	 provide:	 information	 and	 data	management;	 synthesis,	 analysis	 and	 research;	 support	 to	
policy	development	and	dialogue;	 and	 support	 and	 coordination.	 It	 collects	data,	 conducts	 research	and	provides	analysis	on	
mixed	migration	flows	from	East	Africa	and	Yemen.		
UNHCR		
	
UNHCR	works	with	refugees	in	Djibouti,	Puntland	and	Yemen.	It	offers	access	to	basic	supplies	and	services,	including	health	and	
education,	carries	out	refugee	status	determination,	and	manages	refugee	camps.	It	engages	with	governments	and	donors	to	
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64	http://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/press/2017/2/5899ccae13/unhcr-campaign-spreads-awareness-dangers-yemen-sea-crossings.html	
expand	resettlement	and	family	reunification	quotas.	UNHCR	works	to	raise	awareness	on	migration	risks,	and	on	February	2017	
launched	a	regional	video	and	music	campaign	involving	musicians	from	the	region.64	In	2007,	the	organisation	issued	a	10	point	
plan	 of	 action	 on	 refugee	 protection	 and	mixed	migration,	 and	 in	 2013	 developed	 a	 regional	 strategy	 and	 plan	 of	 action	 on	
smuggling	and	trafficking	in	the	East	and	HoA.		
UNODC	 UNODC	is	mandated	to	assist	Member	States	 in	combatting	 illicit	drugs,	crime	and	terrorism.	 In	this	respect,	 it	 is	 the	 lead	UN	
agency	tackling	human	smuggling	and	trafficking,	and	the	criminal	networks	involved	in	these	activities.		
World	Bank	 The	World	Bank	has	made	available	$175	million	 in	 financing	 to	help	mitigate	 the	 impact	of	 forced	displacement	on	refugee-
hosting	communities	in	the	Horn	of	Africa.	This	includes	loans	of	US$	100	million	to	Ethiopia,	US$	50	million	to	Uganda	and	US$	
20	million	to	Djibouti,	and	a	$5	million	grant	to	IGAD.	The	Development	Response	to	Displacement	Impacts	Project	(DRDIP)	aims	
to	 improve	 access	 to	 basic	 social	 services,	 expand	 economic	 opportunities,	 and	 enhance	 environmental	 management	 for	
communities	hosting	refugees.	
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Table	7:	Detail	on	some	of	the	organisations	working	with	migrants	in	Puntland	
Organisation	 Main	activities	
Africa	 Action	 Help	
International,	(AAHI)	
AAHI	supports	urban	refugees	from	Yemen	to	access	basic	education	through	cash-based	interventions	in	order	to	promote	self-
employment	and	business	opportunities	through	grants,	as	well	as	peace	and	co-existence	within	local	communities.	
ASAL	 Implements	WASH	and	food	security	programs	in	IDP	camps.			
CARE	Somalia		 CARE	 is	 operational	 in	 Somaliland	 and	 Puntland,	 and	 implements	 projects	 in	 water	 and	 sanitation,	 sustainable	 pastoralist	
activities,	civil	society	and	media	development,	small-scale	enterprise	development,	primary	school	education,	teacher	training,	
adult	literacy	and	vocational	training.	
Danish	 Refugee	 Council	
(DRC)	
DRC	mainly	works	with	IDPs,	refugees	and	asylum	seekers	in	Puntland,	however	it	also	provides	emergency	medical	assistance	
to	Ethiopian	migrants,	 as	well	 as	emergency	 food	 rations	 for	 those	 in	prison	or	hospital.	 In	 the	past,	 it	 conducted	awareness	
programmes	between	Ethiopian	migrants	and	host	community,	and	about	the	risks	of	migration.		
GRT	Somalia	 In	partnership	with	UNHCR,	GRT	arranges	medical	referrals	for	asylum	seekers	and	refugees	in	Garowe,	Bossaso	and	Qardo.	It	
also	 implements	 livelihoods,	 health,	 nutrition	 and	 education	 programmes,	 and	 gender	 based	 violence	 assistance	 and	
counselling.	
IOM	 IOM	leads	on	migration	management	of	migrants,	refugees	and	returnees	in	Puntland,	in	collaboration	with	UNHCR.	It	provides	
medical	assistance,	supports	assisted	voluntary	return	(AVR),	and	has	conducted	awareness	campaigns	with	migrants	and	local	
communities.	Much	of	its	support	is	channelled	through	the	MRCs	in	Bossaso	and	Obock,	to	which	it	provides	funding.	It	works	
with	local	government	to	build	capacity	through	training	and	funding.	With	EU	funding,	IOM	is	providing	human	trafficking	and	
gender-based	 violence	 (GBV)	 training	 to	 police	 and	 immigration	 offices	 in	 Puntland	 and	 Somaliland.	 It	 has	 also	 run	 similar	
training	 workshops	 with	 the	 Puntland	 Counter	 Trafficking	 Board,	 a	 group	 of	 Puntland	 prosecutors	 and	 the	 Child	 Protection	
Working	 Group.	 With	 funding	 from	 the	 British	 Foreign	 and	 Commonwealth	 Office	 (FCO)	 it	 recently	 completed	 a	 17-month	
project	 called	 ‘Improvement	 of	 Immigration	 Border	 Management	 through	 Capacity	 Building	 for	 Migration	 Management.’	 In	
coordination	with	UN-Habitat,	 IOM	 is	 also	 implementing	 a	 two-year	 project	 called	Achieving	 Local	 Solutions	 to	Displacement	
Crises	in	Somalia,	which	aims	to	improve	social	cohesion	(Altai	Consulting,	2017).	With	funding	from	the	Government	of	Norway,	
IOM	 is	 supporting	 construction	 of	 the	 immigration	 headquarters	 for	 Puntland’s	 Ministry	 for	 Security	 and	 Disarmament,	
Demobilization	and	Reintegration	in	Garowe,	with	the	aim	of	improving	immigration	and	border	management	services.				
KAALO	Organisation	 KAALO	provides	 legal	assistance	and	protection	services	 to	refugees	and	asylum	seekers.	KAALO’s	work	centres	around	relief,	
rehabilitation,	development	and	peace-building	programs.	They	also	work	on	SGBV	prevention,	and	provide	assistance	to	IDPs.			
Laas-Qoray	Concern	 Provides	food	distributions	for	migrants,	with	support	from	WFP.	
Maarso	 Relief	 Society	
(MAARSO)	
Implements	child	protection	programmes	for	IDPs,	refugees	and	asylum	seekers.	
Medicins	 du	 Monde	 Implements	health	programs	for	IDPs,	refugees	and	asylum	seekers	in	Puntland.	
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Organisation	 Main	activities	
(MDM)	
Norwegian	 Refugee	
Council	(NRC)	
NRC	implements	programmes	for	IDPs,	refugees,	and	asylum	seekers,	including	livelihoods,	job	creation,	emergency	assistance,	
education,	health,	food	security	and	shelter.		
Puntland	 Legal	 Aid	
Centre	(PLAC)	
Provides	legal	representation	and	counselling	to	irregular	migrants,	with	funding	from	UNDP.	
Puntland	Elders	Network	
(PEN)	
PEN	works	with	UNHCR	to	assist	Somali	returnees.		
Puntland	 Non-State	
Actors	 Association	
(PUNSAA)	
PUNSAA	brings	 together	a	 range	of	NGOs	and	 civil	 society	actors.	 Through	advocacy	and	 lobbying,	 it	works	 to	 connect	 these	
organisations	 with	 national	 authorities	 and	 international	 policy-makers	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 that	 policy	 and	 programming	 are	
relevant	and	responsive	to	people’s	needs.	
Puntland	 Students	
Association	(PSA)	
With	support	from	UNICEF	and	DRC,	PSA	provides	food	distributions	to	IDPs,	refugees	and	returnees.	It	also	conducts	awareness	
programs	for	young	people	on	the	risks	of	irregular	migration.		
Radio	Ergo	 Raises	awareness	about	the	dangers	of	irregular	migration	through	radio	dramas,	talk	shows	and	messages,	in	collaboration	with	
IOM.	
Red	 Sea	 Fishing	
Organization	(RESFO)	
With	support	 from	IOM,	RESFO	trained	240	migrants	and	 local	 fishermen	on	how	to	 fish,	how	to	manage	the	production	and	
distributed	fishing	equipment.	This	project	is	no	longer	ongoing.		
RESTORE–	 Building	
Resilience	 in	 Northern	
Somalia	
This	EU-funded	project	aims	 to	address	 the	adverse	effects	of	el	Niño	on	 the	 resilience	of	already	vulnerable	communities	of	
Northern	Somalia,	and	reduce	the	effects	of	forced	displacement	and	irregular	migration	in	the	region.	The	geographical	cover	
focuses	on	Puntland	(Bossaso,	Bari,	Nugaal,	Sanaag	and	Sool	districts)	and	Somaliland	(Awdal,	Togdheer	and	Waqooyi	Galbeed	
districts).	 The	 project	 aims	 to	 contribute	 to	 enhancing	 Somali	 institutional	 stakeholders’	 capacity	 to	 effectively	 coordinate,	
programme,	 manage	 and	 monitor	 resilience	 interventions;	 to	 improve	 access	 to	 drinkable,	 affordable	 and	 adequate	 water	
service	delivery	 in	Bossaso	and	 to	 sustainably	 improve	 food	security	and	 livelihoods;	and	 to	build	 resilience	 through	effective	
safety	nets,	among	vulnerable	households	and	their	communities.		
Save	the	Children	 Implements	health,	nutrition,	protection	and	education	programmes	for	IDPs	and	child	refugees,	returnees	and	asylum	seekers.	
In	 Qardo,	 it	 implements	 education	 programmes	 for	 Somali	 returnees	 and	 Yemeni	 refugees	 to	 enable	 them	 to	 enrol	 in	 local	
schools,	 through	 funding	 by	 UNICEF.	 Support	 includes	 provision	 of	 learning	materials	 and	 school	 uniforms,	 and	 payment	 of	
school	fees	and	costs.		
Somafal	 Development	
Organisation	
Somafal	provides	humanitarian	support	to	refugees	and	migrants	in	Bossaso	and	Garowe,	often	through	funds	provided	by	local	
people	 and	 businesses.	 In	 2015	 and	 2016,	 it	 provided	 food,	 water	 and	 aid	 to	 assist	migrants	 in	 the	 port	 area.	 Somafal	 also	
provided	Yemeni	refugees	with	shelter	in	Garowe	for	over	six	months,	and	assisted	them	in	securing	employment	and	livelihood	
opportunities	in	Puntland.		
 	 139	
Organisation	 Main	activities	
Somalia	 Society	Women	
Forum	(SSWF)	
Implements	health,	human	rights	and	education	programs	for	female	IDPs,	refugees	and	asylum	seekers.	
Tadamun	 Social	 Society	
(TASS)	
TASS	 works	 with	 victims	 of	 trafficking	 to	 provide	 them	with	 psychosocial,	 legal,	 medical	 and	 reintegration	 support,	 through	
funding	from	IOM.	It	also	provides	food,	family	tracing,	protection	and	health	support	to	refugees,	returnees	and	IDPs.		
Talo	 Rehabilitation	 and	
Development	
Organization	(TARDO)	
TARDO	 aims	 to	 create	 opportunities	 for	 refugees,	 IDPs,	 returnees	 while	 conducting	 awareness	 campaigns	 targeting	 host	
communities	to	promote	integration	of	returnees,	refugees	and	IDPs.	
UNHCR	 UNHCR	 conducts	 asylum	 and	migration	 programmes	 for	 Ethiopian	 asylum	 seekers	 and	 refugees,	 Somali	 returnees,	 IDPs	 and	
Yemeni	refugees	in	Puntland.	These	include	financial	support,	protection,	legal	counselling,	health	and	education.	For	example,	
it	 supports	 Yemeni	 and	 other	 refugees	 with	 monthly	 welfare	 contribution,	 medical	 care,	 education,	 food	 rations	 (provided	
through	WFP),	and	livelihood	support.	UNHCR	has	two	reception	centres	 in	Bossaso,	which	provide	migrants	with	information	
about	return,	a	temporary	place	to	stay,	and	basic	supplies	and	rations.	UNHCR	also	supported	the	development	of	the	Refugee	
Bill,	which	aims	to	clarify	the	procedure	for	RSD	in	Puntland	(Altai	Consulting,	2017).	
UNICEF	 UNICEF’s	 programmes	 in	 Somalia	 cover	 health	 and	 nutrition,	 water	 supply,	 sanitation	 and	 hygiene,	 and	 basic	 education.	 In	
addition,	 the	 communication,	 protection,	 and	 participation	 programme	 has	 activities	 that	 cut	 across	 all	 programme	 areas	
including:	child	protection,	HIV/AIDS	and	youth	development.		
UNODC	 UNODC	 is	working	with	 the	Bossaso	Port	Police	on	a	 three-year	project	 called	 the	Global	Maritime	Crime	Programme,	which	
aims	to	build	local	government	capacity	through	training,	mentoring	and	provision	of	equipment.		
We	Are	Women	Activists	
(WAWA)	
A	network	of	women’s	organisations,	WAWA	supports	female	IDPs	and	victims	of	SGBV	in	Puntland	with	food,	counselling	and	
medical	assistance.	
NB:	many	of	the	local	organisations	listed	above	carry	out	activities	on	a	project	basis,	meaning	that	the	projects	they	implement	depend	on	
availability	of	funds,	and	when	funding	is	not	available,	they	are	not	always	operational.		
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Table	8:	Detail	on	some	of	the	organisations	working	with	migrants	in	Djibouti	
Organisation	 Main	activities	
Al	Rahma	 With	support	from	UNICEF,	Al	Rahma	provides	professional	and	vocational	training	for	migrant	children	in	Djibouti.		
Association	 pour	 la	
Promotion	 et	 la	
Protection	des	Droits	des	
Enfants	 Mineurs	
(APPDEM)	
APPDEM	provides	psychosocial	and	legal	assistance	to	children	in	difficulties,	such	as	those	who	have	been	sexually	abused	or	
are	in	conflict	with	the	law.	They	conduct	sensitization	workshops	on	the	rights	of	children,	and	train	law	enforcement	officers.		
Caritas	 Caritas	works	in	Djibouti	city,	Obock,	Tadjoura,	Ali	Sabieh,	Dikhil	and	Arta.	It	provides	food,	medical	care,	shelter,	counselling	
and	education	for	hundreds	of	migrants	each	year,	supports	family	returns,	and	carries	out	advocacy	work	for	migrants.	The	
project	 ‘Lire,	 Ecrire,	 Compter’	 provides	 literacy	 centres	 in	 Ali	 Sabieh,	 Arta,	 Obock	 and	 Tadjourah	 for	migrant	 children	 from	
Ethiopia,	 Somalia	 and	Yemen.	 The	organisation	 also	 supports	 return	of	 unaccompanied	migrant	 children	 to	 their	 country	of	
origin,	 and	 has	 recently	 signed	 a	 new	 agreement	 with	 UNICEF	 to	 provide	 professional	 and	 vocational	 training	 for	 migrant	
children.		
DRC		 DRC	works	with	 refugees	 in	Ali	 Sabieh	and	 in	Obock,	with	 a	 focus	on	 livelihoods	 and	protection.	 There	 is	 a	dedicated	 team	
working	on	mixed	migrants,	which	provides	protection	monitoring	and	awareness	around	migrants’	rights.			
FAO	 FAO	supports	food	and	agricultural	projects	in	refugee	camps	and	among	hosting	communities.	These	include	micro-gardening,	
support	to	local	fisherman,	and	water	and	sanitation	through	the	drilling	of	wells	and	boreholes	(8	in	2013,	7	in	2014,	and	5	in	
2015).	
Government	of	Japan	 The	Government	of	Japan	is	implementing	a	one	year	project	called	‘Strengthening	security	in	Djibouti	and	safety	of	migrants	
through	counter-	 trafficking,	marine	safety	and	emergency	assistance.’	The	project	 includes,	among	others,	activities	 for	 the	
rehabilitation	and	capacity	building	of	the	MRC,	the	capacity	building	of	the	National	Police,	Gendarmerie	and	Coast	Guard.	The	
main	beneficiaries	are	the	National	Police,	the	Gendarmerie	Nationale,	the	Coast	Guard	and	the	vulnerable	migrants.	
International	 Committee	
for	the	Red	Cross	(ICRC)	
ICRC	works	with	 refugees	 in	Holl	Holl	and	Ali	Adeh	camps,	and	provides	 support	 to	 the	Obock	MRC.	Main	activities	 include:	
family	reunification;	distribution	of	clothes;	and	assistance	to	migrants	and	others	in	detention.	ICRC	is	also	planning	to	provide	
an	ambulance	service	along	the	migratory	routes.		
IOM	 IOM	 is	 the	 lead	 agency	working	with	migrants.	 It	 provides	 support	 through	 the	Obock	MRC,	 carries	 out	AVR,	 and	 conducts	
sensitization	campaigns.	As	part	of	efforts	to	better	identify	the	flows	of	migrants	entering	and	transiting	through	Djibouti	and	
to	 understand	 the	 migratory	 reality	 of	 the	 country,	 IOM	 is	 launching	 flow	 monitoring,	 a	 component	 of	 its	 Displacement	
Tracking	Matrix	 (DTM).	Data	 in	Djibouti	will	 be	analysed	 jointly	with	 the	 results	of	 similar	 exercises	 to	be	 carried	out	 in	 the	
region	(Yemen,	Ethiopia,	Somalia,	Saudi	Arabia	and	Kenya)	and	will	provide	an	overview	of	migration	and	population	mobility	in	
the	Horn	of	Africa	and	Arab	Peninsula.	
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Organisation	 Main	activities	
Norwegian	 Refugee	
Council	(NRC)	
With	 funding	 from	 the	 EU,	 NRC	 is	 supporting	 long-term	 and	 new	 refugees	 in	 Ali	 Addeh,	 Holl	 Holl	 and	Markazi	 camps	with	
shelter,	essential	non-food	items,	water	and	sanitation.		
UNFPA	 While	UNFPA	does	not	directly	implement	projects	for	migrants,	it	supports	IOM	and	UNHCR	in	the	distribution	of	dignity	kits	
and	emergency	kits,	and	in	reinforcing	health	services	in	the	obstetrics	ward.	
UNICEF	 UNICEF	 conducts	 sensitization	 campaigns	 on	 solidarity	 and	 conflict	 resolution	 with	 host	 communities,	 and	 refers	 young	
migrants	to	the	MRC.	The	organisation	works	in	coordination	with	Caritas	and	Al	Rahma	to	support	street	children,	 including	
UMCs.	UNICEF	and	IOM	also	work	together	on	a	project	called	child’s	best	interest	(“dispositif	supérieur	de	l’enfant”).	
UNODC	 The	‘Strengthening	Criminal	Justice	Responses	to	Trafficking	in	Persons	and	Smuggling	of	Migrants	in	Ethiopia	and	Djibouti’	was	
an	EU-funded	project	 that	 aimed	 to	 achieve	 legislative	 reform,	 through	a	 consultative	process	 resulting	 in	 a	 comprehensive	
legislative	framework	to	combat	and	prevent	human	trafficking	and	to	promote	safe	labour	migration	ready	to	adoption.		
l’Union	 Nationale	 de	
Femmes	 Djiboutiennes	
(UNFD)	
Created	 in	 1977,	 UNFD	 works	 for	 the	 empowerment	 of	 women	 and	 the	 protection	 of	 maternal	 and	 child	 health	 through	
advocacy	and	policy	work.	
	
US	Embassy	in	Djibouti	 Carries	out	advocacy	work	on	migration.		
World	Bank	 The	World	Bank	is	providing	funding	to	host	communities	in	places	like	Obock	to	better	deal	with	the	influx	of	migrants.		
World	 Food	 Programme	
(WFP)	
With	funding	from	the	EU,	WFP	is	providing	cash	for	refugees	who	have	recently	arrived	from	Yemen	and	settled	 in	Markazi	
camp.	This	follows	a	similar	initiative	for	longer-term	refugees	in	Ali-Sabieh	and	Hol	Hol	camps.		
World	 Health	
Organisation	(WHO)	
WHO	does	not	directly	implement	programmes	in	Djibouti,	but	provides	indirect	assistance	to	migrants	through	its	support	to	
the	Ministry	of	Health,	such	as	provision	of	medicine	and	equipment.		
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Table	9:	Detail	on	some	of	the	organisations	working	with	migrants	in	Yemen	
Organisation	 Main	activities	
Adventist	 Development	
and	 Relief	 Agency	
(ADRA)	
ADRA	works	with	refugees	and	IDPs	in	eight	governorates	in	Yemen.	It	implements	health	and	nutrition	projects	for	those	living	
in	 camps.	 The	 organisation	 carries	 out	 protection	 and	 human	 rights-based	 projects,	 with	 a	 focus	 on	 improving	 relations	
between	displaced	and	host	communities.	It	supports	urban	refugees	through	vocational	and	human	rights	training,	often	with	
a	focus	on	women	(saving	and	loans	scheme	and	day	care	centres)	and	youths	(internships).		
Al-Takaful	 Social	
Association	
Works	with	DRC,	 INTERSOS	and	UNHCR	 to	 support	 asylum	 seekers	with	basic	 services	 (food,	 health	 and	 transportation)	 and	
refugee	registration.			
DRC	 DRC	 implements	a	mixed	migration	programme.	 Its	protection	teams	patrol	the	Red	Sea	and	Gulf	of	Aden	coastlines	to	meet	
and	 register	 new	 arrivals,	 process	 their	 data,	 provides	 non-food	 items,	 and	 refer	 persons	 of	 concern	 to	 UNHCR	 or	 IOM.	 Its	
operations	 include	 protection	 assistance,	 food	 security,	 livelihoods,	 and	 water	 and	 sanitation	 hygiene	 (WASH)	 assistance	 to	
children,	vulnerable	households,	internally	displaced	persons	(IDPs),	and	host	communities.	
INTERSOS	 INTERSOS	supports	internally	displaced	Yemenis	as	well	as	refugees	and	asylum	seekers	from	the	HoA	with	medical	care,	food,	
protection,	psychological	support,	protection	and	economic	support.	It	has	also	launched	a	programme	to	identify	and	support	
victims	of	trafficking	in	human	beings	in	Aden,	Kharaz	and	in	the	reception	center	of	Mayfa.	Since	March	2015,	it	has	expanded	
its	activities	to	include	conflict-affected	populations	(IDPs,	returnees	and	host	communities).The	organization	is	operational	 in	
Sana’a,	Aden,	Al	Mukalla,	Taiz,	Ibb	and	Kharaz/Lahj.	
IOM	 IOM	works	with	the	Ministry	of	Expatriate	Affairs	on	Yemeni	migrant	communities	abroad	and/or	returning	to	Yemen.	 It	also	
provides	transportation	assistance	to	migrants	stranded	in	Yemen	and	victims	of	trafficking	in	conjunction	with	the	Immigration	
authorities.	IOM	has	an	office	in	Sana’a,	and	two	sub-offices	in	Aden	and	Al	Hodeidah,	where	it	runs	Migrant	Response	Points	to	
address	the	immediate	needs	of	vulnerable	migrants.	These	include	humanitarian	assistance	(food,	water,	medical	assistance,	
basic	clothing	and	hygiene	 items)	shelter,	medical	referrals	to	 local	hospitals,	and	psychosocial	support.	The	organisation	also	
has	mobile	teams,	which	patrol	the	southern	coast	of	Yemen,	and	provide	food	and	water	to	newly	arrived	migrants.		
IOM	and	DRC	 IOM	and	DRC	are	 implementing	a	DFID-funded	project	called:	 ‘Strengthening	the	protection	of	vulnerable	migrants	 in	Yemen	
through	humanitarian	assistance,	capacity	building	and	better	migration	information	management’.		
Society	 for	Humanitarian	
Solidarity	(SHS)	
Provides	health	and	food	assistance	to	refugees	and	migrants,	and	supports	registration	process	in	coordination	with	UNHCR,	
DRC	and	INTERSOS.	With	support	from	UNHCR,	SHS	also	conducts	coastal	patrols	along	the	Gulf	of	Aden	to	provide	food,	water,	
first	 aid,	 transportation	 and	 protection	 to	migrants.	 Together	with	DRC	 and	 INTERSPS,	 the	 organisation	 is	 also	 involved	 in	 a	
number	 of	 refugee	 reception	 centres	 located	 along	 the	 Gulf	 of	 Aden	 in	 Shabwa,	 Hadramout	 and	 Abyan	 governorates,	
specifically	in	Mayfa’a,	Ahwar	and	Kiada.		
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Organisation	 Main	activities	
Sustainable	
Development	
Foundation	 (Sana’a,	
Yemen)	
Supports	refugees	with	shelter,	schooling,	health	and	employment	opportunities.		
UNHCR	 UNHCR	works	with	IDPs,	refugees	and	asylum	seekers	in	Yemen,	in	particular	through	the	provision	of	protection,	shelter	and	
non-food	items	and	psycho-social	support.	UNHCR	collects	and	disseminates	data	on	migrant	numbers	and	profiles,	and	is	joint	
lead	on	the	Task	Force	on	Population	Movement	(TFPM),	together	with	IOM.	
Yemen	 Organization	 for	
Combating	 Human	
Trafficking	(YOCHT)	
YOCHT	works	 to	 combat	 trafficking	 in	 Yemen	 through	partnerships	 and	 awareness	 raising,	 and	 the	provision	of	 support	 and	
legal	 aid	 to	 victims	 of	 trafficking.	 It	 also	 trains	 law	 enforcement	 officials	 and	 works	 with	 the	 police	 to	 free	 people	 being	
trafficked.		
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Annex	4:	Overview	of	the	governmental	ministries	and	departments	involved	in	migration	in	Puntland,	Djibouti	and	Yemen	
	
Table	10:	Governmental	ministries	and	departments	involved	in	migration	in	Puntland	
Ministry/Department	 Main	Activities/	Responsibilities	
Ministry	of	Interior,	Local	Government	and	
Rural	Development	
This	is	the	mandated	industry	for	dealing	with	migration,	including	refugees,	asylum	seekers,	IDPs,	returnees	
and	irregular	migrants.			
Department	 of	 Refugees,	 Returnees	 and	
Mixed	 Migrants	 (within	 Ministry	 of	
Interior)	
Sitting	 within	 the	Ministry	 of	 Interior,	 this	 is	 the	 designated	 department	 for	 coordinating	migration	 issues	
within	Puntland,	in	particular	monitoring	the	flow	of	migrants	through	the	region.	It	has	a	number	of	‘mixed	
movement	 monitors’	 in	 place	 to	 track	 and	 record	 data	 on	 migrants	 passing	 through	 Puntland,	 reportedly	
located	in	Tukaraq,	Alxamudulilah,	Dhahar	and	Bossaso.	The	Department	releases	monthly	reports	on	the	data	
and	 findings	 collected	 by	 these	 monitors,	 most	 of	 which	 are	 available	 online	 via	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Interior	
website.65	Nevertheless,	Government	authorities	 in	Puntland	have	been	described	as	 lacking	the	capacity	to	
collect,	analyse,	or	share	data	on	migrant	smuggling	and	human	trafficking	networks	(RMMS,	2017).	
Refugee	Affairs	Division	(RAD)			
(within	Ministry	of	Interior)	
RAD	is	mandated	to	protect	and	promote	the	rights	of	refugees	 in	Puntland.	 It	registers	and	screens	asylum	
seekers	 and	 passes	 their	 data	 onto	 UNHCR	 for	 refugee	 status	 determination	 (RSD).	 In	 coordination	 with	
international	organisations,	RAD	implements	a	number	of	programmes	for	Yemeni	refugees	in	Puntland.	It	is	
also	tasked	with	improving	coordination	between	the	different	ministries	involved	in	migration	management	
through	a	Refugee	Affairs	Committee.		
Disaster	Management	Agency	(DMA)	
(within	Ministry	of	Interior)	
DMA	 is	 the	 focal	 point	 for	 humanitarian	 partners	 in	 Somalia,	 and	works	 with	 UNHCR	 and	 IOM	 to	 register	
Somali	returnees	from	Yemen.			
Ministry	of	Security	 Responsible	 for	 managing	 security	 at	 the	 borders,	 and	 works	 with	 the	 armed	 forces	 to	 control	 irregular	
immigration	 flows,	 with	 a	 particular	 focus	 on	 human	 trafficking	 and	 smuggling,	 for	 which	 it	 is	 the	 lead	
ministry.		
Puntland	Maritime	Police	Force	(PMPF)	
(within	Ministry	of	Security)	
Established	 in	 2010	with	 support	 from	 the	United	 Arab	 Emirates	 (UAE).	 It	 is	 primarily	 aimed	 at	 preventing	
piracy,	 illegal	fishing,	and	other	illicit	activity	off	of	the	coast	of	Somalia.	 It	has	around	1,200	soldiers	and	90	
support	 staff	 located	 in	 four	 bases:	 Bosaso	 headquarters	 (located	 near	 Qaw	 on	 the	 western	 outskirts	 of	
Bossaso	town),	and	front	bases	in	Iskushuban,	Bargal,	Hafun	and	Eyl.		
Due	 to	 a	 lack	 of	 governmental	 support	 and	 coordination,	 UAE	 took	 the	 decision	 to	 reduce	 PMPF’s	 anti-
smuggling	and	trafficking	activities,	and	focus	instead	on	piracy.	According	to	sources,	this	decision	followed	a	
                                                
65	http://www.moipuntland.com		
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Ministry/Department	 Main	Activities/	Responsibilities	
number	of	occasions	where	PMPF	arrested	suspected	smugglers	and	traffickers,	and	handed	them	over	to	the	
Puntland	 authorities,	 who	 did	 not	 sentence	 them	 adequately	 and	 often	 released	 them	 back	 into	 the	
community.	 Nevertheless,	 smuggling	 sources	 interviewed	 admitted	 that	 they	 do	 view	 PMPF	 as	 a	 threat	 to	
their	operations,	as	the	force	has	intercepted	and	confiscated	a	number	of	boats,	and	detained	the	crew	and	
boat	owners.	
State	Police	Forces	 Responsible	 for	 border	 control,	 public	 safety	 and	 controlling	 irregular	 migrants.	 In	 Garowe,	 a	 Criminal	
Investigation	Department	(CID)	was	established	to	conduct	criminal	investigations	into	human	smuggling	and	
trafficking.	However,	 this	unit	 is	 yet	 to	 show	a	meaningful	 response,	 and	 is	 said	 to	 lack	proper	 training	 (US	
Department	of	State,	2016).	
Puntland	Intelligence	Agency		 Collects	 security-related	 information,	 including	 on	 smuggling,	 trafficking,	 extremist	 activities	 and	 organised	
crime,	and	shares	these	with	the	relevant	ministries	and	departments.		
Ministry	of	Justice		 The	Ministry	if	working	with	UNODC	to	draft	a	new	Smuggling	and	Trafficking	Act	(Altai	Consulting,	2017).		
Ministry	of	Women	and	Family	Affairs	 Oversees	 trafficking	 efforts	 and	provides	 assistance	 to	 female	 and	 child	migrants	who	have	 suffered	 sexual	
and	other	forms	of	abuse	during	their	journey.		
Office	of	the	Human	Rights	Defender	 Mandated	to	promote	human	rights	among	government	and	civil	society.	
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Table	11:	Governmental	ministries	and	departments	involved	in	migration	in	Djibouti	
Ministry/Department	 Main	Activities/	Responsibilities	
Ministry	of	Interior	(MOI)	 Responsible,	amongst	other	things,	 for	 the	protection	of	 refugees	and	for	verifying	 information	on	migrants	
departing	from	Djibouti	to	Yemen.		
Organisation	 National	 d’Assistance	 aux	
Réfugiés	et	Sinistrés	(ONARS)		
(Sits	within	MOI)	
ONARS	is	the	main	government	institution	responsible	for	refugee	protection	and	the	management	of	refugee	
camps.	It	has	three	main	tasks:	(i)	Register	refugees	and	asylum-seekers’	(ii)	conduct	sensitization	activities	for	
migrants;	 (iii)	provide	assistance	(food	and	transport).	 It	also	has	responsibility	 for	Djibouti’s	refugee	camps.	
They	provide	limited	support	to	IOM	with	AVR	and	sensitization	activities.	While	mixed	migration	is	not	within	
ONARS’	mandate,	 the	organization	 is	evolving	and	 is	 interested	 in	developing	humanitarian,	protection	and	
legal	assistance	activities	for	vulnerable	migrants	and	IDPs.		
National	Police		
(sits	within	MOI)	
The	National	Police	 is	responsible	for	security	within	Djibouti	City	and	has	primary	control	over	 immigration	
and	customs	procedures	for	 land	border-crossing	points	 in	coordination	with	the	Army.	 It	 is	also	 involved	 in	
migrant	deportations.		
National	Gendarme	
(sit	within	Ministry	of	Defence)	
The	National	Gendarmerie	is	responsible	for	all	security	outside	of	Djibouti	City	but	also	has	the	responsibility	
of	 protecting	 critical	 infrastructure	 within	 the	 city,	 such	 as	 at	 the	 international	 airport.	 With	 regards	 to	
migrants,	 the	 Gendarmerie	 is	 supposed	 to	 provide	 initial	 assistance	 (food,	 water,	 first	 aid),	 manage	
deportations	and	intercept	smugglers	and	traffickers.	
Army	
(sits	within	MOI)	
The	army	is	responsible	for	defence	of	the	national	borders.	
Coast	Guard	
(sits	within	MOI)	
Responsible	for	maritime	security	and	patrolling	territorial	waters.	It	is	mandated	to	rescue	migrants	crossing	
the	Red	Sea,	and	intercept	smugglers	and	traffickers.		
National	Eligibility	Commission	
(sits	within	MOI)	
Consists	of	staff	from	UNHCR	and	ONARS,	and	is	mandated	to	find	solutions	to	challenges	on	security	matters,	
malnutrition	and	other	humanitarian	concerns.	
Commission	 Nationale	 d’Éligibilitè	 des	
Refugiès	(CNE)		
Conducts	RSD	under	the	auspices	of	UNHCR.	
Ministry	of	Justice		 The	Ministry	hosts	an	Executive	Secretariat	on	preventing	trafficking.		
Ministry	of	Health	 Responsible	for	migrants’	medical	needs.		
Agence	 Djiboutienne	 de	 Développement	
Social	(ADDS)	
With	funding	from	the	African	Development	Bank,	ADDS	has	implemented	an	emergency	project	for	Yemeni	
Refugees	(January	2016	to	June	2016).	With	funding	from	the	World	Bank,	 it	 is	now	implementing	a	US$	20	
million	 project	 to	 support	 host	 communities	 living	 near	 refugee	 camps.	 The	 objective	 is	 to	 improve	 the	
resilience	of	these	communities	through	improved	natural	resource	management.	
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Annex	5:	Overview	of	National	and	International	Legislation	Relating	to	Migration	
	
Table	12:	Overview	of	national	and	international	legislation	relating	to	migration	
	 International	Law	 National	Law	
Somalia	
• 1951	Refugee	Convention	and	1967	protocol	
• 1969	International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights	
• 1969	 International	 Covenant	 on	 Economic,	 Social	 and	
Cultural	Rights	
• 1969	 International	 Convention	 on	 the	 Elimination	 of	 All	
Forms	of	Racial	Discrimination	
• 1969	 OAU	 Convention	 Governing	 Specific	 Aspects	 of	
Refugee	Problems	in	Africa		
• 1976	 International	 Covenant	 on	 Civil	 and	 Political	 Rights	
(ICCPR)	
• 1990	Convention	on	the	Rights	of	the	Child	(CRC)		
• 2009	 African	 Union	 Convention	 for	 the	 Protection	 and	
Assistance	 of	 Internally	 Displaced	 Persons	 in	 Africa	
(Kampala	Convention)	
• 1961	Immigration	Act	
• Somali	 Provisional	 Refugees	 and	 Asylum	 Act,	 Presidential	
Decree,	1984	
• Transitional	 Federal	Charter	of	 the	 Somali	 Republic	Article	
71	 guarantees	 security	 and	 freedom	 of	 movement	 of	
people,	goods	and	services.	
• Child	Protection	Act,	2014	
Djibouti	
• 1951	Refugee	Convention	and	1967	protocol	
• 1969	 International	 Convention	 on	 the	 Elimination	 of	 All	
Forms	of	Racial	Discrimination	
• 1969	 OAU	 Convention	 Governing	 Specific	 Aspects	 of	
Refugee	Problems	in	Africa		
• 1976	 International	 Covenant	 on	 Civil	 and	 Political	 Rights	
(ICCPR)		
• 1981	 Convention	 on	 the	 Elimination	 of	 All	 Forms	 of	
Discrimination	against	Women	
• Act	 No.	 201/AN/07/5éme	 was	 adopted	 in	 2007	 by	 the	
National	 Assembly	 and	 sets	 the	 conditions	 for	 entry	 and	
residence	 in	 the	 Republic	 of	 Djibouti.	 The	 Act	 made	
irregular	migration	a	crime,	and	all	migrants	should	be	able	
to	 demonstrate	 a	 valid	 travel	 document	 and	 sufficient	
resources	to	live.		
• Law	No.	133	On	the	Fight	Against	Trafficking	in	Persons	and	
Illicit	 Smuggling	 of	 Migrants	 (2016),	 which	 prohibits	 all	
forms	 of	 trafficking	 and	 distinguishes	 between	 trafficking	
and	smuggling.66	
                                                
66	The	2016	law	repeals	Act	No.	210/AN/07/5éme,	which	applied	to	victims	of	trafficking,	with	a	focus	on	vulnerable	groups,	including	children,	women	and	physically	or	
mentally	disabled.		
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	 International	Law	 National	Law	
• 1987	 Convention	 against	 Torture	 and	 Other	 Cruel,	
Inhuman,	or	Degrading	Treatment	or	Punishment	
• 1990	Convention	on	the	Rights	of	the	Child	(CRC)	
• 2003	Protocol	to	Prevent	Suppress	and	Punish	Trafficking	
in	Persons,	especially	Women	and	Children.		
• 2003	 United	 Nations	 Convention	 against	 Transnational	
Organised	Crime	
• 2004	Protocol	against	the	Smuggling	of	Migrants	by	Land,	
Sea	and	Air	
• 2009	 African	 Union	 Convention	 for	 the	 Protection	 and	
Assistance	 of	 Internally	 Displaced	 Persons	 in	 Africa	
(Kampala	Convention)	
• Ordinance	 No.77-053/PR/AE	 (1997)	 is	 the	 primary	 law	 on	
refugees.	
	
Yemen	
• 1930	 International	 Labour	 Organization	 (ILO)	 Forced	
Labour	Convention	(No.	29)	
• 1951	Refugee	Convention	and	1967	protocol	
• 1969	 OAU	 Convention	 Governing	 Specific	 Aspects	 of	
Refugee	Problems	in	Africa		
• 1976	International	Convention	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights	
(ICCPR)		
• 1981	 Convention	 on	 the	 Elimination	 of	 All	 Forms	 of	
Discrimination	against	Women	
• 1987	 Convention	 against	 Torture	 and	 Other	 Cruel,	
Inhuman,	or	Degrading	Treatment	or	Punishment	
• 1990	Convention	on	the	Rights	of	the	Child	(CRC)	
• 2000	 United	 Nations	 Convention	 against	 Transnational	
Organised	Crime	
• Yemen	 Penal	 Code	 Article	 248,	 which	 relates	 to	 human	
smuggling	and	trafficking.	
• Child	Rights	Act	Article	161	
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Annex	6:	Glossary	of	Key	Terms	
	
Asylum	seeker:	“Persons	seeking	to	be	admitted	into	a	country	as	refu-	gees	and	awaiting	
decision	 on	 their	 application	 for	 refugee	 status	 under	 relevant	 international	 and	 national	
instruments.”	IOM.	(2004).	International	Migration	Law:	Glossary	on	Migration	
Internally	 displaced	 person:	 “Persons	 or	 groups	 of	 persons	 who	 have	 been	 forced	 or	
obliged	 to	 flee	 or	 to	 leave	 their	 homes	 or	 places	 of	 habitual	 residence,	 in	 particular	 as	 a	
result	of	or	in	order	to	avoid	the	effects	of	armed	conflict,	situations	of	generalized	violence,	
violations	of	human	rights	or	natural	or	human-made	disasters,	and	who	have	not	crossed	
an	 internationally	 recognized	State	border.”	United	Nations,	Guiding	Principles	on	 Internal	
Displacement,	22	July	1998,	E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2	
Migrant:	Given	the	mixed	nature	of	migration	along	this	route,	the	term	migrant	shall	refer	
to	 a	 range	 of	 people	 including	 economic	 migrants,	 refugees,	 asylum	 seekers,	
unaccompanied	migrant	 children	 (UMCs),	 returnees,	 victims	 of	 trafficking,	 environmental	
migrants	and	stateless	persons.	Pastoralists,	traders	and	visitors	are	also	moving	along	these	
routes.	 Within	 these	 categories,	 migrants’	 movements	 may	 be	 linear,	 circular	 and/or	
repeated,	and	their	journeys	and	duration	of	stay	can	span	days,	weeks	and	years.		
Mixed	 migration:	 “The	 principal	 characteristics	 of	 mixed	 migration	 flows	 include	 the	
irregular	 nature	 of	 and	 the	 multiplicity	 of	 factors	 driving	 such	 movements,	 and	 the	
differentiated	needs	and	profiles	of	the	persons	involved.	Mixed	flows	have	been	defined	as	
‘complex	 population	 movements	 including	 refugees,	 asylum	 seekers,	 economic	 migrants	
and	 other	migrants’.	 Unaccompanied	minors,	 environmental	migrants,	 smuggled	 persons,	
victims	of	trafficking	and	stranded	migrants,	among	others,	may	also	form	part	of	a	mixed	
flow”	(IOM).	
Organized	 criminal	 group:	 “A	 structured	 group	 of	 three	 or	 more	 persons,	 existing	 for	 a	
period	of	time	and	acting	in	concert	with	the	aim	of	committing	one	or	more	serious	crimes	
or	offences	established	 in	accordance	with	 this	Convention,	 in	order	 to	obtain,	directly	or	
indirectly,	 a	 financial	 or	 other	 material	 benefit”	 United	 Nations	 Convention	 Against	
Transnational	Organised	Crime,	resolution	55/25	of	15	November	2000	
Refugee:	A	 person	 who	 “owing	 to	 well-founded	 fear	 of	 persecution	 for	 reasons	 of	 race,	
religion,	nationality,	membership	of	a	particular	social	group	or	political	opinions,	is	outside	
the	 country	 of	 his	 nationality	 and	 is	 unable	 or,	 owing	 to	 such	 fear,	 is	 unwilling	 to	 avail	
himself	 of	 the	 protection	 of	 that	 country”	 (Geneva	 Convention	 relating	 to	 the	 Status	 of	
Refugees,	Art.	1A(2),	1951)	
Returnee:	“Is	the	term	used	by	the	international	community	to	identify	a	person	who	was	a	
refugee,	but	who	has	recently	returned	to	his/her	country	of	origin.	Defining	a	returnee	is	
thus	applicable	on	a	person’s	prior	refugee	status.”	(OHCHR,	2001)	
Smuggling	 of	 migrants:	 “Shall	 mean	 the	 procurement,	 in	 order	 to	 obtain,	 directly	 or	
indirectly,	a	financial	or	other	material	benefit,	of	the	illegal	entry	of	a	person	into	a	State	
Party	of	which	the	person	is	not	a	national	or	a	permanent	resident”	(Protocol	Against	the	
Smuggling	of	Migrants	by	Land,	Sea	and	Air,	2000).	
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Smuggling	under	aggravated	circumstances:	“Circumstances	(a)	That	endanger,	or	are	likely	
to	endanger,	 the	 lives	or	 safety	of	 the	migrants	 concerned;	or	 (b)	 That	entail	 inhuman	or	
degrading	 treatment,	 including	 for	 exploitation,	 of	 such	 migrants.”	 (Protocol	 Against	 the	
Smuggling	of	Migrants	by	Land,	Sea	and	Air,	2000).	
Stateless	 person:	 “A	 stateless	 person	 is	 someone	 who	 is	 not	 a	 citizen	 of	 any	 country.	
Citizenship	is	the	legal	bond	between	a	government	and	an	individual,	and	allows	for	certain	
political,	economic,	social	and	other	rights	of	the	individual,	as	well	as	the	responsibilities	of	
both	government	and	citizen.	A	person	can	become	stateless	due	 to	a	variety	of	 reasons,	
including	sovereign,	legal,	technical	or	administrative	decisions	or	oversights.”	(UNHCR)		
Trafficking	in	persons:	“Shall	mean	the	recruitment,	transportation,	transfer,	harbouring	or	
receipt	of	 persons,	 by	means	of	 the	 threat	or	use	of	 force	or	other	 forms	of	 coercion,	 of	
abduction,	of	fraud,	of	deception,	of	the	abuse	of	power	or	of	a	position	of	vulnerability	or	
of	the	giving	or	receiving	of	payments	or	benefits	to	achieve	the	consent	of	a	person	having	
control	over	another	person,	for	the	purpose	of	exploitation.	Exploitation	shall	include,	at	a	
minimum,	 the	 exploitation	 of	 the	 prostitution	 of	 others	 or	 other	 forms	 of	 sexual	
exploitation,	 forced	 labour	or	 services,	 slavery	or	practices	 similar	 to	 slavery,	 servitude	or	
the	removal	of	organs.67	A	victim	need	not	be	physically	transported	from	one	 location	to	
another,	or	cross	an	international	border,	for	the	crime	to	fall	within	these	definitions.”	(UN	
Protocol	to	Prevent,	Suppress	and	Punish	Trafficking	in	Persons,	2000)		
Unaccompanied	migrant	 child:	 “A	 child	 who	 has	 been	 separated	 from	 both	 parents	 and	
other	relatives	and	is	not	being	cared	for	by	an	adult	who,	by	law	or	custom,	is	responsible	
for	doing	so.”	(1989	Convention	on	the	Rights	of	the	Child)	
	
	
	 	
                                                
67	http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/ProtocolTraffickingInPersons.aspx		
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Annex	7:	List	of	Acronyms	
	
AAHI		 Africa	Action	Help	International	
ADDS		 Agence	Djiboutienne	de	Développement	Social	
ADRA		 Adventist	Development	and	Relief	Agency		
APPDEM		 Association	pour	la	Promotion	et	la	Protection	des	Droits	des	Enfants	
Mineurs		
AQAP		 	 	 Al	Qaeda	in	the	Arabian	Peninsula	
ARRA	 	 	 Administration	for	Refugee	and	Returnee	Affairs		
AVR	 	 	 Assisted	Voluntary	Return	 	 	
CID	 	 	 Criminal	Investigation	Department		
CPWG			 	 Child	Protection	Working	Group		
CRC		 	 	 Convention	on	the	Rights	of	the	Child	
DRC	 	 	 Danish	Refugee	Council	
DRDIP			 	 Development	Response	to	Displacement	Impacts	Project	
DTM	 	 	 Displacement	Tracking	Matrix	
EU	 	 	 European	Union	
EUTF	 	 	 European	Union	Trust	Fund	
FAO	 	 	 Food	and	Agriculture	Organization	
FCO	 	 	 Foreign	and	Commonwealth	Office		
FGD	 	 	 Focus	Group	Discussion	
FSNAU		 	 Food	Security	and	Nutrition	Analysis	Unit	
GCC	 	 	 Gulf	Cooperation	Council	
GIZ	 	 	 German	Society	for	International	Cooperation	
HoA	 	 	 Horn	of	Africa	 	
HRW	 	 	 Human	Rights	Watch	
ICCPR	 	 	 International	Convention	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights	
ICRC	 	 	 International	Committee	of	the	Red	Cross	
IDP	 	 	 Internally	displaced	person	
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IGAD		 	 	 Intergovernmental	Authority	on	Development		
IOM	 	 	 International	Organisation	for	Migration		
IS	 	 	 Islamic	State	
ISSP	 	 	 IGAD	Security	Sector	Program		
KAP		 	 	 Knowledge,	attitudes	and	practices	
MDM		 	 	 Medecins	Du	Monde		
MMTF			 	 Mixed	migration	task	force	
MOI	 	 	 Ministry	of	Interior	
MRC	 	 	 Migrant	Response	Centre	(also	known	as	Migration	Response	Centre)		
MRPs		 	 	 Migrant	Response	Points	
NRC	 	 	 Norwegian	Refugee	Council	
OECD	 	 	 Organisation	for	Economic	Cooperation	and	Development	
OHCHR	 	 The	Office	of	the	United	Nations	High	Commissioner	for	Human	Rights	
ONARS		 	 Organisation	National	d’Assistance	aux	Réfugiés	et	Sinistrés		
PEN	 	 	 Puntland	Elders	Network	
PIA	 	 	 Puntland	Intelligence	Agency	
PLAC		 	 	 Puntland	Legal	Aid	Centre	
PMPF	 	 	 Puntland	Maritime	Police	Forces	
PSA		 	 	 Puntland	Students	Association	
PUNSAA		 	 Puntland	Non-State	Actors	Association	
RAD	 	 	 Refugee	Affairs	Division	
ReDDS		 	 Regional	Durable	Solutions	Secretariat		
REF	 	 	 Research	and	Evidence	Facility	
RESFO	 	 	 Red	Sea	Fishing	Organisation		
RMMS		 	 Regional	Mixed	Migration	Secretariat	
RSD	 	 	 Refugee	Status	Determination	
SDC		 	 	 Swiss	Agency	for	Development	and	Cooperation		
SGBV	 	 	 Sexual	and	gender-based	violence	
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SHS		 	 	 Society	for	Humanitarian	Solidarity	
SNNPR		 	 Southern	Nations,	Nationalities,	and	Peoples'	Region	
SSWF		 	 	 Somalia	Society	Women	Forum	
TARDO		 	 Talo	Rehabilitation	and	Development	Organization		
TASS	 	 	 Tadamun	Social	Society		
TFPM		 	 	 Task	Force	for	Population	Movement	
TIP	 	 	 Trafficking	in	Persons		
UAE	 	 	 United	Arab	Emirates	
UMC	 	 	 Unaccompanied	migrant	child		
UNDP	 	 	 United	Nations	Development	Programme	
UNFD		 	 	 l’Union	Nationale	de	Femmes	Djiboutiennes	
UNHCR	 	 The	Office	of	the	United	Nations	High	Commissioner	for	Refugees		
UNICEF	 	 United	Nations	Children’s	Fund	
UNOCHA	 	 United	Nations	Office	for	the	Coordination	of	Humanitarian	Affairs	
UNODC		 	 United	Nations	Office	on	Drugs	and	Crime	
UNOPS	 	 United	Nations	Office	for	Project	Services	
WAWA	 	 We	Are	Women	Activists	
WFP	 	 	 World	Food	Programme		
WHO	 	 	 World	Health	Organisation	
	
